Introduction
 
For many, South Africa’s Apartheid evokes images of historical struggle and resilience immortalized in history books, while North Korea’s Songbun seems distant in the confines of a closed-off regime. Despite the vast geographical distance between the two countries, these seemingly disparate systems exhibit notable parallels in their mechanisms of oppression and control. As Nelson Mandela and countless others grappled with the chains of Apartheid in South Africa, North Koreans endured—and continue to suffer—the oppressive grasp of the Songbun system. Both Apartheid and Songbun are tainted by state-sanctioned discrimination and human rights abuses.
 
North Korea’s sociopolitical classification system, Songbun (성분), creates distinct classes under oppressive conditions, having an immeasurable and lasting impact on human rights with its highly destructive and repressive effects on the majority of the population. This system, which creates an oppressive society that is practically unparalleled in the contemporary world, consists of three classes that have been created and divided into over 50 categories.[1] As a system that is based on social status assigned to North Koreans at birth, the party-directed caste system is the primary cause of widespread discrimination and other human rights abuses.[2] The harsh reality in North Korea is that this system forces a third of the 23 million citizens into a form of slave labor, while the remainder is bound by loyalty to the regime.[3]
 
The concept of class struggle as the driving force of history can be traced to The Communist Manifesto, where Marx emphasizes that modern bourgeois society, emerging from the remnants of feudalism, has not eradicated class antagonisms. Instead, it has engendered new classes, forms of oppression, and struggles to supplant the old ones.
 
The Kim regime has deliberately established and upheld social hierarchies based on political loyalty. The Songbun system is crucial for understanding North Korean society and especially the mechanism of oppression that the ruling elite employs to protect and maintain political dominance.
​
Thus, this article delves into the historical contexts of the Songbun system in North Korea and the Apartheid system in South Africa, examining their origins, implementations, and societal impacts. It also draws comparisons and contrasts between the two systems by exploring the legal parallels, as both systems have been denounced as crimes against humanity under international law. Additionally, the article proposes strategies and recommends steps forward to approach and confront these systemic injustices and uphold human rights worldwide. Ultimately, the Kim regime has deliberately established and upheld social hierarchies based on political loyalty. The Songbun system is therefore crucial for understanding North Korean society and especially the mechanism of oppression that the ruling elite employs to protect and maintain political dominance.

North Korea’s Songbun System

North Korea first developed the Songbun system to consolidate Kim Il-sung’s rule by isolating, identifying, and controlling perceived political threats. Songbun, which translates as “ingredient” but also can mean “background,” categorizes every North Korean according to how politically reliable or dangerous they were believed to be, based on their family history. By utilizing this system, the regime isolated and purified Kim’s real and perceived enemies and rewarded his supporters.[4] The North Korean regime targeted those who had backgrounds in land ownership, business, religion, or collaboration with Japanese occupiers, branding them as “counterrevolutionaries” and subjecting them to execution, imprisonment, or relocation to remote mountainous regions.[5]
 
In 1957, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) formalized and intensified the Songbun system through proclamations and resolutions, implementing legislative measures such as Cabinet Decree No.149 to justify mass relocations on the grounds of internal security.[6] Key factors determining one’s Songbun include their ancestors’ socioeconomic status at the time of liberation in 1945, their actions during the Korean War (1950–53), and whether they had relatives in South Korea or China, as connections to the outside world were deemed detrimental to one’s loyalty to the Kim regime.[7] The Songbun classification process starts at birth for every North Korean, and children under 17 are classified according to their parents’ status.[8]
 
The Songbun system divides the population into three groups: the “Core,” comprising roughly 28% of the population, including revolutionaries and descendants of war heroes; the “Wavering” group, making up 45%, including individuals from diverse backgrounds such as former South Koreans or intellectuals; and the “Hostile” group, accounting for the remaining 27%, which encompasses descendants of landlords, capitalists, and those deemed politically opposed or associated with external forces. These classifications were meticulously maintained in individual files accessible through the digital system “Faithful Servant 2.0,” in 2019, facilitating government control and surveillance across all administrative levels.[9]
 
Songbun dominates all aspects of individuals’ lives in North Korea. Job assignments are determined by songbun, resulting in significant disparities in work conditions and social standing. Those with high Songbun have access to better educational opportunities, perpetuating privilege across generations. Songbun also significantly impacts family life, as marriage prospects and familial reputation are heavily influenced by it, leading to “intra-class” unions. Those with low songbun may face exile to remote regions, limiting their freedoms and economic opportunities. Furthermore, songbun determines access to food and healthcare, reinforcing class divisions and the dominance of the ruling elite. Despite its opacity, awareness of songbun pervades North Korean society, instilling fear and fostering compliance among the population. It serves as a powerful tool for regime control and maintaining power.[10]
 
According to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (COI), Songbun continues to be enforced by the Kim regime. Moreover, the “discrimination based on gender and songbun is employed as a means of maintaining a rigid social structure less likely to produce challenges to the political system”.[11]

South Africa’s Apartheid

In 1948, the National Party government in South Africa instituted Apartheid, which translates to "apartness" in Afrikaans. The Apartheid system was an organized system of racial segregation that required distinct living spaces, facilities, and restricted interaction between racial groups.[12] This system was distinct from previous segregation regimes in that it used a repressive governmental machinery to crush opposition and legally enforced racial isolation, disproportionately affecting non-White populations. Moreover, Apartheid consistently pushed the majority of the population to the margins of society based only on the color of their skin, leaving non-white people frequently in near destitution.[13] Apartheid institutionalized notions of racial “superiority” and “inferiority.”
 
The Population Registration Act was pivotal in Apartheid legislation, categorizing South Africans into racial groups (white, black, colored, and later Asian) that determined their social, political, educational, and economic opportunities. It formalized racial segregation and upheld the discriminatory practices, supported by complementing laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the Group Areas Act.[14] These rules prohibited interracial unions and divided people into four racial groups: white, black, Indian, and colored. Each group had specific neighborhoods they were allowed to reside in. While white South Africans continued to rule over urban areas, black South Africans were forced to relocate to their tribal homelands. Segregation was further cemented when Afrikaans was mandated as the language of instruction and administration.[15]
 
Despite relentless repression from the ruling government, anti-Apartheid sentiment gave rise to political movements opposing white supremacist ideologies. Prior to 1960, opposition to Apartheid was broad and varied. Along with Indian, Colored, White, and church-based groups, key organizations driving the battle were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), and the United Democratic Front (UDF)[16]. In particular, the African Native National Congress (SANNC), founded in 1912 as the South and later known as the ANC, advocated for South African black rights and played a central role in the anti-apartheid struggle, including the 1952 Defiance Campaign, before internal divisions led to the formation of the PAC in 1959.[17]
 
As domestic and international pressure to end Apartheid grew by the 1980s, political prisoners were freed and there were political negotiations that ultimately led to the founding of a non-racial democratic state in 1994. The end of Apartheid opened the door to creating a more inclusive society in which everyone could take an equal part in public life and governance.
 
North Korea’s Songbun System vs South Africa’s Apartheid
 
Similarities
 
North Korea’s Songbun system and South Africa’s Apartheid regime share striking similarities. Both relied on legislation and political documents to justify discriminatory practices. South Africa’s Population Registration Act of 1950 classified individuals into racial categories, dictating their social, political, and economic rights. Similarly, North Korea’s Songbun system categorized citizens based on perceived loyalty to the regime, influencing their access to resources and opportunities. Specifically, North Korea formalized discriminatory practices through directives such as the “On the Transformation of the Struggle with Counter-Revolutionary Elements into an All-People All-Party Movement” proclamation and the KWP’s May 30 Resolution. These measures are comparable to South Africa’s Population Registration Act.
 
In both South Africa and North Korea, the Apartheid and the Songbun regimes were used to justify the geographical segregation and establishment of localities limiting the freedom of oppressed black South Africans and North Korea’s hostile class.[18] In South Africa, Apartheid laws designated ‘Bantustans’ as homeland areas for black residents, stripping them of citizenship rights and forcing mass relocations.[19] Similarly, North Korea’s “hostile” class faces restricted movement and employment in isolated areas, akin to Apartheid’s spatial segregation.[20] Both regimes employed policies that disrupted families and communities, enduring social and economic hardships.
 
Both Apartheid and Songbun enacted laws that enforced large-scale racial or social segregation, dictating where people could live based on their designated category. They formalized classification systems with identity cards, specifying racial groups in South Africa and background and birth origin groups in North Korea. These categorizations were used to justify forced removals and relocations of marginalized groups to designated areas. Additionally, both states suppressed dissent through laws banning gatherings and organizations perceived as threats, while their education systems perpetuated labor divisions and social inequality. Furthermore, both systems facilitated the exploitation of labor, including instances of forced labor, domestically and sometimes internationally, further entrenching systemic inequities.
 
Differences
 
However, there are also significant differences between the two systems. South Africa’s Apartheid regime, characterized as a crime against humanity, focused primarily on enforcing racial segregation and discrimination through government legislation. Its laws institutionalized racial inequality by restricting the rights and freedoms of non-white South Africans, enforcing separate facilities, and imposing harsh penalties on those who resisted. The system aimed to maintain white minority rule and economic dominance, perpetuating systemic oppression and marginalization of black, colored, and Indian communities.
 
In contrast, North Korea’s crimes against humanity under the Songbun system target groups based on perceived political loyalty and family background. Songbun categorizes individuals into core, wavering, and hostile social classes, dictating access to resources and opportunities. The regime uses Songbun to control and oppress its population, rewarding loyalists while punishing perceived dissenters through systemic discrimination and severe human rights abuses. Unlike Apartheid, which was primarily race-based, North Korea’s system is based on political allegiance and social background, reflecting the regime’s draconian control over every aspect of citizens’ lives. Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that some racial elements are also involved in Songbun.[21] Chinese individuals within families are barred from the core class and can only advance to the wavering class through strict adherence to regime policies. Those with Japanese backgrounds[22] face even harsher discrimination, affecting their songbun classification and treatment in North Korean society, despite occasional exceptions based on exceptional talents or circumstances.[23]

Legal Parallels and Applicable Laws to Apartheid in North Korea

In particular based on discrimination against those of “impure” ethnic background, North Korea’s Songbun system could meet the criteria of contemporary apartheid under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which defines crimes against humanity as “inhumane acts committed within an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups, aimed at maintaining that regime,” including murder, enslavement, torture, and persecution based on various grounds.[24] While South Africa’s crimes predominantly revolved around Apartheid and North Korea’s around the persecution of identifiable groups, both systems exhibit severe human rights abuses consistent with these categories.

Three pivotal international treaties apply to collectively target the crime of Apartheid: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Apartheid Convention, and the Rome Statute.[25] The ICERD, which entered into force in 1966, sets out to eliminate racial discrimination and Apartheid practices by affirming states’ obligations to prevent and eradicate such injustices.[26] In a comparable manner, Apartheid is defined by the Apartheid Convention, which has been in effect since 1976, as systematic oppression through cruel acts that uphold racial dominance and include denial of fundamental rights and discriminatory laws.[27] The 1998 Rome Statute, entered into force in 2002, establishes Apartheid as a crime against humanity in relation to pervasive or organized assaults on civilian populations.[28] While it adopts the same standards as the Apartheid Convention, it faces difficulties in defining "racial group" in accordance with international law.

Specifically, Article 2(h) of the Rome Statute defines Apartheid as inhumane acts similar to those in paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute, occurring within an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression by one racial group over others, aimed at maintaining control. The North Korean regime employs its own form of racism, emphasizing Korean racial superiority over all others. The Songbun system in North Korea, akin to Apartheid, institutionalized racial discrimination and domination by the Kim regime, highlighting the superiority of the Korean race over others and disadvantageous individuals with Chinese or Japanese heritage or backgrounds.[29] These discriminatory practices, alongside documented survivor testimonies and reports, illustrate the systemic oppression and suffering inflicted by both regimes on their respective populations.
 
Some scholars contend that the inclusion of Apartheid in the Rome Statute, which achieved customary international law status and is considered jus cogens—a peremptory norm of international law—is pivotal.[30] They argue that the crime of Apartheid remains relevant and applicable globally, not limited to its original context in South Africa. John Dugard, a South African professor of international law, underscores this view, suggesting that while the Apartheid Convention may have initially targeted South Africa, it now serves as a broader instrument under international law, encompassing systemic racial discrimination in any context. Numerous international legal instruments support this interpretation, such as the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention and the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind, both of which recognize Apartheid as a crime that is not geographically bound but rather as a universal condemnation of institutionalized racial oppression.[31]
 
Additionally, as Apartheid should be universally condemned as a crime for its institutionalization of racial oppression, scholars have aimed to advance different policy suggestions for eradicating this crime from North Korea.  . B. R. Myers, an American professor of international studies at Dongseo University in South Korea, focuses on internal public communication (propaganda) in order to understand how the North Korean regime constructs ideological legitimacy. The emphasis on racial purity in the regime’s own internal pronouncements leads Myers to conclude that rather than being a failed communist state, North Korea derives its legitimacy from “the claim to superior might, race-purity, and resolve”.[32] Based on these observations and his own upbringing in Apartheid-era South Africa, Myers believes that engagement with North Korea is more effective, and its opposite, isolation.
 
However, other commentators who lean towards engagement with North Korea find the comparisons between North Korean racism and Apartheid-era South Africa very uncomfortable. Marcus Noland notes that their reaction is understandable: they find it simpler to justify engaging with “misguided socialists” rather than with “racially obsessed fascists”.[33] For Americans in this category, the discomfort is amplified by the similarities to Ronald Reagan’s failed [34]“constructive engagement” approach towards South Africa’s Apartheid regime, which parallels current discussions on engaging with the Kim regime.[35]
 
Conclusion: A Step Forward

Both systems––South Africa’s Apartheid and North Korea’s Songbun––have been scrutinized for violating international human rights norms. North Korean decrees and resolutions established systemic discrimination against perceived political rivals, while Apartheid's Population Registration Act and later laws reinforced racial discrimination. These actions, which represent the systematic marginalization and repression of specific groups in each community, have been denounced under international law as crimes against humanity.

The Songbun system has escaped international attention despite its substantial ramifications, partly because outsiders are reluctant to recognize its coercive nature and the state maintains secrecy. The system exerts a persistent influence on the day-to-day lives of North Koreans, including through the extremely unequal distribution of resources. As long as North Korea's repressive system and acts of torture, unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, and harsh prison conditions continue, the international community must hold the country accountable for these atrocities.

Nevertheless, the enforcement of international regulations and convention against North Korea’s violations continues to face numerous challenges relative to the necessary fulfillment of the notion of sovereignty. North Korea’s non-ratification or non-signatory status for these conventions, limited jurisdiction of the ICC, and the nature of North Korea as a rogue and dictatorial regime impede the international community to take concrete steps to alter the course of the ongoing violations. However, despite these challenges, international pressure, diplomatic efforts, and advocacy through international organizations remain important tools to promote compliance with international conventions and norms, including those related to human rights and discrimination, including discrimination on the grounds of race. As a first step in combating Apartheid in all its forms, the international community must hold North Korea accountable for its chronic violations of international treaties. This will help protect the fundamental rights of all North Koreans. In particular, when providing humanitarian aid to North Korea, the international community could take steps to ensure that aid reaches the most vulnerable groups, including those disadvantaged under the Songbun system; for instance, the WFP should “develop more stringent monitoring and seek to assure the right to food for all those who are hungry, including those in neglected rural areas, street children and the up to 120,000 men, women and children held in the kwanliso prison labor camps”.[36] This is not the end, but rather another step forward in the international investigation of North Korea’s violations of human rights, indicating to the country and the international community that rapid action is required. The urgency of these efforts is underscored by the profound and ongoing impact on the lives of North Koreans, demanding swift and decisive international action.

SoEun Park is currently a research intern with HRNK. She is an undergraduate student at Harvard University concentrating in Government and Sociology.

[1] Collins, R. & The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2012). Marked for life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s social classification system. In Marked for Life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s Social Classification System. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Robertson, P. (2020, October 28). North Korea’s caste system. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/05/north-koreas-caste-system#:~:text=Kim's%20government%20based%20each%20citizen's,War%2C%20from%201950%20to%201953.
[5] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Collins_Apartheid_Songbun_Final.pdf
[6] Ibid.
[7]  Ibid.
[8]  Ibid.
[9]  Ibid.
[10]  Ibid.
[11]  Ibid.
[12] AUHRM Project Focus Area: The Apartheid | African Union. (n.d.). https://au.int/en/auhrm-project-focus-area-apartheid#:~:text=The%20Apartheid%20
[13] A history of Apartheid in South Africa | South African History Online. (n.d.). https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa
[14] Ibid.
[15] AUHRM Project Focus Area: The Apartheid | African Union. (n.d.).
[16] A history of Apartheid in South Africa | South African History Online. (n.d.).
[17] Ibid.
[18] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Note: Kim Jong-Un’s mother is an ethnic Korean who previously lived in Japan and was born in Osaka, Japan. For political reasons, the regime cannot reveal this to the wider population.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. (n.d.). International Criminal Court. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf
[25] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity.
[26] International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. (1965, December 21). United Nations Human Rights. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-elimination-all-forms-racia
[27] United Nations General Assembly. (1974). International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. In United Nations General Assembly Resolution. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf
[28] United Nations. (n.d.). United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml
[29] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Noland, M. (2014, February 11). Myers, Apartheid, and Engagement with North Korea. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/myers-apartheid-and-engagement-north-korea
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] COHEN, R. (2015, April 21). Must UN Agencies Also Fail in North Korea? 38 North. https://www.38north.org/2015/04/rcohen042115/

            North Korea and its weapons of mass destruction continue to pose a significant challenge for the international community. Pyongyang has been subject to multiple rounds of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. However, these sanctions have yielded mixed results at best, as North Korea maintains its bellicose attitude and doubles down on weapons development.

            Over time, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have become more threatening to regional and global security, but it is increasingly clear that North Korea’s nuclear proliferation problem is also a human rights problem. UNSC Resolution 2397, adopted in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in 2017, notes in its preamble that that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles occur at the expense of North Koreans “by diverting critically needed resources… when they have great unmet needs.”[1]

            At the same time, North Korea has a track record of evading sanctions by engaging in illicit economic activities, using the proceeds earned from such activities to fund its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile tests. The regime has shown a continued disregard for the well-being of its citizens by prioritizing regime security and nuclear weapons over the human rights of its citizens.

            North Korea’s ability to evade sanctions is enabled in part by external actors. This essay explores the maritime aspects of international sanctions enforcement and Chinese interference in said enforcement. UNSC Resolution 2397 further tightened the existing sanctions regime on North Korea by introducing, among others, a limit of 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons on the supply, sale, or transfer of crude oil to North Korea and 500,000 barrels on refined petroleum products.[2] It also placed special emphasis on targeting North Korea’s sanctions evasion, noting that it “is illicitly exporting coal and other prohibited items through deceptive maritime practices and obtaining petroleum illegally through ship-to-ship transfers.”[3] This places an obligation on UN member states to prevent such behavior and implement UNSC resolutions. Without concerted efforts to enforce sanctions, North Korea will be emboldened to evade sanctions with impunity.

North Korea’s Maritime Sanctions Evasion and International Response

              Despite Resolution 2397’s explicit denouncement of North Korea’s illicit maritime activities, they continue unabated. The UN Panel of Experts described ship-to-ship transfers as “a primary method of sanctions evasion” in its annual report for 2019.[4] These transfers also involve “increasingly advanced evasion techniques,” such as:
The disguising of vessels through ship identity theft and false Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions… contrary to International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations governing safety of life at sea, which require that AIS be in operation at all times… Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of tankers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the use of small, unregistered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and the use of additional vessels for transshipment.[5]

            These methods obfuscate the movements and identity of vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers and their cargo, allowing North Korea to breach limits on restricted goods imposed by the UNSC. The transfers are mostly concentrated within the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, and also the East Sea, off the coasts of Russia and North Korea.[6]

            North Korea’s sanctions evasion has been met with greater international efforts to enforce these sanctions. In 2018, U.S. officials revealed plans to expand the interception of ships violating UN sanctions with an emphasis on detecting ship-to-ship transfers, engaging in coordination talks with regional partners to crack down on illicit maritime activity.[7] This led to the creation of the Pacific Security Maritime Exchange (PSMX), an information-sharing initiative to monitor North Korea’s illicit activities and coordinate actions with allies and partners, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.[8]

            PSMX prevents North Korean sanctions evasion by identifying smuggling ships and illicit trading activities, which raises the cost of sanctions evasion by forcing the regime to “create more intricate, expensive, and complicated smuggling networks” and helping to disband existing black market networks.[9] Participating countries also contribute by periodically deploying military resources, such as naval vessels and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, to patrol the regions where ship-to-ship transfers commonly occur. These deployments primarily involve maritime surveillance activities—observing and identifying vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers, documenting evidence, and reporting illicit activities.

            Some deployments are done explicitly for the purpose of supporting the PSMX, such as Canada’s Operation NEON and Australia’s Operation Argos, while other deployments are part of larger missions to the Pacific region in general, as with the United Kingdom.[10] The former deployments occur with more frequency and regularity. Canada, for instance, has recorded ten deployments in total,[11] with Australia recording twelve deployments of maritime patrol aircraft and nine deployments of naval vessels as of September 2023.[12] New Zealand, for its part, has deployed maritime patrol aircraft six times since 2018,[13] and has recently pledged to increase its contributions with more frequent flying missions and sending ships for the first time.[14]

China’s Attitude Towards UN Sanctions

            As a permanent member of the UNSC, China exercises significant influence over the passage of UNSC resolutions. A discussion on why it previously voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea and how it views those sanctions is warranted.

            The current sanctions literature views sanctions as having three different purposes: “to coerce a change in a target’s behavior; to constrain a target from engaging in a proscribed activity; or to signal and/or stigmatize a target or others about the violation of an international norm.”[15] These purposes can be and are often intertwined, but not all three are always pursued simultaneously. Sanctions are also interpreted differently by different actors. This is especially the case for multilateral sanctions like those enacted at the UN, where China often has different priorities from the other UNSC members.

            China has historically been protective of North Korea, a diplomatic legacy from the Korean War and the broader Cold War period. Today, it still resists calls to place more pressure on North Korea. However, North Korea’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons since 2006 have strained its relations with China on occasion, culminating in China’s support for UN sanctions on North Korea. Wenxin Li and Ji Young Kim  argue China’s attitude shift was due to two external factors and one domestic factor: North Korea’s increasingly aggressive military policy, which provoked Chinese condemnation and outrage; American outreach and negotiations to reach agreements on UNSC resolutions; and worsening domestic perceptions of North Korea in state media and public opinion.[16]

            Nevertheless, while China endorsed stricter measures against North Korea, it is wary of applying too much pressure, which could result in regime collapse. Furthermore, China does not view the nuclear issue in a vacuum, but as an extension of the China-U.S. relationship. Li and Kim note that China-North Korea relations have improved since 2018 while China-U.S. relations have worsened, adding that China’s softening attitude on sanctions “came from China’s lack of trust toward the United States rather than China’s support to North Korea’s nuclear policy.”[17] China interprets the imposition of UN sanctions differently, even as it criticized North Korea for raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

            This supports Catherine Jones’ observation that while UN sanctions on North Korea are conventionally viewed through the lens of coercion and constraint, China “has primarily employed sanctions as a signaling device.”[18] It displays its displeasure with North Korea’s actions and claims to comply with UNSC resolutions, but China’s uneven implementation of sanctions in practice sends mixed signals.[19] This undermines the integrity and effectiveness of the sanctions regime. Moreover, China has recently vetoed new sanctions and suggested lifting some sanctions.[20] This demonstrates to North Korea that it has little to worry about from its neighbor. The emphasis on signaling rather than coercing or constraining also means that China is less partial to enforcement efforts by other states, as demonstrated by Beijing’s hostile response.

China’s Harassment of Sanctioning States

            Since the deployment of military assets to patrol the East China Sea and monitor acts of sanctions evasion, various countries have reported being harassed by the Chinese military. This is primarily done through “buzzing,” where Chinese aircraft deliberately fly close to the intended target. One of the earliest occurrences was in October 2018, when Chinese aircraft reportedly flew too close to a Canadian maritime patrol aircraft and “used improper radio procedure and ‘improper language’,” with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand experiencing similar harassment.[21]

            Another instance occurred in June 2019, where Chinese ships and aircraft shadowed two Canadian ships deployed for sanctions enforcement after they left Vietnam for the East China Sea.[22] Later, two fighter jets flew within 300 meters of the ships at 30 meters above the ocean level.[23] While Canada described these initial events as not putting Canadian crew at risk and “not provocative, hazardous or unexpected,” China doubled down on the tactic in 2022. Canada reported that between April and May that year, Chinese aircraft harassed Canada’s maritime patrol aircraft several times, flying so close that the Chinese aircrew were “very clearly visible” and sometimes forcing the Canadian aircrew to modify their own flight path so as to avoid potential collisions.[24] The “buzzing” intensified once more in October 2023, with a jet coming within 5 meters of Canadian aircraft, maneuvering such that the aircraft was in the jet’s blind spot, and releasing “multiple flares while flying close.”[25]

            In one instance involving Australian divers, meanwhile, China employed other methods. When an Australian vessel deployed divers to remove fishing nets that were entangled in its propellers, a Chinese destroyer approached it and began operating its sonar, forcing the divers to get out of the water and causing minor injuries.[26] The most recent disruption occurred in early June, when a Dutch ship and marine patrol helicopter were approached by Chinese forces.[27] More of these “buzzing” incidents can be expected in the future, as long as efforts to enforce maritime sanctions continue.
​
            China publicly criticizes international deployments by framing them as intrusions on national security. It condemned Britain’s decision to sail a warship through the Taiwan Strait after completing sanctions enforcement operations, saying that this behavior “harbored evil intentions.”[28] In the same vein, it accused Canada of violating its airspace “in the name of implementing resolutions,”[29] called on Australia to “stop making trouble in front of China’s doorstep,”[30] and accused the Dutch of being heinous by “falsely claiming to be carrying out a U.N. mission” while infringing upon Chinese jurisdiction.[31]

            China cannot directly criticize the enforcement of sanctions, as this is equivalent to publicly opposing UNSC resolutions. This helps explain Beijing’s claims that countries are using these resolutions as a cover to engage in nefarious activities against China. However, the fact that vessels engaging in ship-to-ship transfers are being identified and reported to the UN belies such claims. New Zealand’s missions alone recorded the observation of four ship-to-ship transfers and thirty vessels of interest, and the reporting of thirty-three vessels suspected of violating UN sanctions.[32] There has also been communication with China regarding illicit practices within its waters and appeals for China to help stop North Korean sanctions evasion.[33]

Concluding Remarks

            China’s support for strengthening sanctions once led some to hope of potential U.S.-China cooperation on denuclearizing North Korea.[34] This is unlikely today, given tense bilateral relations, but it does not change the fact that Chinese cooperation was instrumental in effectively implementing sanctions. When China reduced trade with North Korea and enforced sanctions more strictly, the combined pressure forced North Korea to negotiate terms for de-escalation.[35] This demonstrates the continued utility of sanctions as a means of coercion, provided they are implemented adequately.
​
            Countering sanctions evasion is critical for ensuring that the coercive power of sanctions is not compromised.[36] Through its actions, however, China abets North Korea’s illicit maritime sanctions evasion by disrupting international sanctions enforcement initiatives. It is also signaling to North Korea that its actions will be protected from scrutiny. Improving sanctions enforcement strengthens the strategic capabilities of sanctions, allowing them to be deployed as reliable tools in conjunction with negotiations and other policy instruments.[37] Contrary to what China claims, it must be made clear that any adjustments to the sanctions regime depends on North Korea making concrete commitments for a negotiated settlement and, at minimum, refraining from further nuclear weapons testing or development.

Wu Yang is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, with concentrations in global security and foreign policy, as well as a regional concentration in East and Southeast Asian studies.
​
[1] United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2397 (22 December 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2397, 1.
[2] Ibid, 2.
[3] Ibid, 4.
[4] United Nation Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), UN Doc, S/2019/171, 7.
[5] Ibid, 5.
[6] Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “DPRK Maritime Sanctions Enforcement,” International Law Studies 96, no. 1 (May 12, 2020), 103, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol96/iss1/5.
[7] Matt Spetalnick, Phil Stewart, and David Brunnstrom, “EXCLUSIVE-U.S. Prepares High-Seas Crackdown on N.Korea Sanctions Evaders-Sources,” Reuters, February 25, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/oil/exclusive-us-prepares-high-seas-crackdown-on-nkorea-sanctions-evaders-sources-idUSL2N1QE0FN/.
[8] U.S. Department of State, “Pacific Security Maritime Exchange,” accessed June 14, 2024, https://www.state.gov/pacific-security-maritime-exchange/.
[9] Ibid.
[10] “Pacific Patrol Ships Begin Third Year Deployed Broadening Their Mission,” Royal Navy, September 12, 2023, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2023/september/12/20230912-pacific-patrol-ships-begin-third-year-deployed-broadening-their-mission.
[11] Department of National Defence, “Operation NEON,” Government of Canada, October 2, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html.
[12] Defence Media, “Defence joins international effort to enforce sanctions on North Korea,” Defence Australia, September 16, 2023, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2023-09-16/defence-joins-international-effort-enforce-sanctions-north-korea. At the time of writing, Australia has since participated in more deployments.
[13] “RNZAF P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrols Monitor Suspected Evasions of UNSC Sanctions against North Korea,” New Zealand Defence Force, June 11, 2024, https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/rnzaf-p-8a-poseidon-maritime-patrols-monitor-suspected-evasions-of-united-nations-security-council-sanctions-against-north-korea/.
[14] Lucy Craymer, “New Zealand Will Increase Its Military Contribution to N. Korea Sanctions Monitoring,” Reuters, June 18, 2024, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-will-increase-its-military-contribution-n-korea-sanctions-monitoring-2024-06-18/.
[15] Thomas J. Biersteker, Marcos Tourinho, and Sue E. Eckert, “Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions,” in Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action, ed. Marcos Tourinho, Sue E. Eckert, and Thomas J. Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 21, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.002.
[16] Wenxin Li and Ji Young Kim, “Not a Blood Alliance Anymore: China’s Evolving Policy toward UN Sanctions on North Korea,” Contemporary Security Policy 41, no. 4 (2020): 612-615, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1741143.
[17] Ibid, 624-625.
[18] Catherine Jones, “Sanctions as Tools to Signal, Constrain, and Coerce,” Asia Policy 13, no. 3 (2018): 20–21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26497785.
[19] Ibid, 21-23.
[20] Michelle Nichols, “China, Russia Veto U.S. Push for More U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” Reuters, May 26, 2022, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-russia-veto-us-push-more-un-sanctions-north-korea-2022-05-26/.
[21] Murray Brewster, “Canadian Surveillance Plane Buzzed by Chinese off North Korea, DND Reveals,” CBC News, December 19, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/chinese-korea-embargo-aircraft-buzzed-harassment-1.4953093.
[22] Murray Brewster, “Chinese Jets Buzzed Canadian Naval Ships in East China Sea,” CBC News, June 27, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-fighters-buzzed-regina-asterix-east-china-sea-1.5193149.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Department of National Defence, “Statement from the Canadian Armed Forces,” Government of Canada, June 1, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/statement-from-the-canadian-armed-forces.html.
[25] Murray Brewster, “Chinese Fighters Engaged in ‘unsafe’ Intercept of Canadian Surveillance Plane, Commander Says,” CBC News, October 16, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-air-force-intercept-aurora-surveillance-1.6997852.
[26] “Australia Says Its Navy Divers Were Likely Injured by the Chinese Navy’s ‘unsafe’ Use of Sonar,” AP News, November 18, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-australia-navy-sonar-divers-12a9e6f228aa81272b9b74b87e0489a1.
[27] Brad Lendon, “Chinese Military Harassed Dutch Warship Enforcing UN Sanctions on North Korea, Netherlands Says,” CNN, June 10, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/10/asia/chinese-military-harass-dutch-warship-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.
[28] “China Condemns Britain for Taiwan Strait Warship Mission,” Reuters, September 27, 2021, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/british-frigate-sails-through-taiwan-strait-2021-09-27/.
[29] Joon Ha Park and Lina Park, “China Accuses Canadian Plane of ‘Intruding’ during North Korea Sanctions Mission,” NK News, October 18, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/10/china-accuses-canadian-plane-of-intruding-during-north-korea-sanctions-mission/.
[30] Micah McCartney, “China Denies Injuring Australian Navy Divers with Sonar,” Newsweek, November 21, 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/china-denies-injuring-australian-navy-divers-sonar-1845644.
[31] “China’s Defence Ministry Says Dutch Ship Incident ‘Heinous,’” Reuters, June 11, 2024, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-defence-ministry-says-dutch-ship-incident-heinous-2024-06-11/.
[32] “RNZAF P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrols Monitor Suspected Evasions of UNSC Sanctions against North Korea.”
[33] Michelle Nichols, “Exclusive: G7, Others Ask China to Stop North Korea Sanctions Evasion in Its Waters,” Reuters, July 21, 2023, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/g7-others-ask-china-stop-north-korea-sanctions-evasion-its-waters-2023-07-21/.
[34] See Donald Rauch, “The US and Chinese Navies Have Already Fought Piracy Together - Now They Can Rein in North Korea.,” Foreign Policy, March 1, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/01/the-chinese-navy-can-give-north-korean-sanctions-bite/.
[35] Woo-Jun Min and Sukhee Han, “Economic Sanctions against North Korea: The Pivotal Role of US–China Cooperation,” International Area Studies Review 23, no. 2 (June 1, 2020): 190, https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865920901896.
[36] Christopher J. Watterson, “What next for Sanctions against North Korea?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 5 (2019): 247–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1654270.
[37] Thomas J. Biersteker and Zuzana Hudáková, “International Sanctions on North Korea: Are They Working?,” in Understanding Kim Jong-Un’s North Korea: Regime Dynamics, Negotiation, and Engagement, ed. Chung-in Moon and Robert Carlin (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2022), 201, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=3375721&site=ehost-live&ebv=EB&ppid=pp_185.