By Sloane Thor
Edited by Diletta De Luca
​​
Introduction
          In recent years, dozens and hundreds of North Koreans have escaped their homeland and made the perilous passage across the Tumen River into China[1]. Many North Korean escapees flee from conditions defined by a chronic lack of food and rights due to the songbun system that leaves them disadvantaged and at risk of political persecution. Others leave to seek an income to maintain and support their families in North Korea (often to pay for medical treatment for a relative),[2] or to reunite with family that already left the country. Since the DMZ is full of landmines, the only way to reach freedom for these escapees is to go through China in order to eventually reach resettlement in South Korea.
          North Korean escapees are also vulnerable due to their status as illegal immigrants in China. The Chinese government does not grant refugee status or asylum to North Korean escapees, as it instead considers them illegal economic migrants.[3] This causes many North Koreans who cross the border into China to be subjected to exploitation due their undocumented status and the Chinese government’s refusal to implement the non-refoulement principle (outlined in the U.N.’s 1951 Refugee Convention), meaning that escapees who are caught will be forcibly repatriated back to North Korea where they will be heavily punished. They are often tortured and sent to prison camps for their defection, as it is seen as “treachery against the nation” by the North Korean Ministry of People’s Security.[4] North Korean escapees are not able to obtain working permits, or residency permits due to their “illegal”status in China.[5] This makes them dependent on Chinese citizens in order to obtain housing or work. Coupled with the lack of Chinese language skills, this leaves them extremely exploitable.
          North Korean female escapees are particularly easy targets for traffickers and brokers. They are easily manipulated due to age, status, risk of refoulment, and gender. The most prominent human rights abuses that befall North Korean women escapees are forced marriage, prostitution, and sexual slavery in the cyber realm.
 
The Vulnerability of North Korean Women
          The vulnerability of North Korean women makes them particularly easy targets for traffickers and brokers. Korean NGOs estimate that up to 80% of the female escapees become victims of human trafficking.[6] Victims are usually between the ages of 12 and 29 but some research reports victims as young as 9 years old.[7] Being undocumented and at the risk of refoulement makes it easy for traffickers to control them through threats of exposure to officials if they do not comply with their demands. The risk of refoulement means that victims of human trafficking are unable to ask for help or report to officials as they risk being sent back to North Korea and thus being treated worse than prior to escaping.
The undocumented status of North Korean women in China provides an environment where physical, sexual, mental, and emotional abuse are used to control the women to mold them into complaisant sex slaves. In a recent report published by Korea Future it is noted that North Korean women are subjected to “supplementary violence designed to induce compliance and delivered in the forms of starvation, physical beatings, and verbal threats of repatriation”.[8] This makes them easier to control and less likely to try to escape.

Arranged Marriages and the One-Child Policy
          30% of North Korean women who are trafficked in China are sold into forced marriages with Chinese men, often in rural areas.[9] This is because in China there is a high demand for young, sexually exploitable, and “marriage material” women as an effect of the “One-Child Policy”. This measure was enacted in 1979 and abolished in 2016, and it existed in a law that limited couples to only having one child as an attempt to curb a rapidly rising population. However, the policy resulted in a surplus of over 40 million boys[10] due to the male-dominated culture. The families tended to favor boys over girls as it was preferred to “have a male child to carry on the family’s name and inheritance.”[11] Thus, many Chinese women during this time were born in cities while few to none were born in rural areas as farm work was often carried out by men. This resulted in a high demand for brides in rural areas since the cities were far away and the Chinese women there were becoming educated and setting their sights on wealthier marriage partners This created a lucrative industry of “black-market brides” (trafficking victims from other countries) to remedy the vast gender imbalance, especially in rural areas of China.
Once a price is agreed upon by a broker and the soon-to-be Chinese husband, North Korean wives are relocated to the Chinese families who, fearing their escape,  heavily restrict their freedom of movement for weeks or months by withholding access to a mobile phone, the internet, or the ability to travel outside the property without a family member.[12] While in the village, North Korean women nevertheless are unlikely to be reported to the police or to other local authorities. Additionally, even if they are reported to local authorities, it remains highly unlikely that their presence is revealed to higher level officials. This can be due to bribes or the Chinese concept of guanxi, a system of social networks and relationships that facilitate deals and influence transactions. Guanxi, while an important part of Chinese culture, facilitates the trafficking industry by causing citizens to protect the illegal acts of others to gain favor or receive an advantage or benefit in return.
 
Prostitution and Brothels
          While forced marriage has long been the predominant fate for trafficked North Korean women, it has quickly been overtaken by prostitution. Korea Future estimates that prostitution in general accounts for about 6% of China’s GDP.[13] Currently, it is estimated that 50% of North Korean women who are trafficked in China are sold into brothels, karaoke bars, or other forms of forced prostitution.[14] Prostitution in China seems to be managed by criminal organizations who remain reliant upon the guanxi system and rarely operate nationwide as they prefer to opt for small regions or cities.[15] Many of these North Korean escapees work “in brothels masqueraded as entertainment or service venues, namely: bathhouses, saunas, karaoke bars, cafes, massage parlors, beauty parlors, barbershops, hair salons, small hotels, and restaurants”.[16] It is estimated that North Korean women engage with 2 to 4 men a night and are subjected to multiple forms of rape.[17] They are confined to the establishment and work under the instruction of a pimp or madam. In Shanghai, to avoid abduction by rival organizations and to signify ownership, some North Korean women are branded with tattoos, such as lions and butterflies.”[18] Criminal organizations work closely with corrupt or bribed officials to prevent the escape by the abducted North Korean escapees.[19]
 
The Chinese Cybersex Industry
          With the emergence of the internet, North Korean women who become trafficking victims have been increasingly sold into the cybersex industry. These women are trapped in small apartments with a handful of other women and are sexually assaulted or forced to perform graphic sexual acts via webcam online for paying male clientele.[20] “Unlike bars or brothels with a permanent address, cybersex trafficking victims can be moved to and abused in any location with an internet connection and a webcam, or just a mobile phone”.[21] The cybersex exploitation of North Korean victims takes place on platforms that can be “rudimentary, deliberately inconspicuous, or simply well-known and widely available video-chat services”.[22] The majority of clients utilizing these platforms, particularly chatrooms, tend to be from South Korea, where pornography and prostitution are illegal.[23]
          Off-camera, victims face “coercion, starvation, intimidation, and brutalization”.[24] They are forced to cover up bruises sustained from the acts performed or from abuse by their handler with makeup and cover up hair loss with wigs.[25] Many are often subjected to drug abuse in order to force them to work longer hours and “dull their shame”. [26] Their handlers often dangle the chance of freedom in front of them, telling them that they can go free once they have paid off their debt or the money it took to buy them. However, the women will never see a cent from their work and will not obtain freedom as they remain trapped in a vicious cycle of abuse.[27]

Concluding Remarks
          “Urgent and immediate action, which will run contrary to the prevailing politics of inter-Korean dialogue, is needed to save the lives of countless female North Korean refugees in China”.[28] China has been complicit when it comes to perpetrating and helping cover up human rights abuses against North Korean escapees within its own borders. It has notably become a hub and a destination country for human trafficking.[29] The usage of human trafficking, predominantly of vulnerable populations such as North Korean women, has been an unethical but easy remedy to the surplus of unmarried men left in the wake of the One-Child policy. China is notably a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 2003 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons put forth by the United Nations. Refusing to implement the non-refoulment principle violates the North Korean escapees’ fundamental human rights, from the right to a fair trial to protection from torture. By denying North Korean escapees the right to asylum and refusing to grant them the status of refugees, the Chinese government is directly responsible for the vulnerability and exploitation of North Korean people, particularly when it comes to women and children in their own country.
          As a signatory of multiple U.N. conventions to protect human rights and as a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council, it is of the utmost importance that China adhere to the bylaws it agreed to as it sets a precedent for other nations. The Chinese government should grant North Korean escapees the right to asylum in China as well as refugee status. Banning the practice of forced repatriation is imperative to implementing the non-refoulement principle.

Sloane Thor is a first-year graduate student in the Masters of Asian Studies Program at the Elliott School of International Affairs. As a recipient of the GWIKS Academy of Korean Studies Fellowship, she is excited to pursue her interest in North Korean human rights and inter-peninsular politics. Sloane Thor graduated cum laude from Wittenberg University with a major in East Asian Studies and minors in Mandarin Chinese language and Literature, Political Science, and International Studies. Her passion for North Korean human rights began after studying abroad in South Korea for a semester at Yonsei University in Seoul. During her time there she took a class on North Korean human rights and the U.N. taught by HRNK CEO Greg Scarlatoiu, which prompted her to write a  thesis style paper on North Korean humanrights for her senior capstone project when she returned  to the United States. She currently speaks,reads, and writes Korean at an intermediate level and has advanced proficiency in Chinese and French. As a second-year intern at HRNK she is excited to pursue the topic of North Koreans in China further along with studying North Korean propaganda. She hopes to bring her language skills into use whether it is through translating or cultural literacy when it comes to resources. 

[1] King, Robert R. “Number of North Korean Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two Decades.” CSIS, January 27, 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades.
[2] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China. Washington, D.C.: U.S. (2009). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf.
[3] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China. Washington, D.C.: U.S. (2009). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf.
[4] “World Report 2020: Rights Trends in North Korea.” Human Rights Watch, January 22, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/north-korea.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Zaugg, Julie. “These North Korean Defectors Were Sold into China as Cybersex Slaves. Then They Escaped.” CNN, June 10, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/09/asia/north-korea-defectors-intl-hnk/index.html.
[7] Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.” Forbes, July 1, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/07/01/trafficking-of-north-korean-women-in-china/?sh=1777b7187af0.
[8] Yoon, Hee-soon. “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.” (2019). Korea Future Initiative. http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[9] Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.”
[10] Lisa Cameron, Dan-dan Zhang, and Xin Meng, “China’s One-Child Policy: Effects on the Sex Ratio and Crime.” Institute for Family Studies, December 19, 2018.
[11] Kathleen Davis, “Brides, Bruises and the Border: The Trafficking of North Korean Women into China.” SAIS Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): 131-141, 133.
[12] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.”
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.”
[15] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.”
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative. http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[21] “Cybersex Trafficking - International Justice Mission.” IJM, September 2016. https://www.ijm.org/sites/default/files/IJM_2016_Casework_FactSheets_CybersexTrafficking.pdf.
[22] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[23] Ji-an, Son Hyeon-yoo & Seo. “Attention for Digital Sex Crimes: A Push for Reform in South Korea.” 한양저널, June 1, 2020. https://www.hanyangian.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=992.
[24] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[25] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[26] Sang-hun, Choe. “After Fleeing North Korea, Women Get Trapped as Cybersex Slaves in China.” The New York Times, September 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/asia/north-korea-cybersex-china.html#:~:text=With%20nowhere%20to%20turn%20for,in%20a%20report%20in%20May.
[27] Zaugg, Julie. “These North Korean Defectors Were Sold into China as Cybersex Slaves. Then They Escaped.” CNN, June 10, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/09/asia/north-korea-defectors-intl-hnk/index.html.
[28] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[29] Micallef, Etienne. “China, EU Work to Combat Human Trafficking.” International Organization for Migration, November 15, 2016. https://www.iom.int/news/china-eu-work-combat-human-trafficking.

By Max Smith
Edited by Diletta de Luca, HRNK Research Associate       

          On February 18, 2016, in response to North Korea’s fifth nuclear test, the Obama administration signed into law the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (NKSPEA). The NKSPEA represented the first piece of comprehensive North Korea sanctions legislation in the United States, building on a series of U.S. executive orders and UN resolutions. In addition to mandating the designation of individuals involved in human rights abuses, the legislation set out the conditions under which sanctions may be lifted. These include the dismantling of North Korea’s weapons programs, the release of political prisoners, the lifting of censorship, the establishment of an open society, and the accounting for and repatriation of U.S. citizens.[1] In this way, the NKSPEA, as well as UN and other national sanctions regimes, are a means of coercing North Korea into improving its dismal human rights record. Additionally, by denying the North Korean military and security apparatus easy access to funds, sanctions inhibit the North Korean regime’s ability to easily perpetrate human rights abuses. However, almost ten years after the enactment of the NKSPEA, not only has no progress been made towards human rights benchmarks, but the situation has deteriorated. North Korea has been developing its military capabilities at an alarming rate,[2] it has further cracked down on human rights by instituting draconian punishments for cultural violations,[3] and its network of political prison camps remains operational.[4] Furthermore, despite the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea is arguably at its most resilient.[5] The Kim regime has been amassing vast amounts of wealth through illicit trading, the dispatching of workers overseas, and cybercrime.[6] It is clear, therefore, that the sanctions regime imposed on North Korea is in urgent need of strengthening if progress on human rights is to be achieved.
 
          There are indications that 2025 could become a critical turning point for North Korean sanctions enforcement: the year marks both the inaugural meeting of the new Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), a group of nations who have volunteered to monitor the implementation of North Korea sanctions outside of the UN, and the first months of a new U.S. presidential administration. The creation of a new sanctions monitoring group could allow for more effective enforcement, as previous efforts under the UN Panel of Experts were obstructed by Russia and China.[7] Meanwhile, a new administration in the White House could mean a new direction for U.S. sanctions policy. However, caution is warranted. North Korea and its enablers, in particular Russia and China, have grown increasingly brazen in their violation of international sanctions making enforcement more complex. The Kim regime’s survival has been facilitated through illicit imports taking place in Chinese waters,[8] sales of weapons to support Russia’s war in Ukraine,[9] and access to the international financial system through Russian and Chinese banks.[10] Russia and China have also been vocal advocates for reducing sanctions against North Korea.[11] This culminated in Russia vetoing the renewal of the Panel of Experts’ mandate in 2024[12]. The challenge therefore not only lies in whether to expand sanctions, but also in ensuring they are effectively implemented amid widespread non-compliance and increasingly sophisticated evasion methods. Whether the MSMT and the Trump administration are equipped to meet this challenge remains uncertain, particularly given the possibility that the Trump administration’s attitudes regarding cryptocurrency and tariffs may make enforcement more difficult. The current White House’s relaxed stance on cryptocurrency regulatory enforcement may inadvertently discourage virtual asset service providers from adhering to their anti-money laundering responsibilities.[13] Meanwhile, the recent sweeping tariff announcements have threatened the United States’ position in the global economy and created space for less tightly monitored financial centers.[14] Finally, overshadowing all discussions on the direction of U.S. sanctions is the possibility of renewed negotiations between the United States and North Korea. While such talks could initially result in stricter sanctions, there is a risk that they could be lifted before any meaningful progress is achieved on human rights issues.
 
          Although sanctions have been extensive on paper, they have so far not been fully enforced. North Korea has continued to engage in illicit trade, dispatch overseas workers, and carry out cyberattacks with minimal consequences. On November 21, 2023, 55 countries submitted a report to the 1718 UN Sanctions Committee, the body established to oversee the implementation of sanctions on North Korea, stating that the cap on oil deliveries to North Korea had been breached, possibly by as many as one million barrels.[15] The ships involved in illicit trading have utilized a number of techniques to disguise their actions, such as transmitting false global navigation satellite systems signals, vessel identity laundering, “flag hopping,” and by using complex ownership and management structures.[16] Multilateral cooperation from all stakeholders is needed, to share information on, investigate, and enforce these sanction evasion attempts.[17] However, Russia and China rejected calls to take action, despite this trade occurring in Chinese waters and involving Russian and Chinese entities.[18] Alongside trading, North Korea also continues to maintain access to the international financial system. The 2024 report of the UN Panel of Experts found representatives of North Korean banks present in China, Russia, and Indonesia, in contravention of UN Resolutions 2270 and 2321.[19] This implies that North Korean banks, which manage funds for the country’s defense industry and security apparatus, as well as the Kim family, may be operating overseas.[20] The Panel of Experts also investigated several joint ventures involving North Korean nationals in Russia, as well as Chinese bank accounts maintained by an alleged North Korean Ministry of People’s Armed Forces subsidiary.[21] However, perhaps the most brazen example of enabled sanctions violations remains the infamous transfer of North Korean weapons to Russian forces in support of their war against Ukraine.[22] North Korea’s support for the Russian invasion has increased Moscow’s incentives to block or weaken sanctions against Pyongyang.[23] A clear example of this occurred last year, when Russia vetoed a resolution to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts, effectively terminating their role in support of the 1718 UN Sanction Committee.[24]
 
          Now that the Panel of Experts has been disbanded, its functions have been assumed by the MSMT. The Panel of Experts was created to assist the 1718 UN Sanctions Committee through gathering information and making recommendations.[25] This means that whilst the UN sanctions regime against North Korea remains in place and is still enforced by the 1718 Committee, there is no longer a UN-mandated body providing expert reporting and advice on sanctions enforcement. Instead, South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, France, Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands have created a new body to monitor the enforcement of sanctions outside of the UN framework - the MSMT. While the MSMT introduces a new framework compared to the former Panel of Experts, the enforcement of sanctions will still pose substantial difficulties. Russia and China’s absence could give the MSMT greater freedom to report violations involving their entities, which otherwise may have been obstructed.[26] However, this comes at the cost of reduced international legitimacy.[27] MSMT recommendations will likely go unheeded by the 1718 Committee, as well as potentially other countries, as they originate from a non-UN and Western-dominated body.[28] Russia criticized the Panel of Experts for “kowtowing to Western powers,” and will almost certainly make a similar argument to disregard the findings of the MSMT whilst it sits on the 1718 Committee.[29] There is also the risk that MSMT members may exercise restraint to preserve diplomatic ties with countries found to be in contravention of UN sanctions.[30] This must all be taken into account alongside the fact that the MSMT will face the same challenges as the Panel of Experts regarding the sanctions evasion techniques used by North Korean agents. The MSMT must somehow curtail North Korea’s illicit trading and access to the financial system without the support of the UN framework. The MSMT will have to rely on its capacity to influence the national sanctions regimes of its members, as well as potentially engage with other states by offering a means of reducing exposure to costly UN sanctions violations.[31] This latter point is even more so the case with multinational corporations, who have a greater incentive to avoid the reputational and material risks of being found to have contravened UN sanctions.[32] Thus, crucial to the MSMT’s success will be the diplomatic initiative of its members to engage with both state and non-state third parties, as well as a willingness to embrace the principles of impartiality and inclusivity. In this way, the MSMT will be able to build trust, set standards, and establish itself as a legitimate successor to the Panel of Experts. However, the MSMT must go further in order to overcome the challenges the Panel of Experts faced. Targeting those culpable of knowingly evading sanctions lies with the individual members, the strength of their own sanctions regimes, and their ability to effect compliance among state and non-state actors. Though the MSMT cannot easily interdict illicit trade in the waters surrounding North Korea, it can designate vessels, companies, and individuals involved. Domestic legislation can then be utilized to seize the assets of designated entities, prevent them from doing business in certain jurisdictions, or even arrest them. The MSMT can take action against those facilitating North Korea’s access to the financial system in the same way. This impact will grow if the MSMT is able to gain the compliance of key financial and maritime hubs, potentially to the extent that it surpasses the influence of the Panel of Experts. Nevertheless, this depends on the efforts made by individual members of the MSMT.
 
          As the largest member of the MSMT, the United States is a key player. Even though the United States cannot directly prevent illicit trade between Russia, China, and North Korea, its ability to restrict access to the international financial system gives it significant influence in enforcing sanctions. In Donald Trump’s previous term, the number of new U.S. Treasury Department North Korea designations peaked at 137 individuals, vessels, and entities in 2017.[33] This had an observable effect on North Korea’s economy, with its GDP estimated to have fallen by 3.5%.[34] With Donald Trump once again in the White House, there are expectations for the tightening of the sanctions regime. Indeed, it appears as though the pace of designations is increasing, with six new designations as of May 12, five months into his presidency.[35] However, there are also several reasons to remain cautious. The Trump administration’s favorable attitude regarding cryptocurrency, tariffs, and potential United States-North Korea talks provide reasons to be wary about the prospect of a revived and strengthened sanction regime. Cryptocurrency has provided a source of illicit funds for the Kim regime, and virtual asset ‘mixers’ offer the means to launder illegally obtained virtual currency.[36] Easing off on the regulation of cryptocurrency and virtual asset service providers may therefore create vulnerabilities which North Korean cyber-actors can exploit to evade sanctions. Further issues are created by the Trump administration’s preference for tariffs as a form of coercive diplomacy, as the diplomatic backlash of excessive tariffs pushes nations to economically realign themselves away from the United States. Whilst these two factors potentially create vulnerabilities in the existing sanctions architecture, the prospect of U.S. negotiations with North Korea could alter it significantly as the Trump administration attempts to coerce the Kim regime. This could result in tightened sanctions in the short-term but may see them relaxed before they are able to have any meaningful impact on improving the North Korean human rights situation.
 
          The proliferation of cryptocurrency and other virtual assets has provided North Korea with a large source of illicit funds. The Panel of Experts’ 2020 midterm report found that North Korean cyber-actors were targeting the virtual asset industry to avoid sanctions.[37] Reinforcing the sanctions regime therefore requires tightening regulations and standards when it comes to cryptocurrency. This is all the more the case considering that the proceeds of cybercrime may be the Kim regime’s primary source of income.[38] The report found that North Korean cyber-actors were using loosely regulated virtual asset service providers and brokering services to convert illicitly obtained virtual assets into clean fiat currency.[39] The virtual assets industry is an ideal target for North Korean cybercriminals, as its rapid growth has often come at the cost of cyber security.[40] Government intervention, both in the form of designating and taking down platforms, and in the introduction of cybersecurity standards and best-practices, is needed to address these vulnerabilities. However, equally important is industry cooperation and acceptance of standards.[41] The Trump administration’s overhaul of cryptocurrency policies therefore has negative implications when it comes to the enforcement of sanctions, as it may discourage the stringent due-diligence needed to protect against cybercriminals, including those stealing and laundering funds on behalf of the North Korean regime.  A recent memo from the Department of Justice narrowed the scope of enforcement by directing prosecutors not to charge regulatory violations in cases involving digital assets.[42] Though exceptions are made for organized crime and terrorism, this directive may encourage firms to de-prioritize their anti-money laundering obligations, thus opening the door wider for malicious actors.[43] Also necessary to consider is the Trump administration’s interactions with figures in the industry, which signal a move away from enforcing much-needed standards. On March 27th, Trump granted pardons to three co-founders of the cryptocurrency exchange “BitMEX,” who had failed to properly implement anti-money laundering and know-your-customer programs.[44] These pardons arguably undermine the virtual asset regulatory framework by showing presidential support for industry leaders who did not fulfill their obligations. From the perspective of sanctions enforcement, it is crucial to ensure that virtual asset service providers do their part, by implementing the required programs, ensuring the robust cybersecurity of their platforms, and freezing coins they believe to be linked to crime. If virtual asset service providers de-prioritize their due diligence obligations, then more opportunities will be given to North Korea’s network of cybercriminals to conduct cryptocurrency theft and launder the proceeds of illicit activity. This would weaken the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement, by allowing the North Korean regime easy access to an alternative source of funds, and by making it harder for sanctions enforcement agencies to identify revenue generated by sanctioned activity.
 
          The Trump administration’s attitude towards tariffs is another reason to be cautious regarding the future of the sanctions regime. Thanks to the dollar’s status in the global economy, even many non-U.S. banks clear international transactions through correspondent accounts in U.S. banks.[45] The United States’ ability to exercise a large degree of control over access to the global financial system gives its national sanctions regime far more force than those of other countries.[46] However, the United States’ position in the global economy has been threatened by the tariff announcement on April 2, which harmed the United States’ diplomatic reputation and signified a reordering of the economic order.[47] Some countries have moved away from the United States in response to the tariff threat, and as a result have less incentive to comply with the U.S. sanctions regime.[48] This was the case in Southeast Asia, where particularly high tariffs have paved the way for China to exert greater influence.[49] Though nations there are moving to preserve ties with the United States, the tariffs have already damaged trust.[50] This means that as well as reducing economic incentives to follow U.S. diplomatic initiatives, these tariffs have negatively affected U.S. soft power in the region. Southeast Asia is an important region when it comes to the enforcement of sanctions, as nations in the region still maintain ties to North Korea.[51] Laos in particular, is a sanctions evasion hotspot, being home to numerous North Korean restaurants which generate cash for the regime.[52] The compliance of these nations is crucial for effective sanctions enforcement, but this will be difficult to achieve as the United States loses influence in the region. By reducing the United States’ influence globally, the tariffs have also created room for alternative financial centers, which lack either the capacity or will to enforce sanctions with the same intensity as the United States.[53] The EU is one such example. Though economically powerful and an important financial hub, the efficacy of its sanctions is undermined by uneven enforcement across Member States, and a relative lack of experience compared to the United States.[54] In this way the tariffs have inadvertently and indirectly relieved pressure on North Korea and its enablers. As the United States steps back from the center of the global economy, vulnerabilities are created which the Kim regime will be able to exploit.
 
          Finally, the direction of U.S. sanctions will undoubtedly be influenced by whether or not the Trump administration attempts to once again negotiate with North Korea. It has been reported that the White House and State Department are preparing for possible talks with the Kim regime.[55] In the event that the Trump administration decides to try and force North Korea to the table, it is likely that sanctions against North Korea will be tightened to impose maximum pressure before negotiations.[56] This approach is especially likely given that weakened sanctions enforcement in recent years has allowed North Korea to reach a stronger position than it held in 2019.[57] With Russia now acting as a strategic backer, North Korea may feel less compelled to enter negotiations at all.[58] Therefore, if the Trump administration is indeed seeking talks, stronger sanctions will be a prerequisite. However, there is no guarantee that, once implemented, sanctions will last. Historically, U.S. presidents have offered sanctions relief in exchange for commitments from North Korea.[59] For instance, prior even to the June 2018 Singapore summit, the Trump administration intervened to pause the enforcement of sanctions.[60] More worrying though is the fact that human rights issues are unlikely to be an agenda item. Human rights were not mentioned in the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 2007 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, the 2012 Leap Day Agreement, and, most significantly given that it resulted from Trump’s previous diplomatic efforts regarding North Korea, the Joint Statement of the 2018 Singapore summit.[61] This means that regardless of the direction the sanctions regime takes in relation to talks, it is unlikely to have any meaningful significance for human rights improvements in North Korea.
 
          Despite North Korean human rights being mentioned in the NKSPEA, the inconsistent and weak enforcement of the sanction regime means that North Korea has been able to continue to violate the human rights of its people. In theory, the conditions set out in the NKSPEA imply that there are legally enforceable human rights benchmarks which must be met before sanctions are lifted.[62] However, these conditions mean little if North Korea is able to evade sanctions with impunity. For this reason, the sanction regime against North Korea must be both extensive and well enforced. Even if formal North Korean commitment to improving human rights is essentially impossible, denying funds to the regime and its proxies could at least weaken its grip on the population.[63] The formation of the MSMT may be a reason to be optimistic in this regard, given its potential to more effectively report violations enabled by Russia and China. However, there are also reasons to be skeptical. On top of the existing challenges in sanctions enforcement, the MSMT will face issues with its legitimacy which may hinder its reporting and enforcement capabilities. In addition, the MSMT’s power is highly dependent on the national sanctions regimes of its members, in particular the United States. Consequently, whether 2025 will be the necessary turning point in sanctions enforcement depends upon the decisions of the new Trump administration, whose policies so far have created vulnerabilities in the international sanctions regime. To conclude, while 2025 may be described as a year of change in sanctions enforcement, it remains uncertain whether these changes will lead to the stronger sanctions regime needed to restrict the North Korean regime’s ability to conduct widespread human rights abuses, and pressure it towards improving human rights.

Max Smith, currently a research intern with HRNK, studied Korean for four years at SOAS University of London. During this time, he also spent a year abroad at Seoul National University. Whilst studying, he focused much of his independent research on South Korean foreign policy, including by analyzing different administrations’ approaches to North Korea.
In his final year at SOAS, Max cemented his interest in North Korean issues through a class on North Korean history, politics and society. After graduating, he built on this knowledge further through a two-month internship at the South Korean human rights organization PSCORE.
Max is currently doing a master’s degree in East Asian Studies at the University of Turku. For his master’s thesis, he plans on researching how foreign IGOs and NGOs can influence North Korean policy to improve the humanitarian and human rights situation there.
 
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[1] 114th Congress of the United States, "Text - H.R.757 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016," February 18, 2016, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/757/text.
[2] Vibhu Mishra, “DPR Korea Ploughing Ahead with Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programme,” UN News, May 7, 2025: https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/05/1163016.
[3] Robert Collins, Greg Scarlatoiu (ed.), “North Korea’s Lawfare Strategy,” HRNK Insider, October 30, 2024, https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2024/10/north-koreas-lawfare-strategy.html.
[4] See for example: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Greg Scarlatoiu, and Raymond Ha, “North Korea’s Political Prison Camp Kwan-li-so No. 25, Update 4,” Washington D.C.: The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024.
[5] Ruediger Frank, “The New North Korea: How Geopolitical Advantages and Growing Middle Class Prosperity Challenge the Next South Korean President,” 38 North, April 22, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2025/04/the-new-north-korea-how-geopolitical-advantages-and-growing-middle-class-prosperity-challenge-the-next-south-korean-president/; Daniel Sneider, “Is North Korea the Next Target of Trump’s Search for a Deal?,” Korea Economic Institute, April 30, 2025, https://keia.org/the-peninsula/is-north-korea-the-next-target-of-trumps-search-for-a-deal/.
[6] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2024/215, March 7, 2024, pp. 49-54, pp. 59-61, pp. 64-65; See also: Joe Tidy, “North Korean Hackers Cash Out Hundreds of Millions from $1.5bn ByBit Hack,” BBC, March 10, 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2kgndwwd7lo.
[7] Christopher J. Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring: Can the MSMT Pick Up Where the Panel of Experts Left Off?,” 38 North, April 16, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2025/04/the-new-face-of-north-korean-sanctions-monitoring-can-the-msmt-pick-up-where-the-panel-of-experts-left-off/
[8] The 2020 midterm report by the Panel of Experts recorded illicit coal trading taking place in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area: United Nations Security Council, Midterm report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2020/840, August 28, 2020, p. 19, pp. 136-139; see also Ibid, p. 130; See also United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, pp. 21-22.
[9] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, pp. 34-38, pp. 276-285.
[10] Ibid,  p. 53, and pp. 445-455.
[11] Kim Eun-Bin, “Korea’s Foreign Ministry Protests China and Russia’s Calls for Ending Sanctions on North,” Korea JoongAng Daily, May 14, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-05-14/national/northKorea/Koreas-Foreign-Ministry-protests-China-and-Russias-calls-for-ending-sanctions-on-North/2307281.
[12] United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” SC/15648, March 28, 2024. https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15648.doc.htm.
[13] Sharon McCarthy and Victor Suthammanont, “DOJ’s New Crypto Guidance Muddies the Prosecutorial Waters,” Bloomberg Law, April 23, 2025, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/dojs-new-crypto-crime-guidance-muddies-the-prosecutorial-waters.
[14] Shilo Grayson, “Trump’s Tariffs are Replacing Sanctions,” Royal United Services Institute, April 29, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/trumps-tariffs-are-replacing-sanctions.
[15] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, p. 20 and p. 147.
[16] Ibid, pp. 23-24.
[17] Ibid, pp. 25-26
[18] United Nations Security Council, Midterm report of the Panel of Experts, S/2020/840, August 28, 2020, p. 19, pp. 136-139; see also Ibid, p. 130; See also United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, pp. 21-22.
[19] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, p. 53, and pp. 445-455.
[20] The Korea Daesong Bank is affiliated with Office (Bureau) 39, which is notorious for its involvement in money-laundering and counterfeiting, see Joshua Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” Washington D.C.: The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023, p. 13; The Foreign Trade Bank was designated by the United States for facilitating transactions linked to weapons proliferation, see ibid, p. 47.
[21] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, p. 54.
[22] Ibid, pp. 34-38, pp. 276-285.
[23] Samuel Ramani, “From Reluctant Enforcer to Outright Saboteur: Russia’s Crusade Against North Korea Sanctions,” 38 North, June 24, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/06/from-reluctant-enforcer-to-outright-saboteur-russias-crusade-against-north-korea-sanctions/.
[24] United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
[25] United Nations Security Council, “Work and Mandate,” accessed May 21, 2025,https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/work_mandate
[26] Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring: Can the MSMT Pick Up Where the Panel of Experts Left Off?”; Karl Dewey and Zuzanna Gwadera, “A New Mechanism for North Korean Sanctions,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 13, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/12/a-new-mechanism-for-north-korean-sanctions-monitoring/.
[27] Hyonhee Shin, “US, South Korea, Japan Unveil New Team to Monitor North Korea Sanctions,” Reuters, October 16, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-south-korea-japan-unveil-new-team-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-2024-10-16/; Christy Lee, “New Body to Monitor North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Faces Doubts About Legitimacy,” VOA, October 17, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/new-body-to-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-enforcement-faces-doubts-about-legitimacy/7827082.html.
[28] Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring;” Nika Pasko, “Monitoring Without Mandate: Can Sanctions Succeed Outside a UN Framework?,” The Interpreter, March 18, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/monitoring-without-mandate-can-sanctions-succeed-outside-un-framework; Christy Lee, “New Body to Monitor North Korea Sanctions.”
[29] “General Assembly Debates Russia’s Veto of DPR Korea Sanctions Panel,” UN News, April 11, 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148431. 
[30] Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring.”
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Go Myong-Hyun, “Not Under Pressure - How Pressure Leaked Out of North Korea Sanctions,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, June, 18, 2020, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/not-under-pressure-how-pressure-fizzled-out-of-north-korea-sanctions/. 
[34] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” p. 59.
[35] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Recent Actions,” accessed May 8, 2025, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions.
[36] Alex O’Neil, “Upholding North Korea Sanctions in the Age of Decentralised Finance,” London: Royal United Services Institute, 2024, pp.3-4.
[37] Panel of Experts, S/2020/840, p. 60.
[38] O’Neil, “Upholding North Korea Sanctions in the Age of Decentralised Finance,” p. 6.
[39] Panel of Experts, S/2020/840, p. 44.
[40] O’Neil, “Upholding North Korea Sanctions in the Age of Decentralised Finance,” p. 8.
[41] Ibid, p. 23.
[42] McCarthy and Suthammanont, “DOJ’s New Crypto Guidance Muddies the Prosecutorial Waters.”
[43] Ibid.
[44] Eamon Javers and Dan Mangan, “Trump Pardons Three BitMEX Crypto Exchange Co-Founders, and Ex-Employee,” CNBC, March 29, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/28/trump-pardon-bitmex-crypto-exchange-money-laundering.html?msockid=05e700f335bc642b29200fd934e465ce.
[45] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” pp. 23-24.
[46] Erika Szyszczak, “Sanctions Effectiveness: What Lessons Three Years into the War on Ukraine?” Economics Observatory, February 19, 2025, https://www.economicsobservatory.com/sanctions-effectiveness-what-lessons-three-years-into-the-war-on-ukraine.
[47] Grayson, “Trump’s Tariffs are Replacing Sanctions.”
[48] Ibid; Max Yoeli, “Trump’s Tariff Policy Undermines His Own Agenda and the Foundations of US Economic Power,” Chatham House, April 16, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/trumps-tariff-policy-undermines-his-own-agenda-and-foundations-us-economic-power.
[49] Ben Bland, “Trump’s Tariffs will Push Southeast Asia Uncomfortably Close to China,” Chatham House, April 8, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/trumps-tariffs-will-push-southeast-asia-uncomfortably-close-china
[50] Ibid.
[51] Khang Vu, “North Korea and its Socialist Friends in Southeast Asia,” The Interpreter, April 12, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/north-korea-its-socialist-friends-southeast-asia.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Erika Szyszczak, “Sanctions Effectiveness: What Lessons Three Years into the War on Ukraine?”
[55] Barak Ravid and David Lawler, “Scoop: Trump Admin Game-Planning for Potential North Korea Talks,” Axios, April 27, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/04/27/north-korea-talks-kim-jong-un-trump; “Trump Says He Still Has Good Relations with Leader of ‘Nuclear Power’ North Korea,” Reuters, March 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-he-still-has-good-relations-with-leader-nuclear-power-north-korea-2025-03-13/; Seung-ho Lee, “U.S. State Department, White House Reportedly Preparing for Talks with North,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 28, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-28/national/northKorea/US-State-Department-White-House-reportedly-preparing-for-talks-with-North/2295309.
[56] Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring.”
[57] Sneider, “Is North Korea the Next Target of Trump’s Search for a Deal?”
[58] Hyun-Ju Park, “North Korea’s Ukraine War Admission May Have Potential Trump Talks in Mind, Experts Say,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 28, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-28/national/northKorea/North-Koreas-Ukraine-war-admission-may-have-potential-Trump-talks-in-mind-experts-say/2295521; Song Sang-ho, “Russia-N. Korea Partnership Will Impact Trump’s Leverage in Diplomacy Toward Pyongyang: Expert,” Yonhap, May 3, 2025, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250503000500315?section=national/diplomacy.
[59] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea”, p. 78.
[60] Ibid, pp. 60-61; Vivian Salama and Ian Talley, “U.S. Holds Off on New North Korea Sanctions as Summit Talks Progress,” The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prepares-sanctions-while-pursuing-revived-north-korea-talks-1527526255.
[61] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” p. 77; The White House, “Joint Statement of President Donald J.Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” June 12, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.
[62] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” pp. 86-88.
[63] Ibid, pp. 102-103.

By Isabella Grace Packowski
Edited by Diletta de Luca, HRNK Research Associate

Introduction
The plight of North Korean refugees presents a complex and multifaceted challenge within the realm of international refugee law and human rights. This paper examines the legal status and survival migration of North Korean escapees, exploring the historical context of refugee law, specific case studies of North Korean refugees in China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, and the broader implications of survival migration. By analyzing the institutional frameworks, national policies, and humanitarian efforts, this study aims to shed light on the critical issues faced by North Korean refugees and propose viable solutions to enhance their protection and resettlement.
 
Historical Background | Refugee Law
Before delving into the case studies and offering potential solutions, it is first crucial to analyze the institutional and legal history of the leading body in global governance concerning refugee aid, status, and protection – the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, hereafter). The emergence of refugees as an international concern dates back as early as the 17th century, when religious persecutions and wars in the Middle East and Europe were a concern.[1] This concern continued into the early 20th century, with provisions under the League of Nations and its Office of High Commissioner for Refugees (1921), following events such as the First World War and the Russian Civil War.[2] However, the grounds on which these provisions were built were shaky at best, with minimal legal aid provided and catering to only specific national groups.[3]
 
It wasn’t until the aftermath of World War II, and the founding of the UN in 1946, that global collaboration solidified and accelerated.[4] This was hastily supplemented by the birth of the UNHCR (1950) as one of its key sub-bodies, replacing the International Refugee Organization (IRO -1947) and its predecessor, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA -1943).[5] However, it would not be without its own complexities. There was limited financial and governing autonomy amongst other UN bodies.[6] They also held only specific functions and strict definitions that constituted refugee status, limiting the scope to which such aid could apply (i.e., its mandate to provide international protection for refugees and to find durable solutions to their plight, not including material assistance, the inclusion of “internal refugees,” etc.)[7]
 
Representative of this ambiguity, the United States initially sought to establish a temporary international body with limited authority and a focus on international legal protection.[8] This was contrary to the varying perspectives of other Western States, who sought more operational cost and geographic considerations, and South Asian states, who fought for the permanency of the organization.[9] During the Cold War, international refugee law underwent shifts in its priorities and foundations within a context shaped by Eurocentrism, resolutions passed by the General Assembly expanding mandates, sovereignty and non-intervention, and the emerging concept of “moral authority.”[10] Consequently, after this era ended, contradictions within refugee law, particularly regarding its non-political foundations, attitudes toward interventionism, and emerging security threats such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, profoundly shook the international sphere in the realm of human rights scenarios.[11]
 
North Korean Refugees Case Study
To better understand how refugee law operates in complex geopolitical contexts, the following section focuses on the resettlement process of North Korean refugees in South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China, and proposes considerations and solutions. Due to geographical vicinity, shared history, and cultural similarities, many North Korean escapees, desperate to flee the social inequalities and human rights abuses sustained by the Kim regime, often seek refuge in two of North Korea’s neighboring states: China and South Korea.[12]
 
Although South Korea has taken in over 34,000 refugees from the North – drawing on its constitution, which recognizes, with some limitations, that anyone born on the Korean Peninsula as a South Korean national is entitled to the protection of the Republic of Korea – many defectors still face significant discrimination and stark cultural and political differences.[13] As such, some will opt to be resettled to Western states.[14]
 
Under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, North Korean defectors qualify as refugees sur place, meaning “...individuals who are not considered refugees upon leaving their country but become refugees later due to the persecution they are subjected to if they were to be deported.”[15] However, differences in how countries recognize North Korean refugees stem from the varying diplomatic relationships each nation maintains with North Korea, leading to ambiguities in their refugee status, asylum claims, and perceived legitimacy.[16] The United Kingdom, for example, with a higher refugee intake than other European nation, recognizes these difficulties but does not view them as grounds for asylum.[17] As such, North Korean secondary asylum seekers are subject to refoulement to South Korea under the 2012 UK-ROK Agreement on the Readmission of Persons.[18]
 
Furthermore, the UK aligns with the European Union's (EU) policies, engaging critically with North Korea via cultural exchanges and humanitarian aid.[19] As such, it makes its decisions based on its diplomatic approach to how South Korea handles relations with North Korea while adhering to the aforementioned EU protocols.[20] It is such that the UK Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber (UKUT) has made compromises in accepting asylum seekers, respecting the South Korean Constitution, correlating with the length of time (+/- 10 years) spent in or out of the Korean peninsula: “... if the appellant is known to not have resided outside of the Korean Peninsula for 10 years, they are sent to South Korea; if they are recognized to have been outside for over 10 years, they are accepted. For the latter, UKUT recognizes that if an appellant is not a national at the time of the case and ‘may be refused nationality’, they shall not be treated as a dual national.”[21] Thus, such arguments maintain that these national birthright interpretations remain only within the realm of South Korean domestic policies.[22]
 
Despite aspirations to resettle in Western nations, to date, a total of only 220 North Korean refugees reside in the United States.[23] The limited number is due to an extensive and time-consuming immigration process, which offers fewer benefits compared to South Korea, and mercurial American foreign policy affairs.[24] However, such decreasing trends are not only applicable to the United States, as, according to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, only 229 persons were resettled in 2020, a stark contrast to the 1,047 defectors aided as seen in 2018.[25] Both of these examples not only showcase stricter border controls implemented, especially under the Kim regime, reduced funding from aid countries, and the effects of Covid-19 on financial and physical flexibility.[26]
 
The primary legislation at play for asylum implementation of North Korean refugees in the United States is the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (NKHRA), which was first signed into law by former President George W. Bush in 2004, then extended in 2008, 2012 and 2018.[27] Most recently, the NKHRA was submitted for reauthorization in May 2022, and, despite the House of Representatives having passed it in May 2024, the Senate failed to address it in time, leaving the Act in legal limbo.[28]
 
The US’s approach to this concern is argued to be highly reflective of President Bush’s aggressive and conservative stance on North Korea at the time and its proliferation of nuclear weapons.[29] This forward-leaning approach was maintained through its long-standing military alliance with South Korea, which dates back to the end of the Korean War, as well as through diplomatic affairs with North Korea.[30] Lastly, refugees’ asylum in the United States is not barred for those who have already accepted their South Korean citizenship, further exposing the complexity of foreign affairs and international refugee law.[31]
 
The exact number of North Korean refugees in China remains unknown, but estimates range expansively from 5,000 to 250,000 defectors.[32] This uncertainty and lack of documentation of North Koreans in China is caused primarily by China’s claiming they are “illegal economic migrants,” China’s refusing to grant them access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status, Covid-19, and the precarious nature of legalities, citizenship, and violations of international law.[33] China, therefore, presents a much more complex and egregious view of North Korean defectors, their status, and the lack of protection outside of the discriminatory practices that refugees typically face. Most importantly, China blatantly violates the UN’s 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, infringing, in particular on Article 33.1 of the Convention:
 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”[34]
 
Article 33.1 is violated by China as it, more often than not, willingly expels and forcibly repatriates North Korean refugees to North Korea despite the known persecution or harm that would await them once returned to their home country.[35] Those repatriated are imprisoned in the detention system of the country, either sent to labor camps, 교화소 “kyo-hwa-so”, or to political prison camps, 관리소 “kwan-li-so,” where they face a credible fear of persecution, harsh interrogation, torture, imprisonment, or even death.[36] North Koreans who tried to escape the Kim regime are obstinately sent to political prison camps for severe punishment, as these detention facilities are known for the inhumane conditions that are imposed on prisoners.[37] Since 2014, it is estimated that at least 2,000 North Korean refugees have been deemed illegal migrants and are at risk of being returned to North Korea while being held in Chinese detention centers.[38]
 
North Korean women in particular are subjected to human rights abuses in China. This can be mainly in relation to the conditions of China’s “Red Zone,” in which “... it is estimated that up to 500,000 female North Koreans, some as young as twelve, hide in this region. They are subjected to systematic rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, unwanted pregnancy, forced labor, and cybersex trafficking.”[39] With women and girls being lured into China under the pretense of finding work, as many as 80% are instead forced into the sex trade, and such abuse has become common practice.[40] The trafficking of North Korean women and girls is reported to generate more than $105 million annually for organized crime networks in both China and North Korea.[41]
 
Moreover, North Korean women are often sold to Chinese men as wives.[42] Due to China’s one-child policy, children born in China to North Korean and Chinese parents remain undocumented/stateless children of illegal “mixed marriages.”[43] They are thus deemed “stateless” as they are not in possession of official Chinese citizenship and are born outside of North Korea.[44] In some cases, such as in rural Heilongjiang Province, women who have married Chinese men and have given birth to at least two children are more likely to be issued temporary identification papers.[45]
 
These children then become registered in the 户口 “hukuo” system, in which said practice is to place hardships on the father, especially if the mother is forcibly repatriated.[46] These human rights violations that North Korean escapees face are due to their labelling by China as “illegal economic immigrants.” [47] Escapees thus often remain undocumented without fundamental rights in education, welfare, and health services to avoid repatriation.[48]
 
Lastly, beyond any potential illicit financial gains through transnational crime networks, China’s strategic alliance with North Korea significantly shapes its approach to North Korean refugees.[49] Under a longstanding bilateral agreement and despite pressure by the international community, China continues to classify these individuals as illegal economic migrants rather than refugees and routinely repatriates them.[50] This practice not only contradicts the humanitarian principles of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, in particular Article 33.1 and the principle of non-refoulement, but also raises serious concerns about complicity in human rights violations upon their return.[51]
 
The U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) found that 90% of all forcibly repatriated North Korean refugees sent to detention facilities eventually die from the harsh conditions and violence they are subjected to.[52] Women are additionally routinely subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, from torture to forced abortions or infanticide if they became pregnant with Chinese men.[53]
 
Survival Migration
Throughout this policy analysis, a recurring theme has been the importance of fundamental human rights, comprehensive international law, and protection relative to the treatment of refugees. This leads to the next area of study, “survival migration.” This term refers to “Persons outside their country of origin because of an existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution.”[54] While focusing primarily on cases in sub-Saharan Africa, Andrew Battes expresses how, in addition to the mass exodus example from Zimbabwe, “In Haiti, Iraq, North Korea, and Myanmar, for example, significant numbers of people have fled to neighboring countries not because of a well-founded fear of individualized persecution, but more often because of serious deprivations of socioeconomic rights related to the underlying political situation.”[55]
 
In the case of Myanmar, for example, the Rohingya people face similar disparities in legal status and discrimination after fleeing to India in response to a military junta’s rule and a 2017 genocide.[56] India, not being a signatory of the Convention, acknowledges the fervent prosecution of the Rohingya but national security trumps everything else. Thus, India stresses a ‘right to life’ vs. a ‘right to settle’ approach.[57] As an ethno-religious minority, survival migrants are now the world’s largest group stateless people, having become a serious global issue.[58]
 
The term “survival migration” itself is not mentioned in the 1951 Convention, and, although in theory those who fall under this category have rights under international law, there is no set framework for those who do not fit the rigid definitions that already exist.[59] This is most reflective of the way international bodies and states view the situation, a dichotomy of economic migrant and refugee, without consideration to other factors outside of generalized violence or individualized persecution, including environment, state fragility, and livelihood failure, in addition to socioeconomic deprivation of rights, as seen with North Korea.[60] It thus shows how the process of becoming and being classified as refugees is not monocausal, but is intertwined with these factors and institutional gaps, which, in turn, affect how refugees are assisted.[61] “Regime stretching,” as Betts describes, furthers this thought, in that institutions are not themselves “fixed,” but can be adaptive.[62]
 
Government Organizations
Domestic-based government organizations can also play a significant role in refugee resettlement.  For example, the 하나원 (hanawon), a South Korean government-regulated resettlement facility, established in 1999 by the Ministry for Unification of South Korea 통일부 “tong-il-bu.”[63] Situated in Seoul, the organization provides a place for North Korean defectors to “graduate” before joining South Korean society.[64] The facility consists of two facilities, a school and a hospital, and is heavily guarded. North Korean refugees who recently escaped North Korea participate in a 12-week program where they learn invaluable life skills and are exposed to concepts such as democracy, human rights, and religious freedoms in order to adapt to South Korean society.[65] After “graduating,” defectors receive financial resettlement support, and further facilitative aid can be provided by the South Korean government, such as the Elm House for women.[66] However, despite the success of this rigorous and involved program, discrimination, difficulties in securing full-time work, and losing connections with other North Korean refugees often plague the trainees.[67]
 
NGOs
Alongside formal governance, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can also play a prominent and direct role in aiding refugees. An NGO that helps address topics of human trafficking prevention and rescue for women is the Nomi Network.[68] With over 20,000 aided since 2012, from India to the United States, the organization seeks to empower and protect victims by its mission statement, expressing how “Nomi Network aims to end human trafficking by creating pathways to safe employment, empowering women and girls to break cycles of exploitation in their families and communities.”[69]
 
Although no direct aid to North Korean defectors has been made so far, initiatives represented by global results similar to those provided by the Nomi Network could greatly help prevent or support those trafficked, especially in China. Refugees International, another organization based in Washington D.C., also works to advocate for “...lifesaving assistance, human rights, and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.”[70] They have worked largely with the Rohingya people's crisis thus far.[71]
 
Proposed Solutions
In response to criticisms about the legalities, exclusions, and ambiguities in international refugee law, a multitude of solutions can be proposed, ranging from broader institutional reforms to specific policy adjustments targeting North Korean refugees. Betts suggests two different approaches: normative and institutional.[72] At the normative level, options include working with the existing legal framework, developing a “soft law framework,” consolidating human rights law through guidance from survival and migration principles, and, lastly, adding an additional protocol to the 1951 Convention.[73] The implementation of this method would incorporate “survival migration” into current legislation, pertaining to refugees, escapees, and defectors, such as those from North Korea.[74]
 
For institutional recommendations, Betts presents five ways forward: 1) applying a “cluster approach,” where “...the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) developed in the context of UN humanitarian reform,” 2) designating responsibility to a single agency, 3) creating a new, efficient body that could work on a temporary basis to help coordinate other agencies, 4) creating a special representative that can oversee these coordination, and finally, 5) “...creating an issue-based consultative process.”[75] Overall, Betts argues that such reforms are political in nature and would inevitably lead to disagreements and tensions between states.[76] As such, commitments to helping aid survival migrants should be achieved within existing frameworks, especially when also considering all the other interwoven factors as aforementioned.[77]
 
From a case-study approach, HRNK’s recommendations provide a plethora of solutions, including: 1) Clarifying the number, status and humanitarian situation of the North Korean refugees and workers in China. 2) The imperative for China to address its violations of international law, recognize North Korean escapees as refugees and respect the principle of non-refoulment. 3) The recommendation to the United States to seek more direct ways to reach refugees in China and to help with asylum in the USA. 4) North Korean refugee protection and rescue must become a pillar of the North Korean Human Rights Act. 5) The reauthorization of the NKHR Act, which expired in 2022.[78]
 
Ultimately, I recommend a hybrid solution, considering a mix of these proposed recommendations and results seen in current legislation and advocacy. This alternative would encapsulate Betts’ soft law framework, emphasizing the need to incorporate “survival migrants” and other factors not currently addressed in legislation, particularly the 1951 UN Convention, working more extensively with South Korea’s government-run organizations such as the Hanawon, NGOs such as the Nomi Network and Refugees International, and reauthorizing the NKHR Act, thereby securing a more prominent place in American foreign policy.
 
 
Conclusion
The legal status and survival migration of North Korean refugees underscore the urgent need for comprehensive reforms in international refugee law and humanitarian practices. The case studies of North Korean defectors in South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China reveal significant gaps and ambiguities in their protection and resettlement. Addressing these challenges requires a hybrid approach that incorporates normative and institutional reforms, enhanced collaboration with NGOs, and the reauthorization of the NKHR Act. By prioritizing the fundamental human rights of North Korean refugees and adopting adaptive frameworks, the international community can better support their survival and integration, ultimately fostering a more just and humane global refugee system.

Isabella Grace Packowski is a graduate student at Indiana University Bloomington pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs with a concentration in security, diplomacy, and governance. She holds a BA in Korean Language and Culture with a minor in Political Science, where her studies focused on U.S.–ROK/DPRK relations, foreign policy, and international security. Her research experience includes archival analysis of North Korea’s Juche ideology. As an intern at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) in 2023, she contributed to the translation of publications. She also conducted international media monitoring supported the production of daily newsletters highlighting key developments in North Korean human rights and policy. With a strong foundation in cross-cultural engagement, political history studies, and policy analysis, Isabella aims to advance diplomacy and proliferation security through future work with the U.S. State Department or international NGOs.

 
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[1] Betts, Alexander, Loescher, Gil, and Milner, James. 2012. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection. Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group. Accessed April 27, 2025. ProQuest Ebook Central. (pg. 7)
[2] Ibid, 8-9.
[3] Ibid, 9.
[4] Ibid, 8,10,13.
[5] Ibid..
[6] Ibid, 15.
[7] Ibid, 14.
[8] Ibid., 13-14.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., 2, 19-20, 28-29.
[11] Ibid., 55, 57, 62.
[12] “Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum.” n.d. Journal of Public and International Affairs. https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/seeking-safer-shells-analysis-interpretations-justifications-and-rationales-behind-decisions.    
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ryu, Eric. 2021. “Why the Number of North Korean Refugees in the United States Is so Low.” Edited by Sophia Hapin and Rosa Park. NKHIDDENGULAG. August 10, 2021. https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/why-the-number-of-north-korean-refugees-in-the-united-states-is-so-low.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] “Seeking Safer Shells…”; Young Kim. 2024. “US Congress Fails to Extend North Korean Human Rights Act - Congresswoman Young Kim.” Congresswoman Young Kim - Representing California’s 40th District (blog). December 26, 2024. https://youngkim.house.gov/2024/12/26/us-congress-fails-to-extend-north-korean-human-rights-act/.
[28] Kim, Young, 2024, “US Congress Fails to Extend North Korean Human Rights Act - Congresswoman Young Kim.”; H.R.3012 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2023. (n.d.). Congress.gov | Library of Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/3012?s=1&r=21.
[29] “Seeking Safer Shells…”
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Scarlatoiu, Greg and U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). 2023. “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China.” https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Scarlatoiu-CECC-Response-HRNK-FINAL-.pdf. (pg. 1, 4)
[33] Ibid., 4.
[34] Ibid; United Nations General Assembly & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (n.d.). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/1951-refugee-convention-1967-protocol.pdf (pg. 30)
[35] “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China,” 2.
[36] Ibid., 3,7.
[37] Ibid., 7.
[38] Ibid., 3-4.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid., 6-7.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid., 2-3, 8.
[48] Ibid.
[49] “Seeking Safer Shells…”
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China,” 7.
[53] Ibid., 2.
[54] Betts, Alexander. “Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework.” Global Governance 16, no. 3 (2010): 361–82. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29764952.
[55] Ibid.
[56] “A Lifetime in Detention: Rohingya Refugees in India - Refugees International.” 2025. Refugees International. January 2, 2025. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/a-lifetime-in-detention-rohingya-refugees-in-india/.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., 362, 364.
[60] Ibid, 361-362, 364.
[61] Ibid., 362.
[62] Ibid., 363.
[63] “Hanawon - North Korean Resettlement Facility in South Korea | Crossing borders.” (n.d.). Crossing Borders - Helping North Korean Refugees and Orphans. https://www.crossingbordersnk.org/hanawon
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] “Year in Review | Nomi Network.” n.d. Nomi Network. https://nominetwork.org/year-in-review/.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] “A Lifetime in Detention…”
[72] Ibid., 377.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid., 377-378.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Scarlatoiu, 8.