The Challenges Faced by Resettled North Korean Escapees in South Korea

By Andrew Chan, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca
​

Introduction

In the decades of isolation and authoritarian rule that have gripped North Korea since the end of the Korean War, the number of escapees fleeing the North and settling in different countries has steadily grown. Among the preferred destinations, the most popular is unsurprisingly South Korea, where North Korean escapees are granted automatic citizenship and receive support services from the government. This includes resettlement payment, training services, support programs, and housing assistance.[1] Additionally, escapees who are able to provide South Korean authorities with intelligence aiding the country’s security are entitled to a reward of $860,000, while other payments also being made for those who escape with weapons.[2] The support that the South Korean government provides to escapees is also generous and expensive, encompassing 12 weeks of adaptation training in a resettlement facility, upwards of $50,000 in settlement benefits and housing subsidies depending on the size of the household, and free public school and university education for children.[3]

North Koreans are therefore often drawn to the South as a destination, as many see it as a place where they will be welcomed as citizens and where they will be free from the authoritarian reality they face in the North. As a result, the number of North Korean escapees in South Korea was estimated by the  Ministry of Unification to be at 34,078 in December of 2023.[4] At the same time, North Korean escapees who resettle in South Korea face numerous challenges, and life in their new home entails many significant difficulties.

While resettled North Korean escapees in South Korea find themselves safe from the physical threats posed by the North Korean regime, the hardships many face in the new country are less noticeable in kind. Such challenges are broad in type and have resulted in North Korean escapees struggling to keep up with their fellow South Koreans in many aspects. One example relates to escapee adolescents under the age of 19, which comprise approximately 15% of the escapee population.[5] Among this group, North Korean escapee adolescents demonstrate high rates of faltering growth and compared to their South Korean peers, and studies have found that they are on average shorter and thinner, but also suffer from higher rates of obesity.[6] This is only one example of the physical disparities that are present among North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, and such challenges affect the future generations of these communities.

In order to understand the significance of such disparities, it remains necessary to examine the impact they have on the life of the resettled escapees. These challenges manifest in a number of ways, especially in defining economic, psychological, and cultural differences and struggles. Thus, it is only by examining such challenges and facilitating communication with escapees themselves that positive changes can be achieved to improve the lives of North Korean escapees in South Korea.

Economic Challenges

As perhaps the most visible form of difficulty faced by North Koreans in the South, economic challenges burden almost all of the escapees. As integrating North Koreans into the South Korean economy requires significant support from the government, South Korea provides extensive assistance through financial aid and various programs aimed at increasing self-sufficiency, such as vocational training.[7] Nevertheless, despite the existence of such programs, economic stability is not attainable for most North Korean escapees as many face harsh difficulties in their economic performance.

When compared to their South Korean counterparts, former North Koreans find themselves severely disadvantaged as the unemployment rate among them is approximately twice compared to the national average.[8] Additionally, 56% of North Korean escapees in South Korea are classified as being low-income and 25% qualify for the lowest income bracket subject to national basic livelihood subsidies, a figure which is six times higher than the rate of the South Korean population.[9]

Economic disparities are deeply rooted in multiple causes, including the background of these escapees arriving from North Korea. Many arrive with physical and mental scars that prevent them from settling into a new culture and which affect their ability to obtain and maintain a steady income.[10] Additionally, the different education and training received in North Korea is often incompatible with the job market and society in the South. A BBC interview with an escapee in 2021 discussed many of these issues, describing how many of the jobs available in South Korea are not compatible for the escapees, many of whom have never had to find a job and lack work experience or knowledge of many sectors of the job market.[11]

Financial literacy is another gap existing between North Korean escapees and South Koreans, as the former are significantly less financially literate than the latter.[12] Adapting to a vastly different capitalist society as opposed to a state-controlled command economy is a challenge that requires long-term adaptation and assistance. Nevertheless, North Korean escapees are faced with time constraints and are required to be accustomed to the South Korean model quite abruptly.

Another aspect of the economic challenge is integrating North Korean escapees into a vastly digitized South Korean society that is significantly different from the North. Learning to use modern information and communications technology such as Internet platforms remains a great challenge for many of the escapees who previously had no access to such technologies. Their difficulty in quickly adapting creates a digital divide between them and their South Korean counterparts which further exacerbates social inequality and prevents their smooth integration into a different society.[13] This is an additional contributing factor to the economic woes of North Korean escapees, especially as occupations in countries like South Korea demand higher levels of digital experience and education that escapees do not possess. Such challenges result in frequent low income levels and poor economic performance among North Korean escapees in the South, creating among them chronic feelings of loneliness and abandonment.

Psychological Challenges

Many North Korean escapees arrive in South Korea with psychological trauma that can represent a significant barrier to their resettlement and integration. The trauma and mental health issues escapees suffer stem from traumatic experiences endured in North Korea such as witnessing public executions and enduring human rights abuses as well as the overall state of anxiety that arise from settling in a new country while being separated from family and friends.[14] Additionally, escapees who travelled through different transit countries like China have often fallen victim to human trafficking, which includes gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage against women and girls.[15] Such traumatic experiences greatly affect the mental health of North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea and represent a difficult challenge to overcome.

Among the North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, rates of trauma and mental distress such as PTSD are significant. A study from 2022 found that, among 531 North Korean escapees interviewed, 81.4% suffered from trauma and 15.3% suffered from PTSD, a figure which is nine times higher than the average for South Koreans.[16] Additionally, 53% of escapees who visited hospitals for psychiatric problems after defection were diagnosed with PTSD and many had severe difficulties adapting to the South Korean society and suffered from a lower quality of life.[17] This demonstrates a direct correlation between these escapees’ mental health and their challenges for resettling to the new country.

Among the mental health challenges endured by former North Koreans, suicidal behaviour and suicidal thoughts are among the most concerning. While the suicide rate in South Korea is already one of the highest among OECD countries, the North Korean escapee community faces especially high suicide rates. A study from 2019 showed that 12.4% of escapees had the urge to commit suicide in the previous year and that the suicide rate among them is three times higher than that of the rest of the South Korean population.[18] Other mental health challenges endured by North Korean escapees also include major depressive disorder, agoraphobia[19], social phobia, and panic disorder. These issues can also be exacerbated by other sources in their new environments such as discrimination, cultural differences, and lack of access to resources like support networks or psychological help.[20]

The severe mental health challenges faced by many North Korean escapees additionally represent a significant barrier throughout their resettlement process in South Korea. Many of the escapees afflicted with PTSD, suicidal behaviour or ideation, depression, and other disorders find it difficult to settle into their new homes and build a new life when faced with these overwhelming challenges to their wellbeing. Another factor is the lack of knowledge on how to request assistance among escapees, as up to 70% of them do not know about counselling centres or psychologists from which to receive support.[21] Additionally, as mental health is an issue completely disregarded in North Korea, many escapees are unaware of their mental well-being or of how they could ask for and receive help.[22] As a result, understanding the importance of mental health among North Korean escapees remains a necessary component in their resettlement efforts and for their integration into South Korean society. Until this is accomplished, mental health remains a major challenge faced by escapees.

Cultural Challenges

The third and final challenge faced by North Korean escapees in South Korea lies in their ability to adapt and assimilate into South Korean society and the differences in economic system, technology, and social behaviour. In an effort not to stand out and face prejudice, many North Korean escapees feel pressured to conceal their identities and fit in, leading to greater insecurity and psychological distress as they try to conform, hide their North Korean roots, or intentionally distance themselves from the escapee community.[23] On the other hand, those who do not try to conform to the South Korean society or form bonds only within the escapee community find themselves isolated or discriminated against by the wider society for failing to assimilate.[24]

Discrimination against North Korean escapees by South Koreans also remains a major issue. Accounts from former North Koreans show that social stigma, mistreatment, and suspicion against them from South Koreans is prevalent among certain segments of the population, and it contributes to worsening mental health conditions among escapees.[25] Social stigma and prejudice also extends to discrimination in employment opportunities towards those with the North Korean accent while women and children – who make up the majority of the escapees – reported to have been victims of exploitation and bullying.[26] Discrimination also exists through the slight language barrier between northerners and southerners because, despite sharing a common language, differences persist in spelling, pronunciation, and accents.[27] This is another way in which North Korean escapees can be stigmatized and ostracized in South Korea, hindering their resettlement.

In addition to the issue of discrimination and to the pressure to quickly adapt to a new societal and cultural standard, North Korean escapees tend to avoid communicating their struggles or treatment as they fear being labeled as ungrateful or being targeted by far-right extremists who reject their resettlement and presence in South Korea.[28] As a result, many North Korean escapees who experience discrimination in their everyday lives are reluctant to speak out about their marginalization to avoid being regarded as unappreciative or undeserving of the governmental support they receive.[29]

In light of such challenges, the cultural unsettlement that many North Korean escapees endure is often suffered in silence. The struggles they face in adapting to a new culture and lifestyle, often in face of discrimination and inadequate support, heavily contributes to difficulties in building their new lives in the South and represents a less-discussed challenge that they must endure during their resettlement and adaptation.

Solutions and Conclusion

In light of challenges that North Korean escapees face once resettled in South Korea, it is evident that the more than 30,000 escapees in the country do not have an easy life. Despite the considerable funds that the South Korean government invests on resettling escapees, the transition from the authoritarian North to the South is not always as smooth as both the government and the escapees themselves would wish it to be. Crafting solutions to such issues would inevitably require direct involvement of the escapees, but some methods and strategies to tackle this issue have already been showcasing positive effects. Many of these solutions, such as a more effective and targeted investment of financial support, better education programs, and mental health resources for escapees, are obvious in their purpose while others remain unprioritized. At the same time, these solutions can have major positive impacts and are worth looking at.

The first solution could include the creation of a social support network to help the North Korean escapees. While offering financial support, employment opportunities, education, and training are essential, other measures are needed for achieving the successful integration of escapees in the South.[30] This could be accomplished by creating strong support networks for escapees, both with fellow North Koreans as well as with South Koreans, as the latter could help facilitate communication and smoothen their assimilation and integration processes.[31]

Another measure for the improvement of the integration process should specifically involve young escapees. Communication and collaboration between North Korean and South Korean students as a form of a school program is key in building relationships that benefit everyone.[32] This engagement may also help in debunking prejudices among the South Korean youth against North Korean escapees, encouraging engagement and understanding among the two.[33] These strategies may foster a critical effect in helping settle young escapees and ensure that they have the tools to thrive in their new homes.

The challenges that North Korean escapees continue to endure following their escape from the Kim regime remain difficult and overlooked. The efforts of the South Korean government in resettling most of the escapees is commendable, especially when this is a task most other countries do not fulfill. The U.S., for example, has accepted only about 220 North Korean escapees since 2006 while China has a history of forcefully repatriating escapees back to the North.[34] Yet, it is also clear that efforts to resettle escapees in the South and to help them assimilate into such a different society are not perfect, as escapees suffer from a number of hardships that are not yet being adequately addressed. These hardships, many of which stem from the culture shock of escaping North Korea, can be difficult and long-lasting to tackle. However, supporting North Korean escapees is not only essential for their resettlement but also to help them fulfill their potential. Otherwise, the financial struggles, mental health problems, and discrimination many escapees face upon their arrival will remain the exclusive reality faced by the North Korean community resettled in the South.

References

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Cha, Sangmi and Jon Herskovitz. “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South.” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying- lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.

Couch, Christina. “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea.” PBS. February   16, 2017. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.

Kim, Hagyun and Kwanghyuk Kim. “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school   engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter-  Korean identity through a process of being one of them.” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 288-309. https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.

Kim, Minjung, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee. “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence from North Korean Refugees.” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2505-2527. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.

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Kim, Hee Jin and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya. “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1188-1201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.

Koh, Ho Youn and Kyungmin Baek. “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees.” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 5-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.

Lee, Grace J. M. “It’s time for Canada to jumpstart efforts to support families fleeing North Korea.” Policy Options. August 28, 2023. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2023/north-korean-refugee-sponsorships.

Lee, Hyosun. “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea.” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318-344. https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.

Lee, Mi Kyung, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu. “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea.” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.

Lee, Yeon Jung. Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol,    Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee. “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea.” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-460. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.

Myeong, Hwayeon and Ahlam Lee. “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices.” British Educational   Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 872-899. https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.

Nam, Boyoung and Ijun Hong. “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea.” Violence Against Women (2023): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.

Nam, Boyoung. Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim. “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation.” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564-571. https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.

Nam, Boyoung, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong. “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea.” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024). https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.

Noh, Jin-Won, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu. “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey.” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 26-44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.

Park, Mi Yung. “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea.” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 271-287. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.

Park, Soim, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan. “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.

Shin, Hyonhee. “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life.”     Reuters. January 4, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.

“South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000.” BBC. March 5, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.

South Korean Ministry of Unification. “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors.”             https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.

Williams, Sophie. “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?” BBC. February 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.

Yu, Shieun, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo. “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees.” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1019-1029. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.

Andrew Chan is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy from the University of Toronto. Currently a research intern at HRNK, he is passionate and interested about matters of global security, global policy, and human rights issues.

[1] Hee Jin Kim and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya, “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1189, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.
[2] “South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000,” BBC, March 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.
[3] Sophie Williams, “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?,” BBC, February 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.
[4] South Korean Ministry of Unification, “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors,” (2023), https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.
[5] So-Yeong Kim, Hye-Min Ku, and Seong-Woo Choi, “The growth status of North Korean refugee adolescents in South Korea: comparison with South Korean adolescents,” Annals of Human Biology 50, no. 1 (2023): 148, https://doi.org/10.1080/03014460.2023.2183988.
[6] Ibid., 148-149.
[7] Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu, “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey,” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.
[8] Sangmi Cha and Jon Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South,” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying-lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.
[9] Hyonhee Shin, “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life,” Reuters, January 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.
[10] Cha and Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors.”
[11] Williams, “North Korean defectors.”
[12] Minjung Kim, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee, “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence
from North Korean Refugees,” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2522, https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.
[13] Ho Youn Koh and Kyungmin Baek, “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees,” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 6-7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.
[14] Boyoung Nam and Ijun Hong, “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea,” Violence Against Women (2023): 1, https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.
[15] Ibid., 2.
[16] Mi Kyung Lee, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu, “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea,” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022): 1, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.
[17] Ibid., 1-2.
[18] Boyoung Nam, Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim, “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564, https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.
[19] Agoraphobia is an anxiety disorder wherein the affected perceives their surrounding environment, unfamiliar spaces, or large crowds to be unsafe, causing them to become anxious and reluctant to leave their homes.
[20] Yeon Jung Lee, Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol, Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee, “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea,” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-453, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.
[21] Christina Couch, “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea,” PBS, February 16, 2017, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.
[22] Shieun Yu, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo, “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees,” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1020, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.
[23] Nam and Hong, “Trauma Exposure,” 4-10.
[24] Boyoung Nam, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong, “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea,” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024): 2, https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.
[25] Christoph Bluth, “The North Korean who went home: many defectors struggle against discrimination in the South,” The Conversation, January 7, 2022, https://theconversation.com/the-north-korean-who-went-home-many-defectors-struggle-against-discrimination-in-the-south-174366.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Mi Yung Park, “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea,” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 272, https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.
[28] Hyosun Lee, “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea,” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318, https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.
[29] Ibid., 336.
[30] Soim Park, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan, “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?,” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023): 1-2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.
[31] Ibid., 7-8.
[32] Hagyun Kim and Kwanghyuk Kim, “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter-Korean identity through a process of being one of them,” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 304-305, https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.
[33] Hwayeon Myeong and Ahlam Lee, “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices,” British Educational Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 894, https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.
[34] Grace J. M. Lee, “It’s time for Canada to jumpstart efforts to support families fleeing North Korea,” Policy Options, August 28, 2023, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2023/north-korean-refugee-sponsorships.