North Korea’s Troop Deployment to Russia’s War in Ukraine: Human Rights Concerns

By Senghun Woo, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO

1. Introduction
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a significant escalation in international armed conflict, with enduring implications for global security. As the war has continued, Russia has faced increasing challenges in sustaining its military operations. Against this international backdrop, in June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a surprise visit to North Korea, signaling a rapid deepening of relations between the two countries. On June 19, 2024, North Korea and Russia concluded the Treaty on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which includes a provision committing both parties to provide assistance if either is attacked. While formally framed as a diplomatic and security cooperation agreement, the treaty has been widely interpreted as institutionalizing enhanced military cooperation between the two states.
The course of the war subsequently entered another phase. On August 6, 2024, Ukraine launched a military operation targeting Russia’s Kursk region, initially achieving what was assessed as a degree of operational success. However, the situation changed markedly following reports that North Korean military personnel had joined Russian forces and were deployed in combat operations in the area. The involvement of North Korean troops altered the dynamics of the fighting in Kursk and underscored a significant shift in the conflict, marking the transition of the war from a bilateral armed confrontation to one involving the direct participation of military forces from a third country.
This article focuses on the case of North Korea’s deployment of troops to Ukraine and seeks to examine the human rights conditions of North Korean soldiers arising from this process.

2. Deployment Overview
In October 2024, South Korean intelligence authorities announced that North Korea had deployed approximately four brigades of troops, including special forces units, totaling around 12,000 personnel, to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. According to these authorities, roughly three-quarters of the deployed forces were drawn from the Eleventh Corps, commonly referred to as the “Storm Corps,” while the remaining quarter consisted of personnel from the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Ukrainian intelligence officials further stated that the contingent included approximately 500 officers and three generals based in Pyongyang.
According to media reports, the deployed forces were not sent directly to the front lines following their departure from North Korea. Instead, they were transferred to several military facilities in Russia’s Far East, including Vladivostok, Ussuriysk (Baranovsky), Ulan-Ude (Donguz), Yekaterinoslavsky, Knyazhe-Volkonskoye, and Sergeevka. While stationed at these locations, North Korean troops reportedly underwent approximately six weeks of acclimation training and were issued select modern weapons before being deployed to combat operations in the Kursk region around November 2024.
Subsequently, on February 27, 2025, South Korean intelligence authorities disclosed that North Korea had dispatched an additional contingent of more than 1,000 troops to Russia.
Reports have also indicated that North Korean troops deployed to the battlefield were issued Russian military uniforms and identification documents, effectively concealing their affiliation as members of the Russian armed forces. Although the Russian government initially denied the presence of North Korean troops, on April 26, 2025, Russia officially acknowledged that North Korean forces had participated in operations related to the recapture of the Kursk region.

3. Background
As the war in Ukraine has become increasingly protracted, it has been assessed that Russia has been been facing growing manpower shortages. Roman Botskala, a Ukrainian war correspondent, has noted that Russia sought to address gaps in front-line personnel by utilizing North Korean troops. This assessment suggests that Russia’s reliance on foreign military personnel became more pronounced as the demands of the war intensified.
The Russian government has also partially formalized its position regarding North Korean participation in combat operations. Moscow announced that North Korean troops were deployed in operations to retake the Kursk region and stated that their support contributed to the recapture of the area. This marked a departure from Russia’s earlier blanket denials and represented a limited acknowledgment of the role played by North Korean forces.
North Korea, for its part, is also assessed to have derived substantial benefits from military cooperation with Russia. According to the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, North Korea may have secured economic gains totaling approximately 27 billion U.S. dollars in exchange for providing munitions, troops, and technical support to Russia. Of this amount, an estimated 19.2 billion U.S. dollars reportedly stemmed from the supply of military equipment, while troop deployments are estimated to have generated approximately 280 million U.S. dollars in revenue.
These economic gains may have contributed not only to North Korea’s financial position but also to the political stability of the Kim Jong-un regime. In particular, strengthened relations with Russia appear to have expanded North Korea’s diplomatic space, as evidenced by its participation in China’s Victory Day commemorations and the visible reinforcement of trilateral cooperation among North Korea, Russia, and China. Additionally, a memorial ceremony held in North Korea in August 2025 for soldiers deployed abroad may have been used as a means of reinforcing internal cohesion.
In addition, exposure to modern warfare may have provided North Korea with opportunities to advance its military strategy and develop military technologies. Available assessments indicate that approximately 3,000 North Korean personnel returned to North Korea after deployment, with many of them reportedly reassigned as military instructors responsible for disseminating modern combat tactics, including drone operations and multiple rocket launcher systems, within the North Korean military.

4. The Human Rights Situation of North Korean Soldiers
In November 2024, Ukraine announced via Telegram and other social media platforms that its forces had captured wounded North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region. These cases are widely regarded as direct evidence confirming the deployment of North Korean troops to the war in Ukraine.
Subsequently, the South Korean investigative television program PD Notebook aired in-depth interviews with North Korean prisoners of war, offering a more detailed account of the human rights conditions experienced by North Korean soldiers during their participation in the conflict. According to the broadcast, the captured soldiers are currently held in prisoner-of-war facilities in Ukraine and have reported severe psychological distress stemming from the fact of their capture. Both prisoners stated that they regarded becoming a prisoner of war as a dishonor worse than death and expressed deep anguish over having survived.
One prisoner testified that he was unable to attempt suicide after losing consciousness due to injuries sustained in combat. During the interview, he expressed fear that repatriation to North Korea would result in severe punishment not only for himself but also for his family, and he voiced extreme anxiety over the possibility of being returned. Another prisoner stated that he attempted to commit suicide with a grenade immediately after capture but was prevented when Ukrainian soldiers initially posed as Russian forces. After realizing that they were Ukrainian soldiers, he attempted suicide again but failed. He stated, “A North Korean soldier cannot become a prisoner. Becoming a prisoner itself is a crime,” and expressed resentment over having survived.
In this context, a platoon leader from Ukraine’s 225th Regiment stated in a media interview that North Korean soldiers frequently choose suicide over capture. This behavior is widely understood to be closely linked to ideological indoctrination and military conditioning within North Korean society. According to testimony from North Korean escapees, soldiers are taught that being taken prisoner during wartime constitutes betrayal and are instructed to carry out self-destruction immediately prior to capture.
Another significant human rights issue revealed through prisoner interviews concerns the severe information blackout and complete severance of family contact during the deployment process. Some prisoners stated that they were not informed in advance that they were being sent to an overseas war and were unable to notify their families. One prisoner explained that he only realized he was being sent to Russia after boarding a ship and noticing Russian personnel on board. Another stated that he had not been able to contact his family even once since entering military service.
This severance of family contact appears to have generated widespread anxiety within North Korea. According to Daily NK, following reports of troop deployments, parents with children in the military experienced extreme distress due to uncertainty over whether their children had been deployed. Some parents reportedly attempted to visit their children’s units but were denied access. South Korean intelligence authorities have further assessed that North Korean authorities may have sought to relocate and isolate the families of deployed soldiers as a means of enforcing control and preventing the leakage of information.

5. The Repatriation of North Korean Prisoners of War
It has been reported that the two North Korean prisoners of war currently detained in Ukraine wish to relocate to South Korea. However, the future disposition of these prisoners extends beyond a purely humanitarian matter and is closely intertwined with the complex diplomatic and political dynamics surrounding the war in Ukraine, making resolution difficult. From Ukraine’s perspective, North Korean prisoners of war may be viewed as a potential bargaining instrument in negotiations with Russia.
At the same time, repatriating these prisoners to North Korea or Russia would likely expose them to severe punishment, raising the strong possibility of international humanitarian criticism. As documented in earlier prisoner interviews, North Korean soldiers internalize the fear that being taken prisoner is treated as “treason” or “defection,” potentially subjecting not only themselves but also their families to punishment. Under such circumstances, forced repatriation carries a substantial risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or violations of the right to life.
International humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions, clearly establishes the principle of non-refoulement in relation to the protection of prisoners of war and underscores the need to take individual intent into account. Under the Geneva Conventions, prisoners of war must not be forcibly returned to a country where they face a risk of persecution, and the wishes of the individual concerned should constitute a key consideration in decisions regarding repatriation or resettlement. These principles carry heightened significance in the present context, in which the North Korean prisoners of war have expressed a clear desire to relocate to South Korea.
According to a TV Chosun report published on February 7, 2025, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine reached an agreement through trilateral negotiations to exchange a total of 314 prisoners of war. However, it was confirmed that the two North Korean prisoners held in Ukraine would not be included in the exchange list. This development suggests that the issue of North Korean prisoners of war is being addressed separately from general prisoner exchange negotiations.
Meanwhile, the South Korean government has stated that it would accept all North Korean prisoners of war who formally request to travel to South Korea. Nevertheless, despite this stated principle, the government has thus far been assessed as maintaining a cautious stance with respect to concrete diplomatic and institutional measures. As a result, it remains unclear how the expressed wishes of the North Korean prisoners of war and the protection principles enshrined in international humanitarian law will be implemented in practice.
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6. Concluding Remarks
This report has examined North Korea’s participation in the war in Ukraine and the human rights issues arising from that involvement, based on limited publicly available information and testimony from North Korean prisoners of war. While verified information remains constrained, prisoner interviews constitute a critical evidentiary basis for analyzing human rights violations associated with the deployment of North Korean troops and therefore carry particular significance.
North Korea’s overseas deployment of military personnel represents more than a case of bilateral military cooperation. Rather, it reflects the extension of the systems of control and repression that the North Korean regime has long maintained domestically into the context of an international armed conflict. Testimony from prisoners of war indicates that North Korean soldiers were mobilized without regard to their personal will and were deprived of meaningful access to information or choice regarding their participation in the war. Ideological training and indoctrination that frame capture as a dishonor worse than death underscore the extent to which North Korean soldiers’ right to life and human dignity have been severely compromised. In this context, North Korean soldiers should be understood not primarily as perpetrators of war, but as victims of systematic, state-imposed human rights violations.
The treatment and disposition of North Korean prisoners of war raise serious human rights responsibilities for the international community. Multiple testimonies and sources indicate that repatriation to North Korea or Russia would expose these individuals to a high risk of severe punishment and inhuman treatment. Under such circumstances, the obligation to protect the life and dignity of prisoners of war becomes especially clear. International humanitarian law and international human rights norms establish that prisoners of war are objects of protection rather than instruments of diplomatic negotiation and emphasize the prohibition against forced return to countries where individuals face a risk of persecution.
Accordingly, Ukraine, South Korea, and the broader international community share responsibility for identifying solutions that prioritize the expressed wishes and safety of North Korean prisoners of war, taking into account the specific human rights risk they face. The issue of North Korean prisoners of war is not merely an ancillary consequence of the conflict, but a test case for the fundamental principles of the international humanitarian law and human rights system, including the protection of human dignity and basic rights even in the context of armed conflict.

Senghun Woo is a research intern at HRNK and a senior at Incheon National University in South Korea, where he is double majoring in International Relations and Logistics. He is currently an exchange student at American University in Washington, DC. After completing his military service in Somalia, he became increasingly interested in North Korean human rights issues. His primary areas of interest include political prison camps and the everyday lives of North Korean people, with a focus on how human rights conditions shape social and political outcomes. At HRNK, he supports the team’s monitoring and compilation of North Korea-related developments, including work on the Daily Press as well as logistical tasks essential to the organization’s social media.

7. Sources
Media Reports
Hubina, Yevheniia. “Ukrainian Intelligence Details Russia’s Use of North Korean Troops in War Against Ukraine.” Ukrainska Pravda, February 4, 2026.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/02/04/8019390/.
Oliynyk, Tetyana. “First North Korean Troops Arrive in Russia’s Kursk Oblast—Ukrainian Intelligence.” Ukrainska Pravda, October 24, 2024.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/10/24/7481239/.
Romanenko, Valentyna. “North Korean Drone Operators Adjust Russian Attacks on Ukrainian Forces from Kursk Oblast—Video.” Ukrainska Pravda, October 16, 2025.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/10/16/8003005/.
Jeong, Cheol-hwan. “North Korean Troops Advance Without Aiding Wounded Comrades: Fighting Style Distinct from Russian Forces.” Chosun Ilbo, January 13, 2025.
https://www.chosun.com/international/international_general/2025/01/12/QLFO6OUMXFAG5MFJESNAVTJZSM/.
Kim, Dong-hyun. “Russia Officially Acknowledges First Deployment of North Korean Troops, Says They Helped Repel Ukraine.” Chosun Ilbo, April 28, 2025.
https://www.chosun.com/international/international_general/2025/04/28/7I3LD4QTOFCJNC4Y3Y43BKUQZY/.
Kim, Myeong-il. “North Korean Residents Shaken by Troop Deployments to Russia: Some Parents Rush to Military Units.” Chosun Ilbo, October 31, 2024.
https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2024/10/31/V6OKVBUMPBBSRMLNGTGNM65T2E/.
TV Chosun. “‘We Want to Go to South Korea’: Two North Korean POWs Excluded from Russia–Ukraine Prisoner Exchange.” February 7, 2026.
https://www.chosun.com/national/national_general/2026/02/06/7S75UOA7YFAMTMVPQNPYQB5H5Y/.
Ryu, Byeong-su. “South Korean Intelligence Says North Korea Has Sent Additional Troops to Russia; Scale Under Review.” TV Chosun, February 27, 2025.
https://news.tvchosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2025/02/27/2025022790091.html.
Kim, Hyeon-cheol. “North Korea Earned 27 billion U.S. Dollars by Supporting Russia’s War in Ukraine.”, April 17, 2025.
http://www.g-enews.com/ko
kr/news/article/news_all/2025041623173148029a1f309431_1/article.html
Research Institutes and Academic Publications
Lee, Chung-gu. The Russia–Ukraine War and the Deployment of North Korean Troops: Psychological Warfare Implications and Measures to Strengthen Mental Combat Power of the South Korean Military. Seoul: Defense Institute for Spiritual Combat Power, 2025.
Lee, Su-won. North Korea’s Perception of and Response to the Russia–Ukraine War. August 2025.
Broadcast Media
MBC. PD Notebook.
Part 1: “The Russia–Ukraine War and North Korean Troops—Part 1: The Shadow Army.”
Part 2: “The Russia–Ukraine War and North Korean Troops—Part 2: Endless War.”