THE DIRE TOLL OF NORTH KOREAN HUMAN TRAFFICKING

By Mohona Ganguly, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO of HRNK

Part I: Introduction
 
            The DPRK’s nuclear arsenal has long been considered to be not only its most salient means of attack against its rivals, but also a symbol of “national pride.” North Korea’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, regards the nuclear program to be of personal importance to him due to its potential to grant him space and prominence on the international stage and its supposed representation of economic prosperity and national security (Pak 2020, 228). As such, it is of paramount importance to the DPRK government that the nuclear program be properly funded. In order to secure this financial support, North Korea has actively developed and maintained a series of illicit networks to generate hard currency. Some prominent examples of these illicit activities are Cybercrime, with trained hackers and groups associated with the DPRK stealing millions of dollars in cryptocurrency from international agencies and companies  (Patel 2025, Presentation 5, Slide 17), smuggling of drugs and counterfeit luxury goods (Patel 2025, Presentation 11, Slide 7), the government’s active collaboration with international Organized Crime Groups (OCGs), such as the Japanese Yakuza, the Hong Kong-based Triad, the Russian Mafia, and the Irish Republican Army  (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 2), and its sales of arms and missiles (Patel 2025, Presentation 5, Slide 8). However, the DPRK’s illicit activity that has arguably the direst consequences and human toll is its participation in human trafficking. This memo seeks to analyze the active North Korean human trafficking network through a systems-based approach, with special emphasis on its origins and current activities, and to provide a series of recommendations for the United States to actively take measures to prevent these crimes.
 
Part II. Overview of North Korean Human Trafficking
 
            The DPRK exploits its citizens and others abroad through its extensive human trafficking network. The regime engages in vast human trafficking maneuvers within North Korea’s borders, particularly through forcible imprisonment in labor camps, with an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 people being held within these facilities (U.S. State Department 2024). However, the DPRK receives a portion of the hard currency it requires to fund its nuclear program through its human trafficking activities abroad. These illicit networks take two primary forms: sending North Korean citizens overseas to work (U.S. State Department 2024) or actively participating in trafficking rings headed by international OCGs or other entities (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 10).
 
            The DPRK often sends its citizens abroad to work through bilateral arrangements with foreign governments or businesses (U.S. State Department 2024). These North Koreans work in a variety of industries overseas, such as in restaurants, factories, seafood processing plants, apparel, footwear manufacturing, shipbuilding, and textiles (U.S. State Department 2024).
The workers often migrate to countries with diplomatic relationships with North Korea, such as Russia, China, the UAE, and Malaysia (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). This action is directly in violation of the sanctions placed against North Korean labor overseas in 2019, and furthermore, the workers face a hazardous journey to their destination countries, grueling work conditions, and constant surveillance at their workplaces (U.S. State Department 2024). The workers are also forced to give up their passports, effectively trapping them within their destination countries (U.S. State Department 2024).

Figure 1: Destination Countries for North Korean Overseas Workers
(North Korea in the World 2022)

Figure 2: North Korea’s Major Labor Export Industries
(Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 24)

             The laborers work 12 to 16 hours a day and face the fear of potential retaliation against them and their families back in North Korea should they complain (U.S. State Department 2024).  These factors have led international organizations and experts to characterize this “work expatriation” process as a form of human trafficking, with some even deeming it, “state-sponsored slavery.” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 3). The DPRK uses these workers as a means of procuring hard currency through seizing their wages. Their salaries are often distributed directly into accounts held by the North Korean government, which legitimizes its retention of the wages by claiming that they are, “voluntary contributions,” by the workers to promote the country’s common good (U.S. State Department 2024). Ultimately, the workers receive only a fraction of their salaries, with the DPRK withholding up to 90 percent of their earnings (U.S. State Department 2024). This in turn generates millions of dollars in hard currency for the regime (U.S. State Department 2024). The exact amount of revenue generated through North Korean labor trafficking alone is estimated to be between $200 and $500 million dollars, which could account for a significant portion of the costs needed to maintain the DPRK’s nuclear program, which itself, the South Korean government projects, costs $1 billion dollars (CBS News 2017). Therefore, the DPRK’s labor trafficking does not only exact an immense human cost but also provides a sizable amount of the illicit funding they need to manage their nuclear program.
 
            The DPRK does not restrict its participation in international human trafficking to its citizens, however. Its partnerships with OCGs have also enabled them to participate in criminal activities internationally, including illicit human trafficking operations (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 10). One of the most prominent of these illicit connections is North Korea’s involvement in the Asian casino and gaming sector. The DPRK has strong ties with the 14k Triad, a factionalized organized crime group with illicit networks all throughout Asia (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Some members of the 14k triad have been actively involved in the gaming and casino sector, particularly to gain and eventually launder illicit revenue, and the DPRK is highly suspected to be a part of these schemes as an additional means of sanctions evasion because of their demonstrated close collaborations with the group (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). In 202c it was discovered that Alvin Chau, the CEO of the Macau junket operator Suncity Group, was allegedly closely involved with Broken Tooth, an influential gangster and the leader of the 14k triad faction of Macau (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Chau reportedly has strong ties to oil smuggling operations associated with the DPRK and has received an estimated $15 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank hack (which federal investigators at the time linked in part to North Korean hackers), which was deposited in the Suncity junket account (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8).  Furthermore, Broken Tooth (whose real name is Wan Kuok-Kai), became an investor in Southeast Asian casinos in 2012 (after completing a 14-year prison sentence) and claimed in 2018 that he made hundreds of millions in cryptocurrency through his casino ventures (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 8). These revenues have been attained through online and “above ground” casinos, primarily through illicit means like gambling, cryptocurrency investments, and, most notably, through human trafficking (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). The above ground,  “brick-and-mortar” casinos have long served as hubs for transnational human trafficking, and the 14k triad as an organization have been notable perpetrators of trafficking through these means (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Therefore, North Korea’s intimate involvement with Chau, Broken Tooth, and the 14k triad as a whole, signals that they are involved in human trafficking operations taking place in these casinos as a means to earn hard currency through these transactions to fund their nuclear program.
 
Part III: Case Study 1 - Cambodia and Myanmar Human Trafficking
 
            One of the most prominent instances of human trafficking within a 14k triad casino enterprise with a potential illicit connection to North Korea is the exposure of the extensive trafficking rings operating in “special economic zones” throughout Southeast Asia. These SEZs are industrial parks with relaxed regulations that serve as one-stop tax offices to emulate foreign investment (Kennedy and Southern 2022). However, they also eventually become borderline lawless areas, controlled solely on the whims of private security firms, with the local authorities not having the capacity or the desire to attempt to maintain control over them (Kennedy and Southern 2022). After the Covid-19 pandemic saw a sharp decrease in casino revenue because of travel restrictions halting visits from foreign tourists, those casinos located in SEZs or border towns in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, among other Southeast Asian countries, became a hotbed for online scam proliferation, and with it, human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Many victims, who are mostly young women from Thailand, are lured to these SEZs through online connections promising them decent jobs at the casinos (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Rescuers and survivors of these compounds have described the victims trafficked into these zones as being beaten, starved, deprived of water, electrocuted, and outright sold to other companies if they fail to perform their duties to their customers (Kennedy and Southern 2022).  Enslaved workers are often bought and sold through transactions between companies on a human trafficking Telegram channel known as White Shark (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Videos of workers being handcuffed, tortured, and even tasered in their rooms by their captors are common (Kennedy and Southern 2022). There have also been numerous reported instances of workers having committed suicide due to their treatment (Kennedy and Southern 2022). The local governments have been indifferent to these crimes occurring on their borders and as such have not taken significant action to combat this crisis (Kennedy and Southern 2022). The “slaves-for-scams” crisis has become so dire in Cambodia that the United States made the decision to downgrade the nation to a Tier 3, or the lowest possible level, in its 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Myanmar has also seen a rise in city-like SEZs surrounding Chinese-owned casino enterprises, which were already linked to human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Ekapop Lueangprasert, a local Thai official who has helped to rescue over 140 victims, aided a victim in her escape from a Myaweddy casino by swimming across the Moei River to Thailand, and to safety (Kennedy and Southern 2022).
 
            There are numerous perpetrators involved in these illicit schemes, including Zhao Wei, the Chinese businessman who owns the Kings Roman company, and Huang Mingxuan, a Hong Kong resident (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Zhao has invested over a billion dollars into the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, a self-governed casino and adjacent enclave on the Medong River that has become a hotspot for human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Another very influential figure in the online scam and casino human trafficking ring is Broken Tooth, Wan Kuok-Koi, himself (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Wan has utilized his organization, the World Hongman Association, as a means of investing in these casinos and SEZs, and has framed these ventures as a means of promoting his patriotism, or Chinese national pride (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Wan’s connections with the DPRK and his status as a “founding” figure of these SEZs and human trafficking enterprises calls into question North Korea’s own involvement in these illicit activities. Their longstanding relationship with the 14k triad and their willingness to perform illicit activities and strengthen these networks to fund and bolster their nuclear arsenal increases the likelihood of their involvement in this scheme (Owen and Seshadri, 8). Therefore, specifically targeting human trafficking rings such as these can potentially stall, or halt altogether, any monetary benefits the DPRK may be receiving from these operations.
 
Part IV: Case Study 2 - North Korean Labor in Chinese Seafood Processing Plants
 
            A significant instance of the DPRK trafficking its own citizens abroad for the purpose of working to generate hard currency for their nuclear program is their longstanding partnership with China’s seafood processing industry. Approximately 3,000 North Korean workers were employed at seafood processing plants in the northeastern city of Hunchun in China before the Covid-19 pandemic (Sullivan, Mendoza, and Kim 2021). Working conditions for these laborers are grim, as the North Koreans are subjected to unpaid overtime, routine  health and safety standard violations, and cramped and squalid living quarters (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12).  North Korean workers also face discrimination and isolation from their Chinese counterparts (Scarlatoiu 2023, 5). They are reportedly forced to wear blue headbands to distinguish themselves from the Chinese workers, and are forced to finish their three-year contracts with no sick days or without filing any complaints (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). On the other hand, Chinese workers are granted job protections and are allowed to take time off (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). Furthermore, the North Koreans working in these plants are paid significantly less than their Chinese co-workers, with them receiving approximately $300, while the Chinese workers earned $540 (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). These conditions have led to international human rights organizations, and survivors themselves, characterizing the workers’ conditions in these plants as meeting the necessary criteria for human trafficking, as “they are paid a pittance, constantly surveilled, and are unable to leave” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 8).
 
             The North Korean workers are considered to be more “valuable” in the eyes of their Chinese employers, with Li Shasha, a manager at a Chinese processing plant called Yanbian Shenghai Industry and Trade Co., claiming that North Korean employees are “more stable and unlikely to leave” compared to their Chinese counterparts (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). This reliance on the North Korean workers has led to an increase in demand for them, which in turn has propelled the DPRK to increase the “supply” of workers to China (Scarlatoiu 2023, 7). However, in August of 2023, China repatriated North Korean workers en masse, leading to a stalling in the trafficking of workers (Scarlatoiu 2023, 14). However, there appears to be no plans on either country’s end to permanently halt this arrangement, as the DPRK has indicated that it intends to send entirely new teams to China to replace them (Scarlatoiu 2023, 14).
 
             The DPRK is eager to continue this program by such means because they receive significant revenues from the workers within these processing plants. Of the $300 they earn, the workers only receive $70, as the rest is taken by the North Korean government as a form of, “patriotic contributions” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). Additionally, no wages are handed directly to the employees; rather, they are marked directly in the company’s account books as a payment (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12). The Chinese companies then pay the DPRK authorities directly, in hard Chinese currency (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12). These wage contributions are highly suspected to be appropriated by the government as yet another means of funding their nuclear program. As such, the government is able to benefit from their citizens’ labor, while said workers are forced into squalid working conditions with no means of escape. These decisions also affect supply chains throughout the world, as American chains, restaurants, and grocery stores, such as ALDI, have been found to have been carrying seafood products that were processed by North Korean workers, which leads to even more profits for the DPRK (Scarlatoiu 2023, 7).
 
Part VI - Systems Analysis and DPRK Government Agencies Involved in Human Trafficking
 
            Using the systems model, the DPRK government’s use of human trafficking performs the function of generating funds for the nuclear program, and also moving “goods” (in this case, labor and victims themselves) to achieve this goal. By potentially aiding the 14k triad and other OCGs in their casino human trafficking ventures, they receive some of the revenue gained and are therefore able to bolster their nuclear arsenal. By trafficking their own citizens in the overseas labor market, they create a “supply” for labor and also movement to evade the sanctions. They are also able to generate funds through this labor trafficking, as they appropriate most of their citizens’ wages and also profit off of the overseas trade of the goods North Korean workers produce.
 
            Numerous government agencies are involved in both main aspects of North Korean human trafficking. The most prominent of these agencies is Office 39, which handles most of the financial aspects of North Korea’s illicit networks (Patel 2025, Presentation 4, Slide 13). Some of their activities include managing and facilitating the DPRK’s hard currency earnings, smuggling goods, and counterfeiting (Patel 2025, Presentation 4, Slide 13). As such, Office 39 would be actively involved in any of North Korea’s casino ventures with the Triad and other OCGs. Office 39 also handles a very distinct responsibility in regard to labor trafficking out of North Korea (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 9). Office 39 assigns North Korean workers to industries overseas, with some of their own departments, such as the External Construction General Bureau and the Bong-Hwa General Bureau, assigning each worker to a different industry (in this case, Construction and Logging and Garment work, respectively) (Scarlatoiu et. al  2022, 9).

Figure 3  - Departments Within Office 39 and Respective Industries
(Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 39)

            Other government agencies are also actively involved in recruiting and screening North Koreans to work abroad. These include, but are not limited to, the Central Party’s Overseas Dispatch Department and the Provincial Party’s 2nd Department (Overseas Dispatch Department) (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). The departments who have the ultimate decision in who goes abroad are officials from the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), particularly those from the Organization and Guidance Department (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). The Ministry of Social Security is additionally responsible for security screenings and clearances (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). For the actual journey, the Foreign Ministry issues passports, while other departments train workers for overseas jobs (such as the Hotel Management Department and the Mansudae Art Studio) (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 22). Overall, numerous government agencies are involved in the process of selecting, assigning, and dispatching workers, and also managing the revenues they generate overseas.

Figure 4: North Korea’s Chain of Command for Dispatching and Assigning Overseas Workers
(Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 22)

Part VII: Treatment of North Korean Scientists Assigned to the Nuclear Program

            The importance of the nuclear program, and thus the illicit activities that are utilized to finance it, is highlighted by the DPRK’s treatment of the nuclear scientists who spearhead these programs. In North Korea, training of these scientists is considered paramount to the success of not only the program, but the country itself.  For example, recruitment for these positions begins extremely early, with young students being selected based on their aptitude for the sciences starting in elementary school (Collins 2024, 17). These students are engaged in a rigorous training regimen and pursue further education and research opportunities at universities such as the Mathematics Research Institute of the National Academy of Sciences, Kim Il-sung University, KCUT, the University of Science, Kim Hyong-jik University of Education, the Railroad College, and the College of Machinery (Collins 2024, 18). Many of these students are sent abroad to continue their studies, with notable host institutions including the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) in Dubna, near Moscow, and the Harbin Institute of Technology, one of China’s premier engineering schools (Collins 2024, 19). After they finish their studies, the nuclear scientists are assigned to different locations and facilities throughout North Korea, with the vast majority being assigned to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex (Collins 2024, 22)
 
            Under the rule of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, these scientists were forced to live under squalid conditions, being forced to live a life of relative poverty (Collins 2024, 36). According to one source, 80% of these nuclear scientists had to find work outside of their research in order to support their families (Collins 2024, 36). However, under Kim Jong-un, these workers are afforded substantially more respect, and patience in regard to their scientific processes, marked by trial-and-error (Collin 2024, 36). This demonstrates not only the importance of the nuclear program to Kim but also illuminates the stark contrast between the two groups of laborers whose work supports the nuclear program. While the scientists construct and design the nuclear arsenal and are granted respect for their efforts, the workers whose wages provide financial support for the program continue to suffer abuses and be sent abroad, with no acknowledgement.

Part VIII: Recommendations and Overall Strategy
 
            Due to the multifaceted and complex nature of North Korea’s human trafficking operations, I would suggest that the U.S. Government adopt a “two-pronged” approach towards preventing further operations. This plan would involve addressing both main types of human trafficking (the DPRK working with foreign OCGs and participating in labor trafficking of its own citizens) separately. This will allow for each type to be adequately handled, while also helping to stop any further trafficking and also stemming the flow of cash towards North Korea’s nuclear program from these operations.
 
Addressing North Korea’s Operations with OCGs
 
            The U.S. State Department and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN should first take diplomatic action to prevent human trafficking occurring at casinos in SEZs. These agencies should encourage the countries being affected by these operations, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, to end their indifferent posture and take concrete legislative measures to curb these illicit activities, possibly in conjunction with each other should there be any issues with jurisdiction over the SEZs. Some of these measures could include establishing clear standards for payment types and transparency in casinos, requiring additional licensing for accepting cryptocurrency, getting rid of private security companies, vetting employees and guests, and making identification mandatory for checking in. The State Department could emphasize this as a major priority in its diplomatic dealings with the countries involved, and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN could also suggest a Security Council or Arria-Formula meeting to discuss the matter. Further, U.S. and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies could launch formal investigations into cryptocurrency usage at these casinos as well as attempting to track victims of other human trafficking schemes from those casinos which have already been discovered. Other international human trafficking prevention non-profits or NGOs, such as Polaris, may also be involved to help search, identify, and care for victims. By setting these measures in place and also launching these investigations, one can potentially rescue any victims within these casino rings and also prevent North Korea from receiving any cryptocurrency payments for these transactions to fund their nuclear programs.

Addressing Labor Trafficking Outside North Korea
 
            The U.S. State Department and Permanent Mission to the UN should take measures to apply diplomatic pressure on those countries that have aided or facilitated North Korean overseas labor trafficking. Firstly, they should formally request China, Russia, the UAE, and other countries involved in this trafficking to demonstrate that they have taken measures to prevent any further reliance on North Korean labor, and they should also be tasked with proving that they are no longer employing any North Korean workers.
 
            The Food and Drug administration (FDA), U.S. Department Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Department of Commerce should also take steps to determine whether imports have been processed or made with North Korean labor. One way to begin this process would be to identify companies from nations that have used North Korean labor in the past. For example, imports from Chinese companies that have used seafood processed by North Korean workers and which have imported products to the United States before, such as Hunchun Pagoda Industry Co. Ltd. and Yantai Dachen Hunchun Seafood Products (Scarlatoiu 2023, 5) should be thoroughly inspected. If they are determined to have used North Korean labor, they should be denied entry in accordance with the Tariff Act of 1930 (Scarlatoiu 2023, 15).
 
            The United States should also encourage the International Labor Organization (ILO) to conduct an investigation into processing plants and companies that have used North Korean labor. This is because many countries that have been proven to have utilized North Korean labor, such as China and Russia, have ratified several of the ILO’s Core Conventions (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 5). Using North Korean labor has violated numerous of these conventions, such as the Forced Labor Convention of 1930 and the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize Convention of 1948 (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 10). As these workers are surveilled, live in fear for their lives and their families’ safety if they do not comply, and have their passports confiscated, they are subjected to forced labor and have had the right to freely associate stripped from them. As such, these nations have violated the conventions, and the ILO should investigate.
 
            By taking these actions, the United States can prevent any profits from goods made with North Korean forced labor from reaching the DPRK and potentially funding its nuclear program. They can also move towards bringing the labor trafficking out of North Korea to a halt, saving these workers from dire working conditions and further curtailing the DPRK’s cash flow.
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks
 
            Along with its many other extensive illicit networks, North Korea has relied heavily on human trafficking as a means of funding its nuclear arsenal. By actively participating with OCGs in their human trafficking ventures, and encouraging labor trafficking of its own citizens abroad, North Korea has continued to receive the funds they need through the suffering of others. By adopting these measures, we will not only have come closer to achieving our objective of weakening North Korea’s illicit networks and their nuclear program through cutting off their valuable sources of hard currency, but we will have spared victims of their crimes from further pain and humiliation, and there is no price that can equate to that.
 
Mohona Ganguly is a former HRNK Research Intern. She is a graduate of Cornell University, having majored in Industrial and Labor Relations, and received her Master of Public Administration (MPA) from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. She currently serves as Policy Chair for the South Asian Legal Defense Fund. She is driven by her commitment towards advancing human rights and labor justice. Her academic and professional interests focus on labor rights and international law, especially how they interact with issues related to North Korea and Asia as a whole.

References
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