By Diletta De Luca, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research

February 22, 2022

Today, North Korea (formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or the DPRK) is the least Internet-friendly country in the world, where access to the World Wide Web is only permitted to a few authorized individuals.[1] Nevertheless, Kim Jong-un’s regime, as well as many other authoritarian governments, also recognize the potential to use digital tools and Internet technologies as new forms of social and political control.[2] Considering these actions by authoritarian regimes, digital rights—the right to access, use, create, and publish digital sources and open Internet technologies—should be recognized as human rights that must be respected and protected.
 
Digital Tools & Authoritarian Regimes
 
With the diffusion of information, knowledge, and social mobilization through the Internet, political scientists once anticipated a worldwide wave of democratization.[3] Increased access to online tools was initially considered as the missing but necessary catalyst for democratization.[4] However, there are now contrasting opinions regarding the influence of digitalization under authoritarian regimes. “Cyber-optimists” regard digitalization as an opportunity for citizens to gather information that challenges state propaganda, in turn fostering anti-regime sentiment and mobilization by facilitating collective action.[5] In other words, even if authoritarian regimes impose strict control over the Internet, citizens are still able to access various information online that undermines authoritarian rule in the long term. Conversely, “cyber-pessimists” hold that repressive regimes are able to weaken anti-regime sentiment through sophisticated control over the Internet.[6] They believe that authoritarian powers have shifted their control strategy in recent decades from suppressing communication flows and engaging in censorship to strengthening surveillance mechanisms.[7] Many of today’s authoritarian powers have acquired new capabilities to control and repress individuals both inside and outside their borders by suppressing alternative voices while strengthening their political control.[8]
 
Digitalization Developments in North Korea
 
In North Korea, high-level elites have relatively free access to the Internet since members of the regime’s leadership tailor their political decision-making based on foreign trends and events.[9] Furthermore, digitalization-related developments, such as increasing cybersecurity measures and surveillance tools, are gradually unfolding in the country. A recent United Nations report highlights how North Korea is also launching cyberattacks and stealing money in the form of cryptocurrency to fund the government’s missile and nuclear programs.[10] Nevertheless, most of the population can only access a government-controlled intranet. Furthermore, all media content and broadcasts within the country are controlled by the Korean Workers’ Party, the founding and sole ruling party in the DPRK.[11] All external telecommunications signals, including Wi-Fi, are banned within the country, and government officials constantly monitor citizens’ emails and telephone communications. Central to North Korea’s Internet strategy is the severe punishments faced by citizens if found to be in possession of unauthorized online materials and information.[12] However, despite these punishments, studies and reports suggest the presence of a considerable black market from which foreign movies, cell phones, and radios that can connect to the outside world are sold. Such materials present the population with alternatives to the regime’s propaganda. Based on the opinions of cyber-optimist scholars, such exposure could in turn lead to collective action, motivating citizens to call for more freedom and openness in the country. The detachment and separation of the country from the outside world and high risks of punishment for accessing outside information, however, make a large-scale wave of social change unlikely in the short term.[13]
 
Implications for Human Rights in North Korea
 
In limiting the ability to access, use, create, and publish digital and open media, the North Korean government curtails the human rights of its citizens. Ever since access to the Internet and communication technologies became an essential part of modern society, digital rights have been recognized as an extension of human rights, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also applies to the online digital world. Closely linked to digital rights are, in fact, the right to privacy and the freedom of expression, which are both almost entirely disregarded in North Korea.[14] For this reason, advocacy groups and international organizations should advocate to ensure full respect for these human rights in North Korea in their traditional and online forms, as digital access could be the missing step to a significant opening up of North Korea.
 
Diletta De Luca is a graduate student at the University of Amsterdam, pursuing a Master of Science in International Relations. She focuses on authoritarian practices and gender inequality.


[1] People for Successful COrean REunification (PSCORE), “Digital Life & Digital Rights,” 2021. http://pscore.org/life-north-korea/digital-life-digital-rights/.

[2] Eric Talmadge, “North Korea's digital divide: Online elites, isolated masses,” Chicago Tribune, November 17, 2017. https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/blue-sky/ct-north-korea-digital-divide-20171111-story.html.

[3] Erica Frantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Joseph Wright, "Digital repression in autocracies," Varieties of Democracy Institute Users Working Paper, no. 27 (2020). https://www.v-dem.net/media/publications/digital-repression17mar.pdf.

[4] Seva Gunitsky, “Corrupting the cyber-commons: Social media as a tool of autocratic stability,” Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 1 (2015): 42–54.

[5] Ibid.; Kris Ruijgrok, Internet Use and Protest in Malaysia and Other Authoritarian Regimes: Challenging Information Scarcity (Cham: Springer Nature, 2021).

[6] Kris Ruijgrok, “Illusion of control: how internet use generates anti-regime sentiment in authoritarian regimes,” Contemporary Politics 27, no. 3 (2020): 247–70.

[7] Gunitsky, “Corrupting the cyber-commons.”

[8] Marcus Michaelsen, “Exit and voice in a digital age: Iran’s exiled activists and the authoritarian state,” Globalizations 15, no. 2 (2018): 248–64.

[9] Talmadge, “North Korea's digital divide.”

[10] Edith L. Lederer, “UN expert: North Korea stealing millions in cyber attacks,” AP News, February 7, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-global-trade-united-nations-north-korea-25b1c7199519b31fe592dace54e119d9.

[11] Martyn Williams, Digital Trenches: North Korea’s Information Counter-Offensive (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2019). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Williams_Digital_Trenches_Web_FINAL.pdf.

[12] Johannes Gerschewski and Alexander Dukalskis, “How the Internet Can Reinforce Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of North Korea,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 1 (Fall 2018): 12–19.

[13] Martha Kuhnhenn, Micky Lee, and Weiqi Zhang, “Media Liberalization: Control and Consumption of Foreign Media in North Korea, China, and East Germany,” International Journal of Communication 14 (2020): 1421–37.

[14] PSCORE, “Digital Life & Digital Rights.”

By Claire McCrea, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research

February 17, 2022

On December 13, 2020, South Korea’s National Assembly sparked international controversy by amending the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, prohibiting activists from sending balloons into North Korea containing anti-regime leaflets or USB drives.[1] Activists both inside and outside of South Korea have decried this amendment, known colloquially as the “Anti-Leaflet Law,” for restricting the civil liberties of NGOs and citizen activists and stifling the flow of outside information into North Korea.[2] The South Korean government has defended the amendment by stating that anti-Kim regime leaflets unnecessarily provoke North Korea, and that this prohibition will “contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula.”[3]

Conflict over cross-border leaflet campaigns is not new in South Korea. Leaflets were first dropped on North Korean territory during the Korean War by UN forces to counter communist propaganda, spreading information about the world outside North Korea and encouraging defection to the South.[4] Government-led leaflet campaigns continued for decades until they were officially halted by the Kim Dae-jung administration to meet one of Kim Jong-il’s preconditions for the Inter-Korean Summit on June 15, 2000.[5] Similar concessions would be made over the next twenty years: Roh Moo-hyun’s decision to end all inter-Korean border propaganda activities in 2004, Moon Jae-in’s agreement with Kim Jong-un in 2018 to end the dissemination of leaflets along the Military Demarcation Line, and finally, the South Korean National Assembly’s 2020 amendment banning civilians from launching leaflets across the border.[6] In all four cases, the South Korean government leveraged bans on cross-border information dissemination in an attempt to draw North Korea to the bargaining table and ease inter-Korean tensions.

Despite the government’s belief that banning leaflets will improve inter-Korean relations, many activists and NGOs (such as Fighters for a Free North Korea, one of 289 organizations under investigation by the Ministry of Unification as of December 2020)[7] are concerned about the adverse effects this law will have on the human rights situation in North Korea as well the credibility of democracy in South Korea.[8] Despite these criticisms, the South Korean government has maintained its stance that certain concessions are necessary in the long term to achieve peaceful inter-Korean relations.[9] Thus, an important question presents itself: is the appeasement of North Korean demands a valid and effective means of fostering peace and security on the Korean Peninsula?

The history of inter-Korean relations is a story of alternating hostility and detente. As hostilities increase, the South Korean government is often the first party to offer concessions to ease tensions.[10] When North Korea decides it is satisfied with these concessions and adopts a less hostile posture, relations typically improve for a limited period.[11] This short-term detente often ends when the North Korean regime reneges on a negotiated promise or finds fault in South Korean policy.[12]

For example, in 1992, there was a phase of detente after the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (JDD), which was to be carried out through the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.[13] However, throughout the course of two years and more than thirteen missions, any possible advancement toward denuclearization was prevented by North Korea’s refusal to meet the JDD’s requirement for arms inspections.[14] South Korea continuously offered incentives and concessions in exchange for North Korea’s meeting these basic requirements: the cancelation of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, accepting North Korea as part of the international community, ending diplomatic confrontation, and more.[15] Despite these attempts, North Korea refused to allow nuclear inspections and in 1993 announced its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[16] Instead of holding the Kim regime accountable, South Korea offered to help the DPRK build light reactors as an incentive for staying in the NPT.[17] In 1994, the U.S. and the DPRK signed the Agreed Framework, and the regime was rewarded for this effort despite not following through with any of its stipulations in the long term.[18] By 2003, the Agreed Framework had collapsed and North Korea had left the NPT, rendering all of South Korea and the United States’ concessions fruitless.[19]

History clearly suggests that appeasement is not an effective strategy for improving inter-Korean relations and fostering regional and international peace. It is thus important to consider the context in which the Anti-Leaflet Law was passed and promoted, as well as the contexts in which past concessions have been made. One factor often plays a major role in these cases: domestic and international pressure for progress toward peace on the Korean Peninsula. President Moon Jae-in came into office due, at least in part, to his promise to bring about tangible improvements in inter-Korean relations.[20] As his term comes to an end, he has become increasingly more willing to appease North Korea in exchange for symbolic gestures of peace in the short term.[21] Past administrations, faced with similar pressures by both their constituents and the international community, were also more willing to make concessions for short-term peace at the expense of South Korea’s long-term credibility.[22]

Ultimately, however, consequential foreign policy decisions should not be made based on short-term political goals. Based on the prior history of inter-Korean relations and negotiations surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program, it is clear that the Anti-Leaflet Law will not produce any meaningful change in North Korea’s willingness to pursue peaceful reunification, denuclearize, or improve its human rights record. Instead, this amendment will only further empower the Kim regime to continue suppressing the freedom of information and damage the credibility of South Korean democracy. Going forward, South Korean policymakers should take a tougher stance on North Korea. While the Kim regime should not be provoked unnecessarily, policymakers must avoid making concessions that produce no meaningful long-term results, nor should they continue to bow down to North Korean pressure for the sake of their political image. As these patterns of appeasement continue into the 21st century, North Korea’s bargaining power only grows stronger—at the expense of that of South Korea.
 
Claire McCrea is a first-year student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), pursuing an M.A. in International Relations. Her concentrations include human rights, the Korean Peninsula, and nuclear nonproliferation.


[1] This article was originally submitted as an academic assignment at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in October 2021 and is published here with the instructor’s permission. It has been lightly edited and updated to reflect current events since the assignment was submitted.
[2] Olivia Enos, “Anti-Leaflet Law Poses Threat To Freedom In North And South Korea,” Forbes, December 17, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviaenos/2020/12/17/anti-leaflet-law-poses-threat-to-freedom-in-north-and-south-korea/?sh=581bdd437198.
[3] Tae Yong-Ho, “Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea & Freedom of Expression in North Korea,” HRNK Insider, January 5, 2021. https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/02/anti-leaflet-law-in-south-korea-freedom.html.
[4] “Psychological Warfare in Korea,” Public Opinion Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Spring 1951): 65–75.
[5] Tae, “Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea.”
[6] Ibid.
[7] Editor’s Note: In January 2022, South Korean prosecutors indicted Park Sang-hak, the Chairman of Fighters for a Free North Korea, for an attempted violation of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act. On February 15, 2022, Park’s lawyers requested the Act to be referred to South Korea’s Constitutional Court for constitutional review. See Huh Jin-moo, “Prosecutors Indict Park Sang-hak, Chairman of Fighters for a Free North Korea, for Launching Leaflets to North Korea” [in Korean], The Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 28, 2022. https://www.khan.co.kr/national/court-law/article/202201281626001?www; and Ryu Jae-min, “Park Sang-hak Requests Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act to be Referred to Constitutional Court” [in Korean], The Chosun Ilbo, February 15, 2022.
https://www.chosun.com/national/court_law/2022/02/15/LTQ63A3MDFHMZAK5F5WWIHQUOI/.
[8] Enos, “Anti-Leaflet Law Poses Threat.”
[9] Ibid.
[10] Park Kyung-Ae and Sung-Chull Lee, “Changes and Prospects in Inter-Korean Relations,” Asian Survey 32, no. 5 (1992): 429–47.
[11] Park and Lee, “Changes and Prospects in Inter-Korean Relations.”
[12] Ibid.
[13] “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 26, 2011. https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/joint-declaration-south-and-north-korea-denuclearization-korean-peninsula/.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Park and Lee, “Changes and Prospects in Inter-Korean Relations.”
[16] “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Sang-Hyun Lee, “Inter-Korean Relations at Moon Jae-in Government’s Half Term: A Glass Half Empty,” 38 North, January 16, 2020. https://www.38north.org/2020/01/shlee011620/.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Park and Lee, “Changes and Prospects in Inter-Korean Relations.”