By Max Smith
Edited by Diletta de Luca, HRNK Research Associate       

          On February 18, 2016, in response to North Korea’s fifth nuclear test, the Obama administration signed into law the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (NKSPEA). The NKSPEA represented the first piece of comprehensive North Korea sanctions legislation in the United States, building on a series of U.S. executive orders and UN resolutions. In addition to mandating the designation of individuals involved in human rights abuses, the legislation set out the conditions under which sanctions may be lifted. These include the dismantling of North Korea’s weapons programs, the release of political prisoners, the lifting of censorship, the establishment of an open society, and the accounting for and repatriation of U.S. citizens.[1] In this way, the NKSPEA, as well as UN and other national sanctions regimes, are a means of coercing North Korea into improving its dismal human rights record. Additionally, by denying the North Korean military and security apparatus easy access to funds, sanctions inhibit the North Korean regime’s ability to easily perpetrate human rights abuses. However, almost ten years after the enactment of the NKSPEA, not only has no progress been made towards human rights benchmarks, but the situation has deteriorated. North Korea has been developing its military capabilities at an alarming rate,[2] it has further cracked down on human rights by instituting draconian punishments for cultural violations,[3] and its network of political prison camps remains operational.[4] Furthermore, despite the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea is arguably at its most resilient.[5] The Kim regime has been amassing vast amounts of wealth through illicit trading, the dispatching of workers overseas, and cybercrime.[6] It is clear, therefore, that the sanctions regime imposed on North Korea is in urgent need of strengthening if progress on human rights is to be achieved.
 
          There are indications that 2025 could become a critical turning point for North Korean sanctions enforcement: the year marks both the inaugural meeting of the new Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), a group of nations who have volunteered to monitor the implementation of North Korea sanctions outside of the UN, and the first months of a new U.S. presidential administration. The creation of a new sanctions monitoring group could allow for more effective enforcement, as previous efforts under the UN Panel of Experts were obstructed by Russia and China.[7] Meanwhile, a new administration in the White House could mean a new direction for U.S. sanctions policy. However, caution is warranted. North Korea and its enablers, in particular Russia and China, have grown increasingly brazen in their violation of international sanctions making enforcement more complex. The Kim regime’s survival has been facilitated through illicit imports taking place in Chinese waters,[8] sales of weapons to support Russia’s war in Ukraine,[9] and access to the international financial system through Russian and Chinese banks.[10] Russia and China have also been vocal advocates for reducing sanctions against North Korea.[11] This culminated in Russia vetoing the renewal of the Panel of Experts’ mandate in 2024[12]. The challenge therefore not only lies in whether to expand sanctions, but also in ensuring they are effectively implemented amid widespread non-compliance and increasingly sophisticated evasion methods. Whether the MSMT and the Trump administration are equipped to meet this challenge remains uncertain, particularly given the possibility that the Trump administration’s attitudes regarding cryptocurrency and tariffs may make enforcement more difficult. The current White House’s relaxed stance on cryptocurrency regulatory enforcement may inadvertently discourage virtual asset service providers from adhering to their anti-money laundering responsibilities.[13] Meanwhile, the recent sweeping tariff announcements have threatened the United States’ position in the global economy and created space for less tightly monitored financial centers.[14] Finally, overshadowing all discussions on the direction of U.S. sanctions is the possibility of renewed negotiations between the United States and North Korea. While such talks could initially result in stricter sanctions, there is a risk that they could be lifted before any meaningful progress is achieved on human rights issues.
 
          Although sanctions have been extensive on paper, they have so far not been fully enforced. North Korea has continued to engage in illicit trade, dispatch overseas workers, and carry out cyberattacks with minimal consequences. On November 21, 2023, 55 countries submitted a report to the 1718 UN Sanctions Committee, the body established to oversee the implementation of sanctions on North Korea, stating that the cap on oil deliveries to North Korea had been breached, possibly by as many as one million barrels.[15] The ships involved in illicit trading have utilized a number of techniques to disguise their actions, such as transmitting false global navigation satellite systems signals, vessel identity laundering, “flag hopping,” and by using complex ownership and management structures.[16] Multilateral cooperation from all stakeholders is needed, to share information on, investigate, and enforce these sanction evasion attempts.[17] However, Russia and China rejected calls to take action, despite this trade occurring in Chinese waters and involving Russian and Chinese entities.[18] Alongside trading, North Korea also continues to maintain access to the international financial system. The 2024 report of the UN Panel of Experts found representatives of North Korean banks present in China, Russia, and Indonesia, in contravention of UN Resolutions 2270 and 2321.[19] This implies that North Korean banks, which manage funds for the country’s defense industry and security apparatus, as well as the Kim family, may be operating overseas.[20] The Panel of Experts also investigated several joint ventures involving North Korean nationals in Russia, as well as Chinese bank accounts maintained by an alleged North Korean Ministry of People’s Armed Forces subsidiary.[21] However, perhaps the most brazen example of enabled sanctions violations remains the infamous transfer of North Korean weapons to Russian forces in support of their war against Ukraine.[22] North Korea’s support for the Russian invasion has increased Moscow’s incentives to block or weaken sanctions against Pyongyang.[23] A clear example of this occurred last year, when Russia vetoed a resolution to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts, effectively terminating their role in support of the 1718 UN Sanction Committee.[24]
 
          Now that the Panel of Experts has been disbanded, its functions have been assumed by the MSMT. The Panel of Experts was created to assist the 1718 UN Sanctions Committee through gathering information and making recommendations.[25] This means that whilst the UN sanctions regime against North Korea remains in place and is still enforced by the 1718 Committee, there is no longer a UN-mandated body providing expert reporting and advice on sanctions enforcement. Instead, South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, France, Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands have created a new body to monitor the enforcement of sanctions outside of the UN framework - the MSMT. While the MSMT introduces a new framework compared to the former Panel of Experts, the enforcement of sanctions will still pose substantial difficulties. Russia and China’s absence could give the MSMT greater freedom to report violations involving their entities, which otherwise may have been obstructed.[26] However, this comes at the cost of reduced international legitimacy.[27] MSMT recommendations will likely go unheeded by the 1718 Committee, as well as potentially other countries, as they originate from a non-UN and Western-dominated body.[28] Russia criticized the Panel of Experts for “kowtowing to Western powers,” and will almost certainly make a similar argument to disregard the findings of the MSMT whilst it sits on the 1718 Committee.[29] There is also the risk that MSMT members may exercise restraint to preserve diplomatic ties with countries found to be in contravention of UN sanctions.[30] This must all be taken into account alongside the fact that the MSMT will face the same challenges as the Panel of Experts regarding the sanctions evasion techniques used by North Korean agents. The MSMT must somehow curtail North Korea’s illicit trading and access to the financial system without the support of the UN framework. The MSMT will have to rely on its capacity to influence the national sanctions regimes of its members, as well as potentially engage with other states by offering a means of reducing exposure to costly UN sanctions violations.[31] This latter point is even more so the case with multinational corporations, who have a greater incentive to avoid the reputational and material risks of being found to have contravened UN sanctions.[32] Thus, crucial to the MSMT’s success will be the diplomatic initiative of its members to engage with both state and non-state third parties, as well as a willingness to embrace the principles of impartiality and inclusivity. In this way, the MSMT will be able to build trust, set standards, and establish itself as a legitimate successor to the Panel of Experts. However, the MSMT must go further in order to overcome the challenges the Panel of Experts faced. Targeting those culpable of knowingly evading sanctions lies with the individual members, the strength of their own sanctions regimes, and their ability to effect compliance among state and non-state actors. Though the MSMT cannot easily interdict illicit trade in the waters surrounding North Korea, it can designate vessels, companies, and individuals involved. Domestic legislation can then be utilized to seize the assets of designated entities, prevent them from doing business in certain jurisdictions, or even arrest them. The MSMT can take action against those facilitating North Korea’s access to the financial system in the same way. This impact will grow if the MSMT is able to gain the compliance of key financial and maritime hubs, potentially to the extent that it surpasses the influence of the Panel of Experts. Nevertheless, this depends on the efforts made by individual members of the MSMT.
 
          As the largest member of the MSMT, the United States is a key player. Even though the United States cannot directly prevent illicit trade between Russia, China, and North Korea, its ability to restrict access to the international financial system gives it significant influence in enforcing sanctions. In Donald Trump’s previous term, the number of new U.S. Treasury Department North Korea designations peaked at 137 individuals, vessels, and entities in 2017.[33] This had an observable effect on North Korea’s economy, with its GDP estimated to have fallen by 3.5%.[34] With Donald Trump once again in the White House, there are expectations for the tightening of the sanctions regime. Indeed, it appears as though the pace of designations is increasing, with six new designations as of May 12, five months into his presidency.[35] However, there are also several reasons to remain cautious. The Trump administration’s favorable attitude regarding cryptocurrency, tariffs, and potential United States-North Korea talks provide reasons to be wary about the prospect of a revived and strengthened sanction regime. Cryptocurrency has provided a source of illicit funds for the Kim regime, and virtual asset ‘mixers’ offer the means to launder illegally obtained virtual currency.[36] Easing off on the regulation of cryptocurrency and virtual asset service providers may therefore create vulnerabilities which North Korean cyber-actors can exploit to evade sanctions. Further issues are created by the Trump administration’s preference for tariffs as a form of coercive diplomacy, as the diplomatic backlash of excessive tariffs pushes nations to economically realign themselves away from the United States. Whilst these two factors potentially create vulnerabilities in the existing sanctions architecture, the prospect of U.S. negotiations with North Korea could alter it significantly as the Trump administration attempts to coerce the Kim regime. This could result in tightened sanctions in the short-term but may see them relaxed before they are able to have any meaningful impact on improving the North Korean human rights situation.
 
          The proliferation of cryptocurrency and other virtual assets has provided North Korea with a large source of illicit funds. The Panel of Experts’ 2020 midterm report found that North Korean cyber-actors were targeting the virtual asset industry to avoid sanctions.[37] Reinforcing the sanctions regime therefore requires tightening regulations and standards when it comes to cryptocurrency. This is all the more the case considering that the proceeds of cybercrime may be the Kim regime’s primary source of income.[38] The report found that North Korean cyber-actors were using loosely regulated virtual asset service providers and brokering services to convert illicitly obtained virtual assets into clean fiat currency.[39] The virtual assets industry is an ideal target for North Korean cybercriminals, as its rapid growth has often come at the cost of cyber security.[40] Government intervention, both in the form of designating and taking down platforms, and in the introduction of cybersecurity standards and best-practices, is needed to address these vulnerabilities. However, equally important is industry cooperation and acceptance of standards.[41] The Trump administration’s overhaul of cryptocurrency policies therefore has negative implications when it comes to the enforcement of sanctions, as it may discourage the stringent due-diligence needed to protect against cybercriminals, including those stealing and laundering funds on behalf of the North Korean regime.  A recent memo from the Department of Justice narrowed the scope of enforcement by directing prosecutors not to charge regulatory violations in cases involving digital assets.[42] Though exceptions are made for organized crime and terrorism, this directive may encourage firms to de-prioritize their anti-money laundering obligations, thus opening the door wider for malicious actors.[43] Also necessary to consider is the Trump administration’s interactions with figures in the industry, which signal a move away from enforcing much-needed standards. On March 27th, Trump granted pardons to three co-founders of the cryptocurrency exchange “BitMEX,” who had failed to properly implement anti-money laundering and know-your-customer programs.[44] These pardons arguably undermine the virtual asset regulatory framework by showing presidential support for industry leaders who did not fulfill their obligations. From the perspective of sanctions enforcement, it is crucial to ensure that virtual asset service providers do their part, by implementing the required programs, ensuring the robust cybersecurity of their platforms, and freezing coins they believe to be linked to crime. If virtual asset service providers de-prioritize their due diligence obligations, then more opportunities will be given to North Korea’s network of cybercriminals to conduct cryptocurrency theft and launder the proceeds of illicit activity. This would weaken the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement, by allowing the North Korean regime easy access to an alternative source of funds, and by making it harder for sanctions enforcement agencies to identify revenue generated by sanctioned activity.
 
          The Trump administration’s attitude towards tariffs is another reason to be cautious regarding the future of the sanctions regime. Thanks to the dollar’s status in the global economy, even many non-U.S. banks clear international transactions through correspondent accounts in U.S. banks.[45] The United States’ ability to exercise a large degree of control over access to the global financial system gives its national sanctions regime far more force than those of other countries.[46] However, the United States’ position in the global economy has been threatened by the tariff announcement on April 2, which harmed the United States’ diplomatic reputation and signified a reordering of the economic order.[47] Some countries have moved away from the United States in response to the tariff threat, and as a result have less incentive to comply with the U.S. sanctions regime.[48] This was the case in Southeast Asia, where particularly high tariffs have paved the way for China to exert greater influence.[49] Though nations there are moving to preserve ties with the United States, the tariffs have already damaged trust.[50] This means that as well as reducing economic incentives to follow U.S. diplomatic initiatives, these tariffs have negatively affected U.S. soft power in the region. Southeast Asia is an important region when it comes to the enforcement of sanctions, as nations in the region still maintain ties to North Korea.[51] Laos in particular, is a sanctions evasion hotspot, being home to numerous North Korean restaurants which generate cash for the regime.[52] The compliance of these nations is crucial for effective sanctions enforcement, but this will be difficult to achieve as the United States loses influence in the region. By reducing the United States’ influence globally, the tariffs have also created room for alternative financial centers, which lack either the capacity or will to enforce sanctions with the same intensity as the United States.[53] The EU is one such example. Though economically powerful and an important financial hub, the efficacy of its sanctions is undermined by uneven enforcement across Member States, and a relative lack of experience compared to the United States.[54] In this way the tariffs have inadvertently and indirectly relieved pressure on North Korea and its enablers. As the United States steps back from the center of the global economy, vulnerabilities are created which the Kim regime will be able to exploit.
 
          Finally, the direction of U.S. sanctions will undoubtedly be influenced by whether or not the Trump administration attempts to once again negotiate with North Korea. It has been reported that the White House and State Department are preparing for possible talks with the Kim regime.[55] In the event that the Trump administration decides to try and force North Korea to the table, it is likely that sanctions against North Korea will be tightened to impose maximum pressure before negotiations.[56] This approach is especially likely given that weakened sanctions enforcement in recent years has allowed North Korea to reach a stronger position than it held in 2019.[57] With Russia now acting as a strategic backer, North Korea may feel less compelled to enter negotiations at all.[58] Therefore, if the Trump administration is indeed seeking talks, stronger sanctions will be a prerequisite. However, there is no guarantee that, once implemented, sanctions will last. Historically, U.S. presidents have offered sanctions relief in exchange for commitments from North Korea.[59] For instance, prior even to the June 2018 Singapore summit, the Trump administration intervened to pause the enforcement of sanctions.[60] More worrying though is the fact that human rights issues are unlikely to be an agenda item. Human rights were not mentioned in the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 2007 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, the 2012 Leap Day Agreement, and, most significantly given that it resulted from Trump’s previous diplomatic efforts regarding North Korea, the Joint Statement of the 2018 Singapore summit.[61] This means that regardless of the direction the sanctions regime takes in relation to talks, it is unlikely to have any meaningful significance for human rights improvements in North Korea.
 
          Despite North Korean human rights being mentioned in the NKSPEA, the inconsistent and weak enforcement of the sanction regime means that North Korea has been able to continue to violate the human rights of its people. In theory, the conditions set out in the NKSPEA imply that there are legally enforceable human rights benchmarks which must be met before sanctions are lifted.[62] However, these conditions mean little if North Korea is able to evade sanctions with impunity. For this reason, the sanction regime against North Korea must be both extensive and well enforced. Even if formal North Korean commitment to improving human rights is essentially impossible, denying funds to the regime and its proxies could at least weaken its grip on the population.[63] The formation of the MSMT may be a reason to be optimistic in this regard, given its potential to more effectively report violations enabled by Russia and China. However, there are also reasons to be skeptical. On top of the existing challenges in sanctions enforcement, the MSMT will face issues with its legitimacy which may hinder its reporting and enforcement capabilities. In addition, the MSMT’s power is highly dependent on the national sanctions regimes of its members, in particular the United States. Consequently, whether 2025 will be the necessary turning point in sanctions enforcement depends upon the decisions of the new Trump administration, whose policies so far have created vulnerabilities in the international sanctions regime. To conclude, while 2025 may be described as a year of change in sanctions enforcement, it remains uncertain whether these changes will lead to the stronger sanctions regime needed to restrict the North Korean regime’s ability to conduct widespread human rights abuses, and pressure it towards improving human rights.

Max Smith, currently a research intern with HRNK, studied Korean for four years at SOAS University of London. During this time, he also spent a year abroad at Seoul National University. Whilst studying, he focused much of his independent research on South Korean foreign policy, including by analyzing different administrations’ approaches to North Korea.
In his final year at SOAS, Max cemented his interest in North Korean issues through a class on North Korean history, politics and society. After graduating, he built on this knowledge further through a two-month internship at the South Korean human rights organization PSCORE.
Max is currently doing a master’s degree in East Asian Studies at the University of Turku. For his master’s thesis, he plans on researching how foreign IGOs and NGOs can influence North Korean policy to improve the humanitarian and human rights situation there.
 
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[1] 114th Congress of the United States, "Text - H.R.757 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016," February 18, 2016, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/757/text.
[2] Vibhu Mishra, “DPR Korea Ploughing Ahead with Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programme,” UN News, May 7, 2025: https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/05/1163016.
[3] Robert Collins, Greg Scarlatoiu (ed.), “North Korea’s Lawfare Strategy,” HRNK Insider, October 30, 2024, https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2024/10/north-koreas-lawfare-strategy.html.
[4] See for example: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Greg Scarlatoiu, and Raymond Ha, “North Korea’s Political Prison Camp Kwan-li-so No. 25, Update 4,” Washington D.C.: The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024.
[5] Ruediger Frank, “The New North Korea: How Geopolitical Advantages and Growing Middle Class Prosperity Challenge the Next South Korean President,” 38 North, April 22, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2025/04/the-new-north-korea-how-geopolitical-advantages-and-growing-middle-class-prosperity-challenge-the-next-south-korean-president/; Daniel Sneider, “Is North Korea the Next Target of Trump’s Search for a Deal?,” Korea Economic Institute, April 30, 2025, https://keia.org/the-peninsula/is-north-korea-the-next-target-of-trumps-search-for-a-deal/.
[6] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2024/215, March 7, 2024, pp. 49-54, pp. 59-61, pp. 64-65; See also: Joe Tidy, “North Korean Hackers Cash Out Hundreds of Millions from $1.5bn ByBit Hack,” BBC, March 10, 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2kgndwwd7lo.
[7] Christopher J. Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring: Can the MSMT Pick Up Where the Panel of Experts Left Off?,” 38 North, April 16, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2025/04/the-new-face-of-north-korean-sanctions-monitoring-can-the-msmt-pick-up-where-the-panel-of-experts-left-off/
[8] The 2020 midterm report by the Panel of Experts recorded illicit coal trading taking place in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area: United Nations Security Council, Midterm report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2020/840, August 28, 2020, p. 19, pp. 136-139; see also Ibid, p. 130; See also United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, pp. 21-22.
[9] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, pp. 34-38, pp. 276-285.
[10] Ibid,  p. 53, and pp. 445-455.
[11] Kim Eun-Bin, “Korea’s Foreign Ministry Protests China and Russia’s Calls for Ending Sanctions on North,” Korea JoongAng Daily, May 14, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-05-14/national/northKorea/Koreas-Foreign-Ministry-protests-China-and-Russias-calls-for-ending-sanctions-on-North/2307281.
[12] United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” SC/15648, March 28, 2024. https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15648.doc.htm.
[13] Sharon McCarthy and Victor Suthammanont, “DOJ’s New Crypto Guidance Muddies the Prosecutorial Waters,” Bloomberg Law, April 23, 2025, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/dojs-new-crypto-crime-guidance-muddies-the-prosecutorial-waters.
[14] Shilo Grayson, “Trump’s Tariffs are Replacing Sanctions,” Royal United Services Institute, April 29, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/trumps-tariffs-are-replacing-sanctions.
[15] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, p. 20 and p. 147.
[16] Ibid, pp. 23-24.
[17] Ibid, pp. 25-26
[18] United Nations Security Council, Midterm report of the Panel of Experts, S/2020/840, August 28, 2020, p. 19, pp. 136-139; see also Ibid, p. 130; See also United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, pp. 21-22.
[19] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, p. 53, and pp. 445-455.
[20] The Korea Daesong Bank is affiliated with Office (Bureau) 39, which is notorious for its involvement in money-laundering and counterfeiting, see Joshua Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” Washington D.C.: The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023, p. 13; The Foreign Trade Bank was designated by the United States for facilitating transactions linked to weapons proliferation, see ibid, p. 47.
[21] United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, p. 54.
[22] Ibid, pp. 34-38, pp. 276-285.
[23] Samuel Ramani, “From Reluctant Enforcer to Outright Saboteur: Russia’s Crusade Against North Korea Sanctions,” 38 North, June 24, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/06/from-reluctant-enforcer-to-outright-saboteur-russias-crusade-against-north-korea-sanctions/.
[24] United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
[25] United Nations Security Council, “Work and Mandate,” accessed May 21, 2025,https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/work_mandate
[26] Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring: Can the MSMT Pick Up Where the Panel of Experts Left Off?”; Karl Dewey and Zuzanna Gwadera, “A New Mechanism for North Korean Sanctions,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 13, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/12/a-new-mechanism-for-north-korean-sanctions-monitoring/.
[27] Hyonhee Shin, “US, South Korea, Japan Unveil New Team to Monitor North Korea Sanctions,” Reuters, October 16, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-south-korea-japan-unveil-new-team-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-2024-10-16/; Christy Lee, “New Body to Monitor North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Faces Doubts About Legitimacy,” VOA, October 17, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/new-body-to-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-enforcement-faces-doubts-about-legitimacy/7827082.html.
[28] Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring;” Nika Pasko, “Monitoring Without Mandate: Can Sanctions Succeed Outside a UN Framework?,” The Interpreter, March 18, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/monitoring-without-mandate-can-sanctions-succeed-outside-un-framework; Christy Lee, “New Body to Monitor North Korea Sanctions.”
[29] “General Assembly Debates Russia’s Veto of DPR Korea Sanctions Panel,” UN News, April 11, 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148431. 
[30] Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring.”
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Go Myong-Hyun, “Not Under Pressure - How Pressure Leaked Out of North Korea Sanctions,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, June, 18, 2020, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/not-under-pressure-how-pressure-fizzled-out-of-north-korea-sanctions/. 
[34] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” p. 59.
[35] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Recent Actions,” accessed May 8, 2025, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions.
[36] Alex O’Neil, “Upholding North Korea Sanctions in the Age of Decentralised Finance,” London: Royal United Services Institute, 2024, pp.3-4.
[37] Panel of Experts, S/2020/840, p. 60.
[38] O’Neil, “Upholding North Korea Sanctions in the Age of Decentralised Finance,” p. 6.
[39] Panel of Experts, S/2020/840, p. 44.
[40] O’Neil, “Upholding North Korea Sanctions in the Age of Decentralised Finance,” p. 8.
[41] Ibid, p. 23.
[42] McCarthy and Suthammanont, “DOJ’s New Crypto Guidance Muddies the Prosecutorial Waters.”
[43] Ibid.
[44] Eamon Javers and Dan Mangan, “Trump Pardons Three BitMEX Crypto Exchange Co-Founders, and Ex-Employee,” CNBC, March 29, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/28/trump-pardon-bitmex-crypto-exchange-money-laundering.html?msockid=05e700f335bc642b29200fd934e465ce.
[45] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” pp. 23-24.
[46] Erika Szyszczak, “Sanctions Effectiveness: What Lessons Three Years into the War on Ukraine?” Economics Observatory, February 19, 2025, https://www.economicsobservatory.com/sanctions-effectiveness-what-lessons-three-years-into-the-war-on-ukraine.
[47] Grayson, “Trump’s Tariffs are Replacing Sanctions.”
[48] Ibid; Max Yoeli, “Trump’s Tariff Policy Undermines His Own Agenda and the Foundations of US Economic Power,” Chatham House, April 16, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/trumps-tariff-policy-undermines-his-own-agenda-and-foundations-us-economic-power.
[49] Ben Bland, “Trump’s Tariffs will Push Southeast Asia Uncomfortably Close to China,” Chatham House, April 8, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/trumps-tariffs-will-push-southeast-asia-uncomfortably-close-china
[50] Ibid.
[51] Khang Vu, “North Korea and its Socialist Friends in Southeast Asia,” The Interpreter, April 12, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/north-korea-its-socialist-friends-southeast-asia.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Erika Szyszczak, “Sanctions Effectiveness: What Lessons Three Years into the War on Ukraine?”
[55] Barak Ravid and David Lawler, “Scoop: Trump Admin Game-Planning for Potential North Korea Talks,” Axios, April 27, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/04/27/north-korea-talks-kim-jong-un-trump; “Trump Says He Still Has Good Relations with Leader of ‘Nuclear Power’ North Korea,” Reuters, March 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-he-still-has-good-relations-with-leader-nuclear-power-north-korea-2025-03-13/; Seung-ho Lee, “U.S. State Department, White House Reportedly Preparing for Talks with North,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 28, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-28/national/northKorea/US-State-Department-White-House-reportedly-preparing-for-talks-with-North/2295309.
[56] Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring.”
[57] Sneider, “Is North Korea the Next Target of Trump’s Search for a Deal?”
[58] Hyun-Ju Park, “North Korea’s Ukraine War Admission May Have Potential Trump Talks in Mind, Experts Say,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 28, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-28/national/northKorea/North-Koreas-Ukraine-war-admission-may-have-potential-Trump-talks-in-mind-experts-say/2295521; Song Sang-ho, “Russia-N. Korea Partnership Will Impact Trump’s Leverage in Diplomacy Toward Pyongyang: Expert,” Yonhap, May 3, 2025, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250503000500315?section=national/diplomacy.
[59] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea”, p. 78.
[60] Ibid, pp. 60-61; Vivian Salama and Ian Talley, “U.S. Holds Off on New North Korea Sanctions as Summit Talks Progress,” The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prepares-sanctions-while-pursuing-revived-north-korea-talks-1527526255.
[61] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” p. 77; The White House, “Joint Statement of President Donald J.Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” June 12, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.
[62] Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” pp. 86-88.
[63] Ibid, pp. 102-103.

By Isabella Grace Packowski
Edited by Diletta de Luca, HRNK Research Associate

Introduction
The plight of North Korean refugees presents a complex and multifaceted challenge within the realm of international refugee law and human rights. This paper examines the legal status and survival migration of North Korean escapees, exploring the historical context of refugee law, specific case studies of North Korean refugees in China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, and the broader implications of survival migration. By analyzing the institutional frameworks, national policies, and humanitarian efforts, this study aims to shed light on the critical issues faced by North Korean refugees and propose viable solutions to enhance their protection and resettlement.
 
Historical Background | Refugee Law
Before delving into the case studies and offering potential solutions, it is first crucial to analyze the institutional and legal history of the leading body in global governance concerning refugee aid, status, and protection – the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, hereafter). The emergence of refugees as an international concern dates back as early as the 17th century, when religious persecutions and wars in the Middle East and Europe were a concern.[1] This concern continued into the early 20th century, with provisions under the League of Nations and its Office of High Commissioner for Refugees (1921), following events such as the First World War and the Russian Civil War.[2] However, the grounds on which these provisions were built were shaky at best, with minimal legal aid provided and catering to only specific national groups.[3]
 
It wasn’t until the aftermath of World War II, and the founding of the UN in 1946, that global collaboration solidified and accelerated.[4] This was hastily supplemented by the birth of the UNHCR (1950) as one of its key sub-bodies, replacing the International Refugee Organization (IRO -1947) and its predecessor, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA -1943).[5] However, it would not be without its own complexities. There was limited financial and governing autonomy amongst other UN bodies.[6] They also held only specific functions and strict definitions that constituted refugee status, limiting the scope to which such aid could apply (i.e., its mandate to provide international protection for refugees and to find durable solutions to their plight, not including material assistance, the inclusion of “internal refugees,” etc.)[7]
 
Representative of this ambiguity, the United States initially sought to establish a temporary international body with limited authority and a focus on international legal protection.[8] This was contrary to the varying perspectives of other Western States, who sought more operational cost and geographic considerations, and South Asian states, who fought for the permanency of the organization.[9] During the Cold War, international refugee law underwent shifts in its priorities and foundations within a context shaped by Eurocentrism, resolutions passed by the General Assembly expanding mandates, sovereignty and non-intervention, and the emerging concept of “moral authority.”[10] Consequently, after this era ended, contradictions within refugee law, particularly regarding its non-political foundations, attitudes toward interventionism, and emerging security threats such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, profoundly shook the international sphere in the realm of human rights scenarios.[11]
 
North Korean Refugees Case Study
To better understand how refugee law operates in complex geopolitical contexts, the following section focuses on the resettlement process of North Korean refugees in South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China, and proposes considerations and solutions. Due to geographical vicinity, shared history, and cultural similarities, many North Korean escapees, desperate to flee the social inequalities and human rights abuses sustained by the Kim regime, often seek refuge in two of North Korea’s neighboring states: China and South Korea.[12]
 
Although South Korea has taken in over 34,000 refugees from the North – drawing on its constitution, which recognizes, with some limitations, that anyone born on the Korean Peninsula as a South Korean national is entitled to the protection of the Republic of Korea – many defectors still face significant discrimination and stark cultural and political differences.[13] As such, some will opt to be resettled to Western states.[14]
 
Under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, North Korean defectors qualify as refugees sur place, meaning “...individuals who are not considered refugees upon leaving their country but become refugees later due to the persecution they are subjected to if they were to be deported.”[15] However, differences in how countries recognize North Korean refugees stem from the varying diplomatic relationships each nation maintains with North Korea, leading to ambiguities in their refugee status, asylum claims, and perceived legitimacy.[16] The United Kingdom, for example, with a higher refugee intake than other European nation, recognizes these difficulties but does not view them as grounds for asylum.[17] As such, North Korean secondary asylum seekers are subject to refoulement to South Korea under the 2012 UK-ROK Agreement on the Readmission of Persons.[18]
 
Furthermore, the UK aligns with the European Union's (EU) policies, engaging critically with North Korea via cultural exchanges and humanitarian aid.[19] As such, it makes its decisions based on its diplomatic approach to how South Korea handles relations with North Korea while adhering to the aforementioned EU protocols.[20] It is such that the UK Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber (UKUT) has made compromises in accepting asylum seekers, respecting the South Korean Constitution, correlating with the length of time (+/- 10 years) spent in or out of the Korean peninsula: “... if the appellant is known to not have resided outside of the Korean Peninsula for 10 years, they are sent to South Korea; if they are recognized to have been outside for over 10 years, they are accepted. For the latter, UKUT recognizes that if an appellant is not a national at the time of the case and ‘may be refused nationality’, they shall not be treated as a dual national.”[21] Thus, such arguments maintain that these national birthright interpretations remain only within the realm of South Korean domestic policies.[22]
 
Despite aspirations to resettle in Western nations, to date, a total of only 220 North Korean refugees reside in the United States.[23] The limited number is due to an extensive and time-consuming immigration process, which offers fewer benefits compared to South Korea, and mercurial American foreign policy affairs.[24] However, such decreasing trends are not only applicable to the United States, as, according to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, only 229 persons were resettled in 2020, a stark contrast to the 1,047 defectors aided as seen in 2018.[25] Both of these examples not only showcase stricter border controls implemented, especially under the Kim regime, reduced funding from aid countries, and the effects of Covid-19 on financial and physical flexibility.[26]
 
The primary legislation at play for asylum implementation of North Korean refugees in the United States is the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (NKHRA), which was first signed into law by former President George W. Bush in 2004, then extended in 2008, 2012 and 2018.[27] Most recently, the NKHRA was submitted for reauthorization in May 2022, and, despite the House of Representatives having passed it in May 2024, the Senate failed to address it in time, leaving the Act in legal limbo.[28]
 
The US’s approach to this concern is argued to be highly reflective of President Bush’s aggressive and conservative stance on North Korea at the time and its proliferation of nuclear weapons.[29] This forward-leaning approach was maintained through its long-standing military alliance with South Korea, which dates back to the end of the Korean War, as well as through diplomatic affairs with North Korea.[30] Lastly, refugees’ asylum in the United States is not barred for those who have already accepted their South Korean citizenship, further exposing the complexity of foreign affairs and international refugee law.[31]
 
The exact number of North Korean refugees in China remains unknown, but estimates range expansively from 5,000 to 250,000 defectors.[32] This uncertainty and lack of documentation of North Koreans in China is caused primarily by China’s claiming they are “illegal economic migrants,” China’s refusing to grant them access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status, Covid-19, and the precarious nature of legalities, citizenship, and violations of international law.[33] China, therefore, presents a much more complex and egregious view of North Korean defectors, their status, and the lack of protection outside of the discriminatory practices that refugees typically face. Most importantly, China blatantly violates the UN’s 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, infringing, in particular on Article 33.1 of the Convention:
 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”[34]
 
Article 33.1 is violated by China as it, more often than not, willingly expels and forcibly repatriates North Korean refugees to North Korea despite the known persecution or harm that would await them once returned to their home country.[35] Those repatriated are imprisoned in the detention system of the country, either sent to labor camps, 교화소 “kyo-hwa-so”, or to political prison camps, 관리소 “kwan-li-so,” where they face a credible fear of persecution, harsh interrogation, torture, imprisonment, or even death.[36] North Koreans who tried to escape the Kim regime are obstinately sent to political prison camps for severe punishment, as these detention facilities are known for the inhumane conditions that are imposed on prisoners.[37] Since 2014, it is estimated that at least 2,000 North Korean refugees have been deemed illegal migrants and are at risk of being returned to North Korea while being held in Chinese detention centers.[38]
 
North Korean women in particular are subjected to human rights abuses in China. This can be mainly in relation to the conditions of China’s “Red Zone,” in which “... it is estimated that up to 500,000 female North Koreans, some as young as twelve, hide in this region. They are subjected to systematic rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, unwanted pregnancy, forced labor, and cybersex trafficking.”[39] With women and girls being lured into China under the pretense of finding work, as many as 80% are instead forced into the sex trade, and such abuse has become common practice.[40] The trafficking of North Korean women and girls is reported to generate more than $105 million annually for organized crime networks in both China and North Korea.[41]
 
Moreover, North Korean women are often sold to Chinese men as wives.[42] Due to China’s one-child policy, children born in China to North Korean and Chinese parents remain undocumented/stateless children of illegal “mixed marriages.”[43] They are thus deemed “stateless” as they are not in possession of official Chinese citizenship and are born outside of North Korea.[44] In some cases, such as in rural Heilongjiang Province, women who have married Chinese men and have given birth to at least two children are more likely to be issued temporary identification papers.[45]
 
These children then become registered in the 户口 “hukuo” system, in which said practice is to place hardships on the father, especially if the mother is forcibly repatriated.[46] These human rights violations that North Korean escapees face are due to their labelling by China as “illegal economic immigrants.” [47] Escapees thus often remain undocumented without fundamental rights in education, welfare, and health services to avoid repatriation.[48]
 
Lastly, beyond any potential illicit financial gains through transnational crime networks, China’s strategic alliance with North Korea significantly shapes its approach to North Korean refugees.[49] Under a longstanding bilateral agreement and despite pressure by the international community, China continues to classify these individuals as illegal economic migrants rather than refugees and routinely repatriates them.[50] This practice not only contradicts the humanitarian principles of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, in particular Article 33.1 and the principle of non-refoulement, but also raises serious concerns about complicity in human rights violations upon their return.[51]
 
The U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) found that 90% of all forcibly repatriated North Korean refugees sent to detention facilities eventually die from the harsh conditions and violence they are subjected to.[52] Women are additionally routinely subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, from torture to forced abortions or infanticide if they became pregnant with Chinese men.[53]
 
Survival Migration
Throughout this policy analysis, a recurring theme has been the importance of fundamental human rights, comprehensive international law, and protection relative to the treatment of refugees. This leads to the next area of study, “survival migration.” This term refers to “Persons outside their country of origin because of an existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution.”[54] While focusing primarily on cases in sub-Saharan Africa, Andrew Battes expresses how, in addition to the mass exodus example from Zimbabwe, “In Haiti, Iraq, North Korea, and Myanmar, for example, significant numbers of people have fled to neighboring countries not because of a well-founded fear of individualized persecution, but more often because of serious deprivations of socioeconomic rights related to the underlying political situation.”[55]
 
In the case of Myanmar, for example, the Rohingya people face similar disparities in legal status and discrimination after fleeing to India in response to a military junta’s rule and a 2017 genocide.[56] India, not being a signatory of the Convention, acknowledges the fervent prosecution of the Rohingya but national security trumps everything else. Thus, India stresses a ‘right to life’ vs. a ‘right to settle’ approach.[57] As an ethno-religious minority, survival migrants are now the world’s largest group stateless people, having become a serious global issue.[58]
 
The term “survival migration” itself is not mentioned in the 1951 Convention, and, although in theory those who fall under this category have rights under international law, there is no set framework for those who do not fit the rigid definitions that already exist.[59] This is most reflective of the way international bodies and states view the situation, a dichotomy of economic migrant and refugee, without consideration to other factors outside of generalized violence or individualized persecution, including environment, state fragility, and livelihood failure, in addition to socioeconomic deprivation of rights, as seen with North Korea.[60] It thus shows how the process of becoming and being classified as refugees is not monocausal, but is intertwined with these factors and institutional gaps, which, in turn, affect how refugees are assisted.[61] “Regime stretching,” as Betts describes, furthers this thought, in that institutions are not themselves “fixed,” but can be adaptive.[62]
 
Government Organizations
Domestic-based government organizations can also play a significant role in refugee resettlement.  For example, the 하나원 (hanawon), a South Korean government-regulated resettlement facility, established in 1999 by the Ministry for Unification of South Korea 통일부 “tong-il-bu.”[63] Situated in Seoul, the organization provides a place for North Korean defectors to “graduate” before joining South Korean society.[64] The facility consists of two facilities, a school and a hospital, and is heavily guarded. North Korean refugees who recently escaped North Korea participate in a 12-week program where they learn invaluable life skills and are exposed to concepts such as democracy, human rights, and religious freedoms in order to adapt to South Korean society.[65] After “graduating,” defectors receive financial resettlement support, and further facilitative aid can be provided by the South Korean government, such as the Elm House for women.[66] However, despite the success of this rigorous and involved program, discrimination, difficulties in securing full-time work, and losing connections with other North Korean refugees often plague the trainees.[67]
 
NGOs
Alongside formal governance, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can also play a prominent and direct role in aiding refugees. An NGO that helps address topics of human trafficking prevention and rescue for women is the Nomi Network.[68] With over 20,000 aided since 2012, from India to the United States, the organization seeks to empower and protect victims by its mission statement, expressing how “Nomi Network aims to end human trafficking by creating pathways to safe employment, empowering women and girls to break cycles of exploitation in their families and communities.”[69]
 
Although no direct aid to North Korean defectors has been made so far, initiatives represented by global results similar to those provided by the Nomi Network could greatly help prevent or support those trafficked, especially in China. Refugees International, another organization based in Washington D.C., also works to advocate for “...lifesaving assistance, human rights, and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.”[70] They have worked largely with the Rohingya people's crisis thus far.[71]
 
Proposed Solutions
In response to criticisms about the legalities, exclusions, and ambiguities in international refugee law, a multitude of solutions can be proposed, ranging from broader institutional reforms to specific policy adjustments targeting North Korean refugees. Betts suggests two different approaches: normative and institutional.[72] At the normative level, options include working with the existing legal framework, developing a “soft law framework,” consolidating human rights law through guidance from survival and migration principles, and, lastly, adding an additional protocol to the 1951 Convention.[73] The implementation of this method would incorporate “survival migration” into current legislation, pertaining to refugees, escapees, and defectors, such as those from North Korea.[74]
 
For institutional recommendations, Betts presents five ways forward: 1) applying a “cluster approach,” where “...the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) developed in the context of UN humanitarian reform,” 2) designating responsibility to a single agency, 3) creating a new, efficient body that could work on a temporary basis to help coordinate other agencies, 4) creating a special representative that can oversee these coordination, and finally, 5) “...creating an issue-based consultative process.”[75] Overall, Betts argues that such reforms are political in nature and would inevitably lead to disagreements and tensions between states.[76] As such, commitments to helping aid survival migrants should be achieved within existing frameworks, especially when also considering all the other interwoven factors as aforementioned.[77]
 
From a case-study approach, HRNK’s recommendations provide a plethora of solutions, including: 1) Clarifying the number, status and humanitarian situation of the North Korean refugees and workers in China. 2) The imperative for China to address its violations of international law, recognize North Korean escapees as refugees and respect the principle of non-refoulment. 3) The recommendation to the United States to seek more direct ways to reach refugees in China and to help with asylum in the USA. 4) North Korean refugee protection and rescue must become a pillar of the North Korean Human Rights Act. 5) The reauthorization of the NKHR Act, which expired in 2022.[78]
 
Ultimately, I recommend a hybrid solution, considering a mix of these proposed recommendations and results seen in current legislation and advocacy. This alternative would encapsulate Betts’ soft law framework, emphasizing the need to incorporate “survival migrants” and other factors not currently addressed in legislation, particularly the 1951 UN Convention, working more extensively with South Korea’s government-run organizations such as the Hanawon, NGOs such as the Nomi Network and Refugees International, and reauthorizing the NKHR Act, thereby securing a more prominent place in American foreign policy.
 
 
Conclusion
The legal status and survival migration of North Korean refugees underscore the urgent need for comprehensive reforms in international refugee law and humanitarian practices. The case studies of North Korean defectors in South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China reveal significant gaps and ambiguities in their protection and resettlement. Addressing these challenges requires a hybrid approach that incorporates normative and institutional reforms, enhanced collaboration with NGOs, and the reauthorization of the NKHR Act. By prioritizing the fundamental human rights of North Korean refugees and adopting adaptive frameworks, the international community can better support their survival and integration, ultimately fostering a more just and humane global refugee system.

Isabella Grace Packowski is a graduate student at Indiana University Bloomington pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs with a concentration in security, diplomacy, and governance. She holds a BA in Korean Language and Culture with a minor in Political Science, where her studies focused on U.S.–ROK/DPRK relations, foreign policy, and international security. Her research experience includes archival analysis of North Korea’s Juche ideology. As an intern at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) in 2023, she contributed to the translation of publications. She also conducted international media monitoring supported the production of daily newsletters highlighting key developments in North Korean human rights and policy. With a strong foundation in cross-cultural engagement, political history studies, and policy analysis, Isabella aims to advance diplomacy and proliferation security through future work with the U.S. State Department or international NGOs.

 
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Ryu, Eric. 2021. “Why the Number of North Korean Refugees in the United States Is so Low.” Edited by Sophia Hapin and Rosa Park. NKHIDDENGULAG. August 10, 2021. https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/why-the-number-of-north-korean-refugees-in-the-united-states-is-so-low.

Scarlatoiu, Greg and U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). 2023. “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China.” https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Scarlatoiu-CECC-Response-HRNK-FINAL-.pdf.

“Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum.” n.d. Journal of Public and International Affairs. https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/seeking-safer-shells-analysis-interpretations-justifications-and-rationales-behind-decisions.

United Nations General Assembly & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (n.d.). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/1951-refugee-convention-1967-protocol.pdf

“Year in Review | Nomi Network.” n.d. Nomi Network. https://nominetwork.org/year-in-review/.

Young Kim. 2024. “US Congress Fails to Extend North Korean Human Rights Act - Congresswoman Young Kim.” Congresswoman Young Kim - Representing California’s 40th District (blog). December 26, 2024. https://youngkim.house.gov/2024/12/26/us-congress-fails-to-extend-north-korean-human-rights-act/.


[1] Betts, Alexander, Loescher, Gil, and Milner, James. 2012. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection. Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group. Accessed April 27, 2025. ProQuest Ebook Central. (pg. 7)
[2] Ibid, 8-9.
[3] Ibid, 9.
[4] Ibid, 8,10,13.
[5] Ibid..
[6] Ibid, 15.
[7] Ibid, 14.
[8] Ibid., 13-14.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., 2, 19-20, 28-29.
[11] Ibid., 55, 57, 62.
[12] “Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum.” n.d. Journal of Public and International Affairs. https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/seeking-safer-shells-analysis-interpretations-justifications-and-rationales-behind-decisions.    
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ryu, Eric. 2021. “Why the Number of North Korean Refugees in the United States Is so Low.” Edited by Sophia Hapin and Rosa Park. NKHIDDENGULAG. August 10, 2021. https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/why-the-number-of-north-korean-refugees-in-the-united-states-is-so-low.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] “Seeking Safer Shells…”; Young Kim. 2024. “US Congress Fails to Extend North Korean Human Rights Act - Congresswoman Young Kim.” Congresswoman Young Kim - Representing California’s 40th District (blog). December 26, 2024. https://youngkim.house.gov/2024/12/26/us-congress-fails-to-extend-north-korean-human-rights-act/.
[28] Kim, Young, 2024, “US Congress Fails to Extend North Korean Human Rights Act - Congresswoman Young Kim.”; H.R.3012 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2023. (n.d.). Congress.gov | Library of Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/3012?s=1&r=21.
[29] “Seeking Safer Shells…”
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Scarlatoiu, Greg and U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). 2023. “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China.” https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Scarlatoiu-CECC-Response-HRNK-FINAL-.pdf. (pg. 1, 4)
[33] Ibid., 4.
[34] Ibid; United Nations General Assembly & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (n.d.). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/1951-refugee-convention-1967-protocol.pdf (pg. 30)
[35] “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China,” 2.
[36] Ibid., 3,7.
[37] Ibid., 7.
[38] Ibid., 3-4.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid., 6-7.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid., 2-3, 8.
[48] Ibid.
[49] “Seeking Safer Shells…”
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China,” 7.
[53] Ibid., 2.
[54] Betts, Alexander. “Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework.” Global Governance 16, no. 3 (2010): 361–82. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29764952.
[55] Ibid.
[56] “A Lifetime in Detention: Rohingya Refugees in India - Refugees International.” 2025. Refugees International. January 2, 2025. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/a-lifetime-in-detention-rohingya-refugees-in-india/.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., 362, 364.
[60] Ibid, 361-362, 364.
[61] Ibid., 362.
[62] Ibid., 363.
[63] “Hanawon - North Korean Resettlement Facility in South Korea | Crossing borders.” (n.d.). Crossing Borders - Helping North Korean Refugees and Orphans. https://www.crossingbordersnk.org/hanawon
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] “Year in Review | Nomi Network.” n.d. Nomi Network. https://nominetwork.org/year-in-review/.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] “A Lifetime in Detention…”
[72] Ibid., 377.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid., 377-378.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Scarlatoiu, 8.

By Ada Trybuchowska, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, HRNK Research Associate

Introduction
          Far from the public eye, North Korean workers labor in foreign lands under intense surveillance, stripped of freedom, and denied their earnings. Pyongyang sends tens of thousands of North Korean workers to countries like China and Russia to earn foreign currency for the regime, often under conditions amounting to forced labor.[1] They pack seafood, pour concrete, and sew garments, often receiving a fraction of the pay – if any.[2] What followed in Helong, China, was not merely a labor dispute but a rare assertion of human dignity. Echoing the legacy of Poland’s Solidarność – a trade union movement born from the 1980 Gdańsk Shipyard strikes that successfully challenged a communist regime – this piece examines the Helong protest and draws lessons from Solidarność.
 
A Factory Revolt: The Helong Uprising and Its Roots
          On a bitterly cold morning in January 2024, something extraordinary happened in the China-North Korea border city of Helong. That winter, hundreds of North Korean workers rose against their overseers, staging a rare protest to demand unpaid wages and repatriation. The unrest centered around factories in Nanping Town, a key industrial hub for food processing and garment production, which employed North Koreans.[3] Laborers from over ten textile and garment plants across Helong joined the action.[4] For three tense days, nearly 3,000 North Korean migrant workers staged a mass revolt.[5] They locked their Chinese and North Korean supervisors, halted production, and demanded the wages they had been denied for months, totaling approximately $10 million.[6] This was not a typical labor dispute; it directly confronted one of the world’s most repressive systems of labor control, where obedience stems not just from state coercion but from fear for one’s family, future, and life. Tensions climaxed when, amid confrontation, one of the detained North Korean officials (dispatched to monitor the workers) was beaten to death by the protesters.[7] North Korean state security agents agreed to pay several months’ worth of wages directly to the workers on-site, and the protesters ended the strike later that day. This concession temporarily defused the situation. No other known North Korean labor protest abroad had ever reached this scale.[8]  

          The Helong uprising ruptured Pyongyang’s carefully cultivated fear system. Officially, North Korea had sent young workers abroad under the pretense of patriotism and economic duty. In reality, they formed part of a vast state-run labor export system, which dispatched tens of thousands of North Koreans to factories and construction sites across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.[9] As of 2024, an estimated 100,000 North Koreans continued working in foreign countries.[10] Although some deployments remain nominally legal, they often bypass international labor laws and violate UN Security Council Resolution 2397, which banned North Korean overseas labor and required all such workers to be repatriated by 2019, aiming to cut off the regime’s illicit income for its nuclear program.[11] Due to inconsistent enforcement, many remain abroad, creating a gray economy worth up to US $500 million annually for the North Korean regime.[12]

          The Helong protest began after workers discovered that colleagues repatriated to North Korea had never received their promised wages.[13] Pyongyang confiscates up to 70-90% of workers’ earnings, often only paying workers upon returning home, further ensuring their dependence and obedience.[14] This revelation shattered the fragile illusion that obedience might lead to reward. The workers occupied the factory, barricaded the gates, and refused to return to work. This collective defiance stood out for its scale and the immense risk involved.[15]

          North Korean overseas workers live under constant surveillance, their passports confiscated upon arrival, housed in cramped dormitories with poor living conditions, enduring shifts up to 16 hours daily, with monitored conversations and banned phones.[16][17] Any sign of dissent leads to punishment, including forced repatriation to North Korea, where imprisonment or execution, along with retribution against one’s family, often follows.[18] Within this brutal context, the Helong protest became a rare and radical assertion of human agency.

          By late January, Chinese and North Korean authorities responded. North Korean officials rushed to Helong and paid several months of overdue wages to placate the workers, temporarily defusing the situation.[19] They then quietly dispersed the workers, relocated them to other sites, or returned them home; however, most of them faced consequences.[20] Half of them were forcibly repatriated to North Korea, likely sent to political prison camp; the others were placed under heightened surveillance.[21] This response mirrored a longstanding pattern of punishment; Pyongyang uses overseas labor not only to earn revenue but also to test their loyalty, as many of the workers come from families considered politically loyal.[22]  

          Chinese and North Korean authorities suppressed the Helong protest. Still, the incident remains essential for exposing the limits of control in even most repressive labor systems. Helong matters as it shows that even tightly controlled workers can resist. It also raises questions about how long Pyongyang can contain such defiance. This case compares to another labor movement where workers challenged a regime claiming to speak for them. That movement began in Poland when shipyard workers launched a strike that changed the country’s future.
 
Lessons from Gdańsk: When Labor Became a Movement
          In the summer of 1980, Polish workers at the Gdańsk Shipyard launched a strike that reshaped the Cold War era and redefined labor resistance under authoritarianism. What began as a local protest over price hikes and deteriorating living conditions quickly became one of postwar Europe’s most consequential social movements. At the center stood an electrician named Lech Wałęsa, who later became Poland’s President and received the Nobel Peace Prize.[23] His leadership helped transform a single workplace dispute into Solidarność (Solidarity), the first independent trade union in the Soviet bloc.[24] Within a year, Solidarność grew into a nationwide force with nearly 10 million members, more than a quarter of Poland’s population at the time.[25]

          The movement did not function as an ordinary union. Solidarność became a civic movement that united workers, intellectuals, students, and clergy around a shared vision of rights, dignity, and political reform.[26] Members demanded more than wage increases or better working conditions; they called for freedom of speech, access to independent media, the release of political prisoners, and an end to censorship, demands that directly confronted the communist rule. The August 1980 Gdańsk Accords, signed after mass strikes, granted limited rights to strike and organize independently; that agreement marked a crack in the Iron Curtain, a breach the regime immediately tried to seal.[27]

          In December 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law, banned Solidarność, and imprisoned thousands of activists.[28] Nevertheless, underground networks of union members and supporters continued to publish clandestine newspapers, organize covert meetings, and stage sporadic strikes. The Catholic Church offered protection and moral legitimacy, while Western governments and labor unions provided material and symbolic support.[29] Aid arrived through smuggled printing presses, shortwave radio broadcasts, and public campaigns led by foreign trade unionists.[30] These networks served as lifelines and deterred harsher repression by signaling global awareness and solidarity.

          Throughout the 1980s, Solidarność challenged the communist establishment with persistent resilience. This effort culminated in 1988 when renewed strikes and an economic crisis forced the regime to negotiate. The 1989 Round Table Talks produced an agreement to hold partially free elections, where Solidarność candidates won by a landslide.[31] By August, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, one of the movement’s advisors, assumed office as the first non-Communist Prime Minister in the Eastern Bloc, initiating Poland’s peaceful democratic transition.[32] Solidarność demonstrated that organized labor backed by broad civic coalitions could successfully confront entrenched authoritarian rule.

          Several factors allowed for this transformation. Firstly, the organization was crucial. Solidarność emerged from earlier dissident groups like the Committee for the Defence of Workers (KOR), which provided the intellectual and logistical groundwork for collective resistance.[33] Secondly, pluralism played a key role. Solidarność transcended class and ideology, uniting blue-collar workers, urban professionals, students, and clergy. Thirdly, effective communication sustained momentum. Underground publications, leaflets, and word-of-mouth kept members informed and connected despite martial law.[34] Lastly, international solidarity made a significant difference. Labor unions from Western countries, including the United States and France, contributed funding, training, advocacy platforms, and international visibility.[35] The Vatican also provided moral support, and Western media highlighted the movement’s struggles.[36]

          The Polish experience provides valuable insights. Authoritarian regimes often claim to act in the name of workers. However, when workers rise up, they expose the regime’s most profound contradictions. Solidarność revealed how labor activism, fused with broader demands for justice and freedom, can evolve into a powerful national movement capable of influencing history. It proved that authoritarianism can be vulnerable to collective resistance under the right conditions. North Korean workers have already demonstrated immense courage. The crucial question remains whether conditions permit that courage to grow into a similarly impactful movement inside North Korea.
 
What Connects (and Divides) These Stories
          At first glance, Polish shipyard strikers and North Korean workers in China appear to come from opposite ends of history. They operated under different regimes, faced different constraints, and emerged in dramatically different geopolitical contexts. Yet their acts of defiance, separated by over four decades and thousands of miles, reveal parallels.

          In both cases, groups of ordinary workers took significant personal risks to protest exploitation. It takes immense bravery for any group of laborers, whether shipbuilders in Gdańsk or factory workers in Helong, to collectively say “no.” In both movements, the youth and a sense of injustice played an important role. In Poland, young workers and students joined Solidarność alongside veteran laborers. Teenagers held hunger strikes, wore Solidarność badges, and debated politics in schoolyards.[37] These acts revealed how deeply the movement captured the imagination of a new generation. Similarly, many of the Helong protesters were young women in their twenties, reportedly former Korean People’s Army (KPA) soldiers dispatched abroad through a trading company under North Korea’s Ministry of Defense.[38] Despite their background, they may have been less influenced by regime propaganda than older generations.

          The diffusion of information played a key role in both cases. The Polish movement benefited from established underground communication channels. Activists spread their message through pamphlets, church sermons, and foreign media broadcasts, allowing the strike to inspire solidarity nationwide. In contrast, North Korean workers lacked independent networks, and news of Helong reached the outside world through South Korean intelligence and defector testimonies.[39] Yet even within these limits, information traveled. Researcher Cho Han-bum and former diplomat Ko Young-hwan publicized the Helong protest through interviews and online commentary,[40] and major outlets soon picked up their accounts. Moreover, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed “various incidents and accidents” involving North Korean workers, attributing them to poor labor conditions.[41] Although the NIS released few details, South Korean experts and former North Korean officials quickly amplified the story. The Helong protest sparked similar incidents among North Korean workers in other Chinese cities, including Dandong.[42] In Dandong, workers refused to return to their jobs and demanded to go home, citing long-term physical and emotional exhaustion. According to reports, some said they would rather die in North Korea than remain in China.[43] Although the Helong protest lacked the coordination and structure of Solidarność, it sparked visible unrest elsewhere, showing that even fragmented acts of resistance can carry influence beyond a single factory gate.

          The movements differed not only in scale but also in how they organized and sustained leadership. Solidarność became a formal movement with elected leaders and inter-factory coordination. Dissident advisers supported it, and the movement maintained solidified negotiation channels. The North Korean protests, however, were spontaneous and without a clear leader, and desperation rather than strategy drove them. In Helong, leadership emerged informally and remained anonymous. Authorities later identified around 200 individuals as “leaders” of the unrest and reportedly sent many to prison camps.[44] After the protest, officials increased ideological indoctrination sessions from weekly to daily, seeking to reassert control.[45] These mandatory sessions reinforce loyalty to Kim Jong-un and frame any dissent, even abroad, as betrayal. Workers must attend lectures, recite slogans, and submit written reflections affirming their ideological commitment each day.[46]

          These differing structures shaped each movement’s durability. Solidarność maintained pressure for nearly a decade and eventually helped lead Poland’s democratic transition. The Helong uprising lasted only a few days. Although some overdue wages were paid to ease tensions, authorities swiftly punished those held responsible. In Poland, the majority of leaders returned to public life by 1984.[47] The Helong protest exposed cracks in a system built to suppress dissent. Like the Gdańsk strikers who held their ground, Helong’s workers disrupted the illusion of total control. Their actions signaled to Pyongyang that even the most trusted laborers have limits that must be respected. Moreover, unlike Solidarność, which gained rapid international solidarity in the 1980s, the Helong workers count not receive public support from any foreign government. The global response remained limited to intelligence briefings and quiet diplomacy, likely to avoid worsening the risk to those involved. This silence further illustrates the isolation faced by North Korean workers.

          The severity of state reprisals also differed. While both regimes used crackdowns, North Korea responded more harshly. Martial law in Poland between 1981 and 1983 led to thousands of arrests but relatively few deaths; many of the prisoners later received amnesty.[48] North Korean authorities classify even non-violent strikes as acts of treason, and the Helong protesters likely understood that their actions could lead to execution or indefinite detention.

          North Korea’s system of collective punishment further magnifies these risks. Unlike in Poland, where repression often targeted individual activists, North Korean authorities apply yeon-jwa-je, also known as “guilt by association”.[49] Family members can face punishment for a relative’s perceived disloyalty. This hostage-like leverage discourages many from resisting, forcing them to consider not only their own safety but the fate of their loved ones back home. The regime’s use of collective punishment adds a uniquely cruel dimension to its repression. Workers often comply out of fear for their families and themselves. It stifles not just public voices but even the private thought of resistance.
 
The Role of International Society and What Comes Next
          The international response has not matched the scale of these abuses. No UN resolution or public statement has addressed the Helong protest, likely because China and North Korea concealed the incident, and verifying details remains difficult. The U.S. Treasury sanctioned Chinese and Russian firms in 2020 for violating a UN resolution on overseas labor.[50] These efforts suggest growing concern but limited enforcement. In March 2024, Russia blocked the UN Panel of Experts’ renewal, thus severely diminishing sanctions compliance.[51] Without oversight, violations will likely rise further. Furthermore, in 2024, the UN Human Rights Office described North Korea’s labor export system as state-sponsored forced labor and a potential crime against humanity.[52]

          The legacy of Solidarność reminds us that solidarity must cross borders. Since North Korean workers cannot speak freely, others must continue to do so in their place. NGOs, embassies, and legal advocates must help build secure communication channels for workers in danger. Supporting these workers remains both a moral duty and a practical strategy to weaken North Korea’s forced labor economy.

Concluding remarks
          Poland’s Solidarność movement and the Helong strike, separated by over four decades and vastly different regimes, reveal the power and limits of labor resistance under authoritarian rule. Each began with a basic demand for dignity: Polish shipyard workers sought independent unions, and North Korean laborers demanded their earned wages. Both demands challenged regimes that claimed to defend workers while exploiting their labor. Solidarność succeeded by building leadership, underground networks, and securing international support. North Korean workers, by contrast, continue to lack protection, communication channels, and the freedom to organize. The Helong protest nevertheless reflected extraordinary courage under extreme risk. The international community has taken some steps, but its efforts remain insufficient.
​
          Solidarność offers both an inspiration and a warning. It models how organized labor, civic unity, and international backing can challenge repression, but also warns of the risks when a movement lacks sustained support or fractures under pressure.

          Grassroots defiance can help topple rigid regimes, but only with unity and outside support. The Helong strike reflected that same spirit in one of the harshest conditions imaginable. These workers risk retaliation against themselves and their families. Their resistance calls for an international response. Repression grows stronger when courage meets silence. Small acts of defiance can become lasting movements only if sustained legal, diplomatic, and material support follows.

Ada Trybuchowska is a recent graduate of the Master of Global Affairs program at the University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. She is currently a Research Intern at HRNK, contributing to analysis and communications on North Korean human rights. Her research interests include cybersecurity, human rights advocacy, and the politics of Central and Eastern Europe, with a particular emphasis on populism and digital policy.

[1] Eugene Whong, “100,000 North Koreans Work Abroad, Earning US$500 Million a Year: UN,” Radio Free Asia, March 21, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/workers-03212024162926.html.  
[2] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say,” Reuters, February 8, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/signs-rare-unrest-among-north-korean-workers-china-researchers-say-2024-02-08/.
[3] Seulkee Jang, “N. Korean Official’s Death in China Leads to Increased Ideological Reviews of Workers,” Daily NK, March 6, 2024, http://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-officials-death-china-leads-increased-ideological-reviews-workers/.
[4] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say.”.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report,” Radio Free Asia, February 19, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nkorean-workers-kill-manager-02192024003047.html#:~:text=when%20the%20hostage%20management%20representative,to%20death%20by%20the%20workers.
[8] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say.”
[9] Philippe Pons, “North Korean Workers Abroad, a Financial Windfall for the Pyongyang Regime,” Le Monde, March 30, 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/03/30/north-korean-workers-abroad-a-financial-windfall-for-the-pyongyang-regime_6739654_4.html.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Min Chao Choy, “Last Year, North Korean Workers Were Banned Abroad. But Some Still Didn’t Leave.,” NK News, December 21, 2020, https://www.nknews.org/2020/12/last-year-north-korean-workers-were-banned-abroad-but-some-still-didnt-leave/.
[12] Chad O’Carroll, “100K North Koreans Still Earning Money for Regime Overseas: UN Report,” NK News, March 21, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/03/100k-north-koreans-still-earning-money-for-regime-overseas-un-report/.
[13] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say.”
[14] U.S. Department of State, 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea, July 1, 2021, https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/north-korea/.
[15] Park Chan-kyong, “Could Reports of a North Korean Workers’ Riot in China ‘Pose Threats’ to the Regime?,” South China Morning Post, January 31, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3250287/could-reports-north-korean-workers-riot-china-pose-threats-regime.
[16] U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea, March 20, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/.
[17] Greg Scarlatoiu, Raymond Ha, and Hyunseung Lee, North Korean Workers Officially Dispatched to China & Russia: Human Rights Denial, Chain of Command & Control (Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2022), https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report.”
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Park Chan-kyong, “Could Reports of a North Korean Workers’ Riot in China ‘Pose Threats’ to the Regime?.”
[23] Gdańsk - The Gdańsk Shipyard, the Birthplace of Solidarity,” Zabytek, accessed May 3, 2025, https://zabytek.pl/en/obiekty/gdansk-stocznia-gdanska-miejsce-narodzin-solidarnosci.
[24] Maciej Bartkowski, “Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989),” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, December 2009, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/polands-solidarity-movement-1980-1989/.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Mikołaj Gliński, “The Solidarity Movement: Anti-Communist, Or Most Communist Thing Ever?,” Culture, August 9, 2016, https://culture.pl/en/article/the-solidarity-movement-anti-communist-or-most-communist-thing-ever.
[27] Sebastian Ligarski, “Not Just Gdańsk. the August 1980 Accords,” Polish History, accessed May 3, 2025, https://polishhistory.pl/not-just-gdansk-the-august-1980-accords/.
[28] Wojciech Polak, “Different Faces of Martial Law,” Polonia Institute, June 17, 2024, https://poloniainstitute.net/current-events/different-faces-of-martial-law/.
[29] Rafał Łatka: Kościół Katolicki a Solidarność (1980–1981),” Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, April 15, 2024, https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/historia-z-ipn/archiwum/162937%2CRafal-Latka-Kosciol-katolicki-a-Solidarnosc-19801981.html#:~:text=Wpływ%20na%20etos%20.
[30] Tomasz Kozłowski, “Solidarity: A Trade Union as a Cold War Actor (1980–1993),” in The Palgrave Handbook of Non-State Actors in East-West Relations, ed. Péter Marton, Gitte Thomasen, Csaba Békés, and András Rácz (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05750-2_57-1, p. 3-4.
[31] Ibid., p. 10.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Colin Barker, “The Rise of Solidarnosc,” International Socialism, October 17, 2005, https://isj.org.uk/the-rise-of-solidarnosc/.
[34] Evans, Kristi S. “The Argument of Images: Historical Representation in Solidarity Underground Postage, 1981-87.” American Ethnologist 19, no. 4 (1992): 749–67. http://www.jstor.org/stable/644917.
[35] Arch Puddington, “Surviving the Underground,” American Educator, 2005, https://www.aft.org/ae/summer2005/puddington.
[36] Maciej Bartkowski, “Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989).”
[37] Kristi S. Evans, “The Argument of Images: Historical Representation in Solidarity Underground Postage, 1981–87.”
[38] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report.”
[39] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say.”
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Kim Soo-yeon, “N. Korean Workers Refuse to Go to Work in Dandong: Seoul Expert,” Yonhap, February 29, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240229008500315.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report.”.
[45] Seulkee Jang, “N. Korean Official’s Death in China Leads to Increased Ideological Reviews of Workers.”
[46] Ibid.
[47] Maciej Bartkowski, “Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989).”
[48] Benedek Pál, “‘All the Telephone and Telex Lines Are Disconnected’ – RFE and the 1981 Martial Law in Poland,” Blinken OSA Archivum, December 13, 2021, https://www.archivum.org/entries/blog/all-the-telephone-and-telex-lines-are-disconnected---rfe-and-the-1981-martial-law-in-poland.
[49] David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: The Lives and Voices of “Those Who Are Sent to the Mountains”, 2nd ed.,Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012, https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/eng/HRNK_HiddenGulag2_Web_5-18.pdf, p. 29.
[50] Mathew Ha, “Treasury Sanctions Companies Exporting North Korean Labor to Russia,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, November 23, 2020, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/11/23/treasury-sanctions-north-korean-labor-russia/.
[51] Edith M. Lederer, “Russian Veto Brings an End to the UN Panel That Monitors North Korea Nuclear Sanctions,” AP News, March 28, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/un-us-north-korea-russia-sanctions-monitoring-72f8cbac116dea7c795d9a3357fc45f3.
[52] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report.”.

By Tessa Aguilar, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, HRNK Research Associate

Introduction
               The phenomenon of globalization has generated critical transformations in the international landscape, reshaping the dynamics between states and redefining their global images. This is observed in the rising wave of the ‘Asian Ascendancy,’ most commonly known as increasingly popular Asian cultural exchanges, creating a surge in the hybridity of Western and Asian trends in the contemporary period. This globalized effort is defined by a plethora of Asian countries, the most notable drivers within the twenty-first century including China, Japan, South Korea, and India. More specifically, Asian Ascendancy is the mother concept of the increasingly popular Hallyu, also called the Korean Wave. This cultural boom has allowed increasing mass media exposure of South Korean entertainment, principles, and traditions, redefining current definitions and influence of Westernization. Yet, despite a growing global preference for Asian media, this does not imply that all Asian states are positively featured in the media: What are the dynamics of Asian states that have yet to fully embrace this Ascendancy? How do these states further shift their application relative to a personal socio-cultural agenda?

               In this context, North Korea, an autocratic regime notorious for its isolation and infamous socialist-dynastic political agenda, is the leading actor to apply the Asian Ascendancy to publicizing current propaganda, reinforcing its ideology in the geopolitical environment, and attempting to shift its global perception into a better light. This article presents an analysis of the Korean Wave impact on globalization as part of the broader Asian Ascendancy movement and explores how North Korea has leveraged the cultural exports of the Korean Wave to reconstruct its own global perception.

Asian Ascendancy: The Emergence of Hallyu and its Influence in North Korea

               Asian Ascendancy first emerged in the later twentieth century. Following the end of the Cold War, an increased demand for interconnectedness among societies sparked the Asian Ascendancy through the usage of media distribution amidst the age of technological innovation. Originally intended to combat the “unjust control by the Western developed nations,” Asian Ascendancy continues to reshape the narrative and global dominance of Asian culture and lifestyle.[1] Through this phenomenon, globalization has improved through increased communications fueled by multilateral dialogues and cultural expansion. In turn, globalization has been promoting increasing tolerance of international diversity while discouraging aggression and ultimately fueling interconnectedness and more robust diplomatic relations between nations.[2] Currently, China is notably spearheading this Ascendancy movement, as it expresses the highest development in cultural expansion, facilitating the exchange of multilateral dialogues, and income generation.[3] For instance, the 2008 Beijing Olympics aided in the triumph of Asian perceptions. Entrusting China to host the Games helped “undermine the perception of Western economic prowess,”[4] prompting the reevaluation of Asia’s efficiency and ability to express political disputes and historical resentments.

               One of the leading representatives of Asian Ascendancy has been Hallyu, a term coined in the late 1990s, and translated as the “[South] Korean Wave,” which emerged as a significant influence in recent entertainment and communications development. Essentially, Hallyu is an innovative hybridization of “Westernized modernity” and “Asian sentimentality” in South Korean television, music, and art.[5] As most are aware, younger audiences—from teenagers to thirty-year-old adults and even older—indulge in South Korean media, such as Korean dramas and K-Pop, due to the unique freedom of expression it signifies. The mass popularity of Hallyu is also utilized by the South Korean government, characterized as a form of soft power intended to fulfill the political agenda of “complex interdependence,” boosting the state’s global image and popularity across multiple regions.[6] However, this does not constitute a wholehearted embrace of South Korean culture, as states driven by authoritarianism and one-man dictatorships view this ascendancy as a threat to regime legitimacy and sovereignty.

               The rise of Hallyu has prompted a clash of ideology and support in North Korea. Interestingly, South Korean media was prominent in North Korea even before the Korean Wave.[7] Given the exponential increase of Hallyu and South Korean media consumption, North Korea has demonstrated a multifaceted approach to combating and embracing this dynamic. Therefore, North Korea’s utilization of Hallyu and the broader Asian Ascendancy movement offers insight into its operationalization to navigate the complexities of globalization, further reshaping its global perception. It also highlights the interplay between soft power, cultural exports, and global influence within Asian Ascendancy. North Korea’s response to Hallyu demonstrates significant strategizing around the threat posed by South Korean culture to its authoritarian regime. While the regime may seek to manage perceptions of modernity through tightly curated content, it cannot replicate or co-opt Hallyu, which is fundamentally South Korean—rooted in artistic freedom, internet culture, and Western influences such as hip-hop and global capitalism.
​
                Even so, this strategic mimicry must not be mistaken for cultural openness. In reality, the Kim regime has declared Hallyu a grave ideological threat—so severe that mere possession of South Korean media can lead to imprisonment or execution. The regime’s efforts to control this “cultural contagion” reflect not an interest in integration, but fear of exposure to the freedoms symbolized by the other Korea.

The People’s Embrace and North Korea’s Strategic Response

               Hallyu has been accepted and consumed by North Korea’s people but rejected by its regime and official propaganda. The burgeoning interest in South Korean media among North Korean people derives from a shared ethnic and cultural affiliation.[8] This kinship has cultivated a favorable response among North Korean citizens, partly responsible for a notable increase in defection rates since 1998. A discernible pattern emerges: the greater the consumption of South Korean media by North Korean citizens, the higher the propensity for individuals to defect, demonstrating the impact of cultural liberty and freedom of expression within these media sources.[9] Due to Hallyu, North Koreans receive a sense of hope and empowerment despite being confined to the constraints of an authoritarian, patriarchal society driven by the Juche self-reliance ideology.[10]

               Surprisingly, at times, the DPRK has responded to Hallyu’s components. In 2018, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un formally invited K-Pop musicians—such as Red Velvet, Seohyun from Girls’ Generation, and even Cho Yong-pil—to perform a combination of selected South Korean and traditional North Korean songs at Pyongyang’s “Spring is Coming” concert.[11] This concert would be the last performance by South Korean singers for the coming years due to escalating inter-Korean tensions. While this was truly a shocking invitation, this event should not be misinterpreted as an embrace of Hallyu by the North Korean regime. Instead, it functioned as a temporary, performative gesture aligned with inter-Korean diplomacy at the time—a diplomatic exception rather than a rule. The regime’s cultural policy remains deeply hostile to Hallyu, evidenced by the enactment of the Anti-Reactionary Thought Law in 2020, which punishes Hallyu consumption with prison or even execution.

               The “Sally Parks [송아 SongA Channel]” YouTube channel is particularly significant to North Korea’s intriguing media platforms, not as an extension of Hallyu, but rather as a strategic counter-narrative aimed at offsetting its global influence and soft power reach. Presented through the lens of an eleven-year-old girl named Song-A, this channel showcases her lifestyle in Pyongyang. Song-A provides English-spoken vlogs that offer glimpses into her educational pursuits, ardent basketball practices, and occasional immersion in the arts and English language learning. She has additionally highlighted major North Korean attractions, such as the Munsu Water Park and the 75th-anniversary celebration of the Children’s Union.[12]

                Nevertheless, discerning minds raise pertinent questions about the legitimacy of these vlogs. While these videos serve as an extended form of North Korean propaganda, leveraging the presence of a young girl to elicit sentiment among a global audience raises concerns regarding the authenticity of daily life depicted in North Korea. For instance, Song-A resides in Pyongyang, North Korea’s most developed and wealthiest city, masking the reality of the underdeveloped infrastructure among rural regions. In addition, Song-A’s contrived and rehearsed speech patterns, coupled with the perfection of the environments portrayed, posits doubts about the authenticity of this content. Rather than promoting cultural openness, the channel appears to appropriate the visual language and tone of youth-driven content associated with Hallyu, despite lacking the essential freedoms and influences—especially those from Western genres like hip-hop—that define Hallyu’s authenticity and global reach. Most significantly, these videos have minimal enforcement of North Korean principles. This is likely North Korea’s attempt to engage with the global society through falsely curated content, operating under the presumption that mimicking accessible and globally appealing formats will increase international tolerance or sympathy for the regime’s political endeavors.

Unyielding Walls and Suppressed Waves

               Despite the increasing global visibility of Hallyu and its influence across borders, North Korea’s domestic response has remained aggressively oppositional, characterized by forced ideological compliance, severe punishments for cultural subversion, and a persistent media blackout. Rather than demonstrating growth in the realm of cultural exchange, the regime has intensified efforts to insulate its population from the influence of foreign media, particularly the subversive allure of South Korean entertainment. This is evident in North Korea’s rigid censorship, demolition of cultural diplomacy infrastructure, and the establishment of laws targeting “reactionary” content.

               The straggled opportunities for North Korean tourism operations with South Korea are at an all-time low, even suffering demolition. Specifically, the early 2000s Mount Gumgang tourism project, constructed through the Sunshine Policy by the Hyundai Corporation, is being dismantled.[13] Initially meant to foster inter-Korean engagement, the project was terminated in 2008 due to the shooting death of 53-year-old South Korean tourist Park Wang-ja on a North Korean beach. Years later, North Korea began to take down South Korean facilities at Mount Gumgang.[14]

               Additionally, the North Korean regime has adopted a draconian stance toward its citizens’ consumption of South Korean media. In 2020, the regime introduced the Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act, a doctrine that rigorously enforced punishments for individuals found to be engaging with South Korean media.[15] These penalties range from arduous labor sentences and even the death penalty, depending on whether one is just a consumer or a distributor of South Korean media. For instance, individuals of any age who use “capitalist” terminology—such as referring to one’s spouse as “wife” instead of “dongji” (comrade)—face up to fifteen years of arduous labor at a labor camp.[16] Meanwhile, the death penalty is strictly enforced for those caught distributing South Korean media. Even teenagers have been executed for possessing or sharing K-Dramas, reflecting the regime’s zero-tolerance policy toward cultural infiltration.[17]

               As of 2023, North Korea continues to impose stringent ideological mandates. The intensity of this mandate is exemplified by the directive for citizens to read a minimum of 10,000 pages of propaganda for the year. This requirement urges citizens to read nearly thirty pages of propaganda each day. North Korean citizens are required to diligently journal their daily readings, as this will be presented to the party organization at the end of the year.[18] Despite acknowledging the lackluster nature of propaganda when faced with the allure of South Korean media, compliance with such measures is non-negotiable, as the consequences of nonconformity are severe and even fatal.

               Hallyu’s suppression is not merely cultural—it is a pillar of North Korea’s domestic security policy. By strictly controlling its citizens’ exposure to external influences, North Korea seeks to safeguard its grip on power and negate potential challenges to its authoritarian regime. This implies that the DPRK is adamantly attempting to impose a domestic media and information monopoly. Somehow, similar attempts target international audiences as well, but with a very limited, if any, degree of success.

Contrasting Paths: North and South Korea’s Ideological Implications on Hallyu

               The rise of Hallyu as part of the Asian Ascendancy movement delves into key values that provide a comparative analysis of North and South Korean values. Both states contain a Korean ethnic nexus yet take separate approaches to their responses to Asian Ascendancy through principles of nationalism, secularism, and the role of religion in education.

               North and South Korea exhibit strong nationalist sentiments—albeit with distinct manifestations. Firmly grounded in ethnic nationalism, South Korean nationalism is augmented by a sense of modernity and success achieved within a globalizing world. It is additionally fueled by desires for economic growth and international recognition, making it particularly receptive to the usage of cultural exports for diplomacy and global branding. Therefore, the rise of  Hallyu was embraced by South Korea as both a cultural movement and an instrument of soft power, aiding the country to assert itself across international dimensions. After all, which state would refuse the opportunity to further establish itself politically, economically, and socio-culturally through soft power mitigation?

               In contrast, North Korea fits the narrative that not all states are enthusiastic about cultural influence in global media. The regime’s nationalism is deeply intertwined with its Juche ideology and the personalist regime encompassing the state. This has resulted in a more cautious and restrictive response to Hallyu, as North Korea prefers to reinforce its own narrative established after the formation of the state following the Korean War. For example, this dynamic is observed in the enforcement of North Korea’s Chondoism in the later twentieth century. Chondoism, comprised of traditional Korean shamanism and Confucianism, was employed during Kim Il-Sung’s reign as a political scheme to bolster extreme patriotism in North Korea. It was additionally used as a bridge to reduce tensions with South Korea. However, South Korean officials declined this opportunity, as they recognized the regime’s ulterior motive to establish espionage in South Korean provinces.[19] The prominence of Chondoism in North Korea has recently diminished, due to strict pandemic policies implemented to limit the religious practice.

               Consequently, the role of secularism in North Korea has significantly diverged from the coexistence of religion with the cultural sphere, to cultist personalities. North Korea prohibits religious adherence upon any citizen and hails the Kim dynasty as the ‘saviors’ of the domestic population’s quality of life. It establishes a form of “hard secularism” through the worship of the Kim dynasty, manipulating the traditional secularist dynamic for states to protect religion from extremist distortion while enabling critical thought and information.[20] This repressive structure of secularism stands in contrast to the pluralistic religious tolerance observed in South Korea, where Christian, Buddhist, and other spiritual influences have helped shape the moral themes and creative choices found in some K-dramas and music.[21]While Hallyu does not explicitly promote religion, the cultural values embedded in its narratives—such as community, family, personal redemption, and moral responsibility—often connect with South Korea’s faith-informed social fabric. This newfound role of secularism in North Korea in the twenty-first century is vastly different compared to the promotion of South Korea’s faith-based religious principles in Hallyu.

               North Korea’s current approach to media censorship and suppression presents significant implications for the ideological framework of Hallyu and the Asian Ascendancy in contemporary globalization. It redefines the national and global perspective of state sovereignty and individualism in an ever-evolving society. Unfortunately, amidst a booming era of vibrant Asian culture and philosophy, North Korea is far too concerned with ensuring its own national legitimacy. It is not ready to embrace Hallyu and the broader Asian Ascendancy movement for the benefit of its people and society. Fundamentally, the Kim regime understands that Hallyu cannot be ideologically sanitized or replicated. It is precisely the fusion of liberal modernity, digital connectivity, and Western cultural expressions that renders it irreconcilable with North Korea’s closed, patriarchal state.

Concluding Remarks            

               As the currents of globalization once swept across the international sphere, the phenomenon of Asian Ascendancy and Hallyu stood as a powerful geopolitical force that forged new dynamics and statecraft between Western nations and the global perceptions of Asian cultures. This article discussed North Korea’s strategic employment of Hallyu to reshape its global image, as the regime weaves a carefully curated facade, blurring reality with fiction. Yet, beneath this spectacle lies the narrative of suppression and censorship. While South Korea cemented its role as the creator, distributor, and motivator of Hallyu, North Korea has remained entrenched in the institutionalization of Juche, strictly guarding its populace from the alluring charms of Hallyu, ultimately exemplifying the persistence of regressive forces in contempt of the new wave of globalized cultural exchanges. In an era increasingly marked by nationalist and protectionist currents, North Korea’s refusal to engage with cultural pluralism sinks it to even deeper isolationism. 

Tessa Aguilar is a distinguished graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles, where she earned her Bachelor’s degree in Political Science with a concentration in International Relations, complemented by minors in Global Studies and East Asian Studies. Her academic research is centered on inter-Korean political dynamics, with an emphasis on alleviating interstate animosities through the recognition and reconciliation of historical narratives. She also investigates the strategic deployment of soft power initiatives through modern entertainment and media, with a focus on the international ramifications of state-driven censorship and narrative control.

[1] Osman, Amber, Muhammad Imtiaz Subhani, and Syed Akif Hasan, “Asian Ascendancy: Media in the Age of Globalization.” SpringerPlus 2, no. 1 (2013): 2.
[2] Ibid., 3.
[3] Ibid., 5
[4] J.A. Mangan, “The New Asia: Global Transformation, Regional Ascendancy, and Metaphorical Modernity.” The Triple Asian Olympics - Asia Rising, 2018: 2234.
[5] Gunjoo Jang and Won K. Paik, “Korean Wave as Tool for Korea’s New Cultural Diplomacy,” Advances in Applied Sociology 2, no. 3 (2012): 201.
[6] Ibid., 197.
[7] Ka Young Chung, “Media as Soft Power: The Role of the South Korean Media in North Korea,” The Journal of International Communication 25, no. 1 (2018): 140.
[8] Ibid., 149
[9] Bianca Milanowitsch, “Mapping the Presence of the Korean Wave in North Korea,” International Quarterly for Asian Studies 48, no. 3–4 (2017): 280.
[10] Ibid., 279.
[11] The Guardian, “South Korean K-Pop Stars Perform for Kim Jong-Un in Pyongyang,” Guardian News and Media, April 1, 2018.
[12] YouTube, “Song A’s Life ‘Munsu Water Park Part 2’ |송아|,” YouTube, July 30, 2022.
[13] Samuel Seongseop Kim and Bruce Prideaux, “An Investigation of the Relationship between South Korean Domestic Public Opinion, Tourism Development in North Korea and a Role for Tourism in Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” Tourism Management 27, no. 1 (2006): 125.
[14] Soo-yeon Kim, “Seoul Voices Regret over NK’s Removal of S. Korean-Built Facilities at Mount Geumgang Resort,” Yonhap News Agency, October 18, 2022.
[15] Seulkee Jang, “Daily NK Acquires Full Text of the Anti-Reactionary Thought Law,” Daily NK, March 21, 2023.
[16] Jieun Kim, “Talking like ‘Capitalist’ South Koreans Can Lead to Prison or Death in North Korea,” Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2023.
[17] Hyemin Son, “North Korean Parents Will Be Punished If Their Children Watch Foreign Media Even Once,” Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2023.
[18] Hyemin Son, “North Korea Orders Citizens to Read 10,000 Pages of Propaganda This Year,” Radio Free Asia, April 28, 2023.
[19] Nicolas Levi, “How North Korea Embraced an Obscure Religion as a Tool for Korean Unification,” NK News - North Korea News, June 22, 2023.
[20] Lynn Davies, “One Size Does Not Fit All: Complexity, Religion, Secularism and Education,” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 34, no. 2 (2014): 191.
[21] Ali, Ghada Mohamed,“2 Composers of K-Drama’s OST Explain Their Approaches.” Korea.net, June 30, 2023.

Bibliography

Ali, Ghada Mohamed. 2023. “2 Composers of K-Drama’s OST Explain Their Approaches.” Korea.net. June 30, 2023. https://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/HonoraryReporters/view?articleId=234751. 

Chung, Ka Young. 2018. “Media as Soft Power: The Role of the South Korean Media in North Korea.” The Journal of International Communication 25 (1): 137–57. doi:10.1080/13216597.2018.1533878.

Davies, Lynn. 2014. “One Size Does Not Fit All: Complexity, Religion, Secularism and Education.” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 34 (2): 184–99. doi:10.1080/02188791.2013.875647.

Jang, Gunjoo, and Won K. Paik. 2012. “Korean Wave as Tool for Korea’s New Cultural Diplomacy.” Advances in Applied Sociology 02 (03): 196–202. doi:10.4236/aasoci.2012.23026.

Jang, Seulkee. 2023. “Daily NK Acquires Full Text of the Anti-Reactionary Thought Law.” Daily NK, March 21. https://www.dailynk.com/english/daily-nk-acquires-full-text-of-the-anti-reactionary-thought-law. 

Kim, Jieun. 2023. “Talking like ‘capitalist’ South Koreans Can Lead to Prison or Death in North Korea.” Radio Free Asia. March 22. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/seoul-mal-03222023114700.html.  

Kim, Samuel Seongseop, and Bruce Prideaux. 2006. “An Investigation of the Relationship between South Korean Domestic Public Opinion, Tourism Development in North Korea and a Role for Tourism in Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula.” Tourism Management 27 (1): 124–37, doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2004.08.001. 

Levi, Nicolas. 2023. “How North Korea Embraced an Obscure Religion as a Tool for Korean Unification: NK News.” NK News - North Korea News. June 22. https://www.nknews.org/2023/06/how-north-korea-embraced-an-obscure-religion-as-a-tool-for-korean-unification/. 

Milanowitsch, Bianca. 2017. “Mapping the Presence of the Korean Wave in North Korea.” International Quarterly for Asian Studies (IQAS), 48(3-4), 273-284. https://doi.org/10.11588/iqas.2017.3-4.7444. 

Osman, Amber, Muhammad Imtiaz Subhani, and Syed Akif Hasan. 2013. “Asian Ascendancy: Media in the Age of Globalization.” SpringerPlus 2 (1). doi:10.1186/2193-1801-2-646.

Mangan, J.A. 2018. “The New Asia: Global Transformation, Regional Ascendancy, and Metaphorical Modernity.” The Triple Asian Olympics - Asia Rising, 23–33. doi:10.4324/9780203720431-9.

Son, Hyemin. 2023. “North Korea Orders Citizens to Read 10,000 Pages of Propaganda This Year.” Radio Free Asia. April 28. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/10000_pages-04282023093517.html.   

Son, Hyemin. 2023. “North Korean Parents Will Be Punished If Their Children Watch Foreign Media Even Once.” Radio Free Asia. February 23. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/parents-02232023162227.html. 

The Guardian. 2018. “South Korean K-Pop Stars Perform for Kim Jong-Un in Pyongyang.” Guardian News and Media, April 1. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/01/south-korean-k-pop-stars-perform-for-kim-jong-un-in-pyongyang. 

Kim, Soo-yeon. 2022. “Seoul Voices Regret over NK’s Removal of S. Korean-Built Facilities at Mount Geumgang Resort.” Yonhap News Agency, October 18. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221018004000325. 

YouTube. “Sally Parks [송아 Songa Channel].” YouTube, https://youtube.com/@sallyparkssongachannel7794.   

YouTube. 2023. “Song A’s Life ‘I Am Famous!!’|송아|.” YouTube, June 13. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5LqqgvcgYo. 

YouTube. 2022. “Song A’s Life ‘Munsu Water Park Part 2’ |송아|.” YouTube, July 30. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNhoAhUaAAU.

By Ryan Rohrbach, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, HRNK Research Associate

Introduction
          North Korea’s unpredictable responses to the international community’s efforts to curb human rights violations and maintain peace in East Asia stem from the Korean Peninsula’s unique historical context. The influence of North Korea’s 19th-20th century history has just seldom been isolated and analyzed to explain why North Korea commits its current transgressions. North Korea’s most concerning and recent actions include the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the manufacturing and selling of arms to Russia for use in the invasion of Ukraine, and the dispatch of North Korean troops to the Russian military for use in the conflict in Ukraine. At the heart of North Korea’s aggression stands the North Korean people who are unjustly imprisoned and exploited for labor and scientific advancement with disregard for the state’s human rights and economic obligations. Policymakers, advocacy organizations, and academics must fully understand the domestic motivations of the Kim regime to effectively combat North Korea’s aggression and human rights violations. However, in recent years, with the exception of reports authored by Robert Collins and other HRNK authors, analyses of North Korea’s domestic politics have slowed and policymakers have become discouraged as many view North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development as seemingly “unstoppable.”[1]

            Often responding unpredictably and abnormally to coercive policy initiative from U.S.-aligned nations, the durability of the Kim regime has posed several questions to the international community. First, why do North Korea and South Korea have such different political systems? Second, why has the Kim regime proved to be stable despite North Korea’s history of economic woes and natural disasters? Lastly, what policies can the U.S. and its allies take to stop and reverse the long-term effects of the Kim regime’s systemic human rights violations on North Korea’s future sociopolitical and economic development?

          The sociopolitical history of North Korea and South Korea undoubtedly affects the form that the current North Korean and South Korean polity take. Naturally, answers to these questions should be approached through analyses of North Korea’s divergent sociopolitical development from the human rights-respecting polity that comprised the whole Korean Peninsula to the current authoritarian polity occupying the Korean Peninsula north of the 38th parallel. To reinvigorate efforts to understand North Korea, I suggest a new avenue for analysis of the development of the North Korean polity and society: post-colonial theory. Post-colonial theory is a group of theories that describe the general political, economic, and social development of states that are former colonies of the previous world’s empires. The field of post-colonial studies offers many relatively uncontested theories. Compared to states that were never subjected to the rule of a metropole, former colonies are significantly more vulnerable to authoritarianism, experience lower GDP growth rates, are more likely to develop socialist economies, and are less socioeconomically developed.[2] Post-colonial governments are also more likely to pursue predatory policies while legislative initiatives are inhibited by high degrees of social factionalism.[3] The predisposition of former colonies to these general patterns of political development caused by its identity as a former colony is known as the former colony’s “colonial legacy.”[4] With the history of having been colonized by the Empire of Japan, post-colonial theory largely explains the development of North Korea into its current state.

The Problem: A Lack of Information and Decreasing Motivation

          The goals of explaining why the North Korean polity developed so into today’s state and finding solutions to rectify the Kim regime’s human rights violations motivate many organizations, academics, and policymakers. However, progress on the search for answers to these questions is stalling for many reasons. Since the beginning of the Coronavirus Pandemic, there has been a dearth of breakthroughs in academic research on variables that are associated with increasing or decreasing levels of democracy and sociopolitical development. Academics’ primary research foci have recently shifted from democracy and development to public opinion, political psychology, predictive legislative politics, and election politics.[5] Subsequently, conflicts in the Middle East and Europe have largely taken the attention of the international community from the Kim regime’s human rights violations. Increasing numbers of international issues requiring the attention of analysts and policymakers decreases the focus with which analysts and policymakers can approach North Korea-related problems. Coupled with the ever present lack of new information on domestic North Korean politics and the slowing pace of North Korean politics that began in the late 2010s, many policymakers have become discouraged from confronting remaining questions about North Korea.

            Advocacy organizations and academics must remain empathetic to the discouragement of policymakers and the public. However, policymakers, academics, and advocacy organizations must reevaluate, respecify, and redouble their efforts to understand North Korea’s sociopolitical development. To find an answer to these questions, governments must articulate clear objectives and continue to pursue policies that are unequivocally effective in promoting a state’s respect for human rights and good governance. The international community’s lack of effective policymaking and political coordination towards promoting respect for human rights by the Kim regime and good governance by the North Korean polity has allowed North Korea to commit more brazen and contentious acts such as sending troops to aid Russia in its conflict with Ukraine. Nebulous policy objectives have discouraged US administrations from pursuing well defined, comprehensive, long-term, and unequivocally effective policy.

Comparative Analyses of Both Koreas through Post-Colonial Theory

          The decline of communism and the end of the Cold War in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East reduced the intensity of academic studies on the impact of a state’s historical identity on that state’s modern government. However, I believe that comparing the post-colonial sociopolitical and economic development of South Korea and North Korea will provide novel answers to policymakers’ questions. Through facile consideration of South Korea and North Korea in post-colonial theory, South Korea’s development into a bureaucratic democracy with a strong capitalist economy was less likely than South Korea’s theoretical development into an authoritarian socialist state like contemporary North Korea. The discontinuity of South Korea and North Korea’s development raises the question about why South Korea and North Korea developed into states with very different modern identities.

          In post-colonial theory, the identity of the colonial power and the length of the colonization are the variables with the largest impact on the size of the autocracy-promoting effect of a state’s colonial legacy on the state’s post-colonial government. North Korea and South Korea were unified and subjugated to the same colonial administration for the same length of time. Given the inexplicability of South Korea’s current political and economy strength through post-colonial theory, it is incredibly important to compare South Korea’s rejection of its colonial legacy and consequent development into a bureaucratic capitalist democracy with North Korea’s development of a socialist and authoritarian polity. Transparent access to records of the South Korean government’s development enables comparisons of North Korea’s development in the context of North Korea and South Korea’s shared identity as a former colony of the Empire of Japan.

            Many post-colonial theory case studies have been conducted on African and Latin American countries that were previous colonies of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other European states. The prodigious literature on post-colonial analyses of African and Latin American states should serve as a guide for future post-colonial analyses of North Korea and South Korea. It was a study on the connection between socialism and anti-colonial nationalism in Africa that first averred a link between socialism, anti-colonial nationalism, and a state’s colonial legacy.[6] Through comparisons of settler-colonies such as South Africa and non-settler colonies such as the DRC, academics also established the link between a state’s colonial legacy, the strength of the state’s social institutions, and the state’s level of socioeconomic development.[7]

            Of considerable importance in post-colonial analyses of North Korea and South Korea is the mid-1900s Communist Party in South Korea. The role of Communism in early South Korean society is important to understand for many reasons. According to post-colonial theory, South Korea’s moderate- to large-sized Communist faction was likely a byproduct of South Korea’s experience under Japanese rule. During South Korea’s era as a trustee of the U.S. and incipient independent rule, the rise of Communism in South Korea was a major policy issue that spurred South Korean leaders to act in autocratic fashion. In the unified Korea before August 1945, communities inhabiting modern North Korea and South Korea subscribed to the same Communist faction. Understanding of the link between South Korea’s colonial legacy and the ideology, resources, and network of Communism in early South Korea can be applied to explain the political dynamics of early North Korea, as South Korea’s early post-1945 Communist faction was very similar to North Korea’s early post-1945 Communist faction. Post-colonial analyses of Communism in South Korea and North Korea should also serve as a guide for comparative analyses of many other major parts of South Korea and North Korea’s society, government, and economy.
 
Concluding Remarks

          Academics’ quest to attain further understanding of the inner workings of North Korea, advocates’ goals to end and prevent further human rights violations by the North Korean government, and policymakers’ promotion of peace and economic stability in East Asia have all been stalled by the North Korean polity’s harmful domestic and international actions. A lack of progress towards academics, advocates, and policymakers’ goals has disenchanted the South Korean public, the international community, and many governments. No comprehensive analyses on South Korea or North Korea through post-colonial theory have been published, despite clear reasons to explain and resolve the authoritarianism and human rights abuses of the North Korean government through North Korea and South Korea’s shared history as a colony of the Empire of Japan.

          Explanations of North Korea’s development are enabled by South Korea’s miraculous development into a durable capitalist bureaucratic democracy. In the context of post-colonial theory, South Korea’s democratic development is less easily explained than North Korea’s autocratic development. However, comparing the sociopolitical development of North Korea and South Korea will offer insight into how South Korea rejected its colonial legacy and developed into a strong democracy. These analyses should also prescribe new policy tools to promote democracy and humanitarian economic policies in North Korea.
​
            Post-colonial theory was primarily constructed through analyses of European colonialism in Africa and Latin America. However, post-colonial theory concludes that the identity of the colonial power and the length of the colonization are the most important variables in determining the effect of colonialism’s legacy on a former colony. North Korea and South Korea were subjected to the same colonial power for the same length of time. In the case of North Korea and South Korea, the time and identity variables are constant. This enables valid comparative analyses of the sociopolitical and economic development of North Korea and South Korea through post-colonial theory.

            Comparative analyses of North Korea and South Korea should be constructed through prior analyses of European colonialism in Africa and Latin America. These analyses will describe the factors that led to South Korea’s development into a durable capitalist bureaucratic democracy. The results of analyses of North Korea and South Korea’s development should objectively describe how South Korea’s democracy was achieved. These factors will serve as a roadmap for policymakers to promote humane economic policies and democracy in North Korea by respecifying the policies imposed on North Korea by the U.S. and its allies.


[1] Hamre, John, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Victor Cha, Katrin Fraser Katz, Andy Lim, and Ellen Kim. “Recommendations on North Korea Policy & Extended Deterrence.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 19, 2023

[2] Sørli, Mirjam E., Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Strand. 2005. "Why Is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East?" The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (1): 146.; Grier, Robin M. 1999. "Colonial Legacies and Economic Growth." Public Choice 98 (3/4): 317-335.; Viegi, Nicola. 2016. "The Economics of Decolonisation: Institutions, Education and Elite Formation." Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 63 (147): 63.

[3] Diamond, Larry Jay, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1995. Politics in developing countries: comparing experiences with democracy. 2nd ed. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers. 42-43.; Bernhard, Michael, Christopher Reenock, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. "The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival." International Studies Quarterly 48 (1): 225-250.; Young, Crawford. 1994. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 278-290.; Abernethy, David. 2000. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 367.

[4] Grier, Robin. 1999.

[5] This shift is evident through a review of major political science and international relations journals from 2020 onwards. Major journals include the American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, International Organizations, International Studies Quarterly, and tangentially, Political Methodology.

[6] Young, Crawford. 1982. Ideology and Development in Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 98.

[7] Viegi, Nicola. 2016. 63.

Ryan Rohrbach is an incoming PhD student in political science at Washington University in St. Louis. He is an alumnus of the University at Buffalo, where he received his bachelor’s degree in political science and international studies in 2024. His research focuses on developing academics and the US government’s understanding of the impact of international relations on states’ domestic governance of human rights and protest movements. He hopes to reach this goal through the expansion of statistical methods used to model Poisson-distributed data and advocacy for the use of sophisticated research methods in non-academic political science research. He believes these efforts will ultimately provide novel solutions through which the North Korean regime’s autocratic and human rights abuses can be addressed and stopped. 

Abernethy, David. 2000. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bernhard, Michael, Christopher Reenock, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. "The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival." International Studies Quarterly 48 (1): 225-250. 
Diamond, Larry Jay, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1995. Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. 2nd ed. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers.
Grier, Robin M. 1999. "Colonial Legacies and Economic Growth." Public Choice 98 (3/4): 317-335. 
Hamre, John, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Victor Cha, Katrin Fraser Katz, Andy Lim, and Ellen Kim. “Recommendations on North Korea Policy & Extended Deterrence.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 19, 2023. 
Sørli, Mirjam E., Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Strand. 2005. "Why Is There so Much Conflict in the Middle East?" The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (1): 141-165. 
Viegi, Nicola. 2016. "The Economics of Decolonisation: Institutions, Education and Elite Formation." Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 63 (147): 61-79. 
Young, Crawford. 1994. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Young, Crawford. 1982. Ideology and Development in Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.