North Korean Women: An Allegory of Resilience under the World’s Most Repressive Regime

Photograph Credit: Roman Harak

By Tristin Schultz, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Rosa Park, HRNK Director of Programs and Sophia Hapin, HRNK Research Intern

March 12, 2021

The March of Suffering [고난의 행군]
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 had an immediate effect on the economic sustainability of ideologically aligned nations, many of which were economically, politically, and militarily dependent on the formers Soviet Union. Subsequently, following the expiration of their previous caretaker, and in an effort to avoid total economic catastrophe, ex-allies Cuba and Vietnam fortified their economic resilience through a diversification of trade partners.[1] Conversely, Kim Il-sung and North Korea persevered with juche, or “self-reliance,” as the pièce de résistance of the regime. Consequently, from the erroneous emphasis on food self-sufficiency and perpetuated by an inability to effectively respond to exogenous supply shocks, emerged the Arduous March, a catastrophic famine in the 1990s that, by some estimates, led to the death of one million North Koreans or roughly five percent of the population.[2]

Women & Post-Famine Marketization
The profound demographic, economic, and political reverberations of famine are well-known, and despite the self-proclaimed god-like powers of North Korean leaders Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, and Kim Jong-Un, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) has continuously failed to lead their people to even the slightest semblance of prosperity. During the peak of the famine, even the most loyal of North Koreans diverged from the deteriorating public distribution system (PDS) set forth by the KWP and instead undertook desperate measures to acquire food, such as gathering wild plants, selling their household belongings, and engaging in illicit or gray trade.[2] However, demographically, involvement in the rise of the jangmadang, or “market grounds,” and the eruption of a flourishing informal market, was spurred by a particular group of North Koreans subject to a preponderance of heinous abuse and injustice: women. 

By the mid-1990s, the distribution of grain rations ceased.[3] Most state-owned enterprises stopped functioning. However, despite this, Andrei Lankov points out, “the North Korean government demanded that male employees report to work even if their enterprises were not actually running.”[4] The KWP defended this policy with rhetoric about the need to protect socialist property and to prepare to resume production after overcoming the crisis. However, in reality, Lankov argues, “the government was probably seeking to keep track of its people and to avoid potential unrest and political problems.”[13] 

Despite this harsh new reality, most women did not dare quit their jobs, regardless of receiving little to no pay. In North Korea, if you skip work, you can be sent to a detention center.[5] Since there was no work, women had to bribe party-approved supervisors to look the other way, so that they could leave their workplaces and become active at the markets.[5] To keep the women employed, North Korean factories initially launched “special projects.” A disguise for what, in reality, was scavenging for anything that could be sold or traded for food. However, eventually becoming fed up with the situation, many women began to concoct means of skipping work duties in an effort to provide for themselves and their families in spite of the regime. In particular, married women could do so by registering as a full-time housewife and those with children could procure additional leave.[13]

Naturally, it was then women who led the growth of the new, private, and bottom-up economy that quickly gained significance in the mid to late 1990s. In the beginning, to obtain food, workers salvaged marketable goods from their decaying factories. Women also began to sell various items and manufactured goods at home. The jangmadang quickly sprang up throughout North Korean cities and rural towns.[6] At the same time, other forms of private business emerged in North Korea. The reverberations of unofficial and illegal business activity were twofold. On the one hand, it spurred the development of inns, many of which provided shelter to tradespeople travelling illegally throughout the country.[13] On the other, the bribes paid to Party officials that enabled illegal business also enabled the wives of Party officials to become dominant market agents.[7] Furthermore, increased rates of prostitution, private tutoring, and a diversification of the marketplace enabled North Koreans the minimal means of survival.[8]

A remarkable aspect of women’s role in the development of quasi-private enterprise is the tremendous role that women continue to play in the North Korean economy. While large-scale business is often administered by men, women represent an obvious majority of the owners and managers of small- and medium-sized businesses.[13]

However, accompanying the strides of North Korean women is a broad range of impediments. For one, in conjunction with the challenge of a historically patriarchal society is a high rate of domestic violence towards North Korean women.[13] Women also account for a majority of those arrested for perceived wrongdoing at jangmadang markets or for “illegally” crossing the border.[9] The UN reports, “women detained in prison camps suffer from torture, rape and other forms of ‘multiple and serious’ violence by security and police officials.”[10] Moreover, North Korean women forcibly repatriated from China are subject to forced abortions and infanticide.[11]

North Korean women have held an indispensable role in the development of the North Korean quasi-private markets. Through creativity, perseverance, and resilience, they have overcome the hardships of the 1990s and trailblazed a way of survival when the Kim regime could not. They have erected a quasi-privatized economy, that may account for as much 30-50% of the country’s GDP.[13] In fact, women have seized the de facto role as breadwinners for the majority of North Korean homes, with NPR reporting that an “estimated 80-90% of the households in North Korea rely on the women’s income to keep afloat.”[12] However, North Korean women remain targets of state-sponsored violence, rape, forced abortion, and other types of cruelty. Due to the regime’s intensified crackdown on attempted defections, the resettlement rate of North Korean women in South Korea declined sharply.  In 2009, 2,252 North Korean women defected to the South; in 2015, 1,275 women defected, and in 2020, a mere 157.[13] To understand this, one may look at the 2008 expansion of Kyo-Hwa-So No. 12 Jongo-ri to include a women’s section. This expansion is synchronous with an increasing rate of women arrested for cross border trade and women repatriated from China. Whilst in the detention centers, women are not only forced to labor in inhumane conditions, susceptible to abuse, malnutrition, and death, but are also silenced, unable to share their grievances.[14] As a result, the heroic voices and stories of North Korean women have struggled to elicit the attention of large segments of the international community.

Conclusion
To address the suffering of North Korean women, the Biden administration may as well consider taking an immediate and unwavering stance on the issue of North Korean human rights. This could include addressing China and Russia’s continual disregard for UN resolutions and their responsibility for enabling the continuation of North Korea’s crimes against humanity, especially China’s repatriation of North Korean women in contradiction to its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Finally, in homage to the sacrifices North Korean women make daily to ensure the health and safety of their families, the international community must adequately pressure North Korea to comply with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Female Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders. By doing this, we can both honor and support the bravery and sacrifices of North Korea’s most resilient demographic: women.

Tristin Schultz is a third-year student at Seattle University pursuing a BA in international relations and economics, with a special focus in the political economy of Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In 2019, Tristin was the recipient of the David L. Boren Scholarship to study in Seoul, South Korea.

[1] Branigin, W. (1991, September 09). “Vietnam Fears Effects Of Soviet Upheaval”. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/09/09/vietnam-fears-effects-of-soviet-upheaval/8da962c3-49e6-493b-af1f-72420dfc5365
[2] Haggard, S., & Noland, M. (2005). Hunger and human rights: The politics of famine in North Korea. Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.
[3] No Yong-hwan and Yŏng Ha-ch’ŏng, Pukan-Ŭi Chumin Saenghwal Pochang Chŏngch’Aek P’Yŏngka [An assessment of the social welfare system in North Korea] (Seoul: Hanguk pokŏn sahoe yŏnkuwon, 1997), 47–62.
[4] Lankov, Andrei. Rep. “The Resurgence Of A Market Economy In North Korea”. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2016. https://doi.org/https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Lankov_Eng_web_final.pdf.
[5] Lankov, Andrei. Rep. “The Resurgence Of A Market Economy In North Korea”. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2016. https://doi.org/https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Lankov_Eng_web_final.pdf.
[6] Pak Yŏng-ae. 1990 Nyŏntae Pukhanŭi Kyŏngchenan Ihu Yŏsŏng Yokhak-Kwa Ŭisik Pyŏnhwa [Changes in women’s mentality after the 1990s North Korean economic crisis], T’ongil chŏnlyak, no. 2
(2010).
[7] Park, Ju-min. “In North Korea, Men Call the Shots, Women Make the Money.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, May 25, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-women/in-north-korea-men-call-the-shots-women-make-the-money-idUSKBN0O90Y020150524.
[8] Chŏng Ŭn-i, Pukhan-Ŭi Chaseangchŏk Sichang Palchŏn Yŏnku [A study of the development of North Korea’s unregulated market], T’ongil munche yŏnku, no. 2 (2009).
[9]  “Chungsan No. 11 Detention Facility,” December 21, 2020. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Chu%CC%86ngsan%20No_%2011%20Detention%20Facility%20Web.pdf.
[10] “Human Rights Report Details 'Heartbreaking' Accounts of Women Detained in DPRK | | UN News.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/07/1069131.
[11] Hawk, David. 2003. The Hidden Gulag. Washington: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
[12] Lim, Louisa. “Out of Desperation, North Korean Women Become Breadwinners.” NPR. NPR, December 28, 2012. https://www.npr.org/2012/12/28/168193827/out-of-desperation-north-korean-women-become-breadwinners.
[13] “Policy on North Korean Defectors.” Policy on North Korean Defectors< Data & Statistics< South-North Relations< 통일부_영문. Accessed February 21, 2021. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/.
[14]  Hawk, David. The Hidden Gulag IV: Gender Repression and Prisoner Disappearances. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2015. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hawk_HiddenGulag4_FINAL.pdf.