Introduction

In the decades of isolation and authoritarian rule that have gripped North Korea since the end of the Korean War, the number of escapees fleeing the North and settling in different countries has steadily grown. Among the preferred destinations, the most popular is unsurprisingly South Korea, where North Korean escapees are granted automatic citizenship and receive support services from the government. This includes resettlement payment, training services, support programs, and housing assistance.[1] Additionally, escapees who are able to provide South Korean authorities with intelligence aiding the country’s security are entitled to a reward of $860,000, while other payments also being made for those who escape with weapons.[2] The support that the South Korean government provides to escapees is also generous and expensive, encompassing 12 weeks of adaptation training in a resettlement facility, upwards of $50,000 in settlement benefits and housing subsidies depending on the size of the household, and free public school and university education for children.[3]

North Koreans are therefore often drawn to the South as a destination, as many see it as a place where they will be welcomed as citizens and where they will be free from the authoritarian reality they face in the North. As a result, the number of North Korean escapees in South Korea was estimated by the  Ministry of Unification to be at 34,078 in December of 2023.[4] At the same time, North Korean escapees who resettle in South Korea face numerous challenges, and life in their new home entails many significant difficulties.

While resettled North Korean escapees in South Korea find themselves safe from the physical threats posed by the North Korean regime, the hardships many face in the new country are less noticeable in kind. Such challenges are broad in type and have resulted in North Korean escapees struggling to keep up with their fellow South Koreans in many aspects. One example relates to escapee adolescents under the age of 19, which comprise approximately 15% of the escapee population.[5] Among this group, North Korean escapee adolescents demonstrate high rates of faltering growth and compared to their South Korean peers, and studies have found that they are on average shorter and thinner, but also suffer from higher rates of obesity.[6] This is only one example of the physical disparities that are present among North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, and such challenges affect the future generations of these communities.

In order to understand the significance of such disparities, it remains necessary to examine the impact they have on the life of the resettled escapees. These challenges manifest in a number of ways, especially in defining economic, psychological, and cultural differences and struggles. Thus, it is only by examining such challenges and facilitating communication with escapees themselves that positive changes can be achieved to improve the lives of North Korean escapees in South Korea.

Economic Challenges

As perhaps the most visible form of difficulty faced by North Koreans in the South, economic challenges burden almost all of the escapees. As integrating North Koreans into the South Korean economy requires significant support from the government, South Korea provides extensive assistance through financial aid and various programs aimed at increasing self-sufficiency, such as vocational training.[7] Nevertheless, despite the existence of such programs, economic stability is not attainable for most North Korean escapees as many face harsh difficulties in their economic performance.

When compared to their South Korean counterparts, former North Koreans find themselves severely disadvantaged as the unemployment rate among them is approximately twice compared to the national average.[8] Additionally, 56% of North Korean escapees in South Korea are classified as being low-income and 25% qualify for the lowest income bracket subject to national basic livelihood subsidies, a figure which is six times higher than the rate of the South Korean population.[9]

Economic disparities are deeply rooted in multiple causes, including the background of these escapees arriving from North Korea. Many arrive with physical and mental scars that prevent them from settling into a new culture and which affect their ability to obtain and maintain a steady income.[10] Additionally, the different education and training received in North Korea is often incompatible with the job market and society in the South. A BBC interview with an escapee in 2021 discussed many of these issues, describing how many of the jobs available in South Korea are not compatible for the escapees, many of whom have never had to find a job and lack work experience or knowledge of many sectors of the job market.[11]

Financial literacy is another gap existing between North Korean escapees and South Koreans, as the former are significantly less financially literate than the latter.[12] Adapting to a vastly different capitalist society as opposed to a state-controlled command economy is a challenge that requires long-term adaptation and assistance. Nevertheless, North Korean escapees are faced with time constraints and are required to be accustomed to the South Korean model quite abruptly.

Another aspect of the economic challenge is integrating North Korean escapees into a vastly digitized South Korean society that is significantly different from the North. Learning to use modern information and communications technology such as Internet platforms remains a great challenge for many of the escapees who previously had no access to such technologies. Their difficulty in quickly adapting creates a digital divide between them and their South Korean counterparts which further exacerbates social inequality and prevents their smooth integration into a different society.[13] This is an additional contributing factor to the economic woes of North Korean escapees, especially as occupations in countries like South Korea demand higher levels of digital experience and education that escapees do not possess. Such challenges result in frequent low income levels and poor economic performance among North Korean escapees in the South, creating among them chronic feelings of loneliness and abandonment.

Psychological Challenges

Many North Korean escapees arrive in South Korea with psychological trauma that can represent a significant barrier to their resettlement and integration. The trauma and mental health issues escapees suffer stem from traumatic experiences endured in North Korea such as witnessing public executions and enduring human rights abuses as well as the overall state of anxiety that arise from settling in a new country while being separated from family and friends.[14] Additionally, escapees who travelled through different transit countries like China have often fallen victim to human trafficking, which includes gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage against women and girls.[15] Such traumatic experiences greatly affect the mental health of North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea and represent a difficult challenge to overcome.

Among the North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, rates of trauma and mental distress such as PTSD are significant. A study from 2022 found that, among 531 North Korean escapees interviewed, 81.4% suffered from trauma and 15.3% suffered from PTSD, a figure which is nine times higher than the average for South Koreans.[16] Additionally, 53% of escapees who visited hospitals for psychiatric problems after defection were diagnosed with PTSD and many had severe difficulties adapting to the South Korean society and suffered from a lower quality of life.[17] This demonstrates a direct correlation between these escapees’ mental health and their challenges for resettling to the new country.

Among the mental health challenges endured by former North Koreans, suicidal behaviour and suicidal thoughts are among the most concerning. While the suicide rate in South Korea is already one of the highest among OECD countries, the North Korean escapee community faces especially high suicide rates. A study from 2019 showed that 12.4% of escapees had the urge to commit suicide in the previous year and that the suicide rate among them is three times higher than that of the rest of the South Korean population.[18] Other mental health challenges endured by North Korean escapees also include major depressive disorder, agoraphobia[19], social phobia, and panic disorder. These issues can also be exacerbated by other sources in their new environments such as discrimination, cultural differences, and lack of access to resources like support networks or psychological help.[20]

The severe mental health challenges faced by many North Korean escapees additionally represent a significant barrier throughout their resettlement process in South Korea. Many of the escapees afflicted with PTSD, suicidal behaviour or ideation, depression, and other disorders find it difficult to settle into their new homes and build a new life when faced with these overwhelming challenges to their wellbeing. Another factor is the lack of knowledge on how to request assistance among escapees, as up to 70% of them do not know about counselling centres or psychologists from which to receive support.[21] Additionally, as mental health is an issue completely disregarded in North Korea, many escapees are unaware of their mental well-being or of how they could ask for and receive help.[22] As a result, understanding the importance of mental health among North Korean escapees remains a necessary component in their resettlement efforts and for their integration into South Korean society. Until this is accomplished, mental health remains a major challenge faced by escapees.

Cultural Challenges

The third and final challenge faced by North Korean escapees in South Korea lies in their ability to adapt and assimilate into South Korean society and the differences in economic system, technology, and social behaviour. In an effort not to stand out and face prejudice, many North Korean escapees feel pressured to conceal their identities and fit in, leading to greater insecurity and psychological distress as they try to conform, hide their North Korean roots, or intentionally distance themselves from the escapee community.[23] On the other hand, those who do not try to conform to the South Korean society or form bonds only within the escapee community find themselves isolated or discriminated against by the wider society for failing to assimilate.[24]

Discrimination against North Korean escapees by South Koreans also remains a major issue. Accounts from former North Koreans show that social stigma, mistreatment, and suspicion against them from South Koreans is prevalent among certain segments of the population, and it contributes to worsening mental health conditions among escapees.[25] Social stigma and prejudice also extends to discrimination in employment opportunities towards those with the North Korean accent while women and children – who make up the majority of the escapees – reported to have been victims of exploitation and bullying.[26] Discrimination also exists through the slight language barrier between northerners and southerners because, despite sharing a common language, differences persist in spelling, pronunciation, and accents.[27] This is another way in which North Korean escapees can be stigmatized and ostracized in South Korea, hindering their resettlement.

In addition to the issue of discrimination and to the pressure to quickly adapt to a new societal and cultural standard, North Korean escapees tend to avoid communicating their struggles or treatment as they fear being labeled as ungrateful or being targeted by far-right extremists who reject their resettlement and presence in South Korea.[28] As a result, many North Korean escapees who experience discrimination in their everyday lives are reluctant to speak out about their marginalization to avoid being regarded as unappreciative or undeserving of the governmental support they receive.[29]

In light of such challenges, the cultural unsettlement that many North Korean escapees endure is often suffered in silence. The struggles they face in adapting to a new culture and lifestyle, often in face of discrimination and inadequate support, heavily contributes to difficulties in building their new lives in the South and represents a less-discussed challenge that they must endure during their resettlement and adaptation.

Solutions and Conclusion

In light of challenges that North Korean escapees face once resettled in South Korea, it is evident that the more than 30,000 escapees in the country do not have an easy life. Despite the considerable funds that the South Korean government invests on resettling escapees, the transition from the authoritarian North to the South is not always as smooth as both the government and the escapees themselves would wish it to be. Crafting solutions to such issues would inevitably require direct involvement of the escapees, but some methods and strategies to tackle this issue have already been showcasing positive effects. Many of these solutions, such as a more effective and targeted investment of financial support, better education programs, and mental health resources for escapees, are obvious in their purpose while others remain unprioritized. At the same time, these solutions can have major positive impacts and are worth looking at.

The first solution could include the creation of a social support network to help the North Korean escapees. While offering financial support, employment opportunities, education, and training are essential, other measures are needed for achieving the successful integration of escapees in the South.[30] This could be accomplished by creating strong support networks for escapees, both with fellow North Koreans as well as with South Koreans, as the latter could help facilitate communication and smoothen their assimilation and integration processes.[31]

Another measure for the improvement of the integration process should specifically involve young escapees. Communication and collaboration between North Korean and South Korean students as a form of a school program is key in building relationships that benefit everyone.[32] This engagement may also help in debunking prejudices among the South Korean youth against North Korean escapees, encouraging engagement and understanding among the two.[33] These strategies may foster a critical effect in helping settle young escapees and ensure that they have the tools to thrive in their new homes.

The challenges that North Korean escapees continue to endure following their escape from the Kim regime remain difficult and overlooked. The efforts of the South Korean government in resettling most of the escapees is commendable, especially when this is a task most other countries do not fulfill. The U.S., for example, has accepted only about 220 North Korean escapees since 2006 while China has a history of forcefully repatriating escapees back to the North.[34] Yet, it is also clear that efforts to resettle escapees in the South and to help them assimilate into such a different society are not perfect, as escapees suffer from a number of hardships that are not yet being adequately addressed. These hardships, many of which stem from the culture shock of escaping North Korea, can be difficult and long-lasting to tackle. However, supporting North Korean escapees is not only essential for their resettlement but also to help them fulfill their potential. Otherwise, the financial struggles, mental health problems, and discrimination many escapees face upon their arrival will remain the exclusive reality faced by the North Korean community resettled in the South.

References

Bluth, Christoph. “The North Korean who went home: many defectors struggle against     discrimination in the South.” The Conversation. January 7, 2022. https://theconversation.com/the-north-korean-who-went-home-many-defectors-struggle-  against-discrimination-in-the-south-174366.

Cha, Sangmi and Jon Herskovitz. “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South.” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying- lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.

Couch, Christina. “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea.” PBS. February   16, 2017. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.

Kim, Hagyun and Kwanghyuk Kim. “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school   engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter-  Korean identity through a process of being one of them.” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 288-309. https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.

Kim, Minjung, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee. “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence from North Korean Refugees.” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2505-2527. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.

Kim, So-Yeong. Hye-Min Ku, and Seong-Woo Choi. “The growth status of North Korean refugee adolescents in South Korea: comparison with South Korean adolescents.” Annals of Human Biology 50, no. 1 (2023): 148-151. https://doi.org/10.1080/03014460.2023.2183988.

Kim, Hee Jin and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya. “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1188-1201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.

Koh, Ho Youn and Kyungmin Baek. “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees.” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 5-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.

Lee, Grace J. M. “It’s time for Canada to jumpstart efforts to support families fleeing North Korea.” Policy Options. August 28, 2023. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2023/north-korean-refugee-sponsorships.

Lee, Hyosun. “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea.” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318-344. https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.

Lee, Mi Kyung, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu. “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea.” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.

Lee, Yeon Jung. Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol,    Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee. “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea.” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-460. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.

Myeong, Hwayeon and Ahlam Lee. “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices.” British Educational   Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 872-899. https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.

Nam, Boyoung and Ijun Hong. “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea.” Violence Against Women (2023): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.

Nam, Boyoung. Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim. “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation.” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564-571. https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.

Nam, Boyoung, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong. “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea.” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024). https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.

Noh, Jin-Won, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu. “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey.” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 26-44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.

Park, Mi Yung. “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea.” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 271-287. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.

Park, Soim, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan. “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.

Shin, Hyonhee. “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life.”     Reuters. January 4, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.

“South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000.” BBC. March 5, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.

South Korean Ministry of Unification. “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors.”             https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.

Williams, Sophie. “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?” BBC. February 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.

Yu, Shieun, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo. “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees.” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1019-1029. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.

Andrew Chan is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy from the University of Toronto. Currently a research intern at HRNK, he is passionate and interested about matters of global security, global policy, and human rights issues.

[1] Hee Jin Kim and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya, “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1189, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.
[2] “South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000,” BBC, March 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.
[3] Sophie Williams, “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?,” BBC, February 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.
[4] South Korean Ministry of Unification, “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors,” (2023), https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.
[5] So-Yeong Kim, Hye-Min Ku, and Seong-Woo Choi, “The growth status of North Korean refugee adolescents in South Korea: comparison with South Korean adolescents,” Annals of Human Biology 50, no. 1 (2023): 148, https://doi.org/10.1080/03014460.2023.2183988.
[6] Ibid., 148-149.
[7] Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu, “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey,” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.
[8] Sangmi Cha and Jon Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South,” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying-lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.
[9] Hyonhee Shin, “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life,” Reuters, January 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.
[10] Cha and Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors.”
[11] Williams, “North Korean defectors.”
[12] Minjung Kim, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee, “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence
from North Korean Refugees,” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2522, https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.
[13] Ho Youn Koh and Kyungmin Baek, “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees,” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 6-7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.
[14] Boyoung Nam and Ijun Hong, “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea,” Violence Against Women (2023): 1, https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.
[15] Ibid., 2.
[16] Mi Kyung Lee, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu, “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea,” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022): 1, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.
[17] Ibid., 1-2.
[18] Boyoung Nam, Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim, “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564, https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.
[19] Agoraphobia is an anxiety disorder wherein the affected perceives their surrounding environment, unfamiliar spaces, or large crowds to be unsafe, causing them to become anxious and reluctant to leave their homes.
[20] Yeon Jung Lee, Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol, Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee, “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea,” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-453, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.
[21] Christina Couch, “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea,” PBS, February 16, 2017, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.
[22] Shieun Yu, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo, “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees,” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1020, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.
[23] Nam and Hong, “Trauma Exposure,” 4-10.
[24] Boyoung Nam, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong, “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea,” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024): 2, https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.
[25] Christoph Bluth, “The North Korean who went home: many defectors struggle against discrimination in the South,” The Conversation, January 7, 2022, https://theconversation.com/the-north-korean-who-went-home-many-defectors-struggle-against-discrimination-in-the-south-174366.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Mi Yung Park, “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea,” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 272, https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.
[28] Hyosun Lee, “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea,” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318, https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.
[29] Ibid., 336.
[30] Soim Park, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan, “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?,” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023): 1-2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.
[31] Ibid., 7-8.
[32] Hagyun Kim and Kwanghyuk Kim, “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter-Korean identity through a process of being one of them,” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 304-305, https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.
[33] Hwayeon Myeong and Ahlam Lee, “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices,” British Educational Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 894, https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.
[34] Grace J. M. Lee, “It’s time for Canada to jumpstart efforts to support families fleeing North Korea,” Policy Options, August 28, 2023, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2023/north-korean-refugee-sponsorships.

Introduction
 
For many, South Africa’s Apartheid evokes images of historical struggle and resilience immortalized in history books, while North Korea’s Songbun seems distant in the confines of a closed-off regime. Despite the vast geographical distance between the two countries, these seemingly disparate systems exhibit notable parallels in their mechanisms of oppression and control. As Nelson Mandela and countless others grappled with the chains of Apartheid in South Africa, North Koreans endured—and continue to suffer—the oppressive grasp of the Songbun system. Both Apartheid and Songbun are tainted by state-sanctioned discrimination and human rights abuses.
 
North Korea’s sociopolitical classification system, Songbun (성분), creates distinct classes under oppressive conditions, having an immeasurable and lasting impact on human rights with its highly destructive and repressive effects on the majority of the population. This system, which creates an oppressive society that is practically unparalleled in the contemporary world, consists of three classes that have been created and divided into over 50 categories.[1] As a system that is based on social status assigned to North Koreans at birth, the party-directed caste system is the primary cause of widespread discrimination and other human rights abuses.[2] The harsh reality in North Korea is that this system forces a third of the 23 million citizens into a form of slave labor, while the remainder is bound by loyalty to the regime.[3]
 
The concept of class struggle as the driving force of history can be traced to The Communist Manifesto, where Marx emphasizes that modern bourgeois society, emerging from the remnants of feudalism, has not eradicated class antagonisms. Instead, it has engendered new classes, forms of oppression, and struggles to supplant the old ones.
 
The Kim regime has deliberately established and upheld social hierarchies based on political loyalty. The Songbun system is crucial for understanding North Korean society and especially the mechanism of oppression that the ruling elite employs to protect and maintain political dominance.
​
Thus, this article delves into the historical contexts of the Songbun system in North Korea and the Apartheid system in South Africa, examining their origins, implementations, and societal impacts. It also draws comparisons and contrasts between the two systems by exploring the legal parallels, as both systems have been denounced as crimes against humanity under international law. Additionally, the article proposes strategies and recommends steps forward to approach and confront these systemic injustices and uphold human rights worldwide. Ultimately, the Kim regime has deliberately established and upheld social hierarchies based on political loyalty. The Songbun system is therefore crucial for understanding North Korean society and especially the mechanism of oppression that the ruling elite employs to protect and maintain political dominance.

North Korea’s Songbun System

North Korea first developed the Songbun system to consolidate Kim Il-sung’s rule by isolating, identifying, and controlling perceived political threats. Songbun, which translates as “ingredient” but also can mean “background,” categorizes every North Korean according to how politically reliable or dangerous they were believed to be, based on their family history. By utilizing this system, the regime isolated and purified Kim’s real and perceived enemies and rewarded his supporters.[4] The North Korean regime targeted those who had backgrounds in land ownership, business, religion, or collaboration with Japanese occupiers, branding them as “counterrevolutionaries” and subjecting them to execution, imprisonment, or relocation to remote mountainous regions.[5]
 
In 1957, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) formalized and intensified the Songbun system through proclamations and resolutions, implementing legislative measures such as Cabinet Decree No.149 to justify mass relocations on the grounds of internal security.[6] Key factors determining one’s Songbun include their ancestors’ socioeconomic status at the time of liberation in 1945, their actions during the Korean War (1950–53), and whether they had relatives in South Korea or China, as connections to the outside world were deemed detrimental to one’s loyalty to the Kim regime.[7] The Songbun classification process starts at birth for every North Korean, and children under 17 are classified according to their parents’ status.[8]
 
The Songbun system divides the population into three groups: the “Core,” comprising roughly 28% of the population, including revolutionaries and descendants of war heroes; the “Wavering” group, making up 45%, including individuals from diverse backgrounds such as former South Koreans or intellectuals; and the “Hostile” group, accounting for the remaining 27%, which encompasses descendants of landlords, capitalists, and those deemed politically opposed or associated with external forces. These classifications were meticulously maintained in individual files accessible through the digital system “Faithful Servant 2.0,” in 2019, facilitating government control and surveillance across all administrative levels.[9]
 
Songbun dominates all aspects of individuals’ lives in North Korea. Job assignments are determined by songbun, resulting in significant disparities in work conditions and social standing. Those with high Songbun have access to better educational opportunities, perpetuating privilege across generations. Songbun also significantly impacts family life, as marriage prospects and familial reputation are heavily influenced by it, leading to “intra-class” unions. Those with low songbun may face exile to remote regions, limiting their freedoms and economic opportunities. Furthermore, songbun determines access to food and healthcare, reinforcing class divisions and the dominance of the ruling elite. Despite its opacity, awareness of songbun pervades North Korean society, instilling fear and fostering compliance among the population. It serves as a powerful tool for regime control and maintaining power.[10]
 
According to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (COI), Songbun continues to be enforced by the Kim regime. Moreover, the “discrimination based on gender and songbun is employed as a means of maintaining a rigid social structure less likely to produce challenges to the political system”.[11]

South Africa’s Apartheid

In 1948, the National Party government in South Africa instituted Apartheid, which translates to "apartness" in Afrikaans. The Apartheid system was an organized system of racial segregation that required distinct living spaces, facilities, and restricted interaction between racial groups.[12] This system was distinct from previous segregation regimes in that it used a repressive governmental machinery to crush opposition and legally enforced racial isolation, disproportionately affecting non-White populations. Moreover, Apartheid consistently pushed the majority of the population to the margins of society based only on the color of their skin, leaving non-white people frequently in near destitution.[13] Apartheid institutionalized notions of racial “superiority” and “inferiority.”
 
The Population Registration Act was pivotal in Apartheid legislation, categorizing South Africans into racial groups (white, black, colored, and later Asian) that determined their social, political, educational, and economic opportunities. It formalized racial segregation and upheld the discriminatory practices, supported by complementing laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the Group Areas Act.[14] These rules prohibited interracial unions and divided people into four racial groups: white, black, Indian, and colored. Each group had specific neighborhoods they were allowed to reside in. While white South Africans continued to rule over urban areas, black South Africans were forced to relocate to their tribal homelands. Segregation was further cemented when Afrikaans was mandated as the language of instruction and administration.[15]
 
Despite relentless repression from the ruling government, anti-Apartheid sentiment gave rise to political movements opposing white supremacist ideologies. Prior to 1960, opposition to Apartheid was broad and varied. Along with Indian, Colored, White, and church-based groups, key organizations driving the battle were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), and the United Democratic Front (UDF)[16]. In particular, the African Native National Congress (SANNC), founded in 1912 as the South and later known as the ANC, advocated for South African black rights and played a central role in the anti-apartheid struggle, including the 1952 Defiance Campaign, before internal divisions led to the formation of the PAC in 1959.[17]
 
As domestic and international pressure to end Apartheid grew by the 1980s, political prisoners were freed and there were political negotiations that ultimately led to the founding of a non-racial democratic state in 1994. The end of Apartheid opened the door to creating a more inclusive society in which everyone could take an equal part in public life and governance.
 
North Korea’s Songbun System vs South Africa’s Apartheid
 
Similarities
 
North Korea’s Songbun system and South Africa’s Apartheid regime share striking similarities. Both relied on legislation and political documents to justify discriminatory practices. South Africa’s Population Registration Act of 1950 classified individuals into racial categories, dictating their social, political, and economic rights. Similarly, North Korea’s Songbun system categorized citizens based on perceived loyalty to the regime, influencing their access to resources and opportunities. Specifically, North Korea formalized discriminatory practices through directives such as the “On the Transformation of the Struggle with Counter-Revolutionary Elements into an All-People All-Party Movement” proclamation and the KWP’s May 30 Resolution. These measures are comparable to South Africa’s Population Registration Act.
 
In both South Africa and North Korea, the Apartheid and the Songbun regimes were used to justify the geographical segregation and establishment of localities limiting the freedom of oppressed black South Africans and North Korea’s hostile class.[18] In South Africa, Apartheid laws designated ‘Bantustans’ as homeland areas for black residents, stripping them of citizenship rights and forcing mass relocations.[19] Similarly, North Korea’s “hostile” class faces restricted movement and employment in isolated areas, akin to Apartheid’s spatial segregation.[20] Both regimes employed policies that disrupted families and communities, enduring social and economic hardships.
 
Both Apartheid and Songbun enacted laws that enforced large-scale racial or social segregation, dictating where people could live based on their designated category. They formalized classification systems with identity cards, specifying racial groups in South Africa and background and birth origin groups in North Korea. These categorizations were used to justify forced removals and relocations of marginalized groups to designated areas. Additionally, both states suppressed dissent through laws banning gatherings and organizations perceived as threats, while their education systems perpetuated labor divisions and social inequality. Furthermore, both systems facilitated the exploitation of labor, including instances of forced labor, domestically and sometimes internationally, further entrenching systemic inequities.
 
Differences
 
However, there are also significant differences between the two systems. South Africa’s Apartheid regime, characterized as a crime against humanity, focused primarily on enforcing racial segregation and discrimination through government legislation. Its laws institutionalized racial inequality by restricting the rights and freedoms of non-white South Africans, enforcing separate facilities, and imposing harsh penalties on those who resisted. The system aimed to maintain white minority rule and economic dominance, perpetuating systemic oppression and marginalization of black, colored, and Indian communities.
 
In contrast, North Korea’s crimes against humanity under the Songbun system target groups based on perceived political loyalty and family background. Songbun categorizes individuals into core, wavering, and hostile social classes, dictating access to resources and opportunities. The regime uses Songbun to control and oppress its population, rewarding loyalists while punishing perceived dissenters through systemic discrimination and severe human rights abuses. Unlike Apartheid, which was primarily race-based, North Korea’s system is based on political allegiance and social background, reflecting the regime’s draconian control over every aspect of citizens’ lives. Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that some racial elements are also involved in Songbun.[21] Chinese individuals within families are barred from the core class and can only advance to the wavering class through strict adherence to regime policies. Those with Japanese backgrounds[22] face even harsher discrimination, affecting their songbun classification and treatment in North Korean society, despite occasional exceptions based on exceptional talents or circumstances.[23]

Legal Parallels and Applicable Laws to Apartheid in North Korea

In particular based on discrimination against those of “impure” ethnic background, North Korea’s Songbun system could meet the criteria of contemporary apartheid under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which defines crimes against humanity as “inhumane acts committed within an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups, aimed at maintaining that regime,” including murder, enslavement, torture, and persecution based on various grounds.[24] While South Africa’s crimes predominantly revolved around Apartheid and North Korea’s around the persecution of identifiable groups, both systems exhibit severe human rights abuses consistent with these categories.

Three pivotal international treaties apply to collectively target the crime of Apartheid: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Apartheid Convention, and the Rome Statute.[25] The ICERD, which entered into force in 1966, sets out to eliminate racial discrimination and Apartheid practices by affirming states’ obligations to prevent and eradicate such injustices.[26] In a comparable manner, Apartheid is defined by the Apartheid Convention, which has been in effect since 1976, as systematic oppression through cruel acts that uphold racial dominance and include denial of fundamental rights and discriminatory laws.[27] The 1998 Rome Statute, entered into force in 2002, establishes Apartheid as a crime against humanity in relation to pervasive or organized assaults on civilian populations.[28] While it adopts the same standards as the Apartheid Convention, it faces difficulties in defining "racial group" in accordance with international law.

Specifically, Article 2(h) of the Rome Statute defines Apartheid as inhumane acts similar to those in paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute, occurring within an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression by one racial group over others, aimed at maintaining control. The North Korean regime employs its own form of racism, emphasizing Korean racial superiority over all others. The Songbun system in North Korea, akin to Apartheid, institutionalized racial discrimination and domination by the Kim regime, highlighting the superiority of the Korean race over others and disadvantageous individuals with Chinese or Japanese heritage or backgrounds.[29] These discriminatory practices, alongside documented survivor testimonies and reports, illustrate the systemic oppression and suffering inflicted by both regimes on their respective populations.
 
Some scholars contend that the inclusion of Apartheid in the Rome Statute, which achieved customary international law status and is considered jus cogens—a peremptory norm of international law—is pivotal.[30] They argue that the crime of Apartheid remains relevant and applicable globally, not limited to its original context in South Africa. John Dugard, a South African professor of international law, underscores this view, suggesting that while the Apartheid Convention may have initially targeted South Africa, it now serves as a broader instrument under international law, encompassing systemic racial discrimination in any context. Numerous international legal instruments support this interpretation, such as the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention and the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind, both of which recognize Apartheid as a crime that is not geographically bound but rather as a universal condemnation of institutionalized racial oppression.[31]
 
Additionally, as Apartheid should be universally condemned as a crime for its institutionalization of racial oppression, scholars have aimed to advance different policy suggestions for eradicating this crime from North Korea.  . B. R. Myers, an American professor of international studies at Dongseo University in South Korea, focuses on internal public communication (propaganda) in order to understand how the North Korean regime constructs ideological legitimacy. The emphasis on racial purity in the regime’s own internal pronouncements leads Myers to conclude that rather than being a failed communist state, North Korea derives its legitimacy from “the claim to superior might, race-purity, and resolve”.[32] Based on these observations and his own upbringing in Apartheid-era South Africa, Myers believes that engagement with North Korea is more effective, and its opposite, isolation.
 
However, other commentators who lean towards engagement with North Korea find the comparisons between North Korean racism and Apartheid-era South Africa very uncomfortable. Marcus Noland notes that their reaction is understandable: they find it simpler to justify engaging with “misguided socialists” rather than with “racially obsessed fascists”.[33] For Americans in this category, the discomfort is amplified by the similarities to Ronald Reagan’s failed [34]“constructive engagement” approach towards South Africa’s Apartheid regime, which parallels current discussions on engaging with the Kim regime.[35]
 
Conclusion: A Step Forward

Both systems––South Africa’s Apartheid and North Korea’s Songbun––have been scrutinized for violating international human rights norms. North Korean decrees and resolutions established systemic discrimination against perceived political rivals, while Apartheid's Population Registration Act and later laws reinforced racial discrimination. These actions, which represent the systematic marginalization and repression of specific groups in each community, have been denounced under international law as crimes against humanity.

The Songbun system has escaped international attention despite its substantial ramifications, partly because outsiders are reluctant to recognize its coercive nature and the state maintains secrecy. The system exerts a persistent influence on the day-to-day lives of North Koreans, including through the extremely unequal distribution of resources. As long as North Korea's repressive system and acts of torture, unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, and harsh prison conditions continue, the international community must hold the country accountable for these atrocities.

Nevertheless, the enforcement of international regulations and convention against North Korea’s violations continues to face numerous challenges relative to the necessary fulfillment of the notion of sovereignty. North Korea’s non-ratification or non-signatory status for these conventions, limited jurisdiction of the ICC, and the nature of North Korea as a rogue and dictatorial regime impede the international community to take concrete steps to alter the course of the ongoing violations. However, despite these challenges, international pressure, diplomatic efforts, and advocacy through international organizations remain important tools to promote compliance with international conventions and norms, including those related to human rights and discrimination, including discrimination on the grounds of race. As a first step in combating Apartheid in all its forms, the international community must hold North Korea accountable for its chronic violations of international treaties. This will help protect the fundamental rights of all North Koreans. In particular, when providing humanitarian aid to North Korea, the international community could take steps to ensure that aid reaches the most vulnerable groups, including those disadvantaged under the Songbun system; for instance, the WFP should “develop more stringent monitoring and seek to assure the right to food for all those who are hungry, including those in neglected rural areas, street children and the up to 120,000 men, women and children held in the kwanliso prison labor camps”.[36] This is not the end, but rather another step forward in the international investigation of North Korea’s violations of human rights, indicating to the country and the international community that rapid action is required. The urgency of these efforts is underscored by the profound and ongoing impact on the lives of North Koreans, demanding swift and decisive international action.

SoEun Park is currently a research intern with HRNK. She is an undergraduate student at Harvard University concentrating in Government and Sociology.

[1] Collins, R. & The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2012). Marked for life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s social classification system. In Marked for Life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s Social Classification System. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Robertson, P. (2020, October 28). North Korea’s caste system. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/05/north-koreas-caste-system#:~:text=Kim's%20government%20based%20each%20citizen's,War%2C%20from%201950%20to%201953.
[5] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Collins_Apartheid_Songbun_Final.pdf
[6] Ibid.
[7]  Ibid.
[8]  Ibid.
[9]  Ibid.
[10]  Ibid.
[11]  Ibid.
[12] AUHRM Project Focus Area: The Apartheid | African Union. (n.d.). https://au.int/en/auhrm-project-focus-area-apartheid#:~:text=The%20Apartheid%20
[13] A history of Apartheid in South Africa | South African History Online. (n.d.). https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa
[14] Ibid.
[15] AUHRM Project Focus Area: The Apartheid | African Union. (n.d.).
[16] A history of Apartheid in South Africa | South African History Online. (n.d.).
[17] Ibid.
[18] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Note: Kim Jong-Un’s mother is an ethnic Korean who previously lived in Japan and was born in Osaka, Japan. For political reasons, the regime cannot reveal this to the wider population.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. (n.d.). International Criminal Court. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf
[25] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity.
[26] International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. (1965, December 21). United Nations Human Rights. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-elimination-all-forms-racia
[27] United Nations General Assembly. (1974). International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. In United Nations General Assembly Resolution. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf
[28] United Nations. (n.d.). United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml
[29] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Noland, M. (2014, February 11). Myers, Apartheid, and Engagement with North Korea. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/myers-apartheid-and-engagement-north-korea
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] COHEN, R. (2015, April 21). Must UN Agencies Also Fail in North Korea? 38 North. https://www.38north.org/2015/04/rcohen042115/

            North Korea and its weapons of mass destruction continue to pose a significant challenge for the international community. Pyongyang has been subject to multiple rounds of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. However, these sanctions have yielded mixed results at best, as North Korea maintains its bellicose attitude and doubles down on weapons development.

            Over time, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have become more threatening to regional and global security, but it is increasingly clear that North Korea’s nuclear proliferation problem is also a human rights problem. UNSC Resolution 2397, adopted in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in 2017, notes in its preamble that that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles occur at the expense of North Koreans “by diverting critically needed resources… when they have great unmet needs.”[1]

            At the same time, North Korea has a track record of evading sanctions by engaging in illicit economic activities, using the proceeds earned from such activities to fund its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile tests. The regime has shown a continued disregard for the well-being of its citizens by prioritizing regime security and nuclear weapons over the human rights of its citizens.

            North Korea’s ability to evade sanctions is enabled in part by external actors. This essay explores the maritime aspects of international sanctions enforcement and Chinese interference in said enforcement. UNSC Resolution 2397 further tightened the existing sanctions regime on North Korea by introducing, among others, a limit of 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons on the supply, sale, or transfer of crude oil to North Korea and 500,000 barrels on refined petroleum products.[2] It also placed special emphasis on targeting North Korea’s sanctions evasion, noting that it “is illicitly exporting coal and other prohibited items through deceptive maritime practices and obtaining petroleum illegally through ship-to-ship transfers.”[3] This places an obligation on UN member states to prevent such behavior and implement UNSC resolutions. Without concerted efforts to enforce sanctions, North Korea will be emboldened to evade sanctions with impunity.

North Korea’s Maritime Sanctions Evasion and International Response

              Despite Resolution 2397’s explicit denouncement of North Korea’s illicit maritime activities, they continue unabated. The UN Panel of Experts described ship-to-ship transfers as “a primary method of sanctions evasion” in its annual report for 2019.[4] These transfers also involve “increasingly advanced evasion techniques,” such as:
The disguising of vessels through ship identity theft and false Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions… contrary to International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations governing safety of life at sea, which require that AIS be in operation at all times… Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of tankers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the use of small, unregistered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and the use of additional vessels for transshipment.[5]

            These methods obfuscate the movements and identity of vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers and their cargo, allowing North Korea to breach limits on restricted goods imposed by the UNSC. The transfers are mostly concentrated within the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, and also the East Sea, off the coasts of Russia and North Korea.[6]

            North Korea’s sanctions evasion has been met with greater international efforts to enforce these sanctions. In 2018, U.S. officials revealed plans to expand the interception of ships violating UN sanctions with an emphasis on detecting ship-to-ship transfers, engaging in coordination talks with regional partners to crack down on illicit maritime activity.[7] This led to the creation of the Pacific Security Maritime Exchange (PSMX), an information-sharing initiative to monitor North Korea’s illicit activities and coordinate actions with allies and partners, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.[8]

            PSMX prevents North Korean sanctions evasion by identifying smuggling ships and illicit trading activities, which raises the cost of sanctions evasion by forcing the regime to “create more intricate, expensive, and complicated smuggling networks” and helping to disband existing black market networks.[9] Participating countries also contribute by periodically deploying military resources, such as naval vessels and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, to patrol the regions where ship-to-ship transfers commonly occur. These deployments primarily involve maritime surveillance activities—observing and identifying vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers, documenting evidence, and reporting illicit activities.

            Some deployments are done explicitly for the purpose of supporting the PSMX, such as Canada’s Operation NEON and Australia’s Operation Argos, while other deployments are part of larger missions to the Pacific region in general, as with the United Kingdom.[10] The former deployments occur with more frequency and regularity. Canada, for instance, has recorded ten deployments in total,[11] with Australia recording twelve deployments of maritime patrol aircraft and nine deployments of naval vessels as of September 2023.[12] New Zealand, for its part, has deployed maritime patrol aircraft six times since 2018,[13] and has recently pledged to increase its contributions with more frequent flying missions and sending ships for the first time.[14]

China’s Attitude Towards UN Sanctions

            As a permanent member of the UNSC, China exercises significant influence over the passage of UNSC resolutions. A discussion on why it previously voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea and how it views those sanctions is warranted.

            The current sanctions literature views sanctions as having three different purposes: “to coerce a change in a target’s behavior; to constrain a target from engaging in a proscribed activity; or to signal and/or stigmatize a target or others about the violation of an international norm.”[15] These purposes can be and are often intertwined, but not all three are always pursued simultaneously. Sanctions are also interpreted differently by different actors. This is especially the case for multilateral sanctions like those enacted at the UN, where China often has different priorities from the other UNSC members.

            China has historically been protective of North Korea, a diplomatic legacy from the Korean War and the broader Cold War period. Today, it still resists calls to place more pressure on North Korea. However, North Korea’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons since 2006 have strained its relations with China on occasion, culminating in China’s support for UN sanctions on North Korea. Wenxin Li and Ji Young Kim  argue China’s attitude shift was due to two external factors and one domestic factor: North Korea’s increasingly aggressive military policy, which provoked Chinese condemnation and outrage; American outreach and negotiations to reach agreements on UNSC resolutions; and worsening domestic perceptions of North Korea in state media and public opinion.[16]

            Nevertheless, while China endorsed stricter measures against North Korea, it is wary of applying too much pressure, which could result in regime collapse. Furthermore, China does not view the nuclear issue in a vacuum, but as an extension of the China-U.S. relationship. Li and Kim note that China-North Korea relations have improved since 2018 while China-U.S. relations have worsened, adding that China’s softening attitude on sanctions “came from China’s lack of trust toward the United States rather than China’s support to North Korea’s nuclear policy.”[17] China interprets the imposition of UN sanctions differently, even as it criticized North Korea for raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

            This supports Catherine Jones’ observation that while UN sanctions on North Korea are conventionally viewed through the lens of coercion and constraint, China “has primarily employed sanctions as a signaling device.”[18] It displays its displeasure with North Korea’s actions and claims to comply with UNSC resolutions, but China’s uneven implementation of sanctions in practice sends mixed signals.[19] This undermines the integrity and effectiveness of the sanctions regime. Moreover, China has recently vetoed new sanctions and suggested lifting some sanctions.[20] This demonstrates to North Korea that it has little to worry about from its neighbor. The emphasis on signaling rather than coercing or constraining also means that China is less partial to enforcement efforts by other states, as demonstrated by Beijing’s hostile response.

China’s Harassment of Sanctioning States

            Since the deployment of military assets to patrol the East China Sea and monitor acts of sanctions evasion, various countries have reported being harassed by the Chinese military. This is primarily done through “buzzing,” where Chinese aircraft deliberately fly close to the intended target. One of the earliest occurrences was in October 2018, when Chinese aircraft reportedly flew too close to a Canadian maritime patrol aircraft and “used improper radio procedure and ‘improper language’,” with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand experiencing similar harassment.[21]

            Another instance occurred in June 2019, where Chinese ships and aircraft shadowed two Canadian ships deployed for sanctions enforcement after they left Vietnam for the East China Sea.[22] Later, two fighter jets flew within 300 meters of the ships at 30 meters above the ocean level.[23] While Canada described these initial events as not putting Canadian crew at risk and “not provocative, hazardous or unexpected,” China doubled down on the tactic in 2022. Canada reported that between April and May that year, Chinese aircraft harassed Canada’s maritime patrol aircraft several times, flying so close that the Chinese aircrew were “very clearly visible” and sometimes forcing the Canadian aircrew to modify their own flight path so as to avoid potential collisions.[24] The “buzzing” intensified once more in October 2023, with a jet coming within 5 meters of Canadian aircraft, maneuvering such that the aircraft was in the jet’s blind spot, and releasing “multiple flares while flying close.”[25]

            In one instance involving Australian divers, meanwhile, China employed other methods. When an Australian vessel deployed divers to remove fishing nets that were entangled in its propellers, a Chinese destroyer approached it and began operating its sonar, forcing the divers to get out of the water and causing minor injuries.[26] The most recent disruption occurred in early June, when a Dutch ship and marine patrol helicopter were approached by Chinese forces.[27] More of these “buzzing” incidents can be expected in the future, as long as efforts to enforce maritime sanctions continue.
​
            China publicly criticizes international deployments by framing them as intrusions on national security. It condemned Britain’s decision to sail a warship through the Taiwan Strait after completing sanctions enforcement operations, saying that this behavior “harbored evil intentions.”[28] In the same vein, it accused Canada of violating its airspace “in the name of implementing resolutions,”[29] called on Australia to “stop making trouble in front of China’s doorstep,”[30] and accused the Dutch of being heinous by “falsely claiming to be carrying out a U.N. mission” while infringing upon Chinese jurisdiction.[31]

            China cannot directly criticize the enforcement of sanctions, as this is equivalent to publicly opposing UNSC resolutions. This helps explain Beijing’s claims that countries are using these resolutions as a cover to engage in nefarious activities against China. However, the fact that vessels engaging in ship-to-ship transfers are being identified and reported to the UN belies such claims. New Zealand’s missions alone recorded the observation of four ship-to-ship transfers and thirty vessels of interest, and the reporting of thirty-three vessels suspected of violating UN sanctions.[32] There has also been communication with China regarding illicit practices within its waters and appeals for China to help stop North Korean sanctions evasion.[33]

Concluding Remarks

            China’s support for strengthening sanctions once led some to hope of potential U.S.-China cooperation on denuclearizing North Korea.[34] This is unlikely today, given tense bilateral relations, but it does not change the fact that Chinese cooperation was instrumental in effectively implementing sanctions. When China reduced trade with North Korea and enforced sanctions more strictly, the combined pressure forced North Korea to negotiate terms for de-escalation.[35] This demonstrates the continued utility of sanctions as a means of coercion, provided they are implemented adequately.
​
            Countering sanctions evasion is critical for ensuring that the coercive power of sanctions is not compromised.[36] Through its actions, however, China abets North Korea’s illicit maritime sanctions evasion by disrupting international sanctions enforcement initiatives. It is also signaling to North Korea that its actions will be protected from scrutiny. Improving sanctions enforcement strengthens the strategic capabilities of sanctions, allowing them to be deployed as reliable tools in conjunction with negotiations and other policy instruments.[37] Contrary to what China claims, it must be made clear that any adjustments to the sanctions regime depends on North Korea making concrete commitments for a negotiated settlement and, at minimum, refraining from further nuclear weapons testing or development.

Wu Yang is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, with concentrations in global security and foreign policy, as well as a regional concentration in East and Southeast Asian studies.
​
[1] United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2397 (22 December 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2397, 1.
[2] Ibid, 2.
[3] Ibid, 4.
[4] United Nation Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), UN Doc, S/2019/171, 7.
[5] Ibid, 5.
[6] Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “DPRK Maritime Sanctions Enforcement,” International Law Studies 96, no. 1 (May 12, 2020), 103, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol96/iss1/5.
[7] Matt Spetalnick, Phil Stewart, and David Brunnstrom, “EXCLUSIVE-U.S. Prepares High-Seas Crackdown on N.Korea Sanctions Evaders-Sources,” Reuters, February 25, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/oil/exclusive-us-prepares-high-seas-crackdown-on-nkorea-sanctions-evaders-sources-idUSL2N1QE0FN/.
[8] U.S. Department of State, “Pacific Security Maritime Exchange,” accessed June 14, 2024, https://www.state.gov/pacific-security-maritime-exchange/.
[9] Ibid.
[10] “Pacific Patrol Ships Begin Third Year Deployed Broadening Their Mission,” Royal Navy, September 12, 2023, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2023/september/12/20230912-pacific-patrol-ships-begin-third-year-deployed-broadening-their-mission.
[11] Department of National Defence, “Operation NEON,” Government of Canada, October 2, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html.
[12] Defence Media, “Defence joins international effort to enforce sanctions on North Korea,” Defence Australia, September 16, 2023, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2023-09-16/defence-joins-international-effort-enforce-sanctions-north-korea. At the time of writing, Australia has since participated in more deployments.
[13] “RNZAF P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrols Monitor Suspected Evasions of UNSC Sanctions against North Korea,” New Zealand Defence Force, June 11, 2024, https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/rnzaf-p-8a-poseidon-maritime-patrols-monitor-suspected-evasions-of-united-nations-security-council-sanctions-against-north-korea/.
[14] Lucy Craymer, “New Zealand Will Increase Its Military Contribution to N. Korea Sanctions Monitoring,” Reuters, June 18, 2024, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-will-increase-its-military-contribution-n-korea-sanctions-monitoring-2024-06-18/.
[15] Thomas J. Biersteker, Marcos Tourinho, and Sue E. Eckert, “Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions,” in Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action, ed. Marcos Tourinho, Sue E. Eckert, and Thomas J. Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 21, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.002.
[16] Wenxin Li and Ji Young Kim, “Not a Blood Alliance Anymore: China’s Evolving Policy toward UN Sanctions on North Korea,” Contemporary Security Policy 41, no. 4 (2020): 612-615, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1741143.
[17] Ibid, 624-625.
[18] Catherine Jones, “Sanctions as Tools to Signal, Constrain, and Coerce,” Asia Policy 13, no. 3 (2018): 20–21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26497785.
[19] Ibid, 21-23.
[20] Michelle Nichols, “China, Russia Veto U.S. Push for More U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” Reuters, May 26, 2022, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-russia-veto-us-push-more-un-sanctions-north-korea-2022-05-26/.
[21] Murray Brewster, “Canadian Surveillance Plane Buzzed by Chinese off North Korea, DND Reveals,” CBC News, December 19, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/chinese-korea-embargo-aircraft-buzzed-harassment-1.4953093.
[22] Murray Brewster, “Chinese Jets Buzzed Canadian Naval Ships in East China Sea,” CBC News, June 27, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-fighters-buzzed-regina-asterix-east-china-sea-1.5193149.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Department of National Defence, “Statement from the Canadian Armed Forces,” Government of Canada, June 1, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/statement-from-the-canadian-armed-forces.html.
[25] Murray Brewster, “Chinese Fighters Engaged in ‘unsafe’ Intercept of Canadian Surveillance Plane, Commander Says,” CBC News, October 16, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-air-force-intercept-aurora-surveillance-1.6997852.
[26] “Australia Says Its Navy Divers Were Likely Injured by the Chinese Navy’s ‘unsafe’ Use of Sonar,” AP News, November 18, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-australia-navy-sonar-divers-12a9e6f228aa81272b9b74b87e0489a1.
[27] Brad Lendon, “Chinese Military Harassed Dutch Warship Enforcing UN Sanctions on North Korea, Netherlands Says,” CNN, June 10, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/10/asia/chinese-military-harass-dutch-warship-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.
[28] “China Condemns Britain for Taiwan Strait Warship Mission,” Reuters, September 27, 2021, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/british-frigate-sails-through-taiwan-strait-2021-09-27/.
[29] Joon Ha Park and Lina Park, “China Accuses Canadian Plane of ‘Intruding’ during North Korea Sanctions Mission,” NK News, October 18, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/10/china-accuses-canadian-plane-of-intruding-during-north-korea-sanctions-mission/.
[30] Micah McCartney, “China Denies Injuring Australian Navy Divers with Sonar,” Newsweek, November 21, 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/china-denies-injuring-australian-navy-divers-sonar-1845644.
[31] “China’s Defence Ministry Says Dutch Ship Incident ‘Heinous,’” Reuters, June 11, 2024, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-defence-ministry-says-dutch-ship-incident-heinous-2024-06-11/.
[32] “RNZAF P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrols Monitor Suspected Evasions of UNSC Sanctions against North Korea.”
[33] Michelle Nichols, “Exclusive: G7, Others Ask China to Stop North Korea Sanctions Evasion in Its Waters,” Reuters, July 21, 2023, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/g7-others-ask-china-stop-north-korea-sanctions-evasion-its-waters-2023-07-21/.
[34] See Donald Rauch, “The US and Chinese Navies Have Already Fought Piracy Together - Now They Can Rein in North Korea.,” Foreign Policy, March 1, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/01/the-chinese-navy-can-give-north-korean-sanctions-bite/.
[35] Woo-Jun Min and Sukhee Han, “Economic Sanctions against North Korea: The Pivotal Role of US–China Cooperation,” International Area Studies Review 23, no. 2 (June 1, 2020): 190, https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865920901896.
[36] Christopher J. Watterson, “What next for Sanctions against North Korea?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 5 (2019): 247–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1654270.
[37] Thomas J. Biersteker and Zuzana Hudáková, “International Sanctions on North Korea: Are They Working?,” in Understanding Kim Jong-Un’s North Korea: Regime Dynamics, Negotiation, and Engagement, ed. Chung-in Moon and Robert Carlin (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2022), 201, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=3375721&site=ehost-live&ebv=EB&ppid=pp_185.

By Valerie Xu, HRNK Research Intern[1]
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations & Research

In 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the human rights situation in North Korea concluded that “systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations”[2] have been, and are being, committed by the DPRK, its institutions, and officials. Moreover, it stated that many of these violations constitute crimes against humanity, including: “extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation.”[3] Although it has been ten years since, serious human rights abuses continue to be committed in North Korea.

There have been continued attempts to address the human rights situation in North Korea, yet the result leaves much to be desired. While some point to political leaders for turning a blind eye to North Korea’s human rights record in the hopes of improving relations with Pyongyang, others point to the lack of civil society in North Korea as a factor contributing to the difficulty in institutionalizing human rights reforms. Given the absence of civil society and rights consciousness, it is challenging to diffuse human rights within North Korea.[4] Furthermore, the nature of North Korea’s judicial institutions makes it hard to seek accountability through domestic laws and regulations.[5] Even the COI acknowledged that “The perpetrators enjoy impunity. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is unwilling to implement its international obligation to prosecute and bring the perpetrators to justice, because those perpetrators act in accordance with State policy.”[6]

When the state ignores or directly perpetuates systematic human rights abuses, external interventions can be rendered fruitless. Existing forums and institutions face not only procedural constraints, but also resistance from both North Korea itself and some other countries. The lack of progress is frustrating, but have we truly exhausted all means? What other venues are available to hold North Korea responsible for its human rights violations? In answering these questions, this piece explores the application of universal jurisdiction to address human rights violations that have occurred in North Korea.


Past Efforts

United Nations System

Addressing North Korean human rights issues at the UN has been helpful in maintaining diplomatic momentum and serving as a solidary and concrete statement of concern towards the DPRK by UN member states. But due to the non-binding nature of resolutions passed at the UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), this approach also has its limits. Some member states are opposed to passing UNHRC resolutions on North Korea because “country-specific content had no place at the UNHRC.”[7] Meanwhile, addressing North Korean human rights violations at the UN Security Council (UNSC) — where resolutions are indeed binding — has also been criticized by some member states which argue that “human rights issues are not under the purview of the UN Security Council to begin with.”[8] Constructive engagement with North Korea has been further complicated as North Korea has continued its missile and nuclear tests in direct violation of UNSC resolutions.[9]

In its recommendations, the COI called for “a Security Council referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court or the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal by the United Nations.”[10] However, North Korea is not a signatory of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which means that a UNSC resolution is “the only remaining option to refer the case of human rights violations in the DPRK.”[11] Furthermore, permanent members in the UNSC, namely China and Russia, are likely to veto any UNSC resolutions that attempt to do so. Even if the case is referred to the International Criminal Court, only crimes committed after July 1, 2002 — when the Rome Statute went into effect — can be addressed.[12]
 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was developed in the 1990s after the world witnessed mass atrocities unfold in places such as Somalia and Rwanda.[13] The UN invoked the R2P doctrine to intervene in Libya in 2011, which was the first time that use of force was authorized “for civilian protection purposes against the wishes of a host state.”[14] The COI specifically called on the international community to “accept its responsibility to protect the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from crimes against humanity, because the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has manifestly failed to do so.”[15]

However, invoking R2P in the North Korean context faces many difficulties. First, applying the R2P for chronic cases of human rights abuses may be a stretch, as it has only been used in acute situations in the past.[16] Second, using military force against a nuclear-armed North Korea is unthinkable, as “invocation of R2P by the Security Council could lead to the use of weapons of mass destruction or the launching of missiles.”[17] Lastly, due to controversial results of past R2P applications, including the Libyan case, gathering diplomatic support for this option would be difficult. Moscow or Beijing could easily veto any such resolutions on North Korea at the UNSC.
 
Bilateral Sanctions

Bilateral human rights sanctions on North Korean individuals and entities have also been attempted. Pursuant to Executive Order 13722 signed under the Obama administration, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated individuals and entities for having “engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for an abuse or violation of human rights by the Government of North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of either such entity.”[18] The European Union also imposed sanctions in 2021 under its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on individuals and entities deemed to be involved in human rights abuses in North Korea.[19] North Korea also faces other types of sanctions in addition to those that are imposed on human rights grounds. There are questions, however, about the effectiveness of sanctions on deterring human rights abuses.
 
Engagement and Exchanges

Alternatively, some scholars note that even though the North Korean regime is indeed the main perpetrator of human rights abuses within its borders, the regime is also the only actor that can significantly improve the situation. In other words, any concrete improvements must come from the inside.[20] As such, they argue that non-confrontational and unconditional approaches, such as educational exchanges and technology cooperation, should be considered. These attempts have been made in the past, but they have not led to sustained improvements. Progressive South Korean governments, in particular, have been criticized for their attempts to engage North Korea at the cost of neglecting human rights issues. For example, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) was a flagship inter-Korean economic collaboration program pursued by progressive presidents during the Sunshine Policy era. However, reports by Human Rights Watch have found that labor practices concerning North Korean workers at the KIC were not up to international standards — standards which South Korea has pledged to as an OECD member, yet were set aside to maintain good relations with their North Korean counterparts.[21] Although these progressive administrations and their policies did achieve certain progress, such as summit meetings and reunions for separated families, these gains were ultimately short-lived and did not yield concrete changes to North Korea’s domestic practices.


Concept of Universal Jurisdiction

The UNHRC has recommended universal jurisdiction in explicitly stating: “Another option to ensure criminal accountability in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would be for Member States to pursue investigations and prosecutions based on principles of extraterritorial and/or universal jurisdiction in legal proceedings observing fair trail and due process guarantees.”[22] Furthermore, in her 2024 report, UN Special Rapporteur Elizabeth Salmón recommended that “Prosecutions outside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could, if necessary, be based on principles of extraterritorial and/or universal jurisdiction.”[23] The remainder of this article will assess the prospects for applying universal jurisdiction to human rights violations in North Korea within the framework of international law.

Definitions of universal jurisdiction are relatively homogenous in their emphasis on both the nature of the crimes in question and the agency assigned to states. The International Justice Resource Center defines universal jurisdiction as “the idea that a national court may prosecute individuals for serious crimes against international law — such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and torture — based on the principle that such crimes harm the international community or international order itself, which individual States may act to protect.”[24] Under this definition, the bar for state action is not explicit. Human Rights Watch subscribes that universal jurisdiction “is the ability of the domestic judicial systems of a state to investigate and prosecute certain crimes, even if they were not committed on its territory, by one of its nationals, or against one of its nationals.”[25] This definition explicitly refers to the concept of nationality, which might give rise to complications in the case of the two Koreas, as discussed below.

This piece embraces a more general understanding of universal jurisdiction by focusing on how serious crimes under international law can be prosecuted outside of a nation’s territory, while being mindful of potential caveats that may arise.


Theory and Application of Universal Jurisdiction

The legal concept of jurisdiction is three-fold: the power to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce. Under the post-Westphalian state-centric system, such powers are reserved to states in forms of sovereignty.[26] To put simply, “universal jurisdiction transcends national sovereignty.”[27] It is typically justified on the grounds that “the ‘exceptional gravity’ of the offense ‘affect[s] the fundamental interests of the international community as a whole.’”[28] Caution must be exercised in applying universal jurisdiction. There is a careful balance between respecting a government’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and punishing crimes against humanity when a government fails to do so domestically. As such, universal jurisdiction is still seen as a controversial tool that should be used in a cautious manner.

Past applications of universal jurisdiction include the Spanish prosecution of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and the U.S. prosecution of Chuckie Taylor.[29] It has not been used explicitly in South Korea, but there have been several relevant cases. In 1983, South Korea claimed concurrent jurisdiction in prosecuting the hijacking of an airplane that landed on South Korean territory, even though the aircraft was registered in China and the nationality of the hijacker was Chinese. Although the court’s ruling did not explicitly invoke universal jurisdiction, it was suspected to be behind the court’s decision in claiming jurisdiction.[30] In recent years, South Korean courts have found Kim Jong-un to be personally liable for human rights and humanitarian law violations.[31] For example, in 2023, the Seoul Central District Court ordered North Korea and Kim Jong-un to pay 50 million Korean Won each to three former prisoners of war for their forced labor during captivity.[32] Although actually receiving this compensation may be difficult, it nevertheless points to the possibility of invoking universal jurisdiction in future proceedings.

 
Feasibility and Transferability

In theory, applying universal jurisdiction in South Korea can be grounded in its Act on Punishment of Crimes Under Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Adopted in 2007, the purpose of the Act is to “punish crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and set the procedures for cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the International Criminal Court pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.”[33]

Article 3 defines the scope of applying this Act:

• (1) This Act shall apply to any Korean national or foreigner who commits a crime provided for in this Act within the territory of the Republic of Korea.
• (2) This Act shall apply to any Korean national who commits a crime provided for in this Act outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.
• (3) This Act shall apply to any foreigner who commits a crime provided for in this Act on board a vessel or aircraft owned by Republic of Korea, outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.
• (4) This Act shall apply to any foreigner who commits a crime provided for in this Act against the Republic of Korea or its people outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.
• (5) This Act shall apply to any foreigner who commits the crime of genocide, etc. outside the territory of the Republic of Korea and stays in the territory of the Republic of Korea.

Article 2 also stipulates that “The term ‘crime of genocide, etc.’ means any crimes listed in Articles 8 through 14,” which includes crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes against persons, war crimes against property and rights, war crimes against humanitarian activities, war crimes using forbidden methods, and war crimes using forbidden weapons.[34] Therefore, South Korean courts can invoke this act to prosecute crimes against humanity in line with principles of universal jurisdiction, as long as the perpetrator can be located within South Korea’s borders.

On this note, given the post-Korean War partition of the Peninsula, there is also an interesting discussion as to what constitutes national sovereignty and territorial integrity for North and South Korea. South Korea’s constitution states that “[t]he territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.”[35] In reality, however, North Korea and South Korea each occupy half of the Peninsula, and they are equally recognized as member states of the UN. Regardless, South Korea’s constitution influences how laws such as the Act on Punishment of Crimes Under Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court may be interpreted, especially with regard to the physical location of where crimes were committed and where perpetrators currently reside. Even so, cases can still arise from North Korean escapees who resettle in South Korea.


Risks and Complications

One major concern raised by legal experts is that if South Korean courts indeed invoke the universal jurisdiction approach, “it would require them implicitly to recognize the de facto existence of a North Korean state, putting it into direct conflict with the provisions in the South Korean Constitution explicitly barring such recognition of North Korean statehood.”[36] South Korea is a staunch friend and ally of the United States. South Korea also has to maintain balance in its relations with China. Since both the United States and China have a keen interest in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula, political risks may arise if South Korea unilaterally alters its policies towards North Korea.

Procedurally, criminal prosecutions in South Korea would require the physical presence of the defendant. Otherwise, the court would be unable to enforce any potential remedies that may result from criminal trials.[37] Lastly, as with any legal proceedings, the success of a prosecution would depend on “whether the prosecuting authorities can assemble sufficiently robust evidence to result in a conviction.”[38] This is especially challenging. Even the COI acknowledged the difficulty of gaining on-site access to North Korea or direct input from the government.[39]


Concluding Remarks

Despite these risks and challenges, universal jurisdiction should be seriously explored as a strategy for addressing human rights abuses in North Korea. In the process of pursuing transnational justice, universal jurisdiction should be seen as a means to an end, not as an end in itself. Fulfilling victim communities’ desire to bring perpetrators to justice is only a “symbolic first stage in addressing more restorative and community-centered considerations.”[40] In exploring the option of universal jurisdiction, scholars must keep in mind that “the agency of abuse survivors in planning for future mechanisms of redress” should not be overlooked or set aside.[41] It is imperative to not lose sight of the broader goal of transitional justice.

Valerie Xu is a recent Master’s graduate from a dual-degree program between Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and KDI School of Public Policy and Management. Her passion for sustainable global development and human rights are the motivators behind her academic pursuits and career aspirations.

[1] This article is based on an essay that was originally submitted as an academic assignment at Johns Hopkins University in December 2023. It is published here with the instructor’s permission.
[2] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc, A/HRC/25/63, 2014, para 80.
[3] Ibid., 14.
[4] Patricia Goedde, “Human Rights Diffusion in North Korea: The Impact of Transnational Legal Mobilization,” Asian Journal of Law and Society 5, no. 1 (2018): 177. https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2017.20.
[5] Kyung-ok Do, “Report of the Group of Independent Experts on Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the DPRK: Implications and Future Challenges,” Korea Institute for National Unification, April 5, 2017, 3. https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/8432/1/0001478608.pdf.
[6] A/HRC/25/63, para 85.
[7] Courtney J. Fung, “Just Not in the Neighbourhood: China’s Views on the Application of the Responsibility to Protect in the DPRK,” The China Quarterly 246 (2021): 573. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741020000648.
[8] Ibid., 577.
[9] Patricia Goedde, “Human Rights Diffusion in North Korea: The Impact of Transnational Legal Mobilization,” Asian Journal of Law and Society 5, no. 1 (2018): 179. https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2017.20.
[10] A/HRC/25/63, para 87.
[11] Do, “Report of the Group of Independent Experts on Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the DPRK: Implications and Future Challenges,” 4.
[12] Ibid., 5.
[13] Rosemary Foot, “The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Its Evolution: Beijing’s Influence on Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas,” St Antony’s International Review 6, no. 2 (2011): 49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26226764.
[14] Andrew Garwood-Gowers, “China and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: The Implications of the Libyan Intervention,” Asian Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (2012): 384. https://doi.org/10.1017/S204425131200015X.
[15] A/HRC/25/63, para. 86.
[16] Fung, “Just Not in the Neighbourhood: China’s Views on the Application of the Responsibility to Protect in the DPRK,” 570.
[17] Boris Kondoch, “North Korea,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford University Press, 2016), 830. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198753841.013.44
[18] Exec. Order No. 13722, 81 FR 14943 (March 15, 2016).
[19] Ramon Pacheco Pardo, “Pressure and Principles: The EU’s Human Rights Sanctions on North Korea,” 38 North, March 26, 2021. https://www.38north.org/2021/03/pressure-and-principles-the-eus-human-rights-sanctions-on-north-korea/.
[20] Buhm-Suk Baek, “Partially Right, Partially Wrong: Rethinking the Implementation of International Human Rights Law in Countries with Gross Human Rights Violations,” Pacific Focus, 33 no. 2 (2018): 353. https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12122.
[21] “North Korea: Workers’ Rights at the Kaesong Industrial Complex,” Human Rights Watch, October 2006. https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/10/03/north-korea-workers-rights-kaesong-industrial-complex
[22] United Nations Human Rights Council. Promoting accountability in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/52/64, para 17.
[23] A/HRC/55/63, para 23.
[24] “Universal Jurisdiction,” International Justice Resource Center. https://ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction/.
[25] “Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction,” Human Rights Watch, October 19, 2009. https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-universal-jurisdiction.
[26] M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice,” Virginia Journal of International Law, 42 no. 1 (2001): 89. https://via.library.depaul.edu/lawfacpubs/606.
[27] Ibid., 96.
[28] Ernest A. Young, “Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel,” Duke Law Journal 64 (2015): 1033. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3244.
[29] “Universal Jurisdiction,” International Justice Resource Center.
[30] “Universal Jurisdiction in the Republic of Korea,” United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/RepublicofKorea.pdf.
[31] Daniel Wertz, “Private Litigation against the North Korean Government: Overview and Policy Implications,” NCNK, August 2021. https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/private-litigation-against-north-korean-government.
[32] “Seoul Court Again Orders N. Korea to Pay Compensation to Former POWs,” Yonhap News, May 8, 2023. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230508005900315.
[33] “Act on Punishment of Crimes under Jurisdiction of The International Criminal Court,” Korea Legislation Research Institute & Korea Law Translation Center. https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?lang=ENG&hseq=16463.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Stephan Sonnenberg and Patricia Goedde, “Accountability for Human Rights Crimes in North Korea: Jurisdictional Dilemmas in South Korea.” Asian Perspective 47, no. 3 (2023): 522. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905236.
[36] Ibid., 527.
[37] Ibid., 531.
[38] Ibid., 521.
[39] Goedde, “Human Rights Diffusion in North Korea: The Impact of Transnational Legal Mobilization,” 186.
[40] Mark Findlay, “Activating a Victim Constituency in International Criminal Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 no. 2 (2009): 193. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijp008.
[41] Sarah A. Son, “Chasing Justice: Victim Engagement with Accountability for Human Rights Abuses in North Korea,” Asian Studies Review 44, no. 4 (2020): 623. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2020.1734536.

By Diana Darae Woo, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha (Director of Operations & Research) and Rick Herssevoort (International Outreach Associate)

Since the establishment of the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula, experts, policymakers, and scholars have strived to deepen global understanding of North Korea’s internal dynamics. Their collective efforts shape our knowledge of the pariah state. Although interest in North Korea fluctuates depending on shifts in global priorities, geopolitical events, diplomatic developments, and media coverage, it is imperative to expose the Kim family’s repressive, authoritarian rule as the North Korean people continue to bear the brunt of the country’s isolation and heinous human rights violations.
 
Beyond Utopia sheds light on the experiences of the North Korean people, following the Roh family’s escape from North Korea and Lee So-yeon’s attempt to rescue her son.[1] Their testimonies reveal the harrowing experiences North Koreans continue to endure today. Providing rare and valuable footage of the perilous trek North Korean escapees take to escape the Kim regime, Beyond Utopia is a timely and important call to remember the ongoing and egregious suffering of the North Korean people.

 
Exile List
 
As the documentary begins, the Roh family find themselves stranded in a tent, still near the North Korean border in China. They make an urgent rescue request to Pastor Kim Sung-eun in South Korea. Nearly 4,000 kilometers lie ahead for them to be able to reach South Korea through China, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. They are some of many on Kim Jong-un’s “banishing list,” a fear-and-control tactic used to target and punish relatives of escapees.
 
The consequences include being exiled to prison camps in the remote, mountains regions of North Korea, where they may be subject to forced labor, torture, arbitrary punishment, malnutrition, and other inconceivably harsh conditions. As such, they walk with cyanide capsules in their pockets. For the Roh family, including their two young daughters and 80-year-old grandmother, seeking freedom is the only remaining choice.
 
The Roh family’s escape, as assisted by Pastor Kim, is clear evidence of the lack of protections available for North Korean escapees and the risky business the broker network has become. Even while crossing the mountains of Vietnam in the dark of the night, human greed creeps in. A lead broker walks the family and Pastor Kim in circles, refusing to take them across unless they fork over a higher sum of money. There is little regard for the family who is risking it all. In this concealed industry, currency comes before the sanctity of human life.
 

Broker Network
 
Lee So-yeon’s story also represents the risk and despair North Korean escapees must endure, even for the simple hope of being together as a family. The whereabouts of Lee’s son, Cheong, who attempted to leave North Korea to meet his mother, are unknown. In the months after Cheong is captured near the North Korean border, Lee So-yeon’s only option to obtain the slightest bit of information on her son is to bribe and rely on a network of brokers. Wiring sums of money on multiple occasions does not guarantee clear information. She takes several phone calls with different brokers, who are only able to provide unreliable information. She also receives criticism for prompting her son to make the dangerous journey. Finally, she receives the gut-wrenching news that her son has been severely tortured, with little to no hope of release. There is no bribe, no connection, no NGO, no religion, no country, and no utopia that can rescue her son from the horrors of the North Korean regime’s systematic punishment of forcibly repatriated escapees.

 
Family and Freedom
 
Beyond Utopia pulls back the curtains and brings viewers closer to the North Korean people. Within the film’s frames are the North Korean people’s unbounded human spirit and determination to reach freedom. Even while risking it all, the Roh family’s sense of unity shines through. Between going in and out of safe houses in unfamiliar and potentially dangerous countries, they share meals, laugh, sing, cry, and also grieve for not being able to bring their dog, Bobo, with them. They express deep sympathy and sorrow for their friends and family who are still in North Korea.
 
We also learn firsthand how families are forcibly separated as a consequence of the Kim regime’s human rights violations. The senselessness of her son’s capture and knowing that her elderly mother is now under constant surveillance bring tears to Lee So-yeon’s eyes. She is a North Korean escapee, but more importantly, she is a daughter and a mother. Living in the comforts of a free, democratic country means little as she realizes that she is unable to rescue her son or meet with her mother ever again. She is left heartbroken, in despair, and in guilt, unable to repair her family.


Conclusion
 
More than anything, Beyond Utopia illuminates the personal stories of North Koreans, emphasizing the significance of hearing and seeing directly from North Koreans themselves. Through their own words and lived experiences, the plight of the North Korean people is brought to the forefront of the conversation surrounding the precarious puzzle that is North Korea. As audience members, we must remember that the Kim regime’s severe human rights abuses deserve as much attention as its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. As a global community, we should look beyond great-power competition and geopolitical dynamics to advocate for the human rights of the North Korean people. As fellow human beings, we must remember that North Koreans, too, seek and deserve the opportunity to pursue happiness—the small, blissful moments of living freely with family and friends.
 
Diana Darae Woo is a recent graduate of Northeastern University's M.S. in Global Studies and International Relations program. In October 2023, she began interning at HRNK to pursue her passion for international human rights. 
 
[1] Beyond Utopia. [Film] Directed by: Madeleine Gavin. USA: Ideal Partners, 19340 Productions, XRM Media, Random Good Foundation, Two Chairs Films, Human Rights Foundation; 2023.