China’s Disruption of Maritime Sanctions Enforcement

By Wu Yang, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Alexander Kim, HRNK Operations Associate

            North Korea and its weapons of mass destruction continue to pose a significant challenge for the international community. Pyongyang has been subject to multiple rounds of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. However, these sanctions have yielded mixed results at best, as North Korea maintains its bellicose attitude and doubles down on weapons development.

            Over time, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have become more threatening to regional and global security, but it is increasingly clear that North Korea’s nuclear proliferation problem is also a human rights problem. UNSC Resolution 2397, adopted in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in 2017, notes in its preamble that that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles occur at the expense of North Koreans “by diverting critically needed resources… when they have great unmet needs.”[1]

            At the same time, North Korea has a track record of evading sanctions by engaging in illicit economic activities, using the proceeds earned from such activities to fund its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile tests. The regime has shown a continued disregard for the well-being of its citizens by prioritizing regime security and nuclear weapons over the human rights of its citizens.

            North Korea’s ability to evade sanctions is enabled in part by external actors. This essay explores the maritime aspects of international sanctions enforcement and Chinese interference in said enforcement. UNSC Resolution 2397 further tightened the existing sanctions regime on North Korea by introducing, among others, a limit of 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons on the supply, sale, or transfer of crude oil to North Korea and 500,000 barrels on refined petroleum products.[2] It also placed special emphasis on targeting North Korea’s sanctions evasion, noting that it “is illicitly exporting coal and other prohibited items through deceptive maritime practices and obtaining petroleum illegally through ship-to-ship transfers.”[3] This places an obligation on UN member states to prevent such behavior and implement UNSC resolutions. Without concerted efforts to enforce sanctions, North Korea will be emboldened to evade sanctions with impunity.

North Korea’s Maritime Sanctions Evasion and International Response

              Despite Resolution 2397’s explicit denouncement of North Korea’s illicit maritime activities, they continue unabated. The UN Panel of Experts described ship-to-ship transfers as “a primary method of sanctions evasion” in its annual report for 2019.[4] These transfers also involve “increasingly advanced evasion techniques,” such as:
The disguising of vessels through ship identity theft and false Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions… contrary to International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations governing safety of life at sea, which require that AIS be in operation at all times… Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of tankers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the use of small, unregistered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and the use of additional vessels for transshipment.[5]

            These methods obfuscate the movements and identity of vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers and their cargo, allowing North Korea to breach limits on restricted goods imposed by the UNSC. The transfers are mostly concentrated within the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, and also the East Sea, off the coasts of Russia and North Korea.[6]

            North Korea’s sanctions evasion has been met with greater international efforts to enforce these sanctions. In 2018, U.S. officials revealed plans to expand the interception of ships violating UN sanctions with an emphasis on detecting ship-to-ship transfers, engaging in coordination talks with regional partners to crack down on illicit maritime activity.[7] This led to the creation of the Pacific Security Maritime Exchange (PSMX), an information-sharing initiative to monitor North Korea’s illicit activities and coordinate actions with allies and partners, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.[8]

            PSMX prevents North Korean sanctions evasion by identifying smuggling ships and illicit trading activities, which raises the cost of sanctions evasion by forcing the regime to “create more intricate, expensive, and complicated smuggling networks” and helping to disband existing black market networks.[9] Participating countries also contribute by periodically deploying military resources, such as naval vessels and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, to patrol the regions where ship-to-ship transfers commonly occur. These deployments primarily involve maritime surveillance activities—observing and identifying vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers, documenting evidence, and reporting illicit activities.

            Some deployments are done explicitly for the purpose of supporting the PSMX, such as Canada’s Operation NEON and Australia’s Operation Argos, while other deployments are part of larger missions to the Pacific region in general, as with the United Kingdom.[10] The former deployments occur with more frequency and regularity. Canada, for instance, has recorded ten deployments in total,[11] with Australia recording twelve deployments of maritime patrol aircraft and nine deployments of naval vessels as of September 2023.[12] New Zealand, for its part, has deployed maritime patrol aircraft six times since 2018,[13] and has recently pledged to increase its contributions with more frequent flying missions and sending ships for the first time.[14]

China’s Attitude Towards UN Sanctions

            As a permanent member of the UNSC, China exercises significant influence over the passage of UNSC resolutions. A discussion on why it previously voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea and how it views those sanctions is warranted.

            The current sanctions literature views sanctions as having three different purposes: “to coerce a change in a target’s behavior; to constrain a target from engaging in a proscribed activity; or to signal and/or stigmatize a target or others about the violation of an international norm.”[15] These purposes can be and are often intertwined, but not all three are always pursued simultaneously. Sanctions are also interpreted differently by different actors. This is especially the case for multilateral sanctions like those enacted at the UN, where China often has different priorities from the other UNSC members.

            China has historically been protective of North Korea, a diplomatic legacy from the Korean War and the broader Cold War period. Today, it still resists calls to place more pressure on North Korea. However, North Korea’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons since 2006 have strained its relations with China on occasion, culminating in China’s support for UN sanctions on North Korea. Wenxin Li and Ji Young Kim  argue China’s attitude shift was due to two external factors and one domestic factor: North Korea’s increasingly aggressive military policy, which provoked Chinese condemnation and outrage; American outreach and negotiations to reach agreements on UNSC resolutions; and worsening domestic perceptions of North Korea in state media and public opinion.[16]

            Nevertheless, while China endorsed stricter measures against North Korea, it is wary of applying too much pressure, which could result in regime collapse. Furthermore, China does not view the nuclear issue in a vacuum, but as an extension of the China-U.S. relationship. Li and Kim note that China-North Korea relations have improved since 2018 while China-U.S. relations have worsened, adding that China’s softening attitude on sanctions “came from China’s lack of trust toward the United States rather than China’s support to North Korea’s nuclear policy.”[17] China interprets the imposition of UN sanctions differently, even as it criticized North Korea for raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

            This supports Catherine Jones’ observation that while UN sanctions on North Korea are conventionally viewed through the lens of coercion and constraint, China “has primarily employed sanctions as a signaling device.”[18] It displays its displeasure with North Korea’s actions and claims to comply with UNSC resolutions, but China’s uneven implementation of sanctions in practice sends mixed signals.[19] This undermines the integrity and effectiveness of the sanctions regime. Moreover, China has recently vetoed new sanctions and suggested lifting some sanctions.[20] This demonstrates to North Korea that it has little to worry about from its neighbor. The emphasis on signaling rather than coercing or constraining also means that China is less partial to enforcement efforts by other states, as demonstrated by Beijing’s hostile response.

China’s Harassment of Sanctioning States

            Since the deployment of military assets to patrol the East China Sea and monitor acts of sanctions evasion, various countries have reported being harassed by the Chinese military. This is primarily done through “buzzing,” where Chinese aircraft deliberately fly close to the intended target. One of the earliest occurrences was in October 2018, when Chinese aircraft reportedly flew too close to a Canadian maritime patrol aircraft and “used improper radio procedure and ‘improper language’,” with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand experiencing similar harassment.[21]

            Another instance occurred in June 2019, where Chinese ships and aircraft shadowed two Canadian ships deployed for sanctions enforcement after they left Vietnam for the East China Sea.[22] Later, two fighter jets flew within 300 meters of the ships at 30 meters above the ocean level.[23] While Canada described these initial events as not putting Canadian crew at risk and “not provocative, hazardous or unexpected,” China doubled down on the tactic in 2022. Canada reported that between April and May that year, Chinese aircraft harassed Canada’s maritime patrol aircraft several times, flying so close that the Chinese aircrew were “very clearly visible” and sometimes forcing the Canadian aircrew to modify their own flight path so as to avoid potential collisions.[24] The “buzzing” intensified once more in October 2023, with a jet coming within 5 meters of Canadian aircraft, maneuvering such that the aircraft was in the jet’s blind spot, and releasing “multiple flares while flying close.”[25]

            In one instance involving Australian divers, meanwhile, China employed other methods. When an Australian vessel deployed divers to remove fishing nets that were entangled in its propellers, a Chinese destroyer approached it and began operating its sonar, forcing the divers to get out of the water and causing minor injuries.[26] The most recent disruption occurred in early June, when a Dutch ship and marine patrol helicopter were approached by Chinese forces.[27] More of these “buzzing” incidents can be expected in the future, as long as efforts to enforce maritime sanctions continue.
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            China publicly criticizes international deployments by framing them as intrusions on national security. It condemned Britain’s decision to sail a warship through the Taiwan Strait after completing sanctions enforcement operations, saying that this behavior “harbored evil intentions.”[28] In the same vein, it accused Canada of violating its airspace “in the name of implementing resolutions,”[29] called on Australia to “stop making trouble in front of China’s doorstep,”[30] and accused the Dutch of being heinous by “falsely claiming to be carrying out a U.N. mission” while infringing upon Chinese jurisdiction.[31]

            China cannot directly criticize the enforcement of sanctions, as this is equivalent to publicly opposing UNSC resolutions. This helps explain Beijing’s claims that countries are using these resolutions as a cover to engage in nefarious activities against China. However, the fact that vessels engaging in ship-to-ship transfers are being identified and reported to the UN belies such claims. New Zealand’s missions alone recorded the observation of four ship-to-ship transfers and thirty vessels of interest, and the reporting of thirty-three vessels suspected of violating UN sanctions.[32] There has also been communication with China regarding illicit practices within its waters and appeals for China to help stop North Korean sanctions evasion.[33]

Concluding Remarks

            China’s support for strengthening sanctions once led some to hope of potential U.S.-China cooperation on denuclearizing North Korea.[34] This is unlikely today, given tense bilateral relations, but it does not change the fact that Chinese cooperation was instrumental in effectively implementing sanctions. When China reduced trade with North Korea and enforced sanctions more strictly, the combined pressure forced North Korea to negotiate terms for de-escalation.[35] This demonstrates the continued utility of sanctions as a means of coercion, provided they are implemented adequately.
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            Countering sanctions evasion is critical for ensuring that the coercive power of sanctions is not compromised.[36] Through its actions, however, China abets North Korea’s illicit maritime sanctions evasion by disrupting international sanctions enforcement initiatives. It is also signaling to North Korea that its actions will be protected from scrutiny. Improving sanctions enforcement strengthens the strategic capabilities of sanctions, allowing them to be deployed as reliable tools in conjunction with negotiations and other policy instruments.[37] Contrary to what China claims, it must be made clear that any adjustments to the sanctions regime depends on North Korea making concrete commitments for a negotiated settlement and, at minimum, refraining from further nuclear weapons testing or development.

Wu Yang is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, with concentrations in global security and foreign policy, as well as a regional concentration in East and Southeast Asian studies.
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[1] United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2397 (22 December 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2397, 1.
[2] Ibid, 2.
[3] Ibid, 4.
[4] United Nation Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), UN Doc, S/2019/171, 7.
[5] Ibid, 5.
[6] Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “DPRK Maritime Sanctions Enforcement,” International Law Studies 96, no. 1 (May 12, 2020), 103, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol96/iss1/5.
[7] Matt Spetalnick, Phil Stewart, and David Brunnstrom, “EXCLUSIVE-U.S. Prepares High-Seas Crackdown on N.Korea Sanctions Evaders-Sources,” Reuters, February 25, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/oil/exclusive-us-prepares-high-seas-crackdown-on-nkorea-sanctions-evaders-sources-idUSL2N1QE0FN/.
[8] U.S. Department of State, “Pacific Security Maritime Exchange,” accessed June 14, 2024, https://www.state.gov/pacific-security-maritime-exchange/.
[9] Ibid.
[10] “Pacific Patrol Ships Begin Third Year Deployed Broadening Their Mission,” Royal Navy, September 12, 2023, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2023/september/12/20230912-pacific-patrol-ships-begin-third-year-deployed-broadening-their-mission.
[11] Department of National Defence, “Operation NEON,” Government of Canada, October 2, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html.
[12] Defence Media, “Defence joins international effort to enforce sanctions on North Korea,” Defence Australia, September 16, 2023, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2023-09-16/defence-joins-international-effort-enforce-sanctions-north-korea. At the time of writing, Australia has since participated in more deployments.
[13] “RNZAF P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrols Monitor Suspected Evasions of UNSC Sanctions against North Korea,” New Zealand Defence Force, June 11, 2024, https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/rnzaf-p-8a-poseidon-maritime-patrols-monitor-suspected-evasions-of-united-nations-security-council-sanctions-against-north-korea/.
[14] Lucy Craymer, “New Zealand Will Increase Its Military Contribution to N. Korea Sanctions Monitoring,” Reuters, June 18, 2024, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-will-increase-its-military-contribution-n-korea-sanctions-monitoring-2024-06-18/.
[15] Thomas J. Biersteker, Marcos Tourinho, and Sue E. Eckert, “Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions,” in Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action, ed. Marcos Tourinho, Sue E. Eckert, and Thomas J. Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 21, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.002.
[16] Wenxin Li and Ji Young Kim, “Not a Blood Alliance Anymore: China’s Evolving Policy toward UN Sanctions on North Korea,” Contemporary Security Policy 41, no. 4 (2020): 612-615, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1741143.
[17] Ibid, 624-625.
[18] Catherine Jones, “Sanctions as Tools to Signal, Constrain, and Coerce,” Asia Policy 13, no. 3 (2018): 20–21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26497785.
[19] Ibid, 21-23.
[20] Michelle Nichols, “China, Russia Veto U.S. Push for More U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” Reuters, May 26, 2022, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-russia-veto-us-push-more-un-sanctions-north-korea-2022-05-26/.
[21] Murray Brewster, “Canadian Surveillance Plane Buzzed by Chinese off North Korea, DND Reveals,” CBC News, December 19, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/chinese-korea-embargo-aircraft-buzzed-harassment-1.4953093.
[22] Murray Brewster, “Chinese Jets Buzzed Canadian Naval Ships in East China Sea,” CBC News, June 27, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-fighters-buzzed-regina-asterix-east-china-sea-1.5193149.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Department of National Defence, “Statement from the Canadian Armed Forces,” Government of Canada, June 1, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/statement-from-the-canadian-armed-forces.html.
[25] Murray Brewster, “Chinese Fighters Engaged in ‘unsafe’ Intercept of Canadian Surveillance Plane, Commander Says,” CBC News, October 16, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-air-force-intercept-aurora-surveillance-1.6997852.
[26] “Australia Says Its Navy Divers Were Likely Injured by the Chinese Navy’s ‘unsafe’ Use of Sonar,” AP News, November 18, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-australia-navy-sonar-divers-12a9e6f228aa81272b9b74b87e0489a1.
[27] Brad Lendon, “Chinese Military Harassed Dutch Warship Enforcing UN Sanctions on North Korea, Netherlands Says,” CNN, June 10, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/10/asia/chinese-military-harass-dutch-warship-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.
[28] “China Condemns Britain for Taiwan Strait Warship Mission,” Reuters, September 27, 2021, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/british-frigate-sails-through-taiwan-strait-2021-09-27/.
[29] Joon Ha Park and Lina Park, “China Accuses Canadian Plane of ‘Intruding’ during North Korea Sanctions Mission,” NK News, October 18, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/10/china-accuses-canadian-plane-of-intruding-during-north-korea-sanctions-mission/.
[30] Micah McCartney, “China Denies Injuring Australian Navy Divers with Sonar,” Newsweek, November 21, 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/china-denies-injuring-australian-navy-divers-sonar-1845644.
[31] “China’s Defence Ministry Says Dutch Ship Incident ‘Heinous,’” Reuters, June 11, 2024, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-defence-ministry-says-dutch-ship-incident-heinous-2024-06-11/.
[32] “RNZAF P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrols Monitor Suspected Evasions of UNSC Sanctions against North Korea.”
[33] Michelle Nichols, “Exclusive: G7, Others Ask China to Stop North Korea Sanctions Evasion in Its Waters,” Reuters, July 21, 2023, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/g7-others-ask-china-stop-north-korea-sanctions-evasion-its-waters-2023-07-21/.
[34] See Donald Rauch, “The US and Chinese Navies Have Already Fought Piracy Together - Now They Can Rein in North Korea.,” Foreign Policy, March 1, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/01/the-chinese-navy-can-give-north-korean-sanctions-bite/.
[35] Woo-Jun Min and Sukhee Han, “Economic Sanctions against North Korea: The Pivotal Role of US–China Cooperation,” International Area Studies Review 23, no. 2 (June 1, 2020): 190, https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865920901896.
[36] Christopher J. Watterson, “What next for Sanctions against North Korea?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 5 (2019): 247–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1654270.
[37] Thomas J. Biersteker and Zuzana Hudáková, “International Sanctions on North Korea: Are They Working?,” in Understanding Kim Jong-Un’s North Korea: Regime Dynamics, Negotiation, and Engagement, ed. Chung-in Moon and Robert Carlin (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2022), 201, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=3375721&site=ehost-live&ebv=EB&ppid=pp_185.