By Elizabeth Jean H. Kim, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research The demographics of North Korean escapees reveals a notable gender gap between men and women.[1] Previous studies have already addressed how gender roles have influenced individuals’ decision to escape North Korea since the great famine in the late 1990s. However, the question of “What causes North Korean women to escape in much larger numbers than men?” requires further explanation. This article examines the gendered defection of North Koreans. Given my first-hand experiences as a North Korean refugee and hope to be a scholar of North Korean human rights issues, I am focusing on this research on how the gendered defection of North Koreans is related to structural factors and economic developments, including the rise of market activity during and after the famine of the 1990s. I also emphasize the pull factor of the gender imbalance in China, which led to the large-scale trafficking of North Korean women. Lastly, I argue that escapes from North Korea in recent years have been primarily influenced by family ties and social networks, sometimes involving escapees who have already resettled in South Korea. Structural Factors North Korea’s socialist system structurally segregates gender. Men are required to serve in the military for ten years, starting at the age of 17. During high school, all of my male classmates registered and took regular physical examinations under the local military mobilization department. After graduating, the majority entered military service. Only a few of my male classmates were waived from the military requirements, including those with physical disabilities, those who enrolled in college after being identified for their academic talent, and those with “unfavorable” family backgrounds due to guilt-by-association. On the other hand, only three of my female classmates—those over 5.2 feet (158 cm) tall—were qualified to serve in the military for eight years. Although I was also qualified for military service, I enrolled in college instead. Due to chronic malnutrition and forced labor from a very young age, the average height of North Korean women is smaller than South Korean women. According to a 2016 study, the difference is 3.3cm (162.3 cm vs. 159cm).[2] While North Korean men are tightly controlled under the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in the public sphere, North Korean women mostly remain in the domestic sphere. If girls do not qualify for military recruitment or college enrollment, they automatically became members of the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League in workplaces and institutions, including textile factories and farms. Once these women get married, they are transferred from the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League to the Women’s Union, an official organization that is used for mobilizing North Korean women. Women remain members of the Women’s Union for life. Past Defections and the Impact of Marketization After the collapse of the socialist system and Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, the public distribution system no longer provided enough goods or necessities for North Koreans.[3] The Kim Jong-il regime proclaimed the “Military First” ideology to reinforce national security. The regime continually recruited North Korean men into the military. Meanwhile, the KWP and the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League strictly controlled men who were disqualified from military service by making them work at industrialized facilities with almost no pay. At the time, my father’s official monthly salary was very low. We could barely buy 2 lb of pork, despite his relatively high position in a government-assigned job. My mom did not even calculate his salary in our family finances. Instead, we considered it as “free money.” One escapee I talked to told me that he had been a dam repairman in Ryanggang Province. He received 1,400 North Korean won per month for his work. “There was nothing I could do with this money, maybe I could buy 0.2 kilograms of rice,” he recalled. This reveals a glimpse of just how low official salaries were at the time. They were not enough for male North Korean workers to provide for their family’s basic needs. Instead, women sustained their families through economic activity at local markets, smuggling, developing private farms, and cultivating herbs. This economic activity had a direct influence on migration patterns. Female escapees who lived near the Chinese border (North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces) were more likely to escape due to the emergence of new economic activity. North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces are the focal points of illegal trade with China. According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, almost 80% of the 24,389 female North Korean escapees who have resettled in South Korea are from these two provinces.[4] During my nearly two-year confinement in a refugee camp during my journey to the United States, I met many female escapees from North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces. I was familiar with their northern accent, and I quickly noticed details about their background. Some were from the same town near the border with China, and some even went to the same school before leaving North Korea. Most of them left their hometown to seek economic opportunities or to pursue their personal aspirations for a better life, but they became victims of human trafficking in China. I also met female North Korean escapees from Pyongan Province. One of these women, P, had been born and raised in Pyongyang. After the public distribution system collapsed, however, she went to her aunt’s house in Musan County in North Hamgyong Province to make a living through smuggling. However, a woman in her aunt’s neighborhood approached her to suggest going to China to make money, luring her into sex trafficking and forced marriage with a Chinese man. During and immediately after the famine of the 1990s, fraud and lack of awareness also contributed to gendered defection. Living in a confined, overcrowded room in dire conditions with insufficient food at the refugee camp, I built rapport with many female North Korean refugees. I observed that the majority of North Korean women, especially those who escaped in the late 1990s and early 2000s, were tricked by their neighbors, friends, and sometimes even relatives into going to China, where they became victims of human trafficking. This has also been documented by researchers. For example, one North Korean escapee went to China with her friend and her friend’s father to try and find her two sisters, who had already escaped to China and had been forced to marry Chinese men. However, after crossing the Tumen River, her friend’s father sold her to a Chinese man instead.[5] After the famine, China became North Korea’s most significant trade partner. Chinese companies collected natural resources from North Korea, like wood, medicinal herbs, and mineral resources. Those who live near the border with China rely on exchanging natural resources and other trade to make a living. One such North Korean escapee, C, went to collect blueberries near Baekdu Mountain with her friends, but ended up reaching a Chinese village by accident. “I did not know how to go back home,” she told me. Lacking information or reliable social networks, North Korean women who arrive in China often become victims of trafficking. According to one estimate, approximately 70% to 80% of North Korean women who cross into China fall victim to human trafficking.[6] Pull Factors Gendered North Korean defection is directly reflected in pull factors on the Chinese side. The gender imbalance resulting from decades of enforcing the “one-child policy,” combined with traditional gender norms, created a “demand” for North Korean women, who are sold into marriage and kept in captivity. In contrast, the pull factor of North Korean men to China is relatively low. North Korean men find work on hidden farms or in the lumber industry in northern China through an underground labor market. They are severely exploited by their Korean-Chinese employers. Mr. C, who joined our group of escapees in Shenyang after being released from a long-term prison labor facility in North Korea, said that he crossed the border into China to earn money to support his family. Once he arrived in China, he connected with his friend, who was already working in a lumber facility in Changchun. The living and working conditions there were horrific. Even worse, his employer was unwilling to pay the North Korean workers and reported them to the police. The workers were subsequently repatriated to North Korea. Another male escapee pointed out to me that “we knew that we would not be welcome in China even if we escaped there, and there is nothing we can really do.” Contemporary Trends In recent years, escapes from North Korea are more likely to be related to social networks and human capital. Even after Kim Jong-un further tightened border security upon coming to power, there was still a gender imbalance among escapees who arrived in South Korea. The number of North Korean women who escaped to South Korea after living in China is relatively higher than those who directly crossed the border from North Korea. NGOs and South Korean missionaries play an important role here. I was rescued by a South Korean missionary organization while I was in China. With their help and protection, I successfully reached out to a third country where I could claim my status as a refugee. In my group, six out of eight had been rescued by the same organization from China, and only two had recently left North Korea with help from family members who had already resettled in South Korea. I learned in the refugee camp that there were large numbers of female North Korean escapees who had been rescued by NGOs and mission organizations, many of them from China. Nevertheless, the gender gap among escapees has shrunk since 2021 due to the regime’s COVID-19 restrictions. The small number of escapees who arrived during the pandemic could do so thanks to the help of family members and other social networks, making it easier to navigate their journey to South Korea. It is likely that these recent escapees had been trapped in China for a while, and could sustain themselves with the support of family members who were already living in South Korea. By contrast, it is now difficult for North Korean women in China to escape unless they have family members or relatives who can help. Due to advanced surveillance technology and restrictions on movement, there are greater risks in rescuing North Korean women from China. Moreover, the cost is much higher than before. In the case of K, a female escapee who arrived in South Korea in 2020, both of her parents had already been living in South Korea for a decade. With her parents’ support, K was successfully rescued from North Korea and arrived in South Korea in the middle of the pandemic. Concluding Remarks The decision to escape from North Korea must be examined from multiple perspectives, including structural factors, economic changes, the power of women’s economic contribution, regional mobility, and the pull factor resulting from the gender imbalance in China. During and shortly after the famine of the 1990s, gendered defection directly reflected institutionalized gender separation within North Korea. Economic devastation pushed North Korean women, mostly from North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces, to go to China to seek economic opportunities or to achieve their personal aspirations. However, upon arriving in China, North Korean women were often lured into sex trafficking networks through fraud and deception. Moreover, the gendered defection of North Koreans must be understood with reference to the gender imbalance in China. It is in this context that many North Korean women were sold to poor rural Chinese men. In recent years, escapes from North Korea have been more closely related to family ties and social networks. The latter includes NGOs and religious organizations. Overall, the number of escapees has drastically dropped over the past couple of years. To rescue North Korean women in China who have fallen victim to trafficking, more NGOs and international humanitarian organizations must pay attention to these issues as serious violations of human rights. The international community must pressure China to take responsibility for and assist trafficked North Korean women. China can take tangible steps, such as providing them with a legal basis for staying in China and facilitating humanitarian protection. For North Koreans who newly escape to China, the Chinese government should create a new category of asylum seekers and allow a temporary immigration status instead forcibly repatriating them. Elizabeth Jean H. Kim (pseudonym) is a North Korean refugee student who studied Sociology and International Relations at the University of Southern California. [1] Ministry of Unification, “Number of North Korean Defectors Entering South Korea,” accessed August 8, 2023. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/. [2] Cho Eun-ah, “韓여성 키 162㎝… 100년새 20㎝ ‘폭풍 성장’ 세계 1위” [South Korean Women are 162cm on Average – 20cm Growth over the Past 100 Years], Dong-A Ilbo, July 27, 2016. https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20160727/79419892/1. [3] Fyodor Tertitskiy, “Let them eat rice: North Korea’s public distribution system,” NK News, October 29, 2015. https://www.nknews.org/2015/10/let-them-eat-rice-north-koreas-public-distribution-system/. [4] Ministry of Unification, “Policy on North Korean Defectors,” accessed August 8, 2023. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/. [5] Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2009), 33. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf. [6] Ahn So-young, “국제법률단체 ‘탈북 여성들 중국 동북3성에서 성착취…국제사회 대응 시급’” [The Sexual Exploitation of North Korean Women in Northeastern China Requires Urgent International Attention, says NGO], VOA Korea, March 27, 2023. https://www.voakorea.com/a/7024247.html.
0 Comments
By Daniel McDowall, former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research July 11, 2023 Understanding what ordinary life—or what may be considered ordinary—in North Korea is a challenge. A major difficulty in investigating “normality” is identifying the groups that can be considered ordinary. One North Korean escapee explains that 10% of the population can be considered upper-class, a further 10% middle-class, and the remaining 80% poor.[1] However, there are groups outside of this 80% that may also be considered relatively “ordinary.” This includes those who do not live the luxurious lifestyle of the top elites, but do not experience the serious poverty that is common in the rural areas of the country’s northern provinces. This article aims to explain what “ordinary life” is like in North Korea. It also seeks to identify the features of North Korean life that are arguably unique to the country—features that are so routine they make up a significant part of day-to-day life. Lastly, it also discusses how North Koreans navigate areas of ordinary life, such as family, relationships, and leisure. Poverty and Famine as Ordinary Life North Korea has long faced severe food shortages. In December 2021, the World Food Programme estimated that around 40% of the population was undernourished and 18% of children suffered from impaired growth and development due to chronic malnutrition.[2] Noland, Robinson, and Wang blame North Korea’s food difficulties on the “overcentralization of decision making and an emphasis on large state farms.”[3] Additionally, the prioritization of Pyongyang’s food supplies has implications for rural provinces. For example, in August 2011, Russia sent North Korea 50,000 tons of food aid, 80% of which went to Pyongyang.[4] Mismanagement, as well as badly conceived priorities, led to disaster in North Korea in the 1990s. The consequence for North Koreans was staggeringly harsh. In 1998, surveys revealed that 15.6% of children aged 6-84 months had acute malnutrition.[5] Additionally, although the regime’s estimate of the death toll during the “Arduous March” of the 1990s was 220,000, external estimates put it as high as 2.5 million.[6] Jae-Young Yoon discusses the role of everyday language in referring to this famine. He explains how “if someone died of hunger you couldn’t say that they were so hungry they died. You would say they were in so much pain they died,” and that all manner of references to “hunger” should be replaced by “pain.”[7] This is indicative of not only the harsh experiences of North Koreans during the famine, but also the regime’s attempts to prevent people from directly discussing the food situation. Some individuals were not exposed to the worst consequences of the famine. Young-mi Park discusses how she “never tried the so-called maize” that most North Koreans ate.[8] As the head (inminbanjang) of a neighborhood watch unit (inminban), Park had a more privileged position and better access to food. This differential provision of food is intended to foster loyalty and compliance. The regime leverages food to stabilize itself at the expense of ordinary North Koreans. Political loyalty leads to greater food privileges, and ultimately a greater chance of survival. The report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korean human rights discusses how the regime prioritized food toward people it saw as most useful for its own survival, at the expense of those that it perceived as expendable. For example, an agent in the KPA Escort Command--responsible for guarding Kim Jong-un and his family--recalled how people within this organization received good rations, even during periods of famine.[9] Since the famine, food shortages have continued to be prevalent in North Korea. The food situation has worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which the regime has used as an excuse to tighten border controls and increase repression. After the regime shut its borders in response to the pandemic, China’s food exports to North Korea fell by 80%.[10] The weather also compounded difficulties in producing enough food, with typhoons destroying 100,000 acres of cropland in 2021, and 2022 being far too dry with months like April and May receiving only 70% of the average expected rainfall.[11] The current food crisis is reportedly the worst the country has experienced since the ”Arduous March” of the 1990s. Testimonies from a recent BBC report include harrowing images of people starving--even in Pyongyang--and that beggars can often be found dead on the street.[12] Because of the widespread food shortages experienced by a large proportion of North Koreans, hunger, poverty, and significant food shortages can be considered features of “ordinary” life in North Korea. The regime deliberately uses food as a means of control and compliance. Work, Self-Criticism, and Policing: "Ordinary" Features Exclusive to North Korea There are several characteristics of life in North Korea that can be considered ordinary to its residents. They may be extraordinary to people from other countries, but these features are embedded in everyday life in North Korea. This includes work assignments, self-criticism sessions, policing methods, and strict controls on information. Work assignments and the way in which they are distributed are critical aspects of everyday life. North Koreans work long, arduous days. For the most part, men join the military for ten years or so after secondary school, while most women are assigned to clerical or blue-collar work.[13] Women who do not gain employment are expected to join the Korea Democratic Women’s Union. Work assignments are almost always arbitrary. They are not just strenuous, but often dangerous. Kyung-hee Kim recalls how “no matter how capable we might have been, we had to work the mine. It was a wretched life. Even with no modern facilities or equipment useful for health and safety, we were told to work […] when they set dynamite they don’t wait until the risk is clear. One day dozens of people died that way in a rockslide.”[14] Many North Koreans work in dangerous conditions. There is virtually no chance of social mobility because of the centrality of one’s songbun (socio-political classification). Those with a higher songbun may have alternatives. Jung-go Park explains that “the Party in North Korea is the best organization to work for.”[15] Outside the workplace, North Koreans are expected to attend regular self-criticism sessions in which citizens are expected to “evaluate how well they had complied with directions from the party and state.”[16] Not only do North Koreans evaluate their own performance, but also those of their fellow citizens. This practice begins at a young age. For the most part, the offense that North Koreans admit to is a small one, such as “not trying hard enough when carrying out their communal neighborhood duties.”[17] Personnel from the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) of the Korean Workers’ Party record these confessions and prepare reports that are sent up the chain of command. For wrongdoings, individuals may be given a “warning, severe warning, or even Party disqualification. They could be punished with labour with no pay for a month or several months. They may even receive revolutionary re-education.”[18] These regular self-criticism sessions likely have psychological impacts on the population, in a way that strengthens the regime’s control over the population. Similarly, the internal security agencies are a major element of everyday life. According to a 2012 study, the Ministry of State Security (previously known as the State Security Department or SSD) and the Ministry of Social Security (previously known as the Ministry of People’s Security or MPS) employ a total of 260,000 people in a country of 25 million.[19] The Ministry of State Security searches out those accused of disloyalty and other anti-state crimes and runs North Korea’s political prison camps (kwanliso), while the Ministry of Social Security acts as a national police force and operates the long-term prison labor facilities (kyohwaso).[20] Contact with these security services is a part of daily life, and North Koreans have to cooperate with “on-the-spot street inspections where security officials search for anything suspicious.”[21] These searches can be intrusive. One escapee notes how officials would search phones to look for South Korean colloquialisms in text messages as evidence of using foreign media.[22] Furthermore, security services often conduct unannounced raids and searches of people’s homes. These searches do not require warrants and can happen at any time. Officials sometimes cut the electricity supply to a city block and then conduct raids, as the lack of electricity means that VHS tapes would be stuck inside the player.[23] Naturally, as technology has progressed, catching “offenders” is no longer this simple. This is all part of the regime’s efforts to strictly control access to information. Hassig and Oh note that “during the Cold War, citizens of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had more information available to them about life outside their country than North Koreans do today.”[24] Limited knowledge of the outside world solidifies the regime’s hold on power. As technology has developed, it has become easier for North Koreans to access outside information, especially if they have relatives or friends outside of the country. Jung-ok Choi explains how “since we heard from our relatives in China a lot, we knew how China was and how South Korea was all from stories.”[25] Family, Schooling, and Alcohol: "Ordinary" Features of North Korean Life While North Korea is a totalitarian dictatorship, there are aspects of life that are recognizable elsewhere. This may manifest itself in the shape of family life, going to school, and even how regular people find entertainment despite the difficult circumstances they are in. Naturally, these tasks can be much more difficult in North Korea due to a lack of investment by the regime in basic infrastructure. For example, washing and maintaining hygiene are not always straightforward. People wash themselves at home using a tank of hot water or visit a public bathhouse.[26] Most North Koreans opt for the public bathhouse, though typically wash once every two weeks. These bathhouses are generally large rooms with a pool of heated water, with people using small buckets to rinse themselves. Clothes are mostly washed by hand using soap, rather than detergent.[27] Attending school in North Korea is also unusual, especially terms of the curriculum and activities. According to Hassig and Oh, the school year begins in April, and the first half hour of school is devoted to political messages.[28] Classes begin at 8am. Students are taught to be “good communists and loyal supporters of the regime” and are instructed in “academic skills necessary to make North Korea a kangsong taeguk [strong and prosperous country].”[29] Interestingly, some students are “exposed to capitalist ideas to prepare them to do business with foreigners,” despite the regime’s hostility toward such ideas.[30] Students engage in community services after school, and they attend self-criticism sessions once or twice a week. These children are also a part of official organizations, such as the Korea Children’s Union for children aged 9 to 13.[31] Family life can be a challenge in North Korea. Before 1988, upon having a baby, mothers were given 10kg of rice and other benefits to help feed the baby, such as powders and formulas.[32] This has now been phased out, making it harder for mothers to feed their young children. Additionally, John Everard, the former British Ambassador to North Korea, describes how “all the homes described to me seemed to be very crowded. Several of my friends talked about the intricacies of getting out in the morning – carefully sequenced breakfasts and use of space to dress to ensure that nobody was late for work or for school.”[33] Multiple families sometimes share the same unit. The difficulties of starting a family because of restrictions on space and state help are likely compounded by extremely conservative social attitudes. Ji-min Kang speaks of the North Korean education system’s failure to teach sex education, and how sex is the “forbidden fruit that can destroy one’s wealth and power.”[34] The absence of sex education and lack of information about contraceptives means that there are great social difficulties when unexpected pregnancies happen outside of marriage. Sex before marriage is frowned upon, especially so in rural provinces, where even holding hands in public is not deemed socially acceptable.[35] Nonetheless, North Koreans are much more liberal when it comes to alcohol and leisure. Even children have been known to partake in beer drinking, according to North Korean escapees like Je-son Lee.[36] Tudor explains how “Eumjugamu--drinking, singing, and dancing--are part of Korea’s heritage, and have been for centuries. So when North Koreans drink, music will never be far away.”[37] For young North Koreans, this may come in the shape of using abandoned buildings and dancing to South Korean music, an activity that is strictly forbidden by the regime.[38] Purchasing alcohol is relatively simple. Lee explains that one can obtain alcohol by going to the factory and paying in cash, or by going to a local market where you can find domestic, imported, and home-brewed alcohol. While this is illegal, Lee explains that “the authorities cannot control it.”[39] Criminal Activity and Law-Breaking as "Ordinary" Lee’s description of illegally purchasing alcohol is one of several prohibited activities that happen regularly. Law-breaking is extremely common. According to Changyong Choi’s “Everyday Politics” in North Korea, “every interviewee, regardless of occupation, age, and gender, answered that he or she had participated in a legal or illegal market activity and testified that ‘it was impossible to live without the market, and all the necessities were purchased from the market.’”[40] As a result of the failure of the Public Distribution System, North Koreans engage in private market activity to survive. Residents of urban areas trade with China, and some people are able to make money, especially in Pyongyang, by selling imported shoes and famous brands.[41] One North Korean escapee explains that he would pay to take leave from his work and earn up to 300,000 won in a month, a much higher figure than he would otherwise have received.[42] Private enterprise and market activity also extend to food. People may try to plant their own fields, though these are stifled upon discovery by officials.[43] Consumption of foreign media is a similarly prevalent illegal activity that ordinary North Koreans enjoy. Chinese and South Korean dramas are the most popular, and they make up the bulk of the foreign content consumed in North Korea. Williams states that “the lowest-risk material includes movies from countries such as China, India, and Russia. These pose a low threat as their story lines are rarely political and the countries are not judged to be hostile to North Korea […] the riskiest content includes anything that is anti-regime, religious, explores or attacks the Kim family, and all pornography.”[44] The regime has recently intensified measures to restrict and punish the consumption of outside information. In December 2020, the regime passed a law designed to reject “reactionary ideology and culture.” This involved harsher punishments for “offenders” such as fines or even sentences in prison camps for distributing or consuming foreign media.[45] The new anti-reactionary law is particularly notable for its application of the death penalty, unlike other existing laws, demonstrating how the regime’s policy has escalated in response to the influx of foreign media.[46] In May 2022, an individual was accused by authorities of distributing South Korean media and executed. Similarly, in April 2023, a military officer was executed in public in Pyongyang for distributing information about world news.[47] In tandem with these illegal activities is the high prevalence of bribes. Williams notes that “local officials are most likely to accept bribes, especially when the alleged crimes involve relatively common illicit content such as Chinese television dramas,” although things become more complicated if provincial or national level officers get involved and if the content is of a seriously illegal background.[48] Similarly, it is common for illegal private business owners to make connections with people within the military and bribe them to use officially registered vehicles for their business.[49] On the other hand, there is some debate as to whether bribery can be considered ordinary. While it is certainly widespread, the typical cost of bribes raises the question of who can afford to pay them. For example, one North Korean escapee notes that a bribe should be at least $2 to $3, but it would be much better to offer between $10 and $50. This is much higher than the 40-50 U.S. cents that the average worker earns per month. Another North Korean says that “if you’re not rich then it’s really hard for you to even dare to watch” illegal content, as the bribe to avoid punishment would be too high.[50] Life in Pyongyang as a "Lesser Elite" Robert Collins’ Pyongyang Republic offers great insight to life in the capital city. One of the groups he discusses are the "lesser elite" of North Korea.[51] These individuals experience neither the luxury of the top elite nor the poverty that is common in the northern provinces. From this perspective, the lesser elite can be considered “ordinary” in a broader sense. The lesser elite are usually Party members who hold low positions in government, though they may also work at factories or in agriculture.[52] While these positions are poorly renumerated, it is still much more wealth than can be observed in the rural areas of North Korea. Collins highlights that the lesser elite still feel “fortunate” to live in Pyongyang, and residency here is “paramount to their calculus of survival, because of access to some food, healthcare, and higher quality education for their children.”[53] Life can still be difficult for these people, and the difference between the lesser elite and the upper elite is considerable. Despite the relative wealth that the lesser elite experience in Pyongyang, they also face challenges. Access to food can be problematic. As Collins explains, “even in Pyongyang, there is not enough food for every resident,” and they do not have steady running water, electricity, or heating.[54] When Dong-hyun Lee was living in Pyongyang, he found a woman and a child outside the entrance of his home who had died of hunger. After reporting the deaths, he was shocked by how blasé the response from the authorities was. He also had already found out that morning that there had been multiple reports of dead people on the street.[55] Securing food is not always an easy task, even for the relatively wealthy in Pyongyang. Housing is another area where the lesser elite experience some challenges. While their housing is often better than housing in rural areas, it is still by no means particularly good. Housing is in short supply in Pyongyang, and families live in two-room apartments. Those who have just married may wait years before they have their own apartment. The buildings that the lesser elite live in are often poorly constructed and older. Access to higher quality housing is based on one's songbun, as is the case with all aspects of life in North Korea.[56] There are unique features to ordinary life in Pyongyang as a lesser elite. For example, residents are required to take part in political events, such as observing military parades and carrying out chores like street cleaning.[57] This takes place far more frequently than in the provinces. Additionally, political control and surveillance is much stronger in Pyongyang, making it harder for those in the city to engage in illicit market activity or consume foreign media. Interestingly, when purchasing things in Pyongyang, very rarely is the price asked for in the local currency. The upper elite will ask for the price in U.S. dollars, while those at the middle level will request the price in Chinese currency. Only the poor in Pyongyang ask for prices in North Korean won.[58] Concluding Remarks Identifying what is “ordinary” in North Korea is difficult, given the unusual nature of the Kim regime. Nevertheless, there are some themes and experiences that can be understood as “ordinary.” Ordinary life in North Korea is difficult, often characterized by hardship and lack of essentials. Lack of food and adequate housing, as well as extremely high levels of political coercion, constitute the central features of life in North Korea. In these circumstances, there is still space to observe what may be considered “ordinary” parts of life in other countries, including finding time for family and relationships, for example. Activities that are outlawed by the regime, including the consumption of foreign media, are also a part of ordinary life in North Korea. To improve the quality of life for ordinary North Koreas, there must be a more equitable distribution of the country’s resources, especially to the country’s rural areas. The kleptocratic nature of the Kim regime will, however, make this difficult. The international community must seek creative ways to ensure the North Korean people’s fundamental human rights, and to improve the human security situation for the ordinary people of North Korea. Daniel McDowall is a Master of Global Affairs student at the University of Toronto with a concentration in global security issues and international diplomacy. [1] Robert Collins, South Africa’s Apartheid and North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in Crimes Against Humanity (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2021), 74. [2] World Food Programme, DPR Korea Country Brief, December 2021. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000135453/download/?_ga=2.237313792.1492437778.1687791406-1580620096.1687791406. [3] Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang, “Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49, no. 4 (2001): 743. [4] Robert Collins, Pyongyang Republic: North Korea’s Capital of Human Rights Denial (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2016), 66. [5] Rita Bhatia, “Food Shortages and Nutrition in North Korea,” The Lancet 360 (2002): 27. [6] Ibid. [7] Sandra Fahy, Marching Through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 86–87. [8] Ibid., 25. Young-mi Park was 65 years old at the time of the interview. [9] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 7, 2014, 172–73. [10] Jack Goodman and Alistair Coleman, “North Korea: Why Doesn’t it Have Enough Food This Year?,” BBC News, June 23, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/57524614. [11] Ibid.; “North Korea’s Dire Food Shortage May Become More Acute,” The Economist, July 6, 2022. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/07/06/north-koreas-dire-food-shortage-may-become-more-acute. [12] “North Koreans Tell BBC They are Stuck and Waiting to Die,” BBC News, June 15, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SiviOdWDl9o. [13] Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 95. [14] Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 31. [15] Ibid., 32. [16] Changyong Choi, “‘Everyday Politics’ in North Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 3 (2013): 661. [17] Martyn Williams, Digital Trenches: North Korea’s Information Counter-Offensive (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2019), 22. [18] Robert Collins, North Korea’s Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2019), 112. [19] Ken Gause, Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of the North Korean Police State (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012), 17, 27. [20] Ibid, 17–18, 26. [21] Williams, Digital Trenches, 12. [22] Ibid. [23] Ibid. [24] Hassig and Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, 134. [25] Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 62. [26] Andrei Lankov, North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea (London: McFarland and Company, 2007), 97. [27] Ibid., 98. [28] Hassig and Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, 257. [29] Ibid., 154. [30] Ibid., 156. [31] Ibid., 98. [32] Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 22. [33] John Everard, Only Beautiful, Please: A British Diplomat in North Korea (Stanford: The Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Centre, 2012), 4–5. [34] Daniel Tudor, Ask a North Korean: Defectors Talk About Their Lives Inside the World’s Most Secretive Nation (Tokyo: Tuttle, 2017), 205. [35] Ibid., 201–3. [36] Ibid., 220. [37] Ibid., 218. [38] Ibid. [39] Ibid., 219. [40] Choi, “‘Everyday Politics’ in North Korea,” 659. [41] Ibid. [42] Ibid., 665. [43] Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 46. [44] Williams, Digital Trenches, 8. [45] Josh Smith, “North Korea Cracks Down on Foreign Media, Speaking Styles,” Reuters, January 19, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-media/north-korea-cracks-down-on-foreign-media-speaking-styles-idUSKBN29P0C4. [46] Sang Yong Lee, “North Korea’s War Against Outside Information and Culture,” 38 North, May 25, 2023. https://www.38north.org/2023/05/north-koreas-war-against-outside-information-and-culture/. [47] Ibid. [48] Williams, Digital Trenches, 6. [49] Choi, “‘Everyday Politics’ in North Korea,” 659. [50] Williams, Digital Trenches, 7. [51] Collins, Pyongyang Republic, 33. [52] Ibid. [53] Ibid., 37. [54] Ibid., 37, 43. [55] Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 109. [56] Collins, Pyongyang Republic, 59–60; Hassig and Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, 128. [57] Collins, Pyongyang Republic, 74. [58] Ibid., 72. By Maria Del Carmen Corte (HRNK Satellite Imagery Analysis Associate), Ava Jane Moorlach (HRNK Research Intern), and Kathy Yu (HRNK Research Intern)
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research June 8, 2023 Following the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the 73rd anniversary of the Soviet-North Korea arms agreement on March 17, it has become crucial to consider North Korea’s role in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The categorical denial of any weapons accords between Russia and North Korea is both concerning and significant in the context of the ongoing conflict. In January 2023, media outlets highlighted the remarkable denial of North Korea arming Russia, the first denial of the Russo-North Korean arms trade issued in the months following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[1] What does the Kim regime stand to gain from its relationship with Russia, and what repercussions may result from the continued growth of this relationship? This article examines prospects for Russo-North Korean relations, particularly in light of Moscow’s recent decision to suspend the New START treaty.[2] North Korea has a long history of arms dealings. It has been denounced for exporting weapons to various countries in violation of international sanctions. North Korea was a major supplier of weapons to the Middle East throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and it armed communist regimes in Africa and Asia throughout the Cold War.[3] After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, North Korea’s economy became increasingly dependent on arms dealership, narcotics trafficking, and cyber operations. According to Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., professor of political science at Angelo State University, “for decades, North Korea has proliferated weapons, including conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and chemical agents, to states such as Iran and Syria.”[4] Notably, Pyongyang has continued to pursue arms deals in Africa in recent years.[5] The international community responded to North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 with UN Security Council Resolution 1718. This resolution imposed harsher sanctions, implemented an arms embargo, and intensified scrutiny of Pyongyang’s weapons program.[6] Despite sanctions and diplomatic pressure, North Korea has continued to develop and export weapons, including ballistic missiles and conventional weapons such as tanks and artillery. In April 2008, the United States also released evidence to suggest that North Korea had assisted Syria in the construction of a covert nuclear reactor.[7] Allegations of arms trafficking by North Korea have continued to surface in recent years, causing serious concern among the international community. North Korea’s Arms Trade with Russia North Korea’s arms trade has evolved throughout the course of its short history. Its origins can be traced to Soviet state-building north of the 38th parallel after World War II. The USSR commenced its relationship with North Korea in its efforts to consolidate a communist hegemony. Moscow saw Pyongyang as an important ideological and natural resource-rich ally. Between the end of Japanese occupation in 1945 and before the Korean War in 1950, North Korea was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. Moscow provided monetary and military resources to the burgeoning state as a means of control. The Soviets used the lack of stability in the region to their advantage by directly influencing the origins of the North Korean state and its military. The first disclosed trade of USSR-manufactured weaponry in exchange for North Korean raw materials was in 1949.[8] This began to formalize Russo-Korean arms sales. The sale of weaponry intensified during the Korean War. Armed with Soviet weaponry, North Korea invaded the South. The military structure of North Korea was modeled directly off of the Soviet military, at the behest of the USSR. The Soviet contribution of arms was crucial to the war effort. The contribution of MiG-15 warplanes kept the critical USSR access point open on North Korea’s northern border.[9] The border between the two nations is less than 20 miles long. However, it was a major route for Moscow to supply arms, money, and resources to the war effort. The Soviet Union’s relationship with North Korea evolved over changes of leadership in both countries. Historical records indicate that the relationship was distrustful and complex rather than harmonious.[10] Bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea became tense during this period, primarily due to ideological differences and strategic disagreements. North Korea criticized the Soviet Union for what they perceived as a “capitulation” during the Cuban Missile Crisis.[11] Additionally, Kim Il-sung’s opposition to Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization efforts further distanced North Korea from Moscow. While bilateral relations experienced significant tensions as a result, they did not reach a point of complete severance.[12] The bilateral relationship deteriorated rapidly with the fall of the USSR. Pyongyang had relied heavily on agricultural and energy resources from Moscow. The Soviet Union’s fall in the early 1990s precipitated the breakdown of North Korea’s public distribution system. This directly contributed to the Arduous March, which South Korea’s Unification Ministry estimates resulted in the loss of between 506,000 and 1,125,000 lives.[13] North Korea became increasingly isolated and withdrew from the global stage. The post-Soviet government in Moscow, driven by limited resources and strategic considerations, displayed a greater emphasis on developing investment and commercial relations with South Korea rather than maintaining close diplomatic ties with the isolated nation.[14] Moscow established diplomatic relations with Seoul in September 1990. While maintaining a presence in North Korea held importance, both for political leverage in the relationship with South Korea and other considerations, Russia shifted its focus towards fostering economic partnerships and investment opportunities with South Korea. There was continuous communication between Russia and North Korea, with Russia maintaining a large diplomatic mission in Pyongyang. Kim Jong-un has attempted to improve and upgrade relations with Russia following his father’s death in 2011. For several years, his relationship with Vladimir Putin was largely uneventful. However, in recent years, North Korea has been a vocal supporter of Russia’s war in Ukraine. It was one of five countries to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. North Korea also voted against the UN General Assembly resolution that called on Russia to withdraw its military forces from Ukraine.[15] This vocal support sits in direct opposition to Pyongyang’s ardent denial of its arms trade with Russia. The Vice Director of Military Foreign Affairs at North Korea’s Ministry of National Defense vocally admonished allegations of arms trading as attempts by hostile countries to tarnish North Korea’s reputation and invoke UN Security Council resolutions.[16] To date, North Korea has systematically denied all allegations of arms exports to Russian forces in Ukraine. North Korea’s Evolving Weapons Trade Amidst the Russia-Ukraine War After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, North Korea capitalized on the growing rift between the United States and Russia by deepening its alliance with Moscow, intensifying nuclear-weapons rhetoric, and leveraging the Sino-Russian partnership to its advantage. It is unsurprising that North Korea has remained in a position of relative strength since the outset of the conflict, leaving the United States with few viable options for advancing nuclear negotiations.[17] North Korea has made significant strides in its weapons program, conducting tests of its newly developed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system on March 10,[18] followed by the launch of its first suspected ICBM since 2017 on March 24.[19] At the same time, North Korea passed a new law that refurbished and clarified its nuclear precepts and regulations on nuclear weapons. With the passage of the law, Kim Jong-un stated that the country’s status as a nuclear weapons state “has now become irreversible” and that there would “never be any declaration of giving up our nukes or denuclearization” in future negotiations.[20] As Ukrainian forces targeted bridges leading to the occupied city of Kherson to disrupt Russian supply routes, and in the midst of attacks surrounding the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Kim Jong-un sent a congratulatory message to Vladimir Putin on the 77th anniversary of Korea’s liberation in August 2022. Kim expressed warm greetings and reaffirmed the strong strategic and tactical cooperation, support, and solidarity between the two countries.[21] Since September 2022, declassified American intelligence has indicated that Russia has purchased rockets and artillery shells from North Korea on a large scale. The weapons supplied to Russia, however, appear to be rudimentary and unsophisticated.[22] An order was issued in October 2022 to North Korean shell-producing factories to produce more conventional artillery shells, including grenades, rockets, and anti-aircraft shells.[23] Two leading shell factories, the Kanggye General Tractor plant, and the Chanjagang Machine Tools Factory in Manpo, were among the factories that received the order.[24] This was notable for three reasons. Firstly, the timing of the order was unusual and unexpected. In the final quarter of the fiscal year, from October to December, factories typically prepare for end-of-year reviews and are focused on meeting annual quotas rather than beginning new production projects.[25] Secondly, the order demanded finished products, rather than the intermediate goods the factory typically produces.[26] Thirdly, the products were not moisture-proofed, a typical practice to ensure the longevity of munitions in storage.[27] Taken together, this indicates that North Korea produced weapons intended for immediate use. In November 2022, satellite imagery showed a train crossing the Tumangang Friendship Bridge (Korea-Russia Friendship Bridge) for the first time since it was closed in February 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This passage across the only land connection between North Korea and Russia drew the attention of the White House and 38 North. That month, the White House made a statement claiming that North Korea attempted to conceal its activities by funneling weapons through the Middle East and North Africa.[28] North Korea’s Ministry of Defense has repeatedly denied exporting weapons to Russia. The basic agreement between North Korea and Russia also prohibits the participation of North Koreans in the war, and North Korea also appears to have delayed sending workers to Ukraine to participate in reconstruction projects. This suggests that North Korea may be concerned with the perception of sending mercenaries to directly aid Russian troops in Ukraine.[29] Three insights can be drawn from these observations. First, economic sanctions on Russia have successfully choked its ability to produce and access weapons, forcing it to turn to allies such as Iran and North Korea.[30] Second, this situation provides some insight into North Korea’s dire economic situation following the COVID-19 pandemic. The economic situation in North Korea, particularly in regard to the impact of sanctions, is a complex issue that Joshua Stanton explores in depth in HRNK’s latest report, The Root of All Evil.[31] Third, it suggests a strengthening of Russo-North Korean relations and a potential avenue for continued future partnership. Concluding Remarks Despite the recent denial of any weapons deal between the two countries, North Korea-Russia relations are highly likely to endure. However, the strength of this relationship depends on the result of the conflict in Ukraine. North Korea’s arms trade with Russia has been a significant aspect of the bilateral relationship, which has persisted despite international sanctions and diplomatic pressure. While the historical record shows a sometimes volatile, distrustful and complex relationship between the two countries, Kim Jong-un has attempted to reestablish closer relations with Russia, particularly by supporting Russia's war in Ukraine. In light of Russia's recent decision to suspend the New START treaty, it is imperative to assess prospects for the alliance between North Korea and Russia, especially on the heels of the commemoration of the 1949 Soviet-North Korean arms agreement. The 75th anniversary milestone underscores the significance of historical ties between the two nations as well as the urgency of a comprehensive reexamination of the bilateral relationship. Maria Del Carmen Corte is the Satellite Imagery Analysis Associate at HRNK and a recent MALD graduate of Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where she studied International Security and Humanitarian Affairs with an emphasis on the Korean Peninsula. Ava Jane Moorlach is a Research Intern at HRNK and current student at American University studying Interdisciplinary Studies in Communication, Legal Institutions, Economics, and Government. Kathy Yu is a Research Intern at HRNK and a rising senior at Duke University pursuing a Bachelor's Degree in Economics, a minor in History, and earning a certificate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. [1] Timothy W. Martin, “North Korea Says It Isn’t Supplying Russia with Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-says-it-isnt-supplying-russia-with-weapons-11663820755. [2] Amy Mackinnon, “Putin’s New START Announcement and the Future of Arms Control,” Foreign Policy, February 23, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/21/putin-new-start-announcement-arms-control-nuclear-weapons-united-states-war/. [3] Paul Iddon, “North Korea’s Enigmatic Role in the Middle East Arms Market,” Middle East Eye, January 20, 2023. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/north-korea-enigmatic-role-middle-east-arms-market; Samuel Ramani, “North Korea’s Enduring Economic and Security Presence in Africa,” 38 North, June 24, 2021. https://www.38north.org/2021/06/north-koreas-enduring-economic-and-security-presence-in-africa/. [4] Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “North Korea’s Illegal Weapons Trade: The Proliferation Threat From Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, June 6, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-06-06/north-koreas-illegal-weapons-trade. [5] Salem Solomon, “Sanctioned and Shunned, North Korea Finds Arms Deals in Africa,” VOA News, March 22, 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/sanctioned-and-shunned-north-korea-finds-arms-deals-in-africa/3777262.html. [6] UN Security Council, “Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006),” accessed May 24, 2023. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718; Kelsey Davenport, “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,” Arms Control Association, last updated January 2022. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea; Natalia Slavney, “North Korea’s Trading of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Open-Source Information Analysis of Sanctions Implementation,” 38 North, September 1, 2022. https://www.38north.org/2022/09/north-koreas-trading-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-open-source-information-analysis-of-sanctions-implementation/. Resolution 1874 expanded the arms embargo after the second nuclear test in 2009. [7] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Background Briefing with Senior U.S. officials on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea’s Involvement,” April 24, 2008. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20080424_interview.pdf. [8] “March 17, 1949: Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the DPRK Regarding Extending a Loan by the Soviet Union to the Government of the DPRK to Pay for Equipment and Materials as Well as the Military Property Supplied to Korea,” Wilson Center Digital Archive. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/agreement-between-government-ussr-and-government-dprk-regarding-extending-loan-soviet. [9] Mark O’Neill, “Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View from the Soviet-Era Archives,” OAH Magazine of History 14, no. 3 (2000): 20–24. [10] Joseph M. Ha, “Soviet Perceptions of North Korea,” Asian Perspective 6, no. 2 (1982): 105–31. [11] James Person, “The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Origins of North Korea’s Policy of Self-Reliance in National Defense,” Wilson Center, accessed June 8, 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/north-korea-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis. [12] Andrei Lankov, “Soviet-DPRK Relations: Purges, Power, and Dissent in North Korea’s Formative Years,” Sino NK, March 29, 2013. https://sinonk.com/2013/03/29/lankov-on-ussr-dprk-50s-60s/. [13] Suk Lee, “The DPRK Famine of 1994–2000: Existence and Impact,” Studies Series 05-06 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005). https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/827/1/0000605327.pdf; Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2005). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hunger_and_Human_Rights.pdf. [14] Kim Tong-Hyung, “Russian-North Korean relations since the Korean War,” Associated Press, April 24, 2019. https://apnews.com/article/24932ed50a424a12a243cc1434c71b49. [15] Artyom Lukin, “Russia and North Korea: Moving Toward Alliance 2.0?,” 38 North, September 27, 2022. https://www.38north.org/2022/09/russia-and-north-korea-moving-toward-alliance-2-0/. [16] Hyung-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, “N. Korea denies US claims it sent artillery shells to Russia,” Associated Press, November 7, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/europe-united-states-south-korea-moscow-north-e9b82adb07b67f64b83853e6a8108ecc. [17] Mike Chinoy, “Kim Jong Un Is Putin’s and Xi’s New Best Friend,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/12/north-korea-russia-china-partnership-putin-xi-kim/. [18] Betsy Klein and Maegan Vazquez, “US Assesses North Korea Launches Constitute Use of New ICBM System,” CNN, March 10, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/10/politics/north-korea-biden-administration/index.html. [19] Samuel Ramani, “North Korea’s Enduring Economic and Security Presence in Africa,” 38 North, June 24, 2021. https://www.38north.org/2021/06/north-koreas-enduring-economic-and-security-presence-in-africa/. [20] Kelsey Davenport, “North Korea Passes Nuclear Law,” Arms Control Association, October 2022. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-10/news/north-korea-passes-nuclear-law. [21] “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Sends Congratulatory Message to President of Russian Federation,” Korean Central News Agency, August 15, 2022. [22] Julian E. Barnes, “Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to U.S. Intelligence,” The New York Times, September 5, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html. [23] Seulkee Jang, “N. Korea May Be Producing Munitions for Export to Russia,” Daily NK, November 24, 2022. https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-may-producing-munitions-export-russia/. [24] Ibid. [25] Ibid. [26] Ibid. [27] Ibid. [28] “Train crosses North Korea border into Russia after arms report, think tank says,” Reuters, November 5, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/train-crosses-north-korea-border-into-russia-after-arms-report-think-tank-2022-11-04/. [29] Seulkee Jang, “N. Korea orders trading companies in Russia to select personnel to send to Ukraine,” Daily NK, February 2, 2023. https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-orders-trading-companies-russia-select-personnel-send-ukraine/. [30] Michael Georgy, “Iran Agrees to Ship Missiles, More Drones to Russia,” Reuters, October 18, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/exclusive-iran-agrees-ship-missiles-more-drones-russia-defying-west-sources-2022-10-18/. [31] Joshua Stanton, The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/RoAE_Web_0407.pdf. By Joseph Choi, former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research May 23, 2023 In 2016, the International Mathematical Olympiad, the world’s premier high school mathematics championship, was held at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.[1] On the night he was supposed to return to North Korea with the rest of his team, 18-year-old Ri Jong-yol, a teenage math genius from North Korea, defected just after winning silver for the third year in a row.[2] North Korea, one of the most repressive countries in the world, harbors some of the world’s most elite hackers. This may be shocking to some, since North Korea may appear to be lacking in terms of its economy, technology, and education. In fact, the North Korean regime relies on its apparatus of coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment to exploit the best and brightest minds in the country. North Korean hackers have gained an infamous reputation over the last few years, especially with the number of hacking attacks that have specifically targeted cryptocurrency. While most observers only view North Korean hackers as weapons of a totalitarian state, these hackers are also victims of the North Korean regime’s policy of human rights denial. The Selection Process In 1996, Kim Jong-il allegedly told a group of frontline troops that “all wars in the future will be computer wars.”[3] According to defectors and South Korean officials, North Korea cultivates its elite hackers the same way other countries train future Olympic athletes.[4] Math and science are heavily emphasized in elementary schools. Students who show promise in these fields are then given access to computers.[5] Students as young as eleven years old who show promise are then forced through a series of special programming schools, where they are taught hacking skills and how to develop computer viruses.[6] The North Korean regime continues to invest in exceptional students to develop them into cyber soldiers. The top students at these specialized schools are allowed to travel abroad to compete in mathematical contests, just like Ri Jong-yol. In 2015, North Korean teams ranked first, second, and third, out of more than 7,600 teams worldwide in a global competition called CodeChef, which was held by an Indian software company.[7] Three out of the top fifteen coders in CodeChef’s network of roughly 100,000 participants are North Korean.[8] Students also go through intense preparation for annual “hackathon” competitions in Pyongyang. Teams of students are holed up learning how to solve hacking problems under severe time constraints.[9] A North Korean defector familiar with the country’s cyber training said: “For 6 months, day and night, we prepared only for this contest.”[10] After going through specialized schools and competing at multiple competitions, top students then go on to attend some of the best universities in North Korea—including Kim Il Sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology, Moranbong University, and Mirim University—to further develop their hacking skills.[11] Students at Kim Il-sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology often outperform their American and Chinese counterparts in the International Collegiate Programming Contest, which is considered the most competitive collegiate competition for programming and computing. During the 2019 International Collegiate Programming Contest, Kim Chaek University of Technology placed 8th, ahead of Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, and Stanford.[12] The North Korean regime exploits talented students for its own objectives, not for the benefit of the country as a whole. Students are identified and scouted as early as elementary school. Students who show great promise in math and science are forced to undergo years of intense training with no opportunity to pursue their own interests. They are directed to fields that serve the regime’s objectives, such as hacking and weapons development. Additionally, students who are proficient in coding and programming are also trained as IT workers to earn foreign currency for the regime. U.S. officials warned companies from inadvertently hiring IT staff from North Korea because they were taking advantage of remote work opportunities to funnel money into Pyongyang, which then used the funds for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[13] These talented and hard-working students could use their skills to improve the lives of their fellow citizens by focusing on sectors such as technology, infrastructure, and engineering, but they are not given the opportunities to do so. The Kim regime sees the North Korean people as means to an end, not as unique individuals with dreams and aspirations. Soldiers for the Regime According to the testimony of a South Korean intelligence chief, Kim Jong-un reportedly declared that, “Cyberwarfare, along with nuclear weapons and missiles, is an ‘all-purpose sword’ that guarantees our military’s capability to strike relentlessly.”[14] Cyber operations have become central components of North Korea’s asymmetric military strategy, peacetime provocations, and illicit activities.[15] According to South Korea’s 2020 Defense White Paper, North Korea operates a 6,800-strong unit of cyber-warfare specialists and is investing in research and development to enhance its cyber capabilities.[16] This unit, which works under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), is thought to be split up into three groups. The A team, often called “Lazarus,” attacks foreign entities and is associated with North Korea’s most notorious feats, such as the 2014 Sony and WannaCry attacks.[17] The B team traditionally focuses on South Korea and sweeps for military or infrastructure secrets, while the C team does lower-skilled work, such as targeted email attacks.[18] Large-Scale Attacks In the past decade alone, North Korea has perpetrated numerous large-scale cyberattacks around the world. These attacks are not isolated to one sector, but are aimed at governments, private companies, financial institutions, and individuals. In 2014, North Korea launched a massive cyberattack on Sony Pictures for planning to release The Interview, a comedy about the assassination of Kim Jong-un. The attackers, calling themselves the “Guardians of Peace,” stole huge amounts of information from Sony’s network, leaked the information to journalists, and then threatened to commit acts of terrorism against movie theaters.[19] Sony Pictures canceled the release of its film after the attack, but it later reversed its decision and released the film in select theaters and online.[20] American officials concluded that North Korea was “centrally involved” in the hacking of Sony Pictures.[21] Intelligence officials also concluded that the cyberattack was state-sponsored and far more destructive than any other seen on American soil.[22] In February 2016, North Korea launched another state-sponsored cyberattack. This time, it targeted financial institutions across the world. The Lazarus Group attempted to steal at least $1 billion from the Bangladesh Bank and managed to steal $81 million.[23] North Korean hackers compromised the bank’s computer network through spear-phishing emails sent to bank employees. They were then able to access the bank’s computer terminals that interfaced with SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications).[24] In December 2017, the U.S. and UK governments accused North Korea of the WannaCry malware attack that affected hospitals, businesses, and banks across the world.[25] The attack was launched in May 2017 and is said to have hit more than 300,000 computers and caused billions of dollars in damage.[26] Although the North Korean regime has denied involvement in all of these cyberattacks, there is strong evidence to the contrary. These attacks are state-sponsored attacks that cause immense damage and strengthen the RGB for future attacks. These attacks do not benefit the people of North Korea, from the hackers to the citizens in the “hostile class." The Rise in Cryptocurrency Attacks North Korea has also capitalized on the rise of cryptocurrency by stealing hundreds of millions of dollars in the last few years. The lack of oversight and regulations on cryptocurrency has made it a prime target for the North Korean regime. Experts say that North Korea uses stolen digital currencies to fund its nuclear weapons and missile programs.[27] According to a report by the UN Panel of Experts on sanctions against North Korea, North Korea stole more than $300 million worth of virtual assets between 2019 and 2020.[28] In April 2023, Google’s cybersecurity unit, Mandiant, reported that over the past five years, a North Korean hacking group known as Kimsuky hacked cryptocurrency to financially support North Korea’s espionage operations related to its nuclear program.[29] Kimsuky was able to launder the stolen crypto funds through cloud-mining services, disrupting the trail of the funds. The laundered funds were then used to collect information about nuclear weapons by sending spear-phishing emails to policymakers or researchers in South Korea and the United States.[30] In 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice released an indictment against three North Korean hackers, charging them for their alleged roles in a scheme that included attempts to steal and extort more than $1.3 billion of money and cryptocurrency from financial institutions and companies.[31] Assistant Attorney General John C. Demers of the Justice Department’s National Security Division stated, “North Korea’s operatives, using keyboards rather than guns, stealing digital wallets of cryptocurrency instead of sacks of cash, are the world’s leading bank robbers.”[32] Acting U.S. Attorney Tracy L. Wilkerson for the Central Division of California said, “The conduct detailed in the indictment are the acts of a criminal nation-state that has stopped at nothing to extract revenge and obtain money to prop up its regime.”[33] The indictment alleged that Jon Chang-hyok, Kim Il, and Park Jin-hyok were members of the RGB.[34] Concluding Remarks The North Korean regime has exploited some of its youngest and brightest minds for its own benefit, rather than enabling them to pursue their own aspirations. Students as young as eleven years old are forced onto a path that they cannot stray from. They are forced to train for years to hone their cyber capabilities to further the regime’s objectives. Rather than giving these extremely intelligent individuals the freedom to pursue other goals that would further the country’s development, they are forced into a restrictive and dangerous lifestyle. The North Korean regime has benefitted immensely from its hackers, who have successfully launched massive attacks against a wide range of targets. The regime has stolen hundreds of millions of dollars through these attacks to directly fund its military, its nuclear and missile programs, and luxury goods for the core elite. Although these North Korean hackers live a better lifestyle than most, they still live in a repressive, oppressive, and inhumane society. The North Korean regime gives just enough to their hackers so they will not step out of line. If they do, they will be marked as traitors and most likely be thrown into the regime’s network of detention facilities. If life were so good for these hackers, we would not have seen 18-year-old Ri Jong-yol escape from the regime. They have no choice but to become soldiers of the regime. Although they are weapons of the regime, they are also its victims. Joseph Choi is a rising senior at Boston University pursuing a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations, with a regional concentration in Europe and a functional concentration in Foreign Policy and Security Studies. [1] Bruce Harrison, “How North Korea Recruits Its Army of Young Hackers,” NBC News, December 8, 2017. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/how-north-korea-recruits-trains-its-army-hackers-n825521. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Timothy W. Martin, “How North Korea’s Hackers Became Dangerously Good,” The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-north-koreas-hackers-became-dangerously-good-1524150416. [5] Harrison, “How North Korea Recruits Its Army of Young Hackers.” [6] Martin, “How North Korea’s Hackers Become Dangerously Good.” [7] Ibid. [8] Ibid. [9] Ibid. [10] Ibid. [11] Harrison, “How North Korea Recruits Its Army of Young Hackers.” [12] Ed Caesar, “The Incredible Rise of North Korea’s Hacking Army,” The New Yorker, April 19, 2021, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/26/the-incredible-rise-of-north-koreas-hacking-army. [13] “U.S. Warns against Inadvertently Hiring North Korean IT Workers,” Reuters, May 17, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-warns-against-inadvertently-hiring-north-korean-it-workers-2022-05-16/. [14] David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick, and Nicole Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed at North Korean Cyberpower. No More.,” The New York Times, October 15, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html. [15] Mathew Ha and David Maxwell, “Kim Jong Un’s ‘All-Purpose Sword,’” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, October 3, 2018. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/10/03/kim-jong-uns-all-purpose-sword/#easy-footnote-bottom-19-69181. [16] “2020 Defense White Paper,” December 31, 2020, https://mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_202301171100181360.pdf. [17] Martin, “How North Korea’s Hackers Become Dangerously Good.” [18] Ibid. [19] Emily St. James and Timothy B. Lee, “The 2014 Sony Hacks, Explained,” Vox, January 20, 2015. https://www.vox.com/2015/1/20/18089084/sony-hack-north-korea. [20] Ibid. [21] David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony,” The New York Times, December 17, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-sony-hacking.html. [22] Ibid. [23] Jim O’Grady and Kenny Malone, “A SWIFT Getaway : Planet Money,” NPR, February 9, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/02/09/1079528331/a-swift-getaway. [24] Sanger and Perlroth, “U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony.” [25] “Cyber-Attack: US and UK Blame North Korea for WannaCry,” BBC News, December 19, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42407488. [26] Ibid. [27] Christy Lee, “North Korea Turns to Crypto Theft to Fund Weapons Programs,” Voice of America, February 23, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-turns-to-crypto-theft-to-fund-weapons-programs/6455347.html. [28] Ibid. [29] Kim Boram, “N. Korean Hacking Group Kimsuky Funds Pyongyang’s Espionage Operations through Cybercrimes,” Yonhap News, April 4, 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230404005700320?section=nk/nk. [30] Ibid. [31] U.S. Department of Justice, “Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes across the Globe,” February 17, 2021. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and. [32] Ibid. [33] Ibid. [34] Ibid. By Natalie Horton, former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research September 6, 2022 Over the next century, areas all around the globe will feel the effects of climate change as it puts strain on every system. North Korea’s limited capacity and willingness to effectively and comprehensively respond to these changes, including more frequent extreme weather events, will deeply impact the human rights situation within its borders. Impact on Agriculture More frequent extreme weather events and sea level rise will heavily impact the Korean Peninsula in the next thirty years, endangering the food security and infrastructure of North Korea. According to the Council on Strategic Risks, climate change will have noticeable impacts on crop yields by 2030, and inland flooding and sea level rise will similarly affect the country by 2050.[i] North Korea’s breadbasket, the low-lying lands in the country’s western regions, will be particularly at risk for extreme rainfall, more frequent droughts, and flooding due to storm surges. Due to changes in precipitation and temperature, the region that produces nearly 40% of the country’s rice and 30% of its soybeans will experience up to an additional three months of severe drought each year by 2035. Rice yield failures will also occur more often—once every five years instead of once every seven years.[ii] Rice is one of the main staple crops of North Korea. With even less rice than the country can produce currently, the North Korean people will be in dire straits. Food insecurity will increase due to more crop failures resulting from droughts and floods. Misallocation of food resources within the country will become even more serious, and corruption in this regard is likely to worsen. As of 2020, over 59% of North Koreans were food insecure. With worsening agricultural conditions, the country is at heightened risk of experiencing additional famines.[iii] Increase in Flooding Flooding will inundate many important infrastructural and agricultural areas in North Korea, both as a product of storm surges coupled with sea level rise, as well as a general increase in extreme rainfall events. Warmer temperatures and increases in humidity on the Korean Peninsula due to climate change will drive typhoons northward and increase their intensity. Damage from such storms has already been recorded during two successive typhoons in August and September 2020.[iv] The passage of Typhoon Hinnamnor through the Korean Peninsula illustrates, once again, the severe risks that accompany extreme weather events.[v] Massive deforestation on North Korean soil will also contribute to the devastation following these rainfall events, as there will be no roots to hold soil in place and keep it from causing landslides and running into rivers when extreme precipitation occurs.[vi] The flood risk in Pyongyang, stemming from the Taedong River, is predicted to nearly triple by 2050, with 1-in-100 year flood events becoming 1-in-34 year events.[vii] The flood risk is projected to double in the breadbasket region of North Hwanghae Province, with 1-in-100-year flood events becoming 1-in-57-year events.[viii] Flooding will inundate many agriculturally and infrastructurally important locations, increasing food insecurity, infrastructural costs, and displacing citizens from their homes. Prisoners of detention facilities are also likely to be affected, such as when Kyo-hwa-so No. 12 was damaged by typhoon flooding in 2016.[ix] Citizens of lower songbun will likely receive much less government assistance for both preventative measures and rebuilding and relocation efforts, rendering them extremely vulnerable to flood damage. It should also be noted that North Korea lost 1.2 million tons of its grain reserves during the floods of the mid-1990s, as these reserves were held in underground facilities.[x] There seems to be no current information as to if the emergency grain reserves have been moved aboveground, or if the underground stores have been retrofitted to protect against flooding. Even if they have been retrofitted, it is difficult to determine the efficacy of the changes. This could prove to be an issue in future flood events. Moreover, flooding could pose a threat to North Korea’s nuclear facilities, such as the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, located on a river to the north of Pyongyang.[xi] This facility uses the river for its cooling system. Flooding or drought conditions could critically affect reactor operations. During the Fukushima Daiichi Accident of 2011, when water surged from the tsunami and inundated the Fukushima facility, the water pumps for the nuclear cooling system were damaged, in addition to the diesel generator and electrical system. The damage to the cooling system and the electrical blackout greatly contributed to the reactor’s failure.[xii] A similar failure could conceivably occur at Yongbyon due to flooding if these systems are damaged. On the other hand, if the country experiences a major drought, it could lead to insufficient water reaching the cooling system from the river, increasing the risk of accidents. Safety features have apparently been installed against flood damage at Yongbyon, but their efficacy is uncertain.[xiii] A flood affecting this facility could have massive implications for the health of the people in the area and further complicate the international community’s efforts to address North Korea’s nuclear program. After Fukushima, many health consequences from radiation in the community have been observed, such as a high death toll among the elderly, more chronic diseases, and an overall decline in the health of the community.[xiv] This is not to mention the environmental consequences, such as soil and groundwater contamination, which require extensive efforts to reverse and make safe again for habitation.[xv] If such a disaster occurred at Yongbyon, similar human and environmental consequences could occur, affecting the health of countless North Koreans. Sea Level Rise Sea level rise, exacerbated by storm surges and annual flooding, is projected to impact over 550,000 people in North Korea by 2050. The effects of these storm surges can already be felt in many coastal areas on the Korean Peninsula.[xvi] Inundation of key ports and airports will be particularly destructive, as many of these coastal facilities play an important economic role.[xvii] Repairs or relocation would also be very costly. Particularly at risk is the city of Sinuiju, an important economic hub on North Korea’s border with China. According to Climate Central, sea level rise, compounded by storm surges and annual flooding, could overtake Sinuiju by 2050.[xviii] By that year, 800,000 North Koreans will be displaced or significantly affected by coastal flooding, as they live below the elevation of the projected flood levels. By the year 2100, one million North Koreans will be in that position.[xix] In theory, Sinuiju and other threatened regions have several ways of protecting themselves from this outcome, such as building sea walls, elevating roads, or relocating citizens. However, it is unclear whether North Korea has the political will or the capacity to enact such major infrastructural changes. Other Impacts Additional environmental impacts that will likely greatly impact North Korea are the decline of fish communities in its waters, and the effect of droughts on North Korea’s hydropower facilities. Fisheries across the globe are declining due to overfishing, pollution, and temperature change. This is also true in the waters around the Korean Peninsula. Species diversity has been falling, and there are fewer fish overall.[xx] This does not bode well for North Korea, as many citizens rely on fish as a vital part of their diet, particularly due to shortages in land-cultivated food.[xxi] Fish also used to be an important source of income for the regime, until the UN Security Council imposed restrictions on exports in 2017. However, there is evidence that North Korea has circumvented this ban by selling fish through China.[xxii] The decline in fish population will directly affect the North Korean people and further constrain a key source of revenue for the regime. Increased instances of drought could also weaken the country’s hydropower capabilities, resulting in energy shortages. Hydropower accounts for 55% of the country’s energy production. The possibility of that 55% being affected is a grave one, with far-reaching implications for North Korean society, including impacts on hospitals, factories, transportation, and households.[xxiii] Periods of increased rainfall will also occur, which may even the situation out if managed correctly. However, North Korea’s economic interests may affect its policy decisions in this area. North Korea sells millions of dollars’ worth of hydropower energy to China each year.[xxiv] Energy is more profitable to sell during the dry season. Controlled releases of water downstream during drought periods could have similar effects to those along the Mekong River. During wet months, China has often withheld water using dams along the Mekong, and then released it all at once, causing flooding and wiping out downstream crops while seeking profit during dry months.[xxv] North Korea could use a similar strategy to maximize its profits during droughts in the future. During periods of increased rainfall, North Korea is known to release large amounts of water downstream. Although such releases must be announced for safety reasons, North Korea has a history of causing damage downstream because they neglect to alert the South Korean authorities in advance. Without proper early warnings, these releases of water can be fatal.[xxvi] These events could become more likely in the future, especially if North Korea decides to get rid of excess water during periods of increased rainfall. Overall, unsteady rainfall does not bode well for the hydropower industry or those who live downstream of hydropower facilities. These additional stressors will likely impact the regime’s ability to deliver food, shelter, safety, and energy, threatening the lives of millions of North Koreans and weakening the regime’s control over North Korean society. The Regime’s Response to Climate Change Outwardly, Kim Jong-un has committed to fighting climate change and mitigating its effects on North Korea. Pyongyang is party to relevant international agreements, including the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2016 Paris Agreement.[xxvii] North Korea has also pledged to reduce greenhouse gases by 15% by 2030, or even by 50% in the event that it receives international assistance.[xxviii] One major issue, however, is that a large part of North Korea’s revenue depends on the export of coal, which the rest of the world is trying to phase out. Although the UN Security Council banned North Korea’s coal exports in 2017, it is still an important stream of revenue for Pyongyang.[xxix] The international community’s efforts to phase out coal will affect the regime’s finances. The country’s impoverished state is also a large barrier to mitigating climate change-related disasters within its borders. Environmental solutions will require large investments, which the North Korean government will be unable to make without external assistance. This makes the country vulnerable in a host of ways, to both domestic turmoil and international interference, including debt-trapping infrastructural investment by China. Although Kim Jong-un may be aware of the ongoing and future effects of climate change on North Korea, it appears unlikely that his regime will be able to respond effectively, due to not only a lack of funds, but also the rampant corruption and mismanagement characteristic of the North Korean government. Systemic inequality in North Korea pursuant to the songbun system will continue to threaten the lives of millions, particularly in the face of fewer resources and successive climate change-related disasters. The Regime’s Response to the 1990s Famine To understand how the North Korean government might react to crises resulting from climate change, it is instructive to examine the Kim regime’s response to the famine of the 1990s. Due to a combination of external factors including the loss of Soviet oil imports, North Korea was in a precarious position in the early 1990s. When severe flooding occurred in conjunction with a bad harvest in 1994, rendering 15% of the country’s arable land unusable, the country descended into a four-year famine. In response, Pyongyang asked the international community for aid. The aid was mainly distributed to the military and the elites, while those of low songbun saw little improvement.[xxx] This further widened the gap between those of high and low songbun. Although it received over $2 billion in aid from 1995 to 2005, Haggard and Noland note that North Korea “used aid…as balance-of-payments support” by “reallocating expenditures to other priorities.”[xxxi] Specifically, in 1999, North Korea slashed grain imports while “[allocating] scarce foreign exchange to the purchase of 40 MiG-21 fighters and 8 military helicopters from Kazakhstan.”[xxxii] Similar mismanagement appears likely in the face of climate disasters, with far-reaching implications for human rights and potentially the stability of the Kim regime. What few climate solutions are implemented will likely be centered on the elite and the military, while those of lower songbun are left behind. This will apply to grain distribution, water and electricity rationing in the face of drought, and funding for preventative measures or the reconstruction or relocation of citizens and infrastructure. In the face of climate change, the prioritization of regime resources toward nuclear weapons and missile development will continue to harm the welfare of the North Korean people. Concluding Remarks By 1998, the worst of the Arduous March had passed due to better harvests, an influx of international food aid, and the development of informal markets.[xxxiii] However, unlike the famine of the 1990s, climate change will have long-lasting consequences for North Korea. Bad harvests, sea level rise, and flooding will only become worse and more frequent over time. NGOs must be allowed back into the country to help with relief efforts for the climate disasters to come, as well as to ensure the adequate provision of aid to the most vulnerable groups in North Korea. Pyongyang must take meaningful steps to prioritize the welfare of its citizens in the face of climate change. It should ensure a baseline level of transparency and access in line with international standards as it seeks international aid and assistance to counter and alleviate the effects of climate change. However, external aid cannot sustain the country forever. Without the reprieve of improving natural conditions, North Korea will face formidable challenges as it contends with serious climate change-induced crises in the coming decades. Natalie Horton is a senior at the George Washington University pursuing two bachelor's degrees, one in Asian Studies and the other in Korean Language & Literature, along with a minor in Chinese Language & Literature. [i] Catherine Dill et al., “Converging Crises in North Korea: Security, Stability & Climate Change,” The Center for Climate and Security, July 2021, 1. https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Converging-Crises-in-North-Korea_Security-Stability-and-Climate-Change_CSR_Woodwell.pdf. [ii] Ibid, 3. [iii] Ibid. [iv] Ibid, 2. [v] Min Joo Kim, “Typhoon Hinnamnor bears down on South Korea, bringing damaging winds,” The Washington Post, September 5, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/05/south-korea-typhoon-hinnamnor-storm/. [vi] Jean Chemnick, “With Widespread Deforestation, North Korea Faces an Environmental Crisis,” Scientific American, April 19, 2019. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/with-widespread-deforestation-north-korea-faces-an-environmental-crisis/. [vii] Dill et al., “Converging Crises in North Korea,” 5. [viii] Ibid., 6. [ix] Joseph S. Bermudez and Greg Scarlatoiu, North Korea: Flooding at Kyo-hwa-so No. 12, Jŏngŏ-ri (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea), September 16, 2016. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Kyo-hwa-so%20No_%2012%20Flooding.pdf. [x] John Hemmings, “Deciphering the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” International Politics Reviews 1 (2013): 73. https://doi.org/10.1057/ipr.2013.7. [xi] Peter Makowsky, “North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Center: Flood Damage Repairs Underway,” 38 North, July 12, 2022. https://www.38north.org/2020/10/yongbyon202210/. [xii] “Fukushima Daiichi Accident,” World Nuclear Association, May 2022. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-daiichi-accident.aspx. [xiii] Dill et al., “Converging Crises in North Korea,” 5. [xiv] Dennis Normile, “This Physician Has Studied the Fukushima Disaster for a Decade-and Found a Surprising Health Threat,” Science, March 4, 2021. https://www.science.org/content/article/physician-has-studied-fukushima-disaster-decade-and-found-surprising-health-threat. [xv] Maria Burke, “A Decade on Japan Is Still Grappling with the Environmental Impact of Fukushima.” Chemistry World, March 11, 2021. https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/a-decade-on-japan-is-still-grappling-with-the-environmental-impact-of-fukushima/4013364.article. [xvi] Dill et al., “Converging Crises in North Korea,” 6. [xvii] Ibid., 7. [xviii] Jacob Fromer, “Rising Sea Levels Could Inundate North Korea's Sinuiju by 2050, New Study Shows,” NK News, November 6, 2019. https://www.nknews.org/2019/11/rising-sea-levels-could-inundate-north-koreas-sinuiju-by-2050-new-study-shows/. [xix] Ibid. [xx] Suam Kim et al., “Climate variability and its effects on major fisheries in Korea,” Ocean Science Journal 42, (2007): 179–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03020922. [xxi] Robert Winstanley-Chesters, “Fishing in North Korea, A History and A Geography,” in Fish, Fishing and Community in North Korea and Neighbours (Springer Singapore, 2020), 99–134. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0042-8_4. [xxii] Sue-Lin Wong, “How North Korean Seafood Ends up in Countries That Ban It,” Reuters, December 20, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-northkorea-seafood/how-north-korean-seafood-ends-up-in-countries-that-ban-it-idUSKBN14A084. [xxiii] Jason Bartlett, “North Korea Plans to Dig Deep into Renewable Energy Alternatives,” The Diplomat, December 7, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/north-korea-plans-to-dig-deep-into-renewable-energy-alternatives/. [xxiv] Jeremy Page, “North Korea is Making Millions of Dollars Selling Power to China,” The Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-is-making-millions-of-dollars-selling-power-to-china-1521192603. [xxv] Brian Eyler and Courtney Weatherby, “New Evidence: How China Turned off the Tap on the Mekong River,” Stimson Center, April 30, 2020. https://www.stimson.org/2020/new-evidence-how-china-turned-off-the-mekong-tap/. [xxvi] Da-gyum Ji, “N. Korea Discharges Water from Border Dam without Prior Notice,” The Korea Herald, June 30, 2022. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220630000868. [xxvii] Christian Davies, “Natural Disasters Drive North Korea's Embrace of International Climate Goals,” Financial Times, January 11, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/d637c465-fc9e-4254-8191-193ac5eae30e. [xxviii] Ibid. [xxix] Troy Stangarone, “North Korean Coal Smuggling, Still Profitable,” Korea Economic Institute of America, February 27, 2020. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/north-korean-coal-smuggling-still-profitable/. [xxx] Erin Blakemore, “North Korea's Devastating Famine,” History.com, September 1, 2018. https://www.history.com/news/north-koreas-devastating-famine. [xxxi] Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2005), 10–11. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hunger_and_Human_Rights.pdf. [xxxii] Ibid., 16. [xxxiii] Jordan Weissmann, “How Kim Jong Il Starved North Korea,” The Atlantic, December 20, 2011. https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/how-kim-jong-il-starved-north-korea/250244/. |
DedicationHRNK staff members and interns wish to dedicate this program to our colleagues Katty Chi and Miran Song. Categories
All
Archives
April 2024
Categories
All
|