The Legal Status of North Korean Refugees & Survival Migration

By Isabella Grace Packowski
Edited by Diletta de Luca, HRNK Research Associate

Introduction
The plight of North Korean refugees presents a complex and multifaceted challenge within the realm of international refugee law and human rights. This paper examines the legal status and survival migration of North Korean escapees, exploring the historical context of refugee law, specific case studies of North Korean refugees in China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, and the broader implications of survival migration. By analyzing the institutional frameworks, national policies, and humanitarian efforts, this study aims to shed light on the critical issues faced by North Korean refugees and propose viable solutions to enhance their protection and resettlement.
 
Historical Background | Refugee Law
Before delving into the case studies and offering potential solutions, it is first crucial to analyze the institutional and legal history of the leading body in global governance concerning refugee aid, status, and protection – the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, hereafter). The emergence of refugees as an international concern dates back as early as the 17th century, when religious persecutions and wars in the Middle East and Europe were a concern.[1] This concern continued into the early 20th century, with provisions under the League of Nations and its Office of High Commissioner for Refugees (1921), following events such as the First World War and the Russian Civil War.[2] However, the grounds on which these provisions were built were shaky at best, with minimal legal aid provided and catering to only specific national groups.[3]
 
It wasn’t until the aftermath of World War II, and the founding of the UN in 1946, that global collaboration solidified and accelerated.[4] This was hastily supplemented by the birth of the UNHCR (1950) as one of its key sub-bodies, replacing the International Refugee Organization (IRO -1947) and its predecessor, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA -1943).[5] However, it would not be without its own complexities. There was limited financial and governing autonomy amongst other UN bodies.[6] They also held only specific functions and strict definitions that constituted refugee status, limiting the scope to which such aid could apply (i.e., its mandate to provide international protection for refugees and to find durable solutions to their plight, not including material assistance, the inclusion of “internal refugees,” etc.)[7]
 
Representative of this ambiguity, the United States initially sought to establish a temporary international body with limited authority and a focus on international legal protection.[8] This was contrary to the varying perspectives of other Western States, who sought more operational cost and geographic considerations, and South Asian states, who fought for the permanency of the organization.[9] During the Cold War, international refugee law underwent shifts in its priorities and foundations within a context shaped by Eurocentrism, resolutions passed by the General Assembly expanding mandates, sovereignty and non-intervention, and the emerging concept of “moral authority.”[10] Consequently, after this era ended, contradictions within refugee law, particularly regarding its non-political foundations, attitudes toward interventionism, and emerging security threats such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, profoundly shook the international sphere in the realm of human rights scenarios.[11]
 
North Korean Refugees Case Study
To better understand how refugee law operates in complex geopolitical contexts, the following section focuses on the resettlement process of North Korean refugees in South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China, and proposes considerations and solutions. Due to geographical vicinity, shared history, and cultural similarities, many North Korean escapees, desperate to flee the social inequalities and human rights abuses sustained by the Kim regime, often seek refuge in two of North Korea’s neighboring states: China and South Korea.[12]
 
Although South Korea has taken in over 34,000 refugees from the North – drawing on its constitution, which recognizes, with some limitations, that anyone born on the Korean Peninsula as a South Korean national is entitled to the protection of the Republic of Korea – many defectors still face significant discrimination and stark cultural and political differences.[13] As such, some will opt to be resettled to Western states.[14]
 
Under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, North Korean defectors qualify as refugees sur place, meaning “...individuals who are not considered refugees upon leaving their country but become refugees later due to the persecution they are subjected to if they were to be deported.”[15] However, differences in how countries recognize North Korean refugees stem from the varying diplomatic relationships each nation maintains with North Korea, leading to ambiguities in their refugee status, asylum claims, and perceived legitimacy.[16] The United Kingdom, for example, with a higher refugee intake than other European nation, recognizes these difficulties but does not view them as grounds for asylum.[17] As such, North Korean secondary asylum seekers are subject to refoulement to South Korea under the 2012 UK-ROK Agreement on the Readmission of Persons.[18]
 
Furthermore, the UK aligns with the European Union's (EU) policies, engaging critically with North Korea via cultural exchanges and humanitarian aid.[19] As such, it makes its decisions based on its diplomatic approach to how South Korea handles relations with North Korea while adhering to the aforementioned EU protocols.[20] It is such that the UK Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber (UKUT) has made compromises in accepting asylum seekers, respecting the South Korean Constitution, correlating with the length of time (+/- 10 years) spent in or out of the Korean peninsula: “... if the appellant is known to not have resided outside of the Korean Peninsula for 10 years, they are sent to South Korea; if they are recognized to have been outside for over 10 years, they are accepted. For the latter, UKUT recognizes that if an appellant is not a national at the time of the case and ‘may be refused nationality’, they shall not be treated as a dual national.”[21] Thus, such arguments maintain that these national birthright interpretations remain only within the realm of South Korean domestic policies.[22]
 
Despite aspirations to resettle in Western nations, to date, a total of only 220 North Korean refugees reside in the United States.[23] The limited number is due to an extensive and time-consuming immigration process, which offers fewer benefits compared to South Korea, and mercurial American foreign policy affairs.[24] However, such decreasing trends are not only applicable to the United States, as, according to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, only 229 persons were resettled in 2020, a stark contrast to the 1,047 defectors aided as seen in 2018.[25] Both of these examples not only showcase stricter border controls implemented, especially under the Kim regime, reduced funding from aid countries, and the effects of Covid-19 on financial and physical flexibility.[26]
 
The primary legislation at play for asylum implementation of North Korean refugees in the United States is the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (NKHRA), which was first signed into law by former President George W. Bush in 2004, then extended in 2008, 2012 and 2018.[27] Most recently, the NKHRA was submitted for reauthorization in May 2022, and, despite the House of Representatives having passed it in May 2024, the Senate failed to address it in time, leaving the Act in legal limbo.[28]
 
The US’s approach to this concern is argued to be highly reflective of President Bush’s aggressive and conservative stance on North Korea at the time and its proliferation of nuclear weapons.[29] This forward-leaning approach was maintained through its long-standing military alliance with South Korea, which dates back to the end of the Korean War, as well as through diplomatic affairs with North Korea.[30] Lastly, refugees’ asylum in the United States is not barred for those who have already accepted their South Korean citizenship, further exposing the complexity of foreign affairs and international refugee law.[31]
 
The exact number of North Korean refugees in China remains unknown, but estimates range expansively from 5,000 to 250,000 defectors.[32] This uncertainty and lack of documentation of North Koreans in China is caused primarily by China’s claiming they are “illegal economic migrants,” China’s refusing to grant them access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status, Covid-19, and the precarious nature of legalities, citizenship, and violations of international law.[33] China, therefore, presents a much more complex and egregious view of North Korean defectors, their status, and the lack of protection outside of the discriminatory practices that refugees typically face. Most importantly, China blatantly violates the UN’s 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, infringing, in particular on Article 33.1 of the Convention:
 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”[34]
 
Article 33.1 is violated by China as it, more often than not, willingly expels and forcibly repatriates North Korean refugees to North Korea despite the known persecution or harm that would await them once returned to their home country.[35] Those repatriated are imprisoned in the detention system of the country, either sent to labor camps, 교화소 “kyo-hwa-so”, or to political prison camps, 관리소 “kwan-li-so,” where they face a credible fear of persecution, harsh interrogation, torture, imprisonment, or even death.[36] North Koreans who tried to escape the Kim regime are obstinately sent to political prison camps for severe punishment, as these detention facilities are known for the inhumane conditions that are imposed on prisoners.[37] Since 2014, it is estimated that at least 2,000 North Korean refugees have been deemed illegal migrants and are at risk of being returned to North Korea while being held in Chinese detention centers.[38]
 
North Korean women in particular are subjected to human rights abuses in China. This can be mainly in relation to the conditions of China’s “Red Zone,” in which “... it is estimated that up to 500,000 female North Koreans, some as young as twelve, hide in this region. They are subjected to systematic rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, unwanted pregnancy, forced labor, and cybersex trafficking.”[39] With women and girls being lured into China under the pretense of finding work, as many as 80% are instead forced into the sex trade, and such abuse has become common practice.[40] The trafficking of North Korean women and girls is reported to generate more than $105 million annually for organized crime networks in both China and North Korea.[41]
 
Moreover, North Korean women are often sold to Chinese men as wives.[42] Due to China’s one-child policy, children born in China to North Korean and Chinese parents remain undocumented/stateless children of illegal “mixed marriages.”[43] They are thus deemed “stateless” as they are not in possession of official Chinese citizenship and are born outside of North Korea.[44] In some cases, such as in rural Heilongjiang Province, women who have married Chinese men and have given birth to at least two children are more likely to be issued temporary identification papers.[45]
 
These children then become registered in the 户口 “hukuo” system, in which said practice is to place hardships on the father, especially if the mother is forcibly repatriated.[46] These human rights violations that North Korean escapees face are due to their labelling by China as “illegal economic immigrants.” [47] Escapees thus often remain undocumented without fundamental rights in education, welfare, and health services to avoid repatriation.[48]
 
Lastly, beyond any potential illicit financial gains through transnational crime networks, China’s strategic alliance with North Korea significantly shapes its approach to North Korean refugees.[49] Under a longstanding bilateral agreement and despite pressure by the international community, China continues to classify these individuals as illegal economic migrants rather than refugees and routinely repatriates them.[50] This practice not only contradicts the humanitarian principles of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, in particular Article 33.1 and the principle of non-refoulement, but also raises serious concerns about complicity in human rights violations upon their return.[51]
 
The U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) found that 90% of all forcibly repatriated North Korean refugees sent to detention facilities eventually die from the harsh conditions and violence they are subjected to.[52] Women are additionally routinely subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, from torture to forced abortions or infanticide if they became pregnant with Chinese men.[53]
 
Survival Migration
Throughout this policy analysis, a recurring theme has been the importance of fundamental human rights, comprehensive international law, and protection relative to the treatment of refugees. This leads to the next area of study, “survival migration.” This term refers to “Persons outside their country of origin because of an existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution.”[54] While focusing primarily on cases in sub-Saharan Africa, Andrew Battes expresses how, in addition to the mass exodus example from Zimbabwe, “In Haiti, Iraq, North Korea, and Myanmar, for example, significant numbers of people have fled to neighboring countries not because of a well-founded fear of individualized persecution, but more often because of serious deprivations of socioeconomic rights related to the underlying political situation.”[55]
 
In the case of Myanmar, for example, the Rohingya people face similar disparities in legal status and discrimination after fleeing to India in response to a military junta’s rule and a 2017 genocide.[56] India, not being a signatory of the Convention, acknowledges the fervent prosecution of the Rohingya but national security trumps everything else. Thus, India stresses a ‘right to life’ vs. a ‘right to settle’ approach.[57] As an ethno-religious minority, survival migrants are now the world’s largest group stateless people, having become a serious global issue.[58]
 
The term “survival migration” itself is not mentioned in the 1951 Convention, and, although in theory those who fall under this category have rights under international law, there is no set framework for those who do not fit the rigid definitions that already exist.[59] This is most reflective of the way international bodies and states view the situation, a dichotomy of economic migrant and refugee, without consideration to other factors outside of generalized violence or individualized persecution, including environment, state fragility, and livelihood failure, in addition to socioeconomic deprivation of rights, as seen with North Korea.[60] It thus shows how the process of becoming and being classified as refugees is not monocausal, but is intertwined with these factors and institutional gaps, which, in turn, affect how refugees are assisted.[61] “Regime stretching,” as Betts describes, furthers this thought, in that institutions are not themselves “fixed,” but can be adaptive.[62]
 
Government Organizations
Domestic-based government organizations can also play a significant role in refugee resettlement.  For example, the 하나원 (hanawon), a South Korean government-regulated resettlement facility, established in 1999 by the Ministry for Unification of South Korea 통일부 “tong-il-bu.”[63] Situated in Seoul, the organization provides a place for North Korean defectors to “graduate” before joining South Korean society.[64] The facility consists of two facilities, a school and a hospital, and is heavily guarded. North Korean refugees who recently escaped North Korea participate in a 12-week program where they learn invaluable life skills and are exposed to concepts such as democracy, human rights, and religious freedoms in order to adapt to South Korean society.[65] After “graduating,” defectors receive financial resettlement support, and further facilitative aid can be provided by the South Korean government, such as the Elm House for women.[66] However, despite the success of this rigorous and involved program, discrimination, difficulties in securing full-time work, and losing connections with other North Korean refugees often plague the trainees.[67]
 
NGOs
Alongside formal governance, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can also play a prominent and direct role in aiding refugees. An NGO that helps address topics of human trafficking prevention and rescue for women is the Nomi Network.[68] With over 20,000 aided since 2012, from India to the United States, the organization seeks to empower and protect victims by its mission statement, expressing how “Nomi Network aims to end human trafficking by creating pathways to safe employment, empowering women and girls to break cycles of exploitation in their families and communities.”[69]
 
Although no direct aid to North Korean defectors has been made so far, initiatives represented by global results similar to those provided by the Nomi Network could greatly help prevent or support those trafficked, especially in China. Refugees International, another organization based in Washington D.C., also works to advocate for “...lifesaving assistance, human rights, and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.”[70] They have worked largely with the Rohingya people's crisis thus far.[71]
 
Proposed Solutions
In response to criticisms about the legalities, exclusions, and ambiguities in international refugee law, a multitude of solutions can be proposed, ranging from broader institutional reforms to specific policy adjustments targeting North Korean refugees. Betts suggests two different approaches: normative and institutional.[72] At the normative level, options include working with the existing legal framework, developing a “soft law framework,” consolidating human rights law through guidance from survival and migration principles, and, lastly, adding an additional protocol to the 1951 Convention.[73] The implementation of this method would incorporate “survival migration” into current legislation, pertaining to refugees, escapees, and defectors, such as those from North Korea.[74]
 
For institutional recommendations, Betts presents five ways forward: 1) applying a “cluster approach,” where “...the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) developed in the context of UN humanitarian reform,” 2) designating responsibility to a single agency, 3) creating a new, efficient body that could work on a temporary basis to help coordinate other agencies, 4) creating a special representative that can oversee these coordination, and finally, 5) “...creating an issue-based consultative process.”[75] Overall, Betts argues that such reforms are political in nature and would inevitably lead to disagreements and tensions between states.[76] As such, commitments to helping aid survival migrants should be achieved within existing frameworks, especially when also considering all the other interwoven factors as aforementioned.[77]
 
From a case-study approach, HRNK’s recommendations provide a plethora of solutions, including: 1) Clarifying the number, status and humanitarian situation of the North Korean refugees and workers in China. 2) The imperative for China to address its violations of international law, recognize North Korean escapees as refugees and respect the principle of non-refoulment. 3) The recommendation to the United States to seek more direct ways to reach refugees in China and to help with asylum in the USA. 4) North Korean refugee protection and rescue must become a pillar of the North Korean Human Rights Act. 5) The reauthorization of the NKHR Act, which expired in 2022.[78]
 
Ultimately, I recommend a hybrid solution, considering a mix of these proposed recommendations and results seen in current legislation and advocacy. This alternative would encapsulate Betts’ soft law framework, emphasizing the need to incorporate “survival migrants” and other factors not currently addressed in legislation, particularly the 1951 UN Convention, working more extensively with South Korea’s government-run organizations such as the Hanawon, NGOs such as the Nomi Network and Refugees International, and reauthorizing the NKHR Act, thereby securing a more prominent place in American foreign policy.
 
 
Conclusion
The legal status and survival migration of North Korean refugees underscore the urgent need for comprehensive reforms in international refugee law and humanitarian practices. The case studies of North Korean defectors in South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China reveal significant gaps and ambiguities in their protection and resettlement. Addressing these challenges requires a hybrid approach that incorporates normative and institutional reforms, enhanced collaboration with NGOs, and the reauthorization of the NKHR Act. By prioritizing the fundamental human rights of North Korean refugees and adopting adaptive frameworks, the international community can better support their survival and integration, ultimately fostering a more just and humane global refugee system.

Isabella Grace Packowski is a graduate student at Indiana University Bloomington pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs with a concentration in security, diplomacy, and governance. She holds a BA in Korean Language and Culture with a minor in Political Science, where her studies focused on U.S.–ROK/DPRK relations, foreign policy, and international security. Her research experience includes archival analysis of North Korea’s Juche ideology. As an intern at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) in 2023, she contributed to the translation of publications. She also conducted international media monitoring supported the production of daily newsletters highlighting key developments in North Korean human rights and policy. With a strong foundation in cross-cultural engagement, political history studies, and policy analysis, Isabella aims to advance diplomacy and proliferation security through future work with the U.S. State Department or international NGOs.

 
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[1] Betts, Alexander, Loescher, Gil, and Milner, James. 2012. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection. Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group. Accessed April 27, 2025. ProQuest Ebook Central. (pg. 7)
[2] Ibid, 8-9.
[3] Ibid, 9.
[4] Ibid, 8,10,13.
[5] Ibid..
[6] Ibid, 15.
[7] Ibid, 14.
[8] Ibid., 13-14.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., 2, 19-20, 28-29.
[11] Ibid., 55, 57, 62.
[12] “Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum.” n.d. Journal of Public and International Affairs. https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/seeking-safer-shells-analysis-interpretations-justifications-and-rationales-behind-decisions.    
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ryu, Eric. 2021. “Why the Number of North Korean Refugees in the United States Is so Low.” Edited by Sophia Hapin and Rosa Park. NKHIDDENGULAG. August 10, 2021. https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/why-the-number-of-north-korean-refugees-in-the-united-states-is-so-low.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] “Seeking Safer Shells…”; Young Kim. 2024. “US Congress Fails to Extend North Korean Human Rights Act - Congresswoman Young Kim.” Congresswoman Young Kim - Representing California’s 40th District (blog). December 26, 2024. https://youngkim.house.gov/2024/12/26/us-congress-fails-to-extend-north-korean-human-rights-act/.
[28] Kim, Young, 2024, “US Congress Fails to Extend North Korean Human Rights Act - Congresswoman Young Kim.”; H.R.3012 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2023. (n.d.). Congress.gov | Library of Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/3012?s=1&r=21.
[29] “Seeking Safer Shells…”
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Scarlatoiu, Greg and U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). 2023. “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China.” https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Scarlatoiu-CECC-Response-HRNK-FINAL-.pdf. (pg. 1, 4)
[33] Ibid., 4.
[34] Ibid; United Nations General Assembly & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (n.d.). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/1951-refugee-convention-1967-protocol.pdf (pg. 30)
[35] “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China,” 2.
[36] Ibid., 3,7.
[37] Ibid., 7.
[38] Ibid., 3-4.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid., 6-7.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid., 2-3, 8.
[48] Ibid.
[49] “Seeking Safer Shells…”
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China,” 7.
[53] Ibid., 2.
[54] Betts, Alexander. “Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework.” Global Governance 16, no. 3 (2010): 361–82. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29764952.
[55] Ibid.
[56] “A Lifetime in Detention: Rohingya Refugees in India - Refugees International.” 2025. Refugees International. January 2, 2025. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/a-lifetime-in-detention-rohingya-refugees-in-india/.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., 362, 364.
[60] Ibid, 361-362, 364.
[61] Ibid., 362.
[62] Ibid., 363.
[63] “Hanawon - North Korean Resettlement Facility in South Korea | Crossing borders.” (n.d.). Crossing Borders - Helping North Korean Refugees and Orphans. https://www.crossingbordersnk.org/hanawon
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] “Year in Review | Nomi Network.” n.d. Nomi Network. https://nominetwork.org/year-in-review/.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] “A Lifetime in Detention…”
[72] Ibid., 377.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid., 377-378.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Scarlatoiu, 8.