The Arduous March and North Korea's Denial of the Right to Food

By Diletta De Luca, HRNK Research Associate
Edited by Cherise Kim (former HRNK Research Intern) and Raymond Ha (HRNK Director of Operations & Research)

In 2014, the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) concluded that the North Korean regime was perpetrating crimes against humanity.[1] Among the human rights concerns noted by the COI, the North Korean regime has been accused of systematically violating the Right to Food of its citizens. Food insecurity in the country is not a recent development. The most devastating food emergency the country experienced dates back to 1995, when the regime officially acknowledged the so-called “Arduous March.”[2] Yet, the people of North Korea continue to remain food insecure today.
 
Food Insecurity in North Korea Today
 
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights first enshrined the right to adequate food in Article 25.[3] Subsequently, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) further defined the Right to Food as “the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.”[4] As a party to the ICESCR since 1981, North Korea is among the 171 countries[5] that are obligated to respect this right.[6]
 
Nevertheless, the North Korean population continues to suffer from high levels of malnutrition and food insecurity. The UN’s 2022 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report classifies North Korea as one of the countries with the largest number of malnourished people in the world—41.6 percent of the population is undernourished.[7] Despite ongoing international concern and efforts to mitigate chronic food insufficiency in the country, the most catastrophic food emergency recorded in North Korea dates to the second half of the 1990s. This famine, often referred to as the Arduous March, is estimated to have killed up to 1 million North Koreans—approximately 5 percent of the population.[8]
 
The 1995 Famine
 
Scholars and analysts believe that North Korea’s food crisis began to unfold in the 1980s, before the regime publicly acknowledged the emergency.[9] The causes of the famine were formally attributed to a severe economic crisis and natural disasters. During the early 1990s, North Korea experienced economic difficulties following the collapse of the Soviet Union and internal reforms unfolding in China.[10] Its two major trading partners, which had supported the country through favorable pricing and other economic assistance, suddenly cut their exports, provoking economic instability in North Korea.[11] With almost no exports and minimal diplomatic and economic relations with countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence, the country had to rely on domestic agricultural production. Natural disasters in 1995, including floods and droughts, further reduced the country’s agricultural production and ability to provide food its own citizens.[12] As the crisis continued to worsen, the North Korean regime did not take any action to improve the situation. By the end of 1995, international assistance was provided by the World Food Programme, non-governmental organizations, and individual countries through bilateral aid, mainly from South Korea.[13] Although the famine eventually passed, food insecurity has remained a chronic problem ever since.
 
North Korea’s Obligations on the Right to Food
 
In 1999, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights issued General Comment 12 on the Right to Food. The comment outlines three obligations for states in ensuring the right to adequate food: the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill.[14] The North Korean regime neglected all three during the famine of the 1990s.
 
The obligation to respect is a negative responsibility that prevents states from adopting measures that could ultimately preclude access to adequate food for all or part of their populations. In the 1990s, the poorest North Korean citizens engaged in market activities to access food. Many sold foodstuffs in local markets, but some also turned to prostitution, theft, or defection.[15] The regime prevented citizens from engaging in such market activities, as these were considered capitalist and therefore disloyal to the regime.[16] The consequences ranged from punishment to imprisonment and even execution.
 
Moreover, after receiving aid from humanitarian agencies, major constraints were imposed on foreign workers. This prevented foreign aid agencies from assisting the most vulnerable segments of the population, as they could not access specific geographical areas. Information flows within the country were restricted, and it was not possible to properly monitor the distribution of aid. Consequently, most humanitarian organizations withdrew from the country only after a few years.[17] As the regime perceived humanitarian operations as a political threat, the strict restrictions imposed made it impossible for foreign workers to assess the needs of people in remote areas and evaluate the impact of their efforts.[18] The Kim regime ultimately precluded and obstructed the provision of assistance to segments of its population, which constituted a breach of its obligation to respect.
 
The obligation to protect is the requirement for states to adopt measures that ensure that no individual is deprived of their Right to Food. This was violated by the North Korean regime in multiple ways. First, the regime lacked the political will to effectively assist its population. Scholars characterized the famine as a “priority regime famine,” meaning that the regime prioritized ideological programs over feeding citizens for strengthening its authority.[19] The famine was therefore the result of the regime’s deliberate decision to prioritize its own political and ideological agenda over the welfare of its people, resulting in mass starvation. It could have increased access to food by reallocating resources assigned to the military and the elite, but it decided otherwise.[20]
 
Second, issues of distribution and entitlement caused the poorest and most vulnerable individuals to suffer the worst consequences. Access to food was and still is determined by one’s songbun, a socio-political classification assigned at birth that is based on one’s family background. It is a means through which the regime determines and controls all aspects of citizens’ lives based on their perceived loyalty to the Kim family. Based on this classification, citizens are assigned to one of three classes—the “core (loyal) class, the “wavering” class, or the “hostile” class. One’s songbun determines decisions about residency, occupation, access to food, health care, education, and other services. In turn, the songbun system allows the regime to maintain and reinforce its political control over the population.[21],[22] Based on one’s songbun, entitlements to food are strictly defined. Access to food has continued to be seriously limited for those who are not considered loyal to the Kim family, decreasing their chances of survival. During the Arduous March, the areas closer to Pyongyang, where most of the elite is located, received significant food assistance while more remote areas of the country remained inaccessible to humanitarian workers.[23] The famine and the failure of the regime to protect its citizens were clear manifestations of widespread violations of human rights, perpetrated by the regime to strengthen its power and reinforce its ideology.
 
Finally, the obligation to fulfill, which includes the facilitation and promotion of conditions and resources that allow citizens to enjoy their Right to Food, was also neglected. As mentioned above, resources were not equitably distributed among the population. Privileged groups such as the military, the elite, and members of the Korean Workers’ Party never faced food insecurity as they continued to receive food rations and foodstuff. The rest of the population had no possibility to call upon the regime to provide assistance and respect their basic human rights.[24] Nevertheless, the regime could have increased access to food by allocating less resources to the military and the security apparatus.[25] The famine was the result of the Kim regime’s deliberate decision to prioritize its own power and stability over the rights and welfare of its citizens.
 
Concluding Remarks
 
Today, the situation remains precarious. News coverage of the ongoing food crisis in North Korea is recurrent, as the circumstances have been further aggravated by the closure of the country’s borders during the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has worsened the situation due to the widespread global price increase for food, energy, gas, and fertilizers.[26] Regardless, the government’s continued investment in its security apparatus, nuclear weapons, and missiles while its population continues to starve highlights the regime’s deliberate neglect of its responsibilities and its people’s human rights. The famine of the 1990s, as well as the current food crisis that the North Korean people are enduring, constitute violations of a wide range of basic human rights other than the Right to Food. The North Korean regime’s infringements of its international obligations also include violations of socio-political rights and physical integrity.[27] It therefore remains essential for the international community to continue to urge the North Korean regime to respect its obligations and ensure the fundamental human rights of its population.

Diletta De Luca has a Master of Science (cum laude) in Political Science from the University of Amsterdam and is currently pursuing a Master of Arts in International Security Studies at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies & the School of International Studies at the University of Trento.

[1] United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 14, 2014. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/108/71/PDF/G1410871.pdf?OpenElement.
[2] As defined by Heonik Kwon (“Chapter 8: Time Consciousness in North Korea’s State Security Discourse” in Times of Security: Ethnographies of Fear, Protest and the Future, edited by M. Hoolbraad and M. A. Pedersen, Routledge, 2013), the term refers to “the (North Korean) political community's unwavering determination to ‘raise the flag of socialism high’ despite the collapse of the Soviet-let socialist international order, including the readiness to undergo economic difficulties and political isolation entailed by this proud negation of postsocialism” (p. 203).
[3] United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 1948. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/03/udhr.pdf.
[4] United Nations General Assembly, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” Art. 11, para 2, 1966. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/cescr.pdf.
[5] As of September 2023.
[6] United Nations Treaty Collection, “Chapter IV: Human Rights. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” n.d. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en.
[7] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) Report - 2022, July 7, 2022. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140990/download/?_ga=2.166537143.822104784.1671276365-431266521.1671276365.
[8] Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2005). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hunger_and_Human_Rights.pdf.
[9] Sandra Fahy, “Chapter 2: Famine and Hunger,” in Dying for Rights: Putting North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses on the Record (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019).
[10] Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Chapter 1: Introduction, Famine, Aid, and Markets in North Korea” & “Chapter 2: The Origins of the Great Famine,” in Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
[11] Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, “The North Korean famine and its demographic impact,” Population and Development Review 27, no. 2 (2001): 219–38.
[12] In July and August 1995, floods led to a decrease in the grain production of almost 2 million tons. In 1997, droughts affected the breadbasket of the country (North Korea's southern provinces, many of which had been affected in previous years as well), leading to grain losses as high as 1.9 million tons. Goodkind and West (2001) provide a detailed summary of the impact of the natural disasters over different areas of the country.
[13] Fahy, “Chapter 2: Famine and Hunger.”
[14] United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, “General Comment 12,” E/C.12/1999/5, May 12, 1999. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838c11.pdf.
[15] Haggard and Noland, “Chapter 1: Introduction, Famine, Aid, and Markets in North Korea” & “Chapter 2: The Origins of the Great Famine.”
[16] Fahy, “Chapter 2: Famine and Hunger.”
[17] Goodkind and West, “The North Korean famine and its demographic impact.”
[18] Fahy, “Chapter 2: Famine and Hunger.”
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf.
[22] United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 14, 2014.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, “North Korea: Case for New International Treaty on the Right to Food,” Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 15 (2014): 31–50.
[25] Fahy, “Chapter 2: Famine and Hunger.”
[26] Kim Tong-Hyung, “North Korea party meeting set to discuss ‘urgent’ food issue,” Associated Press, February 6, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-north-korea-government-china-nuclear-weapons-30f247b53975c410e96c2246de301ad5.
[27] Fahy, “Chapter 2: Famine and Hunger.”