Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of North Korea

By Senghun Woo, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO

Focus on Upper Echelon Changes
According to North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (KWP) opened in Pyongyang on February 19. The congress was convened about five years and one month after the 8th Congress and marks the third party congress held since Kim Jong-un came to power. This year’s congress appears to have focused more on changes within the leadership echelon than on economic development. In his opening speech, Kim Jong-Un stated that when the 8th Congress was convened in 2021, the country faced severe conditions due to “hostile forces, embargoes, and sanctions,” but that the situation has now fundamentally changed.
Kim Jong-un was also reappointed as General Secretary, the highest position in the Workers’ Party. North Korea justified his reappointment by claiming that the country’s war deterrence capability, centered on its nuclear forces, has been dramatically strengthened, suggesting that it will continue to pursue policies aimed at enhancing its nuclear and missile programs.

North Korea External Policy Changes
In his daily dispatch “Fault Lines,” HRNK author and George Mason University professor Dr. George Hutchinson pointed out that Kim closed the party congress with a nuclear expansion pledge, thus institutionalizing hostility toward Seoul while inviting conditional U.S. engagement.
Kim Jong-un stated that North Korea would “firmly maintain the toughest stance as its consistent policy toward the United States.” At the same time, he added that “if the United States respects the current status of our state as enshrined in the Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and withdraws its hostile policy toward North Korea, there is no reason for us not to maintain good relations with the United States.”
This remark is interpreted as signaling a positive stance regarding the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit, which has been raised in connection with U.S. President Donald Trump’s planned visit to China in April. On the other hand, the current “status as enshrined in the Constitution” is that of a nuclear state. In other words, it seems that, while North Korea has expressed openness to “unconditional talks with the United States,” it seems to have a condition of its own: acceptance as a nuclear power state. That, of course, is highly unlikely, as the United States has not abandoned its ultimate strategic goal of North Korea policy, the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID), or the full, final, verifiable denuclearization (FFVD) of North Korea.
With regard to South Korea, Kim Jong-un emphasized the concept of “two hostile states.” Kim Jong-un asserted that North Korea would never engage in dialogue with South Korea, which it regards as a most hostile country, and declared that the North would no longer consider the South as part of the same ethnicity or nation. According to KBS News, Kim also criticized the South Korean government’s conciliatory stance, calling it a “clumsy deception” and a “poorly executed act.” He warned that If South Korea’s actions were to undermine North Korea’s security, the possibility of South Korea’s complete collapse could not be ruled out.
In response, President Lee Jae-myung stated: “The values the South Korean government must pursue are peace and stability, and since hostile sentiments that risk war cannot be eliminated overnight, sustained efforts are necessary. I do not believe that threatening actions toward North Korea have served South Korea’s national interests. We will continue striving for dialogue between the leaders of the two Koreas.”
Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), assessed North Korea’s recent foreign policy stance as signaling an intention to sever inter-Korean relations while seeking to improve ties with the United States. He argued that without easing sanctions on North Korea, the country would be unable to avoid significant economic damage.

Major Personnel Reshuffle
According to KBS News, significant personnel changes were also evident at the 9th KWP Congress. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un, was promoted from deputy department director to director general and was reinstated as an alternate member of the KWP Politburo.
The Presidium of the Political Bureau, which is the party’s highest decision-making body, now includes Kim Jong-un, Pak Tae-song (Premier), Jo Yong-won (Director of the Organization and Guidance Department), Kim Jae-ryong (Director of the Discipline Investigation Department), and Ri Il-hwan (Party Secretary). In contrast, senior figures such as Choe Ryong-hae (Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly), Pak Jong-chon, and Ri Pyong-chol were excluded from the latest appointments, signaling a generational shift within North Korea’s leadership.
Notably, unlike in the past, none of the five members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau come from purely military backgrounds. Cho Han-bum, a KINU senior research fellow, assessed a stronger emphasis on policy execution and further consolidation of Kim Jong-un’s centralized leadership.
Meanwhile, key officials previously responsible for inter-Korean affairs were also ommitted from major appointments. Ri Son-gwon, director of the Party’s 10th Bureau, and Kim Yong-chol, a party advisor, both of whom had been elected to the Central Committee at the 8th Party Congress, were not included in any major positions this time. This omission suggests a significant reduction in the political standing of figures once regarded as specialists in South Korean affairs. In a regular briefing, Yoon Min-ho, spokesperson for South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, noted that the “South Korea line” appears to have been removed from the leadership structure.

Senghun Woo is a research intern at HRNK and a senior at Incheon National University in South Korea, where he is double majoring in International Relations and Logistics. He is currently an exchange student at American University in Washington, DC. After completing his military service in Somalia, he became increasingly interested in North Korean human rights issues. His primary areas of interest include political prison camps and the everyday lives of North Korean people, with a focus on how human rights conditions shape social and political outcomes. At HRNK, he supports the team’s monitoring and compilation of North Korea-related developments, including work on the Daily Press as well as logistical tasks essential to the organization’s social media.
 
Bibliography
Fault Lines Daily Summary – (02/26/2026, George Hutchnson)
ALJAZEERA, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un pledges to lift living standards at rare congress (02/20/2026, AL Jazeera staff)
BBC News Korea, 김정은, 9차 당대회서 만장일치로 총비서 재추대...애시당초 '반대표'는 불가능하다? (02/26/2026, 한상미)
BBC News Korea, 북한 9차 당대회 7일 만에 종료…주목할 점은? (02/26/2026, 구유나)
[한눈에 이슈] 북한 9차 당대회 결론은 ... '통미봉남' 노선 견지? (02/26/2026, KBS)
[현장영상] "북한이 우리를 불신한다고.." 북 언사에 대통령 입 열었다 (02/26/2026, JTBC)