By Samantha Clark, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO

In the heart of Maputo, Mozambique’s capital, a 31-foot bronze statue of President Samora Machel stands watch over Independence Square. The monument, cast and erected by the North Korean state construction firm Mansudae Overseas Projects, is one of Pyongyang’s most visible legacies in southern Africa [International-Relations-2022]. For decades, North Korea’s leaders saw African liberation movements as both ideological allies and potential diplomatic votes in their long rivalry with South Korea. Mozambique, a Cold War battleground turned emerging economy, was one of those targets.

Yet while Pyongyang’s imprint in Maputo is undeniable, its role was primarily cultural and symbolic rather than in heavy infrastructure. The country’s marquee national stadium — the 42,000-seat Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto — was financed by Beijing and constructed by China’s Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group, a prominent example of China’s modern “stadium diplomacy” [news reports on Zimpeto].

Revolutionary solidarity and early ties

Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975 under the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO party. Like other newly liberated African states, it attracted attention from Pyongyang. North Korea’s Africa policy in the 1970s and 80s was ambitious: Kim Il-sung aimed to promote Juche (self-reliance), offer training and weapons to liberation movements, and secure diplomatic recognition over Seoul [International-Relations-2022]. This “Third World solidarity” was also a Cold War tactic — the DPRK hoped to win votes in the Non-Aligned Movement and United Nations General Assembly, where South Korea was competing for legitimacy [International-Relations-2022].

After Mozambique’s independence, Pyongyang positioned itself quickly after independence as a friendly socialist partner. It exported ideology and gifts. Mansudae artists and engineers became cultural ambassadors: in Maputo they built the Samora Machel statue, echoing similar commissions across Africa such as Heroes’ Acre in Namibia and monuments in Zimbabwe [International-Relations-2022]. Against the background of such cultural and ideological exchanges, according to military proliferation expert Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. (Angelo State University), North Korea’s relationship with Mozambique has been centered on sanctions evasion, military exports and aid, and illegal fishing.

Mozambique’s unique political economy

To understand why North Korea’s role remained symbolic rather than structural, it helps to look at Mozambique’s internal development strategy. As Hye-lim Yoo notes, post-independence Mozambique faced extreme regional imbalance. The south, anchored by Maputo and closely tied to South Africa, dominated politics and industry; the mid and north, rich in land and resources, were poorly integrated [Yoo 2015]. When FRELIMO abandoned socialism after a devastating civil war with RENAMO and democratized in 1994, it still chose an urban, manufacturing-centered growth path rather than rural resource extraction [Yoo 2015]. This made the government eager for foreign partners in light manufacturing and prestige projects but less interested in North Korea’s now-limited capital and expertise.

Mozambique also pivoted diplomatically. Despite its Portuguese past, it joined the British Commonwealth in 1995, a remarkable shift showing openness to Western economic advice [Yoo 2015]. Western and Chinese investment soon outpaced Pyongyang’s small offers. North Korea lacked the capacity — or global financial access — to underwrite the kind of mega-projects Mozambique sought.

Stadiums and symbolism

As Mozambique looked for large-scale infrastructure, it turned to Beijing. The Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto — centerpiece of the 2011 All-Africa Games — was a Chinese state gift, worth about US$65 million, financed by China and built by Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group [news sources on Zimpeto]. This fits a pattern of “stadium diplomacy” China has practiced across Africa, using highly visible sports infrastructure as a soft-power tool.

North Korea’s built legacy in Mozambique is primarily the Samora Machel statue and other smaller civic or memorial works, not large stadiums [International-Relations-2022]. The distinction illustrates how, on the cultural exchange and architectural front, Pyongyang’s resources and reach have remained limited compared with China’s.

Adapting under sanctions: doctors and illicit revenue

Though big infrastructure faded, Pyongyang found other ways to keep ties alive and earn currency. One was the exportation of North Korean health workers. As late as the 2010s, Mozambique hosted dozens of DPRK doctors on government-to-government contracts [UN 2020 report cited in International-Relations-2022]. In 2019, six North Korean physicians were arrested in the northern city of Pemba for operating a private clinic with state equipment, illustrating how sanctions-era workers sometimes moved into gray-market activity [International-Relations-2022].

Another small but telling episode occurred in 2015, when Mozambican authorities stopped a North Korean diplomat with roughly $100,000 and 4.5 kilograms of rhino horn in a car tied to the DPRK embassy in Pretoria — a stark example of how Pyongyang’s Africa presence often turns to illicit trade when formal channels dry up [International-Relations-2022].

During the Kim Jong-un era, Mozambique pledged to suspend and terminate North Korean medical contracts to comply with UN Security Council resolutions banning DPRK labor abroad [UN Panel, International-Relations-2022]. Official exchanges dwindled.

Why the relationship still matters

Despite this apparent retreat, Mozambique remains part of the story of North Korea’s Africa strategy. Scholars of DPRK foreign policy note that Africa provided an early proving ground for Juche diplomacy and later a residual set of sympathetic states or quiet economic partners under sanctions [International-Relations-2022]. Mozambique’s “solidarity, cordiality and friendship,” language used in its 2020 UN sanctions report, shows a desire to maintain historic goodwill even as it implements compliance measures [UN report, International-Relations-2022].

For Mozambique, North Korea is a small, once-symbolic partner now overshadowed by China’s scale and Western finance. Yet the DPRK’s art diplomacy still shapes the urban landscape — the Machel statue remains a landmark and a tourist photo stop.

Concluding remarks
​
Mozambique illustrates both the reach and the limits of North Korea’s Africa policy. Pyongyang once courted FRELIMO with ideology and monuments but never commanded the resources to build infrastructure on par with China’s Zimpeto Stadium. As sanctions cut off formal revenue and Mozambique globalized, North Korea’s presence shifted from symbolic solidarity to marginal economic workarounds, such as medical labor and occasional illicit ventures.

Understanding this layered history helps clarify how different external powers have shaped Mozambique — and how Pyongyang’s African ambitions have shrunk from Kim Il-sung’s grand Cold War vision to Kim Jong-un’s sanctions-battered pragmatism.

​Samantha Clark is an undergraduate at William & Mary studying Government and History. Her areas of focus are North Korean relations with Africa and the human rights consequences of authoritarian alliances. Recently, she was a research intern at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).

References 
1) International Relations 2022. An Exploratory Analysis of North Korea’s Relationship with Africa. -STEPHEN McGLINCHEY
2) Hye-Lim Yoo. “Political Dynamics of Mozambican Economic Growth Strategy Without Natural Resources Development and Its Implications on Applying East Asian Developmental State Model to Africa.” Paper presented at Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Sheffield, UK, 2015.
3) UN Security Council. “Report on Implementation of UN Sanctions: Mozambique.” United Nations, 2020.
4) Xinhua News Agency. “China Hands Over Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto to Mozambique.” August 2011.
5) BBC Africa. “China Finances and Builds Mozambique’s New National Stadium.” August 2011.
6) Mansudae Overseas Projects. Company materials and reporting on North Korean monuments abroad.
7) UN Panel of Experts on DPRK. Reports on North Korean overseas labor and sanctions evasion, 2019–2021.

By Mohona Ganguly, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO of HRNK

Part I: Introduction
 
            The DPRK’s nuclear arsenal has long been considered to be not only its most salient means of attack against its rivals, but also a symbol of “national pride.” North Korea’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, regards the nuclear program to be of personal importance to him due to its potential to grant him space and prominence on the international stage and its supposed representation of economic prosperity and national security (Pak 2020, 228). As such, it is of paramount importance to the DPRK government that the nuclear program be properly funded. In order to secure this financial support, North Korea has actively developed and maintained a series of illicit networks to generate hard currency. Some prominent examples of these illicit activities are Cybercrime, with trained hackers and groups associated with the DPRK stealing millions of dollars in cryptocurrency from international agencies and companies  (Patel 2025, Presentation 5, Slide 17), smuggling of drugs and counterfeit luxury goods (Patel 2025, Presentation 11, Slide 7), the government’s active collaboration with international Organized Crime Groups (OCGs), such as the Japanese Yakuza, the Hong Kong-based Triad, the Russian Mafia, and the Irish Republican Army  (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 2), and its sales of arms and missiles (Patel 2025, Presentation 5, Slide 8). However, the DPRK’s illicit activity that has arguably the direst consequences and human toll is its participation in human trafficking. This memo seeks to analyze the active North Korean human trafficking network through a systems-based approach, with special emphasis on its origins and current activities, and to provide a series of recommendations for the United States to actively take measures to prevent these crimes.
 
Part II. Overview of North Korean Human Trafficking
 
            The DPRK exploits its citizens and others abroad through its extensive human trafficking network. The regime engages in vast human trafficking maneuvers within North Korea’s borders, particularly through forcible imprisonment in labor camps, with an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 people being held within these facilities (U.S. State Department 2024). However, the DPRK receives a portion of the hard currency it requires to fund its nuclear program through its human trafficking activities abroad. These illicit networks take two primary forms: sending North Korean citizens overseas to work (U.S. State Department 2024) or actively participating in trafficking rings headed by international OCGs or other entities (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 10).
 
            The DPRK often sends its citizens abroad to work through bilateral arrangements with foreign governments or businesses (U.S. State Department 2024). These North Koreans work in a variety of industries overseas, such as in restaurants, factories, seafood processing plants, apparel, footwear manufacturing, shipbuilding, and textiles (U.S. State Department 2024).
The workers often migrate to countries with diplomatic relationships with North Korea, such as Russia, China, the UAE, and Malaysia (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). This action is directly in violation of the sanctions placed against North Korean labor overseas in 2019, and furthermore, the workers face a hazardous journey to their destination countries, grueling work conditions, and constant surveillance at their workplaces (U.S. State Department 2024). The workers are also forced to give up their passports, effectively trapping them within their destination countries (U.S. State Department 2024).

             The laborers work 12 to 16 hours a day and face the fear of potential retaliation against them and their families back in North Korea should they complain (U.S. State Department 2024).  These factors have led international organizations and experts to characterize this “work expatriation” process as a form of human trafficking, with some even deeming it, “state-sponsored slavery.” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 3). The DPRK uses these workers as a means of procuring hard currency through seizing their wages. Their salaries are often distributed directly into accounts held by the North Korean government, which legitimizes its retention of the wages by claiming that they are, “voluntary contributions,” by the workers to promote the country’s common good (U.S. State Department 2024). Ultimately, the workers receive only a fraction of their salaries, with the DPRK withholding up to 90 percent of their earnings (U.S. State Department 2024). This in turn generates millions of dollars in hard currency for the regime (U.S. State Department 2024). The exact amount of revenue generated through North Korean labor trafficking alone is estimated to be between $200 and $500 million dollars, which could account for a significant portion of the costs needed to maintain the DPRK’s nuclear program, which itself, the South Korean government projects, costs $1 billion dollars (CBS News 2017). Therefore, the DPRK’s labor trafficking does not only exact an immense human cost but also provides a sizable amount of the illicit funding they need to manage their nuclear program.
 
            The DPRK does not restrict its participation in international human trafficking to its citizens, however. Its partnerships with OCGs have also enabled them to participate in criminal activities internationally, including illicit human trafficking operations (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 10). One of the most prominent of these illicit connections is North Korea’s involvement in the Asian casino and gaming sector. The DPRK has strong ties with the 14k Triad, a factionalized organized crime group with illicit networks all throughout Asia (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Some members of the 14k triad have been actively involved in the gaming and casino sector, particularly to gain and eventually launder illicit revenue, and the DPRK is highly suspected to be a part of these schemes as an additional means of sanctions evasion because of their demonstrated close collaborations with the group (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). In 202c it was discovered that Alvin Chau, the CEO of the Macau junket operator Suncity Group, was allegedly closely involved with Broken Tooth, an influential gangster and the leader of the 14k triad faction of Macau (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Chau reportedly has strong ties to oil smuggling operations associated with the DPRK and has received an estimated $15 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank hack (which federal investigators at the time linked in part to North Korean hackers), which was deposited in the Suncity junket account (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8).  Furthermore, Broken Tooth (whose real name is Wan Kuok-Kai), became an investor in Southeast Asian casinos in 2012 (after completing a 14-year prison sentence) and claimed in 2018 that he made hundreds of millions in cryptocurrency through his casino ventures (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 8). These revenues have been attained through online and “above ground” casinos, primarily through illicit means like gambling, cryptocurrency investments, and, most notably, through human trafficking (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). The above ground,  “brick-and-mortar” casinos have long served as hubs for transnational human trafficking, and the 14k triad as an organization have been notable perpetrators of trafficking through these means (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Therefore, North Korea’s intimate involvement with Chau, Broken Tooth, and the 14k triad as a whole, signals that they are involved in human trafficking operations taking place in these casinos as a means to earn hard currency through these transactions to fund their nuclear program.
 
Part III: Case Study 1 - Cambodia and Myanmar Human Trafficking
 
            One of the most prominent instances of human trafficking within a 14k triad casino enterprise with a potential illicit connection to North Korea is the exposure of the extensive trafficking rings operating in “special economic zones” throughout Southeast Asia. These SEZs are industrial parks with relaxed regulations that serve as one-stop tax offices to emulate foreign investment (Kennedy and Southern 2022). However, they also eventually become borderline lawless areas, controlled solely on the whims of private security firms, with the local authorities not having the capacity or the desire to attempt to maintain control over them (Kennedy and Southern 2022). After the Covid-19 pandemic saw a sharp decrease in casino revenue because of travel restrictions halting visits from foreign tourists, those casinos located in SEZs or border towns in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, among other Southeast Asian countries, became a hotbed for online scam proliferation, and with it, human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Many victims, who are mostly young women from Thailand, are lured to these SEZs through online connections promising them decent jobs at the casinos (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Rescuers and survivors of these compounds have described the victims trafficked into these zones as being beaten, starved, deprived of water, electrocuted, and outright sold to other companies if they fail to perform their duties to their customers (Kennedy and Southern 2022).  Enslaved workers are often bought and sold through transactions between companies on a human trafficking Telegram channel known as White Shark (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Videos of workers being handcuffed, tortured, and even tasered in their rooms by their captors are common (Kennedy and Southern 2022). There have also been numerous reported instances of workers having committed suicide due to their treatment (Kennedy and Southern 2022). The local governments have been indifferent to these crimes occurring on their borders and as such have not taken significant action to combat this crisis (Kennedy and Southern 2022). The “slaves-for-scams” crisis has become so dire in Cambodia that the United States made the decision to downgrade the nation to a Tier 3, or the lowest possible level, in its 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Myanmar has also seen a rise in city-like SEZs surrounding Chinese-owned casino enterprises, which were already linked to human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Ekapop Lueangprasert, a local Thai official who has helped to rescue over 140 victims, aided a victim in her escape from a Myaweddy casino by swimming across the Moei River to Thailand, and to safety (Kennedy and Southern 2022).
 
            There are numerous perpetrators involved in these illicit schemes, including Zhao Wei, the Chinese businessman who owns the Kings Roman company, and Huang Mingxuan, a Hong Kong resident (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Zhao has invested over a billion dollars into the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, a self-governed casino and adjacent enclave on the Medong River that has become a hotspot for human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Another very influential figure in the online scam and casino human trafficking ring is Broken Tooth, Wan Kuok-Koi, himself (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Wan has utilized his organization, the World Hongman Association, as a means of investing in these casinos and SEZs, and has framed these ventures as a means of promoting his patriotism, or Chinese national pride (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Wan’s connections with the DPRK and his status as a “founding” figure of these SEZs and human trafficking enterprises calls into question North Korea’s own involvement in these illicit activities. Their longstanding relationship with the 14k triad and their willingness to perform illicit activities and strengthen these networks to fund and bolster their nuclear arsenal increases the likelihood of their involvement in this scheme (Owen and Seshadri, 8). Therefore, specifically targeting human trafficking rings such as these can potentially stall, or halt altogether, any monetary benefits the DPRK may be receiving from these operations.
 
Part IV: Case Study 2 - North Korean Labor in Chinese Seafood Processing Plants
 
            A significant instance of the DPRK trafficking its own citizens abroad for the purpose of working to generate hard currency for their nuclear program is their longstanding partnership with China’s seafood processing industry. Approximately 3,000 North Korean workers were employed at seafood processing plants in the northeastern city of Hunchun in China before the Covid-19 pandemic (Sullivan, Mendoza, and Kim 2021). Working conditions for these laborers are grim, as the North Koreans are subjected to unpaid overtime, routine  health and safety standard violations, and cramped and squalid living quarters (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12).  North Korean workers also face discrimination and isolation from their Chinese counterparts (Scarlatoiu 2023, 5). They are reportedly forced to wear blue headbands to distinguish themselves from the Chinese workers, and are forced to finish their three-year contracts with no sick days or without filing any complaints (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). On the other hand, Chinese workers are granted job protections and are allowed to take time off (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). Furthermore, the North Koreans working in these plants are paid significantly less than their Chinese co-workers, with them receiving approximately $300, while the Chinese workers earned $540 (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). These conditions have led to international human rights organizations, and survivors themselves, characterizing the workers’ conditions in these plants as meeting the necessary criteria for human trafficking, as “they are paid a pittance, constantly surveilled, and are unable to leave” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 8).
 
             The North Korean workers are considered to be more “valuable” in the eyes of their Chinese employers, with Li Shasha, a manager at a Chinese processing plant called Yanbian Shenghai Industry and Trade Co., claiming that North Korean employees are “more stable and unlikely to leave” compared to their Chinese counterparts (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). This reliance on the North Korean workers has led to an increase in demand for them, which in turn has propelled the DPRK to increase the “supply” of workers to China (Scarlatoiu 2023, 7). However, in August of 2023, China repatriated North Korean workers en masse, leading to a stalling in the trafficking of workers (Scarlatoiu 2023, 14). However, there appears to be no plans on either country’s end to permanently halt this arrangement, as the DPRK has indicated that it intends to send entirely new teams to China to replace them (Scarlatoiu 2023, 14).
 
             The DPRK is eager to continue this program by such means because they receive significant revenues from the workers within these processing plants. Of the $300 they earn, the workers only receive $70, as the rest is taken by the North Korean government as a form of, “patriotic contributions” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). Additionally, no wages are handed directly to the employees; rather, they are marked directly in the company’s account books as a payment (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12). The Chinese companies then pay the DPRK authorities directly, in hard Chinese currency (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12). These wage contributions are highly suspected to be appropriated by the government as yet another means of funding their nuclear program. As such, the government is able to benefit from their citizens’ labor, while said workers are forced into squalid working conditions with no means of escape. These decisions also affect supply chains throughout the world, as American chains, restaurants, and grocery stores, such as ALDI, have been found to have been carrying seafood products that were processed by North Korean workers, which leads to even more profits for the DPRK (Scarlatoiu 2023, 7).
 
Part VI - Systems Analysis and DPRK Government Agencies Involved in Human Trafficking
 
            Using the systems model, the DPRK government’s use of human trafficking performs the function of generating funds for the nuclear program, and also moving “goods” (in this case, labor and victims themselves) to achieve this goal. By potentially aiding the 14k triad and other OCGs in their casino human trafficking ventures, they receive some of the revenue gained and are therefore able to bolster their nuclear arsenal. By trafficking their own citizens in the overseas labor market, they create a “supply” for labor and also movement to evade the sanctions. They are also able to generate funds through this labor trafficking, as they appropriate most of their citizens’ wages and also profit off of the overseas trade of the goods North Korean workers produce.
 
            Numerous government agencies are involved in both main aspects of North Korean human trafficking. The most prominent of these agencies is Office 39, which handles most of the financial aspects of North Korea’s illicit networks (Patel 2025, Presentation 4, Slide 13). Some of their activities include managing and facilitating the DPRK’s hard currency earnings, smuggling goods, and counterfeiting (Patel 2025, Presentation 4, Slide 13). As such, Office 39 would be actively involved in any of North Korea’s casino ventures with the Triad and other OCGs. Office 39 also handles a very distinct responsibility in regard to labor trafficking out of North Korea (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 9). Office 39 assigns North Korean workers to industries overseas, with some of their own departments, such as the External Construction General Bureau and the Bong-Hwa General Bureau, assigning each worker to a different industry (in this case, Construction and Logging and Garment work, respectively) (Scarlatoiu et. al  2022, 9).

            Other government agencies are also actively involved in recruiting and screening North Koreans to work abroad. These include, but are not limited to, the Central Party’s Overseas Dispatch Department and the Provincial Party’s 2nd Department (Overseas Dispatch Department) (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). The departments who have the ultimate decision in who goes abroad are officials from the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), particularly those from the Organization and Guidance Department (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). The Ministry of Social Security is additionally responsible for security screenings and clearances (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). For the actual journey, the Foreign Ministry issues passports, while other departments train workers for overseas jobs (such as the Hotel Management Department and the Mansudae Art Studio) (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 22). Overall, numerous government agencies are involved in the process of selecting, assigning, and dispatching workers, and also managing the revenues they generate overseas.

Part VII: Treatment of North Korean Scientists Assigned to the Nuclear Program

            The importance of the nuclear program, and thus the illicit activities that are utilized to finance it, is highlighted by the DPRK’s treatment of the nuclear scientists who spearhead these programs. In North Korea, training of these scientists is considered paramount to the success of not only the program, but the country itself.  For example, recruitment for these positions begins extremely early, with young students being selected based on their aptitude for the sciences starting in elementary school (Collins 2024, 17). These students are engaged in a rigorous training regimen and pursue further education and research opportunities at universities such as the Mathematics Research Institute of the National Academy of Sciences, Kim Il-sung University, KCUT, the University of Science, Kim Hyong-jik University of Education, the Railroad College, and the College of Machinery (Collins 2024, 18). Many of these students are sent abroad to continue their studies, with notable host institutions including the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) in Dubna, near Moscow, and the Harbin Institute of Technology, one of China’s premier engineering schools (Collins 2024, 19). After they finish their studies, the nuclear scientists are assigned to different locations and facilities throughout North Korea, with the vast majority being assigned to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex (Collins 2024, 22)
 
            Under the rule of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, these scientists were forced to live under squalid conditions, being forced to live a life of relative poverty (Collins 2024, 36). According to one source, 80% of these nuclear scientists had to find work outside of their research in order to support their families (Collins 2024, 36). However, under Kim Jong-un, these workers are afforded substantially more respect, and patience in regard to their scientific processes, marked by trial-and-error (Collin 2024, 36). This demonstrates not only the importance of the nuclear program to Kim but also illuminates the stark contrast between the two groups of laborers whose work supports the nuclear program. While the scientists construct and design the nuclear arsenal and are granted respect for their efforts, the workers whose wages provide financial support for the program continue to suffer abuses and be sent abroad, with no acknowledgement.

Part VIII: Recommendations and Overall Strategy
 
            Due to the multifaceted and complex nature of North Korea’s human trafficking operations, I would suggest that the U.S. Government adopt a “two-pronged” approach towards preventing further operations. This plan would involve addressing both main types of human trafficking (the DPRK working with foreign OCGs and participating in labor trafficking of its own citizens) separately. This will allow for each type to be adequately handled, while also helping to stop any further trafficking and also stemming the flow of cash towards North Korea’s nuclear program from these operations.
 
Addressing North Korea’s Operations with OCGs
 
            The U.S. State Department and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN should first take diplomatic action to prevent human trafficking occurring at casinos in SEZs. These agencies should encourage the countries being affected by these operations, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, to end their indifferent posture and take concrete legislative measures to curb these illicit activities, possibly in conjunction with each other should there be any issues with jurisdiction over the SEZs. Some of these measures could include establishing clear standards for payment types and transparency in casinos, requiring additional licensing for accepting cryptocurrency, getting rid of private security companies, vetting employees and guests, and making identification mandatory for checking in. The State Department could emphasize this as a major priority in its diplomatic dealings with the countries involved, and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN could also suggest a Security Council or Arria-Formula meeting to discuss the matter. Further, U.S. and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies could launch formal investigations into cryptocurrency usage at these casinos as well as attempting to track victims of other human trafficking schemes from those casinos which have already been discovered. Other international human trafficking prevention non-profits or NGOs, such as Polaris, may also be involved to help search, identify, and care for victims. By setting these measures in place and also launching these investigations, one can potentially rescue any victims within these casino rings and also prevent North Korea from receiving any cryptocurrency payments for these transactions to fund their nuclear programs.

Addressing Labor Trafficking Outside North Korea
 
            The U.S. State Department and Permanent Mission to the UN should take measures to apply diplomatic pressure on those countries that have aided or facilitated North Korean overseas labor trafficking. Firstly, they should formally request China, Russia, the UAE, and other countries involved in this trafficking to demonstrate that they have taken measures to prevent any further reliance on North Korean labor, and they should also be tasked with proving that they are no longer employing any North Korean workers.
 
            The Food and Drug administration (FDA), U.S. Department Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Department of Commerce should also take steps to determine whether imports have been processed or made with North Korean labor. One way to begin this process would be to identify companies from nations that have used North Korean labor in the past. For example, imports from Chinese companies that have used seafood processed by North Korean workers and which have imported products to the United States before, such as Hunchun Pagoda Industry Co. Ltd. and Yantai Dachen Hunchun Seafood Products (Scarlatoiu 2023, 5) should be thoroughly inspected. If they are determined to have used North Korean labor, they should be denied entry in accordance with the Tariff Act of 1930 (Scarlatoiu 2023, 15).
 
            The United States should also encourage the International Labor Organization (ILO) to conduct an investigation into processing plants and companies that have used North Korean labor. This is because many countries that have been proven to have utilized North Korean labor, such as China and Russia, have ratified several of the ILO’s Core Conventions (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 5). Using North Korean labor has violated numerous of these conventions, such as the Forced Labor Convention of 1930 and the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize Convention of 1948 (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 10). As these workers are surveilled, live in fear for their lives and their families’ safety if they do not comply, and have their passports confiscated, they are subjected to forced labor and have had the right to freely associate stripped from them. As such, these nations have violated the conventions, and the ILO should investigate.
 
            By taking these actions, the United States can prevent any profits from goods made with North Korean forced labor from reaching the DPRK and potentially funding its nuclear program. They can also move towards bringing the labor trafficking out of North Korea to a halt, saving these workers from dire working conditions and further curtailing the DPRK’s cash flow.
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks
 
            Along with its many other extensive illicit networks, North Korea has relied heavily on human trafficking as a means of funding its nuclear arsenal. By actively participating with OCGs in their human trafficking ventures, and encouraging labor trafficking of its own citizens abroad, North Korea has continued to receive the funds they need through the suffering of others. By adopting these measures, we will not only have come closer to achieving our objective of weakening North Korea’s illicit networks and their nuclear program through cutting off their valuable sources of hard currency, but we will have spared victims of their crimes from further pain and humiliation, and there is no price that can equate to that.
 
Mohona Ganguly is a former HRNK Research Intern. She is a graduate of Cornell University, having majored in Industrial and Labor Relations, and received her Master of Public Administration (MPA) from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. She currently serves as Policy Chair for the South Asian Legal Defense Fund. She is driven by her commitment towards advancing human rights and labor justice. Her academic and professional interests focus on labor rights and international law, especially how they interact with issues related to North Korea and Asia as a whole.

References
1) Collins, Robert. “Slaves to the Bomb - The Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists.” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024.
2) “How U.S. Seafood Fans May Help Fund North Korea.” CBS News, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-us-seafood-fans-may-unwittingly-help-fund-north-korea/.
3) Kennedy, Lindsey, and Nathan Paul Southern. “Inside Southeast Asia’s Casino Scam Archipelago.” – The Diplomat, August 2, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/inside-southeast-asias-casino-scam-archipelago/.
4) “North Korean Overseas Workers.” North Korea in the World, June 11, 2021. https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/economic/north-korean-overseas-workers.
5) Owen, Allison, and Chandana Seshadri. “North Korean Activity in the Casino and Gaming Sector.” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, September 2024. https://static.rusi.org/north-korean-activity-in-casino-gaming-industry_0.pdf.
6) Pak, Jung H. Becoming Kim Jong Un: A former CIA officer’s insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Leader. S.l.: Random House, 2020.
7) Patel, Kris, “4. DPRK Govt Basics” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, January 28, 2025)
8) Patel, Kris, “5. Basics of DPRK illicit activities” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, February 3rd , 2025)
9) Patel, Kris, “5.5 Basics of DPRK illicit activities” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, February 4th , 2025)
10) Patel, Kris, “11. Other Illicit Activities - Not Cybercrime” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, March 5th, 2025)
11) Sullivan,Tim, Martha Mendoza, and Hyung-Jin Kim, “NKorean Workers Prep Seafood Going to US Stores, Restaurants,” AP News, August 21, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/sports-middle-east-canada-europe-global-trade- 8b493b7df6e147e98d19f3abb5ca090a.
12) Scarlatoiu, Greg. “How Forced Labor in China Taints America’s Seafood Supply Chain.” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, October 24, 2023. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/evo-subsites/cecc.house.gov/files/documents/Greg%20Scarlatiou%20-%20CECC%20testimony%20-%20revised%20as%20of%2010.26.pdf.
13) Scarlatoiu, Greg, Raymond Ha, and Hyunseung Lee. “North Korean Workers Officially Dispatched to China & Russia.” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2022. https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf.
14)“2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea.” U.S. Department of State, 2024. https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/north-korea/.

By Hannah Whiting, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO of HRNK

          What started with the compassionate heart of the King has seen its way through challenge and triumphed once again.[i] The Korean language, in its differing forms and journeys, holds the heart of over eighty million people today.[ii] Language can form a person's identity. The ability to adequately express oneself builds human connection. Kind and true words foster unification. Can a simple understanding of language bridge the gap between two enemy countries? Are the languages of North and South Korea the same or different? How might this affect the future of Korea? The history and evolution of the Korean language lights understanding into the past and breeds questions about the nearing future. 

King Sejong and the compassionate creation of Hangul

          With difficulty communicating, the common Korean lived their life as they watched only the elite communicate with the written word of the Hanja script. Hanja Chinese characters could not accurately depict the full sounds of the spoken Korean.[iii] Many of the Koreans did not endeavor to learn it which created a divide.  

         Much to the benefit of the country, King Sejong portrayed understanding to the fact that the Classical Chinese characters felt hard to learn by the common person (which made up most of the population). Through scientific understanding and compassion, King Sejong and a group of scholars endeavored to create Hangul. This 28-letter language blessed the Korean people with the option to more easily learn to read, write, and accomplish King Sejong’s desire for greater ability to express their feelings (Milwaukee Independent, 2025).

Hangul banned and revived again

           In the Joseon Dynasty, fear took over. They did not approve or like the fact that all the commoners knew Hangul. They also felt that Hanja took more of a respectable stance in terms of language and writing. As a result, in 1504 they banned Hangul. It stayed banned for many years after.

          In the 16th and 17th centuries Hangul began to creep back in. Finally, in 1849, King GoJong requested it back for the writing of important documents. Such occurrences brought back the use of Hangul. Finally, in 1894 teachers began to teach it in schools (The Korea Herald, 2025).

The Japanese rule and banning of the language

          Just under twenty years later in 1910, the Japanese took over and declared Japanese as the official language. They did not, however, eliminate Hangul ... yet. During this time, Ju Si Gyeong helped to name and partially standardize some of the Korean language. In 1938, however, the Japanese removed all the Korean education in schools. They strove to eliminate the entire Korean culture.

          While it continued to stay in use, the language did not officially come back for almost ten whole years.[iv] When the United States finally defeated the Empire of Japan, at the end of World War II,[v] the Koreans renewed their pride in the language and Hangul received full standardization. The Koreans’ preservation, memory, and protection of the language and alphabet carried through. Their endurance paid off as they retrieved their beautiful culture again (Linguatute, 2025).

North and South Korea split, affecting the language

          Despite the joyful liberation from colonial rule, Koreans experienced conflict within their own country. Toward the end of World War II in the Pacific, the Soviet Union occupied much of the north side of Korea and the United States assumed control of the south. They helped to create the line between North and South Korea as they both supported different governments. The Soviet Union left the North overwhelmed by communism and the United States instituted in the South an incipient democratic government.[vi]

          This resulted in the infamous official split of North and South Korea in 1948.[vii] That next year, North Korea created Chosŏn’gŭl (조선글). This language took out Hanja and kept the Hangul (Linguatute, 2025). The South Koreans, on the other hand, kept both. Korean dictionaries use Hanja to explain words.[viii]

North and South Korean language in the modern day

          In the modern day, South Korea has continued to experience language influence from the outside world. When asking a North Korean escapee what she found most distinct about the current South Korean language she responded “loanwords.” Due to history, 60% of the language consists of Sino-Korean.[ix] Many wonder why we use two different number systems in Korea. Sino-Korean owns one number system. There are two because China influenced Korea many years back. This evolved into Sino-Korean.[x] Currently there are many loanwords that come from the United States.[xi] Completing a quick search will provide English-Korean words such as “pizza, computer, television, ice-cream, shopping, jogging” and more.

          North Koreans are known to use some Russian and Chinese loanwords.[xii] North Korea has also striven to eliminate language from South Korea. In 2023 the Pyongyang Cultural Language Act stated that they will put someone for at least ten years in a labor camp if they spread the “puppet language,” a term North Korean propaganda uses to describe the South Korean dialect.[xiii] This type of desire for negative talk about the South dates to the end of World War 2.[xiv] 

A present and potential future, marked but not defined by differences

          If the North and South came back together, they would need to consider and agree upon how to use the language. Would they choose to take Hanja out altogether throughout the whole country? Who would decide this? The current app “Univoca” helps to bridge the gap between North and South Korean words by providing continually evolving translation.[xv] North Koreans have found it useful. South Korean teachers hope it will help the escapees to integrate well.[xvi]

Concluding remarks

          In conclusion, the Korean language and Korean writing have evolved overtime. From Hanja to Hangul creation, to elimination, to the rise again, to the Japanese rule, and to the revival of Hangul. Hangul survived despite the leadership that desired its extinction. Currently North and South Korea benefit from the uses of its creation.

          With knowledge of South Korea accepting more new words, one may conclude that in the future the dialects of the North and the South will differ even more. To what degree might this produce problems? If the language difference continues to increase and the North and South reunite, the country may need more translators. The younger generation of Koreans may need to look to their older generations who better remember the traditional language. Expressions of patience and humility may need to take place as the people regain their understandings and form the future official Korean language.

Hannah Whiting is a former HRNK intern and an aspiring marriage and family therapist with a Bachelor's degree in Marriage and Family Studies and a certificate in Child and Family Advocacy. Her love for the people of Korea developed while living as a missionary for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Seoul, South Korea. While there, the Korean people and experience won her heart and changed her life forever. 

Endnotes
[i]. Milwaukee Independent, “The Creation of Hangul: A Linguistic Masterpiece Designed by King Sejong to Increase Korean Literacy,” Milwaukee Independent, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/articles/creation-hangul-linguistic-masterpiece-designed-king-sejong-increase-korean-literacy/.

[ii]. The Korea Herald, “Korean Has 81.7 Million Speakers, Driven by Global Pop Culture Superpower from Asia,” Korea Herald, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3032661#:~:text=Korean%20has%2081.7%20million%20speakers,pop%20culture%20superpower%20from%20Asia.

[iii]. The Anthrotorian, “The Hangul Revolution: How the Creation of a New Written Language Changed South Korea Forever,” The Anthrotorian, accessed August 30, 2025, https://theanthrotorian.com/culture/the-hangul-revolution-how-the-creation-of-a-new-written-language-changed-south-korea-forever.
 
[iv]. Linguatute, “Symbols of Identity: The Role of the Hangul Writing System in Korean History,” Linguatute, accessed August 30, 2025, https://linguatute.com/symbols-of-identity-the-role-of-the-hangul-writing-system-in-korean-history/.

[v]. The National WWII Museum, “End of World War II (1945),” The National WWII Museum, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/topics/end-world-war-ii-1945.

[vi]. Encyclopædia Britannica, “Aftereffects: Korean War,” video, Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/video/aftereffects-Korean-War/-255378.

[vii]. History.com Editors, “North and South Korea Divided: Reasons and Facts,” History.com, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.history.com/articles/north-south-korea-divided-reasons-facts.

[viii]. 90 Day Korean, “Hanja,” 90 Day Korean, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.90daykorean.com/hanja/.

[ix]. Duolingo Blog, “History of the Korean Language,” Duolingo Blog, accessed August 30, 2025, https://blog.duolingo.com/history-of-korean-language/#:~:text=The%20impact%20of%20Chinese%20on,similar%20to%20spoken%20Chinese%20today.

[x]. YouTube, “Short Video,” YouTube Shorts, 2025, accessed August 30, 2025, https://youtube.com/shorts/ezfE9gEdQic?si=Q3YyUMkHNNTodbeF.
 
[xi]. Young Pioneer Tours, “Korean Language,” Young Pioneer Tours, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.youngpioneertours.com/korean-language/.

[xii]. KBS World, “Content View,” KBS World, accessed August 30, 2025, https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/contents_view.htm?lang=e&board_seq=362271.

[xiii]. Daily NK, “Daily NK Obtains Full Text of Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act,” Daily NK, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.dailynk.com/english/daily-nk-obtains-full-text-pyongyang-cultural-language-protection-act/.

[xiv]. The Guardian, “North and South Korea: Tensions, Relations, Issues, Conflict, Division Explained in 30 Seconds,” The Guardian, August 15, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/15/north-and-south-korea-tensions-relations-issue-conflict-division-explained-in-30-seconds.

[xv]. WorldCrunch, “App Helps North Korean Defectors Learn Southern Slang,” WorldCrunch, accessed August 30, 2025, https://worldcrunch.com/tech-science/app-helps-north-korean-defectors-learn-southern-slang/.

[xvi]. The Borgen Project, “Univoca,” The Borgen Project, accessed August 30, 2025, https://borgenproject.org/univoca/.

By Ellie Richard, former HRNK intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO

The dangers of escaping from North Korea are well-documented. Between dodging landmines, eluding border patrol agents, and avoiding arrest by Chinese officials, North Korean escapees face a path replete with risks. Success on this journey can be the difference between life and death – and it’s a trek that disproportionately affects one group above all others:
 
North Korean women.
 
According to the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “approximately 80% of North Korean escapees are women.” There are plenty of reasons why North Korean women flee the country more than their male counterparts. To begin, men and women assume different roles in North Korean society, and such differences influence escape capabilities. Men are typically under strict surveillance from the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), and they are required to serve in the military for a minimum of ten years. While service in the military is compulsory for men, participation is voluntary for women. Women who enlist in the military — though not all are required to — serve for six years. This relatively shorter term provides a broader window for escape for women, as men are conscripted for longer periods.  
 
Generally, North Korean women have more time to spend on their families and communities compared to men, especially married women. Most women in the country participate in the Socialist Women’s Union of Korea, an organization that enlists women in various public mobilization campaigns. Women who are a part of this union spend their weekends working on public infrastructure projects, including road construction work and railway assignments. Married women are exempt from union service, allowing them more time to care for their families. As primary caretakers, they bear a heavy burden, particularly as many families struggle to meet basic needs.
 
Food insecurity is a common push factor that encourages women to flee from North Korea. Most North Korean citizens suffer from some form of food insecurity. The World Food Programme estimates that 10.7 million people are malnourished in North Korea, which is approximately 40% of the population. Food shortages largely stem from North Korea’s decision to prioritize military spending and nuclear weapons development rather than agricultural sectors. Such food deprivation places an enormous strain on North Korean women, who assume more family responsibilities than men. Driven by the urgent need to feed their families, many women flee North Korea in search of food and resources essential for survival.
 
This food insecurity and resulting economic hardships encourage women to seek pathways to escape from North Korea. During the famine of the 1990s, many women became more involved in informal markets known as the Jangmadang. Their participation in these markets enabled them to gain more financial independence and, as a result, become exposed to outside market actors. Women were introduced to economic opportunities outside of North Korea, and these opportunities for a lucrative career became enticing as many struggled to feed their families.
 
Human traffickers target these women and prey on their vulnerabilities — especially ringleaders who run complex human trafficking networks in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Perpetrators in China work in tandem with corrupt brokers who lure North Korean women to China under false promises of employment to exploit them for financial gain. One common form of exploitation and crime is sex trafficking. A report by the Migration Policy Institute states that “more than 60 percent of North Korean girls and women between ages 12-29 who escape are trafficked into China’s lucrative sex trade.”
 
Cybersex trafficking is a dangerous subset of this crime. The Migration Policy Institute reports that in recent years, “a growing number – approximately 15 percent of those trafficked – have been coerced into cybersex, which includes livestreamed sexual abuse and rape to a paying clientele of mostly South Korean men.” Such a finding demonstrates the expansive nature of these trafficking networks, as traffickers exploit women in China and other countries.
 
The black market for North Korean women in China extends beyond sex trafficking, too. Traffickers also coerce women into forced marriages. Indeed, the Migration Policy Institute finds that “more than 30 percent [of women] are believed to be sold into forced marriages with rural Chinese men.” This situation stems from a lack of marriage-age women in the northeast region of China due to previous population control measures implemented by the PRC. The infamous ‘one child’ policy, where the government restricted families from having more than one child, resulted in a skewed sex ratio in China, as families would undergo gender-based abortions to avoid having a female child. This female infanticide, in turn, created a large demand for brides, and North Korean women proved a convenient solution.
 
The consequences of this situation are devastating. North Korean women in forced marriages not only suffer from rape and gender-based violence but also live under constant threat of arrest. They have no official standing in China, nor do they have any legal avenues they can pursue to protect themselves. The Chinese government often categorizes North Korean escapees as ‘economic migrants’ rather than asylum seekers, and such mis categorization facilitates a system of forced repatriation. The government can deport citizens without acknowledging the immense danger they face upon returning home, including imprisonment, torture, and execution upon return to North Korea. Female escapees face a unique set of hazards. The Transitional Justice Working Group affirmed that “in detention centers and interrogation facilities, female returnees are reportedly subject to invasive gynecological exams, beatings, and sexual assault, all without medical justification or legal oversight.” Women carrying children face even greater consequences. Pregnant women in detention centers are subjected to forced abortions and infanticide as punishment for their ‘disloyalty’ to the Kim regime.
 
This data, if nothing else, provides a window into the experiences of women who try to escape from North Korea and the dangers they face along the way. However, the data can only tell so much of the story. Statistics on a page cannot sufficiently convey the overwhelming fear these women experience and the strength they are required to possess during their journeys. The voice of Vivian Kim, an escapee-turned-human rights advocate and U.S. CEO, best showcases the resilience of female North Korean escapees.
 
***
 
Originally born in the northern province of Hamgyong Bukdo, Vivian spent her entire childhood and adolescence in North Korea. She witnessed extreme poverty and starvation firsthand, as well as the censorship and indoctrination levied by the Kim regime. She knows how it feels to live in a totalitarian state, and she knows how dangerous it is to leave it, having done so herself in 2010. Vivian recently described her experience leaving the regime in an interview with HRNK, and among all the trials and tribulations she faced, one topic kept resurfacing throughout the conversation:
 
Fear.
 
When asked about the scariest moment during her escape, Vivian didn’t hesitate to answer: “Every single moment. It’s not just one moment. Every single step. Every single moment until I got to Thailand.” Her journey stretched from backcountry roads in China, jungles in Laos, rivers in Thailand, and eventually the Hanawon refugee center in South Korea. Natural dangers jeopardized her safety at every location, as she navigated rugged mountains, frozen rivers, and treacherous insects during her trip.
 
Man-made threats were even more frightening. “The first scary thing when I decided to escape, and as I crossed the border, was that I might be shot in the back by the North Korean government,” Vivian said. “The second [threat] was not by the North Korean government but by the brokers, the human traffickers.”
 
In her interview with HRNK, Vivian provided greater insight into the mindset of the brokers who help North Koreans escape. Many of them charge substantial fees to individuals and their families looking to leave North Korea. Even if a woman can meet the base costs, she still runs the risk of being outbid by a human trafficking perpetrator who wants to sell her into sex work. Many brokers will choose the more profitable option, creating a cycle of exploitation. Vivian’s husband, a fellow defector and human rights advocate named Jake Kim, wired a substantial amount of money to their broker to protect his wife’s safety. As a result, Vivian avoided any ensnarement in these human trafficking rings. The same cannot be said for every woman who makes this journey. Many who rely on their brokers are ultimately betrayed, highlighting how difficult it is for these women to decide whom to trust.
 
These anxieties stick with defectors long after they arrive in a safe new country. Some defectors might struggle to trust people following their experiences with these brokers. Vivian, meanwhile, still carries trauma related to law enforcement as the Chinese government could have arrested her on multiple occasions.
 
 “Police cars are normal. Police cars are everywhere in the world, but the lights, not only for me but for all North Korean escapees in China, [I feel like] someone is watching me, and they are going to shoot me,” Vivian lamented. “It’s so so scary. Every time I see police car lights, it’s this kind of trauma.”
 
The struggles she faced, both as a North Korean defector and as a woman, during her escape, were tremendous. Her journey is described in much greater detail in her book, A Necessary Lie: Escape for Freedom and Love, which she co-wrote with her husband and author Heidi Tucker.
 
After speaking with HRNK, Heidi reaffirmed how traumatizing this experience was for Vivian, having worked with her to translate her story. “The fear kept coming up,” Heidi recalled. “The fear of Vivian crossing the ice [on the frozen Yalu River]. She was just like ‘How did my heart not stop beating? The fear that they were going to shoot her in the back at any moment…[she] would often go back to the fear.”
 
Fear is a central part of her story, but so too is the strength and perseverance she displayed in the face of this distress. Despite the odds being widely stacked against her, Vivian Kim found a way out and eventually reunited with her husband. She is now a loving mother of two children, a proud college graduate, a prominent CEO of a children’s clothing brand, and an empowered human rights activist in the United States. Vivian’s story is nothing short of inspiring and a critical reminder of the importance of this issue.
 
***
 
I believe that the United States of America has a moral responsibility and strategic opportunity to promote and protect the rights of North Korean citizens and refugees. Escapees — many of them women — are often overlooked and forgotten about. To amplify their voices, I believe we must urge members of Congress to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. Although this legislation largely enjoyed bipartisan support, it expired in 2023 and its renewal is critical. The bill not only reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to protecting human rights and democracy on the international stage but also funded vital refugee support programs and supported independent media outlets like Radio Free Asia and Voice of America that broadcast information into the country. Reauthorizing this act would send a clear message: the United States cares about the well-being of North Korean refugees and citizens and will not turn away from their struggle.
 
With over three years since the last congressional hearing on North Korea, it’s time to push for renewed focus. Contact your representatives to demonstrate your concern for this issue. More specifically, let them know that you want to see the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 renewed. The time for passive concern has come and gone. We must act decisively, and we must act now.
 

Ellie Richard is a senior at the University of Michigan, where she is pursuing a double major in International Relations and Spanish, along with a minor in History. As a pre-law student, she is deeply passionate about foreign affairs, with particular interests in international human rights law and immigrant rights protection. Ellie brings valuable research experience to HRNK, having previously served as a research assistant for the University of Michigan Law School. In that role, she collaborated with former U.S. State Department Ambassador and Department of Justice Prosecutor Luis C. deBaca to create an archive documenting the early efforts of the anti-human trafficking movement. This experience — combined with a formative lecture on the implications of the Songbun system in North Korea — sparked her interest in Korean peninsula affairs and strengthened her commitment to uncovering human rights abuses through research with HRNK.

 
Bibliography
Bremer, Ifang. "Almost half of North Korea's population undernourished due to food shortages: UN." NK News, July 14, 2023. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.nknews.org/2023/07/almost-half-of-north-koreas-population-undernourished-due-to-food-shortages-un/#:~:text=Security%20/%20Human%20Rights-,Almost%2012%20million%20North%20Koreans%20are%20undernourished%2C%20a%20new%20U.N.,from%20between%202019%20and%202021.
 
"Democratic People's Republic of Korea." United Nations World Food Programme. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.wfp.org/countries/democratic-peoples-republic-korea?utm_source=
 
Hee-Seok Shin, Ethan, April Song-Ah Park, Jeonghyun Kang, et al. "Documentation and Accountability for North Korea's Crime of Enforced Disappearance: Stock-taking and Recommendations." Transitional Justice Working Group, 2025. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea/.
 
Kim, Vivian. Interview by Ellie Richard. Washington D.C. July 19, 2025.
 
Natsios, Andrew, Avie Vaidya, Clayton Elbel, et al. "Is There a Famine in North Korea?" The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Last modified June 17, 2025. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/IS-THERE-A-FAMINE-IN-NORTH-KOREA.pdf.
 
Reddy, Damian. "Communication to the Commission on the Status of Women." Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu. HRNK Insider. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2025/08/communication-to-commission-on-status.html.
 
Scarlatoiu, Greg. Interview by Ellie Richard. Washington D.C. August 2025.
 
Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. "Trafficked and Forgotten: The Plight of North Korean Women in China." 2024. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://timep.org/.
 
Tucker, Heidi. Interview by Ellie Richard. Washington D.C. July 28, 2025.
 
Um-Lo, Noël, and Eunsook Jang. "Slipping through the Cracks in South Korea: The Uncertain Futures for the Children of North Korean Defectors." Migration Policy Institue, July 8, 2025. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/north-korean-defector

By Samantha Clark, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President & CEO

          When Zimbabwe got independence from white-minority rule in 1980, its new head of state Robert Mugabe was faced with the challenge of consolidating the country while ensuring that he remained firmly in place. Instead of seeking primary advice and support from Western countries, Mugabe looked to Kim Il-sung, North Korea's first leader and founder. He ruled an authoritarian regime centered on very strict discipline, one party, and a  personality cult. Their relationship created one of the most anomalous and notable alliances of the later Cold War. North Korea gave military training, templates of ideology, and grand monuments to Zimbabwe. But these presents also facilitated one of the darkest periods in Zimbabwean history: the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980s.

          The origins of the North Korea–Zimbabwe alliance can be traced back to the 1970s, during Zimbabwe’s long fight for independence. At that time, the country was called Rhodesia and was ruled by a white-minority government under Prime Minister Ian Smith. Two major African nationalist groups led the struggle against Smith’s regime. The first was Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), whose military wing was known as the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The second was Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which had its own armed wing. Foreign powers lined up behind these movements. The Soviet Union backed ZAPU, while North Korea chose to support Mugabe’s ZANU. Pyongyang supplied ZANLA with weapons and training, which built trust between Mugabe and Kim Il-sung well before Zimbabwe gained independence (Young 2018). This early support gave North Korea an advantage over other outside powers when Mugabe came to power in 1980. Both Mugabe and Kim believed that armed struggle, revolutionary vigilance, and collective discipline were the true foundations of political legitimacy, which made the two leaders natural allies (Young 2018).

          Mugabe looked up to North Korea further after independence. In 1980, he went to Pyongyang to witness a meeting of the Korean Workers' Party and listened as Kim Il-sung declared that he would be succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-il. Mugabe valued North Korea's land reform, whereby farms had been “allocated” to peasants working on collective farms, and its concept of "self-reliance" (Juche). He also liked the huge mass games, where large numbers of North Korean kids exercised gymnastics and danced in unison to display their loyalty to the leader. These demonstrations of unity were precisely what Mugabe sought to have at home in Zimbabwe. Upon his return to Harare, he went so far as to set up a Juche study center at the University of Zimbabwe to teach students about North Korea's ideology (Young 2018).
 
          The most significant part of the relationship in terms of impact, however, was in the military sphere. Soon after independence, Mugabe requested North Korea's help in creating an elite force under his direct command. Kim Il-sung agreed, and in 1981 North Korean instructors visited Zimbabwe to train the new brigade, which would come to be known as the Fifth Brigade. As opposed to the remainder of the military, the Fifth Brigade was instructed by Mugabe alone. Its training emphasized unrestrained devotion to the ruling party and loyalty to the president, like the "single-minded unity" that is taught in the Korean People's Army (Young 2018). By 1985, the brigade had grown to around 20,000 soldiers and became one of Mugabe’s most powerful tools.

          Not long after its creation, the Fifth Brigade turned its guns inward. From 1983 to 1987, the unit ran a terror campaign in Matabeleland, a region where support for Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU was strong. Known as Gukurahundi—a Shona phrase meaning “the early rain that washes away the chaff”—the government claimed it was a security operation against dissidents. It became a massacre of civilians. Around 20,000 people were killed, and very sadly many more were tortured, raped, or forced into reeducation camps. These years remain among the darkest chapters in Zimbabwe’s history. North Korea did not carry out the killings directly. However, by training the Fifth Brigade, it had given Robert Mugabe the tools to crush political opposition on a massive scale. Many distinctive features of the North Korean regime were transplanted to Zimbabwe (Young 2018).

          North Korea also helped design buildings in Zimbabwe. The state construction firm of North Korea, Mansudae Overseas Projects, constructed and designed Harare's National Heroes' Acre, a large monument complex to commemorate individuals who participated in the struggle for independence. The project was completed in 1982 and has large statues, large stone stairways, and an eternal flame, and it is a replica of monuments in Pyongyang. Like much of Mansudae's African work, it was constructed by North Korean laborers for the most part, under conditions akin to forced labor (van der Hoog 2018). The Heroes' Acre was both a monument and a political declaration, acknowledging Mugabe as the rightful victor of a heroic struggle.

          Cumulatively, the export of military skills and mega-architecture captures the way North Korea did business in Africa. On the surface, Pyongyang was a supporter of anti-colonialist movements, joining hands with new independent nations in opposition to imperialism. These alliances served to advance North Korean interests via the establishment of building contracts, weapons sales, and the spread of its ideology beyond its territory (van der Hoog 2018). Zimbabwe was Pyongyang's closest supporter in this policy, and Mugabe's personal admiration of Kim Il Sung helped to sustain it. Despite worldwide condemnation of Zimbabwe for the Gukurahundi massacres and despite growing global condemnation of North Korea for its foreign interventions, the alliance continued. Mugabe continued to publicly praise Pyongyang, and even in the 2000s Juche books could be found in Zimbabwean government offices (Young 2018). For North Korea, the preservation of its ties to Harare showed that it still had allies in the Global South, even as it grew increasingly isolated elsewhere. For Mugabe, Pyongyang was a symbol of authoritarian longevity and a sign of support he had amassed when he had ascended to power.
 
          The Zimbabwe experience illustrates the human rights effects of North Korea's foreign alliances. While “legitimized” as an alleged representative of “anti-imperialist solidarity,” in practice Pyongyang exported repressive practices associated with authoritarianism. In Zimbabwe, the Fifth Brigade was deployed as a tool of mass terror, and Mansudae's monuments legitimized a political culture revolving around a personality cult. These legacies illustrate how Cold War alliances left deep-seated wounds to African domestic politics.
 
          Today everyone is debating whether sanctions are effective against North Korea. They are not, as Zimbabwean lessons teach how difficult it is to prevent North Korea's activities elsewhere. Despite decades of sanctions, North Korea remained active in Africa with cultural cooperation, infrastructure projects, and clandestine defense ties. Zimbabwe illustrates how authoritarian governments exchange favors among themselves all over the world. It also points to the imperious need to document this history, so that the toll taken on human rights is not lost. For Zimbabwe, the Fifth Brigade is one of its darkest post-independence tales. For North Korea, the alliance shows how much power it wielded once—and as a reminder of the devastation authoritarian unity can cause.
 
Samantha Clark is an undergraduate at William & Mary studying Government and History. Her areas of focus are North Korean relations with Africa and the human rights consequences of authoritarian alliances. Recently, she was a research intern at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).
 
Works Cited
Kuo, Jaewon. “An Exploratory Analysis of North Korea’s Relationship with Africa.” North Korean Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2019, pp. 61–78.
Van der Hoog, Jonas. Uncovering North Korean Forced Labour in Africa: The Case of the Mansudae Overseas Project Group in Namibia. European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea, 2018.
Young, Benjamin R. “An Emotional Relationship: Trust, Admiration, and Fear in North Korea–Zimbabwe Relations, 1976–1988.” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 20, no. 4, 2018, pp. 6–31.