By Valerie Xu, HRNK Research Intern[1]
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations & Research

In 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the human rights situation in North Korea concluded that “systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations”[2] have been, and are being, committed by the DPRK, its institutions, and officials. Moreover, it stated that many of these violations constitute crimes against humanity, including: “extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation.”[3] Although it has been ten years since, serious human rights abuses continue to be committed in North Korea.

There have been continued attempts to address the human rights situation in North Korea, yet the result leaves much to be desired. While some point to political leaders for turning a blind eye to North Korea’s human rights record in the hopes of improving relations with Pyongyang, others point to the lack of civil society in North Korea as a factor contributing to the difficulty in institutionalizing human rights reforms. Given the absence of civil society and rights consciousness, it is challenging to diffuse human rights within North Korea.[4] Furthermore, the nature of North Korea’s judicial institutions makes it hard to seek accountability through domestic laws and regulations.[5] Even the COI acknowledged that “The perpetrators enjoy impunity. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is unwilling to implement its international obligation to prosecute and bring the perpetrators to justice, because those perpetrators act in accordance with State policy.”[6]

When the state ignores or directly perpetuates systematic human rights abuses, external interventions can be rendered fruitless. Existing forums and institutions face not only procedural constraints, but also resistance from both North Korea itself and some other countries. The lack of progress is frustrating, but have we truly exhausted all means? What other venues are available to hold North Korea responsible for its human rights violations? In answering these questions, this piece explores the application of universal jurisdiction to address human rights violations that have occurred in North Korea.


Past Efforts

United Nations System

Addressing North Korean human rights issues at the UN has been helpful in maintaining diplomatic momentum and serving as a solidary and concrete statement of concern towards the DPRK by UN member states. But due to the non-binding nature of resolutions passed at the UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), this approach also has its limits. Some member states are opposed to passing UNHRC resolutions on North Korea because “country-specific content had no place at the UNHRC.”[7] Meanwhile, addressing North Korean human rights violations at the UN Security Council (UNSC) — where resolutions are indeed binding — has also been criticized by some member states which argue that “human rights issues are not under the purview of the UN Security Council to begin with.”[8] Constructive engagement with North Korea has been further complicated as North Korea has continued its missile and nuclear tests in direct violation of UNSC resolutions.[9]

In its recommendations, the COI called for “a Security Council referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court or the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal by the United Nations.”[10] However, North Korea is not a signatory of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which means that a UNSC resolution is “the only remaining option to refer the case of human rights violations in the DPRK.”[11] Furthermore, permanent members in the UNSC, namely China and Russia, are likely to veto any UNSC resolutions that attempt to do so. Even if the case is referred to the International Criminal Court, only crimes committed after July 1, 2002 — when the Rome Statute went into effect — can be addressed.[12]
 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was developed in the 1990s after the world witnessed mass atrocities unfold in places such as Somalia and Rwanda.[13] The UN invoked the R2P doctrine to intervene in Libya in 2011, which was the first time that use of force was authorized “for civilian protection purposes against the wishes of a host state.”[14] The COI specifically called on the international community to “accept its responsibility to protect the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from crimes against humanity, because the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has manifestly failed to do so.”[15]

However, invoking R2P in the North Korean context faces many difficulties. First, applying the R2P for chronic cases of human rights abuses may be a stretch, as it has only been used in acute situations in the past.[16] Second, using military force against a nuclear-armed North Korea is unthinkable, as “invocation of R2P by the Security Council could lead to the use of weapons of mass destruction or the launching of missiles.”[17] Lastly, due to controversial results of past R2P applications, including the Libyan case, gathering diplomatic support for this option would be difficult. Moscow or Beijing could easily veto any such resolutions on North Korea at the UNSC.
 
Bilateral Sanctions

Bilateral human rights sanctions on North Korean individuals and entities have also been attempted. Pursuant to Executive Order 13722 signed under the Obama administration, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated individuals and entities for having “engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for an abuse or violation of human rights by the Government of North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of either such entity.”[18] The European Union also imposed sanctions in 2021 under its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on individuals and entities deemed to be involved in human rights abuses in North Korea.[19] North Korea also faces other types of sanctions in addition to those that are imposed on human rights grounds. There are questions, however, about the effectiveness of sanctions on deterring human rights abuses.
 
Engagement and Exchanges

Alternatively, some scholars note that even though the North Korean regime is indeed the main perpetrator of human rights abuses within its borders, the regime is also the only actor that can significantly improve the situation. In other words, any concrete improvements must come from the inside.[20] As such, they argue that non-confrontational and unconditional approaches, such as educational exchanges and technology cooperation, should be considered. These attempts have been made in the past, but they have not led to sustained improvements. Progressive South Korean governments, in particular, have been criticized for their attempts to engage North Korea at the cost of neglecting human rights issues. For example, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) was a flagship inter-Korean economic collaboration program pursued by progressive presidents during the Sunshine Policy era. However, reports by Human Rights Watch have found that labor practices concerning North Korean workers at the KIC were not up to international standards — standards which South Korea has pledged to as an OECD member, yet were set aside to maintain good relations with their North Korean counterparts.[21] Although these progressive administrations and their policies did achieve certain progress, such as summit meetings and reunions for separated families, these gains were ultimately short-lived and did not yield concrete changes to North Korea’s domestic practices.


Concept of Universal Jurisdiction

The UNHRC has recommended universal jurisdiction in explicitly stating: “Another option to ensure criminal accountability in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would be for Member States to pursue investigations and prosecutions based on principles of extraterritorial and/or universal jurisdiction in legal proceedings observing fair trail and due process guarantees.”[22] Furthermore, in her 2024 report, UN Special Rapporteur Elizabeth Salmón recommended that “Prosecutions outside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could, if necessary, be based on principles of extraterritorial and/or universal jurisdiction.”[23] The remainder of this article will assess the prospects for applying universal jurisdiction to human rights violations in North Korea within the framework of international law.

Definitions of universal jurisdiction are relatively homogenous in their emphasis on both the nature of the crimes in question and the agency assigned to states. The International Justice Resource Center defines universal jurisdiction as “the idea that a national court may prosecute individuals for serious crimes against international law — such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and torture — based on the principle that such crimes harm the international community or international order itself, which individual States may act to protect.”[24] Under this definition, the bar for state action is not explicit. Human Rights Watch subscribes that universal jurisdiction “is the ability of the domestic judicial systems of a state to investigate and prosecute certain crimes, even if they were not committed on its territory, by one of its nationals, or against one of its nationals.”[25] This definition explicitly refers to the concept of nationality, which might give rise to complications in the case of the two Koreas, as discussed below.

This piece embraces a more general understanding of universal jurisdiction by focusing on how serious crimes under international law can be prosecuted outside of a nation’s territory, while being mindful of potential caveats that may arise.


Theory and Application of Universal Jurisdiction

The legal concept of jurisdiction is three-fold: the power to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce. Under the post-Westphalian state-centric system, such powers are reserved to states in forms of sovereignty.[26] To put simply, “universal jurisdiction transcends national sovereignty.”[27] It is typically justified on the grounds that “the ‘exceptional gravity’ of the offense ‘affect[s] the fundamental interests of the international community as a whole.’”[28] Caution must be exercised in applying universal jurisdiction. There is a careful balance between respecting a government’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and punishing crimes against humanity when a government fails to do so domestically. As such, universal jurisdiction is still seen as a controversial tool that should be used in a cautious manner.

Past applications of universal jurisdiction include the Spanish prosecution of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and the U.S. prosecution of Chuckie Taylor.[29] It has not been used explicitly in South Korea, but there have been several relevant cases. In 1983, South Korea claimed concurrent jurisdiction in prosecuting the hijacking of an airplane that landed on South Korean territory, even though the aircraft was registered in China and the nationality of the hijacker was Chinese. Although the court’s ruling did not explicitly invoke universal jurisdiction, it was suspected to be behind the court’s decision in claiming jurisdiction.[30] In recent years, South Korean courts have found Kim Jong-un to be personally liable for human rights and humanitarian law violations.[31] For example, in 2023, the Seoul Central District Court ordered North Korea and Kim Jong-un to pay 50 million Korean Won each to three former prisoners of war for their forced labor during captivity.[32] Although actually receiving this compensation may be difficult, it nevertheless points to the possibility of invoking universal jurisdiction in future proceedings.

 
Feasibility and Transferability

In theory, applying universal jurisdiction in South Korea can be grounded in its Act on Punishment of Crimes Under Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Adopted in 2007, the purpose of the Act is to “punish crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and set the procedures for cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the International Criminal Court pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.”[33]

Article 3 defines the scope of applying this Act:

• (1) This Act shall apply to any Korean national or foreigner who commits a crime provided for in this Act within the territory of the Republic of Korea.
• (2) This Act shall apply to any Korean national who commits a crime provided for in this Act outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.
• (3) This Act shall apply to any foreigner who commits a crime provided for in this Act on board a vessel or aircraft owned by Republic of Korea, outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.
• (4) This Act shall apply to any foreigner who commits a crime provided for in this Act against the Republic of Korea or its people outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.
• (5) This Act shall apply to any foreigner who commits the crime of genocide, etc. outside the territory of the Republic of Korea and stays in the territory of the Republic of Korea.

Article 2 also stipulates that “The term ‘crime of genocide, etc.’ means any crimes listed in Articles 8 through 14,” which includes crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes against persons, war crimes against property and rights, war crimes against humanitarian activities, war crimes using forbidden methods, and war crimes using forbidden weapons.[34] Therefore, South Korean courts can invoke this act to prosecute crimes against humanity in line with principles of universal jurisdiction, as long as the perpetrator can be located within South Korea’s borders.

On this note, given the post-Korean War partition of the Peninsula, there is also an interesting discussion as to what constitutes national sovereignty and territorial integrity for North and South Korea. South Korea’s constitution states that “[t]he territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.”[35] In reality, however, North Korea and South Korea each occupy half of the Peninsula, and they are equally recognized as member states of the UN. Regardless, South Korea’s constitution influences how laws such as the Act on Punishment of Crimes Under Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court may be interpreted, especially with regard to the physical location of where crimes were committed and where perpetrators currently reside. Even so, cases can still arise from North Korean escapees who resettle in South Korea.


Risks and Complications

One major concern raised by legal experts is that if South Korean courts indeed invoke the universal jurisdiction approach, “it would require them implicitly to recognize the de facto existence of a North Korean state, putting it into direct conflict with the provisions in the South Korean Constitution explicitly barring such recognition of North Korean statehood.”[36] South Korea is a staunch friend and ally of the United States. South Korea also has to maintain balance in its relations with China. Since both the United States and China have a keen interest in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula, political risks may arise if South Korea unilaterally alters its policies towards North Korea.

Procedurally, criminal prosecutions in South Korea would require the physical presence of the defendant. Otherwise, the court would be unable to enforce any potential remedies that may result from criminal trials.[37] Lastly, as with any legal proceedings, the success of a prosecution would depend on “whether the prosecuting authorities can assemble sufficiently robust evidence to result in a conviction.”[38] This is especially challenging. Even the COI acknowledged the difficulty of gaining on-site access to North Korea or direct input from the government.[39]


Concluding Remarks

Despite these risks and challenges, universal jurisdiction should be seriously explored as a strategy for addressing human rights abuses in North Korea. In the process of pursuing transnational justice, universal jurisdiction should be seen as a means to an end, not as an end in itself. Fulfilling victim communities’ desire to bring perpetrators to justice is only a “symbolic first stage in addressing more restorative and community-centered considerations.”[40] In exploring the option of universal jurisdiction, scholars must keep in mind that “the agency of abuse survivors in planning for future mechanisms of redress” should not be overlooked or set aside.[41] It is imperative to not lose sight of the broader goal of transitional justice.

Valerie Xu is a recent Master’s graduate from a dual-degree program between Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and KDI School of Public Policy and Management. Her passion for sustainable global development and human rights are the motivators behind her academic pursuits and career aspirations.

[1] This article is based on an essay that was originally submitted as an academic assignment at Johns Hopkins University in December 2023. It is published here with the instructor’s permission.
[2] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc, A/HRC/25/63, 2014, para 80.
[3] Ibid., 14.
[4] Patricia Goedde, “Human Rights Diffusion in North Korea: The Impact of Transnational Legal Mobilization,” Asian Journal of Law and Society 5, no. 1 (2018): 177. https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2017.20.
[5] Kyung-ok Do, “Report of the Group of Independent Experts on Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the DPRK: Implications and Future Challenges,” Korea Institute for National Unification, April 5, 2017, 3. https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/8432/1/0001478608.pdf.
[6] A/HRC/25/63, para 85.
[7] Courtney J. Fung, “Just Not in the Neighbourhood: China’s Views on the Application of the Responsibility to Protect in the DPRK,” The China Quarterly 246 (2021): 573. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741020000648.
[8] Ibid., 577.
[9] Patricia Goedde, “Human Rights Diffusion in North Korea: The Impact of Transnational Legal Mobilization,” Asian Journal of Law and Society 5, no. 1 (2018): 179. https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2017.20.
[10] A/HRC/25/63, para 87.
[11] Do, “Report of the Group of Independent Experts on Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the DPRK: Implications and Future Challenges,” 4.
[12] Ibid., 5.
[13] Rosemary Foot, “The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Its Evolution: Beijing’s Influence on Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas,” St Antony’s International Review 6, no. 2 (2011): 49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26226764.
[14] Andrew Garwood-Gowers, “China and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: The Implications of the Libyan Intervention,” Asian Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (2012): 384. https://doi.org/10.1017/S204425131200015X.
[15] A/HRC/25/63, para. 86.
[16] Fung, “Just Not in the Neighbourhood: China’s Views on the Application of the Responsibility to Protect in the DPRK,” 570.
[17] Boris Kondoch, “North Korea,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford University Press, 2016), 830. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198753841.013.44
[18] Exec. Order No. 13722, 81 FR 14943 (March 15, 2016).
[19] Ramon Pacheco Pardo, “Pressure and Principles: The EU’s Human Rights Sanctions on North Korea,” 38 North, March 26, 2021. https://www.38north.org/2021/03/pressure-and-principles-the-eus-human-rights-sanctions-on-north-korea/.
[20] Buhm-Suk Baek, “Partially Right, Partially Wrong: Rethinking the Implementation of International Human Rights Law in Countries with Gross Human Rights Violations,” Pacific Focus, 33 no. 2 (2018): 353. https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12122.
[21] “North Korea: Workers’ Rights at the Kaesong Industrial Complex,” Human Rights Watch, October 2006. https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/10/03/north-korea-workers-rights-kaesong-industrial-complex
[22] United Nations Human Rights Council. Promoting accountability in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/52/64, para 17.
[23] A/HRC/55/63, para 23.
[24] “Universal Jurisdiction,” International Justice Resource Center. https://ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction/.
[25] “Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction,” Human Rights Watch, October 19, 2009. https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-universal-jurisdiction.
[26] M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice,” Virginia Journal of International Law, 42 no. 1 (2001): 89. https://via.library.depaul.edu/lawfacpubs/606.
[27] Ibid., 96.
[28] Ernest A. Young, “Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel,” Duke Law Journal 64 (2015): 1033. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3244.
[29] “Universal Jurisdiction,” International Justice Resource Center.
[30] “Universal Jurisdiction in the Republic of Korea,” United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/RepublicofKorea.pdf.
[31] Daniel Wertz, “Private Litigation against the North Korean Government: Overview and Policy Implications,” NCNK, August 2021. https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/private-litigation-against-north-korean-government.
[32] “Seoul Court Again Orders N. Korea to Pay Compensation to Former POWs,” Yonhap News, May 8, 2023. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230508005900315.
[33] “Act on Punishment of Crimes under Jurisdiction of The International Criminal Court,” Korea Legislation Research Institute & Korea Law Translation Center. https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?lang=ENG&hseq=16463.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Stephan Sonnenberg and Patricia Goedde, “Accountability for Human Rights Crimes in North Korea: Jurisdictional Dilemmas in South Korea.” Asian Perspective 47, no. 3 (2023): 522. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.a905236.
[36] Ibid., 527.
[37] Ibid., 531.
[38] Ibid., 521.
[39] Goedde, “Human Rights Diffusion in North Korea: The Impact of Transnational Legal Mobilization,” 186.
[40] Mark Findlay, “Activating a Victim Constituency in International Criminal Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 no. 2 (2009): 193. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijp008.
[41] Sarah A. Son, “Chasing Justice: Victim Engagement with Accountability for Human Rights Abuses in North Korea,” Asian Studies Review 44, no. 4 (2020): 623. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2020.1734536.

By Diana Darae Woo, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha (Director of Operations & Research) and Rick Herssevoort (International Outreach Associate)

Since the establishment of the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula, experts, policymakers, and scholars have strived to deepen global understanding of North Korea’s internal dynamics. Their collective efforts shape our knowledge of the pariah state. Although interest in North Korea fluctuates depending on shifts in global priorities, geopolitical events, diplomatic developments, and media coverage, it is imperative to expose the Kim family’s repressive, authoritarian rule as the North Korean people continue to bear the brunt of the country’s isolation and heinous human rights violations.
 
Beyond Utopia sheds light on the experiences of the North Korean people, following the Roh family’s escape from North Korea and Lee So-yeon’s attempt to rescue her son.[1] Their testimonies reveal the harrowing experiences North Koreans continue to endure today. Providing rare and valuable footage of the perilous trek North Korean escapees take to escape the Kim regime, Beyond Utopia is a timely and important call to remember the ongoing and egregious suffering of the North Korean people.

 
Exile List
 
As the documentary begins, the Roh family find themselves stranded in a tent, still near the North Korean border in China. They make an urgent rescue request to Pastor Kim Sung-eun in South Korea. Nearly 4,000 kilometers lie ahead for them to be able to reach South Korea through China, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. They are some of many on Kim Jong-un’s “banishing list,” a fear-and-control tactic used to target and punish relatives of escapees.
 
The consequences include being exiled to prison camps in the remote, mountains regions of North Korea, where they may be subject to forced labor, torture, arbitrary punishment, malnutrition, and other inconceivably harsh conditions. As such, they walk with cyanide capsules in their pockets. For the Roh family, including their two young daughters and 80-year-old grandmother, seeking freedom is the only remaining choice.
 
The Roh family’s escape, as assisted by Pastor Kim, is clear evidence of the lack of protections available for North Korean escapees and the risky business the broker network has become. Even while crossing the mountains of Vietnam in the dark of the night, human greed creeps in. A lead broker walks the family and Pastor Kim in circles, refusing to take them across unless they fork over a higher sum of money. There is little regard for the family who is risking it all. In this concealed industry, currency comes before the sanctity of human life.
 

Broker Network
 
Lee So-yeon’s story also represents the risk and despair North Korean escapees must endure, even for the simple hope of being together as a family. The whereabouts of Lee’s son, Cheong, who attempted to leave North Korea to meet his mother, are unknown. In the months after Cheong is captured near the North Korean border, Lee So-yeon’s only option to obtain the slightest bit of information on her son is to bribe and rely on a network of brokers. Wiring sums of money on multiple occasions does not guarantee clear information. She takes several phone calls with different brokers, who are only able to provide unreliable information. She also receives criticism for prompting her son to make the dangerous journey. Finally, she receives the gut-wrenching news that her son has been severely tortured, with little to no hope of release. There is no bribe, no connection, no NGO, no religion, no country, and no utopia that can rescue her son from the horrors of the North Korean regime’s systematic punishment of forcibly repatriated escapees.

 
Family and Freedom
 
Beyond Utopia pulls back the curtains and brings viewers closer to the North Korean people. Within the film’s frames are the North Korean people’s unbounded human spirit and determination to reach freedom. Even while risking it all, the Roh family’s sense of unity shines through. Between going in and out of safe houses in unfamiliar and potentially dangerous countries, they share meals, laugh, sing, cry, and also grieve for not being able to bring their dog, Bobo, with them. They express deep sympathy and sorrow for their friends and family who are still in North Korea.
 
We also learn firsthand how families are forcibly separated as a consequence of the Kim regime’s human rights violations. The senselessness of her son’s capture and knowing that her elderly mother is now under constant surveillance bring tears to Lee So-yeon’s eyes. She is a North Korean escapee, but more importantly, she is a daughter and a mother. Living in the comforts of a free, democratic country means little as she realizes that she is unable to rescue her son or meet with her mother ever again. She is left heartbroken, in despair, and in guilt, unable to repair her family.


Conclusion
 
More than anything, Beyond Utopia illuminates the personal stories of North Koreans, emphasizing the significance of hearing and seeing directly from North Koreans themselves. Through their own words and lived experiences, the plight of the North Korean people is brought to the forefront of the conversation surrounding the precarious puzzle that is North Korea. As audience members, we must remember that the Kim regime’s severe human rights abuses deserve as much attention as its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. As a global community, we should look beyond great-power competition and geopolitical dynamics to advocate for the human rights of the North Korean people. As fellow human beings, we must remember that North Koreans, too, seek and deserve the opportunity to pursue happiness—the small, blissful moments of living freely with family and friends.
 
Diana Darae Woo is a recent graduate of Northeastern University's M.S. in Global Studies and International Relations program. In October 2023, she began interning at HRNK to pursue her passion for international human rights. 
 
[1] Beyond Utopia. [Film] Directed by: Madeleine Gavin. USA: Ideal Partners, 19340 Productions, XRM Media, Random Good Foundation, Two Chairs Films, Human Rights Foundation; 2023.

By Abbigail Thacker, former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha (Director of Operations & Research) and Damian Reddy (Legal Counsel & Project Development Associate)

Article 16.3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declares that “the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”[1] The International Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also states in Article 10.1 that “the widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society.”[2]
 
Similarly, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) notes in its preamble that “the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded…necessary protection and assistance.”[3] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states in Article 24.1 that “every child shall have, without any discrimination…the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.”[4] The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) further states in Article 16.1 that states must “eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations.”
 
North Korea is a party to all of these treaties and conventions. Article 78 of its constitution states that “marriage and the family shall be protected by the state. The State pays great attention to consolidating the family, the basic unit of social life.”[5] However, family life continues to suffer under the Kim Jong-un regime. This article examines norms surrounding marriage and family life in North Korea, as understood through escapee testimony. It also analyzes how political practices affect family life in North Korea and identifies relevant human rights violations.

​
Marriage and Family Norms in North Korea
 
Dating in North Korea
 
According to a North Korean escapee interviewed for this article, dating is still very taboo, and it is embarrassing for couples if someone discovers the relationship.[6] Another escapee noted that “dating culture in North Korea varies across the country,” although most teenagers will wait to date until their second or third year in high school.[7]
 
Public displays of affection (PDA) are almost nonexistent in dating relationships. Pre-marital relationships are very private and often include no physical intimacy beyond holding hands. This aversion to PDA could be due in part to the taboo on dating. Hyeonseo Lee wrote of her dating experience in North Korea as follows—“like any other boyfriend and girlfriend in North Korea of this age, we did not even kiss. Holding hands was as far as it went. Even then we were discreet.”[8]
 
The lack of sex education could help explain the lack of PDA. Escapee #1 reported that there was no sex education, and teenagers feared that even holding hands could result in an unwanted pregnancy. Hyeonseo Lee notes that “for all its interference in our lives, the Party was extraordinarily bashful when it came to telling us how life itself was made.”[9]
 
A final factor influencing limited affection in relationships between young North Koreans is the fear of ruining future marriage opportunities. Hyeonseo Lee writes that dating was “quite a serious matter, because when word gets out that a girl has been dating it’s not easy for her to find another match.”[10] When arranging marriages, the social standing of both parties is scrutinized, and past dating history can be a disadvantage.
 
Dating in North Korea is limited to casual relationships before marriage. North Korea’s domestic law does not protect or recognize unwed couples who live together. According to a May 2023 report, “North Korea is sending unwed couples who are living together to serve time in labor camps, saying they are poisoning the country’s socialist society.”[11] This reinforces long-held beliefs that intimacy outside of marriage is morally wrong and, in the case of North Korea, a criminal offense. This limits the kind of relationships that North Koreans can have. “The crackdown on [these] couples is part of a larger effort by the government to eliminate “capitalist” or “anti-socialist” culture from infiltrating society, with increasingly harsh consequences for activities that the government deems to be unbecoming of a loyal citizen.”[12]

Marriage in North Korea
 
Marriage is considered important in North Korea. Escapee #2 reported that it is taboo to be an old bachelor, and staying single for long could result in an arranged marriage:
 
Marriages in North Korea can be born out of love or arranged. Those who choose to marry after a dating period typically do so out of mutual affection. Conversely, arranged marriages do not involve a dating phase, with marriage ensuing shortly after a few family meetings and brief encounters between the prospective couple. In my experience, the occurrences of both types of marriage are about even.

Of arranged marriages, Hyeonseo Lee writes that “financial security came first. With luck, the couple could fall in love after the marriage.”[13]
 
Every North Korean couple must first register their marriage with the authorities. The wedding ceremony itself is simple. The couple will go to each family’s house and hold a small gathering. The two families do not spend an extended amount of time together. Pictures are taken, often in front of statues of past and present Supreme Leaders. According to one account,
 
There are no Juche clergy to preside over weddings or funerals. When a couple marries, they both swear their loyalty to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. After the brief wedding ceremony, the newly-weds are expected to visit a nearby statue of Kim Il Sung, place some flowers in front of it, and then have their picture taken with the statue in the background.[14]

Past Supreme Leaders influence more than just wedding pictures. A couple “cannot walk down the aisle on 15 April or 16 February, the birthdays of the former leaders.”[15] This is all to demonstrate “that however much a couple might love each other their love for the Fatherly Leader was greater.”[16]
 
North Korea has strong patriarchal norms. This directly affects the situation of women’s rights, including that of married women. “The prevailing notion of male dominance and traditional patriarchal practices lead to domestic violence, especially when husbands believe that their wives are not respecting or obeying them.”[17] In addition, “even if witnesses or victims of domestic violence report it to the police, the police completely disregard the case and send them back home.”[18] By doing so, the state perpetuates domestic violence. Women’s status in North Korea has improved recently, as they have taken a more active role in markets,[19] but patriarchal norms remain prevalent in North Korea.[20]

Divorce in North Korea
 
Divorces are relatively uncommon in North Korea. According to escapee #2,
 
Divorce in North Korea requires a court decision, and mutual agreement is not a viable method for divorce. Due to the strict criteria for divorce and the complex proceedings, the divorce rate is relatively low. Moreover, the societal stigma attached to divorce, especially for women, makes it a difficult choice. Divorced individuals are issued a new ID card marked with the ‘divorce’ label, perpetuating the stigma.
 
Married women with children may be subject to discrimination if they undergo a divorce. Writing of her own mother’s divorce, Hyeonseo Lee says that “a divorced daughter was shameful enough, but a divorced daughter with a baby on her back would make her chances of making a successful match with someone else almost impossible.”[21]
 
Extramarital affairs are one of the few circumstances that could lead to divorce. According to escapee #2, while extramarital affairs are uncommon in North Korea, they do occur, especially among high-status individuals whose social standing protects them from “significant repercussions.” For those who have an affair but do not have high social status, they not only face divorce, but also criminal punishment.

Children in North Korea           
 
As in many other societies, “men and women in North Korea are expected to get married and have children.”[22] North Korean women who have many children are given special privileges in society and are regarded as maternal heroes.[23]
 
However, escapee #1 reported that the average family in North Korea will only have one or two children due to economic difficulties. Providing for a child in North Korea is difficult not just due to food and living expenses, but also because of education expenses. Escapee #2 shared that, “affluent families, particularly in urban areas, often hire tutors and invest considerably in their children’s academic performance. They strive to enroll their children in top-tier schools like the ‘First High School’ or prestigious universities.” Even if families do not spend extra money on a child’s education, school in North Korea is not free. “Parents are perpetually being given quotas for donations of goods, which the school sells to pay for facilities,” Lee recalls.[24]
 
Moreover, the rigid set of patriarchal norms in North Korean society “often manifests itself in neglect, deprivation or discriminatory treatment of girls in various settings, including in schools.”[25] If a family cannot afford to send two children to school, the female child will often be the one that stops going to school in favor of her brother continuing to have educational opportunities.


The Effect of Political Practices on Family Life
 
The Songbun System
 
North Korea classifies its citizens according to the songbun system of socio-political classification. Every North Korean has a songbun classification that determines where they can live, what education they have access to, and what jobs are available to them.
 
Songbun is also an important consideration in marriage. A marriage between two individuals of incompatible songbun would not be approved of by society.[26] Additionally, “many sources have reported the importance of songbun in such social institution as marriage” in North Korea.[27] A family can enhance the social standing of their child by arranging a marriage with someone of good songbun.
           
Escapee #2 reports that during and after the Great Famine of the 1990s, the focus shifted from marriages between compatible songbun to marriages that provided economic advantages. Traders, for example, came to be regarded as favorable marriage partners. While songbun is no longer the primary factor in marriage decisions, it still plays a role. Economic opportunities are more readily available for those who are considered loyal to the regime.

Guilt-by-Association
           
In North Korea, if an individual is found guilty of a crime or political offense, up to three generations of their family may be punished due to a system of guilt-by-association. Punishments could include a lower songbun, forced relocation to rural areas, or being sent to a prison camp. Hyeonseo Lee described an instance in which her uncle was arrested and imprisoned:
 
My grandmother then stepped in to protect the family and fixed it so that Aunt Old could divorce her husband and put the three children up for adoption. This way, the family could avoid the guilt by association with a ‘criminal element’ that would degrade their songbun and blight the family for generations. This is a common arrangement when a spouse is imprisoned.[28]
​
These measures may appear drastic, but in North Korea this is one of very few viable options to avoid life-long discrimination.

North Korean families are trapped by the guilt-by-association system. Actions that are necessary for survival, such as smuggling in goods from China to buy food, may be “deterred by the prospect of their entire family paying a terrible price as well – including, perhaps, descendants yet unborn.”[29] This is also why many North Koreans are hesitant to escape the country. If they are caught during an escape attempt, their whole family is at risk. “Not only the defectors but also their family members have been charged with the crime of ‘transgression of the Kim Il-sung/Kim Jong-il Ideology’ and thrown in political prison camps.”[30] For similar reasons, North Korean refugees often remain out of the public eye after they have escaped.


Human Rights Violations Relating to the Family
               
North Korea fails to protect human rights relating to family life. Contrary to Article 23 of the UDHR and Article 11.1 of the ICESCR, it does not ensure the right to a family existence worthy of human dignity, nor does it ensure the right to everyone and every family to an adequate standard of living. The regime also violates Article 12 of the UDHR by forcibly relocating families whose loyalty to the Supreme Leader is in question, and also Article 2.2 of the CRC by assigning songbun at birth and punishing children for the political transgressions of their parents or grandparents.
 
There are also relevant provisions of the CEDAW that North Korea fails to uphold. Article 2(c) calls upon states to establish effective legal protections for women against “any form of discrimination.” Moreover, under Article 10(h), states must give  “access to specific educational information to help ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and advice on family planning.”[31] The authorities ignore reports of domestic violence against women, fail to ensure that young girls have the same access to education as boys, and neglect to provide sex education or adequate information about family planning.


Conclusion

North Korea disregards the promises it has made as a UN member state—as well as the legal obligations it has assumed as a party to the ICESCR, ICCPR, CRC, and CEDAW—by failing to protect the fundamental rights of families and children. Furthermore, social norms in North Korea are influenced by corrupt political practices and chronic economic difficulties. The use of guilt-by-association imposes collective punishment on the family, barring children from access to educational and occupational opportunities. Protecting families must be a priority for civil society organizations and international human rights organizations in ongoing efforts to improve the human rights situation in North Korea.

Abbigail Thacker recently graduated from Brigham Young University with her bachelor's degree in political science and international strategy and diplomacy. She interned for HRNK during the summer of 2023 and continues her human rights advocacy in Utah as she prepares to attend law school this coming fall. 


[1] United Nations, General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris,  December 10, 1948). https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights; United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (December 16, 1966). https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights.
[2] United Nations, General Assembly International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (December 16, 1966). https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights.
[3] United Nations, General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child (November 20, 1989).  https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child.
[4] United Nations, General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (December 16, 1966).
[5] Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2019). https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/DPRK%20constitution%20%282019%29.pdf.
[6] This interviewee is referred to as “Escapee #1” throughout the article.
[7] This interviewee is referred to as “Escapee #2” throughout the article.
[8] Hyeonseo Lee, The Girl with Seven Names (London: William Collins, 2015), 77.
[9] Ibid., 75.
[10] Ibid., 77.
[11] Hyemin Son, “North Korea Punishes Unwed Couples Who are Living Together,” Radio Free Asia, May 2, 2023. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/commonlaw-05022023104312.html.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Lee, The Girl with Seven Names, 7.
[14] Donald L. Baker, “North Korea” in Worldmark Encyclopedia of Religious Practices, vol. 3 (Thomson Gale, 2006), 163.
[15] Kim Yoo-sung, “Ask a North Korean: What Happens on Your Wedding Day,” The Guardian, August 3, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/03/north-korean-weddings-kim-il-sung.
[16] Lee, The Girl with Seven Names, 8.
[17] Sanghee Bang, The Battered Wheel of the Revolution (Seoul: Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2011), 21. https://www.nkhr.or.kr/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/NKHR-Briefing-Report-No.6-The-Battered-Wheel-of-the-Revolution-2.pdf?ckattempt=1.
[18] Ibid., 23.
[19] Ibid., 27.
[20] UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” UN Doc. A/HRC/52/65, April 3, 2023. https://seoul.ohchr.org/en/node/506.
[21] Lee, The Girl with Seven Names, 9.
[22] Sonia Ryang, Reading North Korea: An Ethnological Inquiry (BRILL, 2020), 204.
[23] Song Hyun-jin, “The Types and Meanings of Maternal Heroes in the North Korean Songun (Military First) Era,” Journal of Peace and Unification 8.1 (2018): 65–107. https://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE08840561.
[24] Lee, The Girl with Seven Names, 36.
[25] Bang, The Battered Wheel of the Revolution, 25.
[26] Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea's Social Classification System (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012), 84.
[27] Helen-Louise Hunter, Kim Il-song’s North Korea (Bloomsbury Publishing, 1999), 8.
[28] Lee, The Girl with Seven Names, 66.
[29] Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (Oxford University Press, 2015), 50.
[30] Keumsoon Lee, The Border-crossing North Koreans: Current Situations and Future Prospects (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006), 71.
[31] United Nations, General Assembly Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York, December 18, 1979). https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-elimination-all-forms-discrimination-against-women.

By Jong-Min Lee
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations & Research

On May 19, 2023, the South Korean military discovered the body of a deceased North Korean escapee in its waters. According to the South Korean authorities, roughly 70g of methamphetamine was found on the individual’s leg.[1] Considering North Korea’s past actions and their impact on nearby countries, the concerns pertaining to methamphetamine from North Korea are nothing new for South Korea. This piece examines the past and present of narcotrafficking in relation to North Korea, with a focus on China's northeastern provinces that have been most affected by this issue.

History of North Korea’s State-led Narcotrafficking 

According to testimonies by high-ranking defectors, including Thae Yong-ho (former deputy ambassador to the UK) and Hwang Jang-yeop (former Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly), the North Korean regime started its narcotic-trafficking operations under Kim Jong-il’s guidance between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. This state-sponsored narcotrafficking started as an effort to prove Kim Jong-il’s political competency to his father, Kim Il-sung, by obtaining much-needed foreign currency for the regime.[2]
 
However, this state-sponsored narcotrafficking experienced drawbacks during the 1970s. These operations caused significant diplomatic problems. Numerous North Korean diplomats were implicated for their involvement. In 1976 alone, North Korean diplomats were expelled and designated persona non grata from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden for trafficking hashish.[3] Subsequently, North Korea started to work with criminal organizations in the 1980s to mitigate diplomatic complications.[4]
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea faced significant economic difficulties and experienced a famine in the mid- to late-1990s. The North Korean regime called the famine the “Arduous March.” Professor Sandra Fahy states that “Marching through Suffering” is a more faithful translation. It connotes valiantly struggling through the dire conditions of the famine, which North Korea blamed on the United States. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of Soviet subsidies, Kim Il-sung expanded the regime’s narcotrafficking operations. In 1992, under Kim Il-sung’s orders, the cultivation of heroin was promoted on a national scale under the name of “White Bellflower Movement,” along with the production of methamphetamine, to secure foreign currency.[5]
 
During the famine, Kim Jong-il further encouraged North Korea’s illicit operations to overcome economic challenges.[6] In 1996, there was a major shift in North Korea’s narcotics production. Severe floods and the famine damaged its poppy fields and created difficulties for heroin production. The regime thus turned to methamphetamine as an alternative.[7]
 
Under orders from Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s diplomatic service, security apparatus, and numerous state agencies became involved in illicit activities.[8] For example, according to Hwang Jang-Yeop, North Korean naval vessels were routinely involved in narcotrafficking to Southeast Asia until the mid-1990s.[9] Hwang also testified in 1997 that Nanam Pharmaceutical plant managed heroin, Suncheon Pharmaceutical plant managed morphine, and Pyongyang Pharmaceutical plant managed meth production, showing deep and widespread state involvement in drug production.[10] In the case of heroin, it has been alleged that the forced labor of political prisoners was used to cultivate poppies. Satellite images have shown large poppy plantations near the Yodok political prison camp, and testimonies from refugees attest to the use of forced labor in heroin production.[11]
 
The North Korean regime was also deeply involved in the production of crystal meth. The use of government-sanctioned pharmaceutical plants guarantees a high level of purity for the end products.[12] It has been alleged that the regime enhanced its narco-products by recruiting professional methamphetamine producers from South Korea in the early 1990s.[13] Chinese court dockets indicate that both South Korean[14] and Chinese transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)[15] have been involved in North Korea-related narcotrafficking.
 
Extensive state involvement in narco-production and trafficking has increased the commercial value of North Korean products in the global narco-market.[16] These narcotics have been sold through North Korea’s diplomatic outposts and restaurants,[17] and also with the cooperation of various TCOs, including the Yakuza, the Russian Mafia, and the Triads.[18] It has been alleged that North Korea partnered with these organizations to cover its tracks.[19][20]
 
Over time, this state-sponsored narcotrafficking project has resulted in the proliferation of professional narco-producers across the country. The regime has lost control over narcotics production, as these individuals are no longer constrained by the state. Drug-related crimes in North Korea have grown rampant despite the enactment of legislation on narco-control in 2004[21] and 2013.[22] Recent testimonies from refugees attest to an upsurge in public executions and criminal punishment for narcotics-related offenses.[23]
 
North Korean meth products have also been found in the Philippines,[24] Australia,[25] China,[26] and South Korea.[27] They even came close to entering the United States in 2013.[28] China has been a major point of transit for North Korean narcotics.[29] The scale of North Korea’s narco-production and trafficking cannot be verified, mainly due to China’s unwillingness to release detailed information that could be politically sensitive.[30] In the absence of official documentation, the main source of information on the subject has been the testimonies of North Korean refugees.[31]
 
Impact of North Korean Narcotics on the People’s Republic of China
 
It has been widely acknowledged that North Korea’s narcotrafficking has most heavily impacted Chinese cities near the Sino-North Korean border. Although aggregated data on North Korean narcotics is unavailable, its existence and impact can be inferred from Chinese and South Korean sources. North Korean crystal meth was sold for roughly 1,200 RMB per gram in northeast China in 2010,[32] and the estimated annual North Korean production of crystal meth and other synthetic drugs is around 3,000 kg.[33] Meanwhile, South Korean sources estimate that Bureau 39, which is tasked with raising foreign currency for the North Korean regime, has been making roughly $100-200 million annually through narcotrafficking operations.[34]
 
The high purity of North Korea’s crystal meth has made it increasingly competitive in the Chinese drug market. Police officers in northeast China have stated that North Korean crystal meth has been sold at a higher price than that from southern China, where illicit substances are obtained from the “Golden Triangle” (Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar). In contrast to crystal meth from southern China, which was sold at approximately 1g/1200 RMB (equivalent to $186), the starting price of North Korean crystal meth was approximately 1g/1500 RMB (equivalent to $232).[35] Even though exact information is not publicly available, narcotrafficking operations are likely to have been a major source of revenue for the North Korean regime.
 
Based on Chinese court cases, relevant statistics, and statements from senior Chinese Ministry of Public Safety (MPS) officials, North Korea’s narcotrafficking operations caused significant security challenges for the Chinese government and resulted in corruption among border security personnel. In 2011, Liu Yuejin, Vice Commissioner of the National Narcotics Control Commission, commented:
 
The number of people using methamphetamine in Northeast China has increased significantly. The abuse situation in Northeast China is prominent, and the registered synthetic drug abusers in the three Northeastern provinces have accounted for more than 72% of all drug users. To the surprise of the Chinese people, the three Eastern provinces, which are neither coastal nor drug-producing, have become the hardest hit areas. Russia and South Korea, which border the three Eastern provinces, are importers of drugs, are not important sources of exports, and only North Korea has grown to be the manufacturer of drugs on a large scale since the 1990s. There is also plenty of evidence that drugs from North Korea, especially methamphetamine, are rampant in the three Northeastern provinces.[36]
 
Northeast China has been hit the hardest by drug problems relative to other regions of the country. According to statistics from the Yanji municipal government in 2009, the number of narcotic offenders related to crystal meth in the city in 1995 was only 44, but the number had increased to 2,090 over a decade.[37] Meanwhile, the Shenyang City Prosecution Service stated that 73% of all narcotraffickers prosecuted between 2009 and 2011 were foreign nationals.[38] These “foreign” nationals are allegedly North Koreans. Furthermore, from January to May 2015, the Jilin provincial government seized and incinerated roughly 170 kg of narcotics.[39]
 
When the Regional Deputy Director of Ministry of Public Safety and the Commander of the Byeonbang (Border Area) Reconnaissance Battalion in Donggang City were indicted in 2015 for colluding with North Koreans, Chinese authorities seized approximately 50 kg of North Korean crystal meth during the arrest.[40] The opaqueness of narcotrafficking from North Korea also presents a significant challenge to Chinese President Xi Jinping, who declared a war on drugs in 2014.[41] In 2020, Xi re-emphasized the importance of China’s counter-narcotic efforts.[42] China’s 2019 National Drugs Situation Report identified 0.16% of its population (2.148 million) as drug users.[43] This poses a significant challenge for Xi, and China has taken steps to address the problem over the past decade.
 
Despite the severity of this issue, information about North Korea’s narcotrafficking in China has not been publicized through foreign media outlets since 2018,[44] when there was a thaw in Sino-North Korean relations with multiple summit meetings between Xi and Kim.[45] Since then, Sino-North Korean relations have been reinforced as Sino-U.S. relations have deteriorated. Reports from the Liaoning Daily and statistics from the Intermediate People’s Court of Shenyang in 2020 note that the number of narcotics-related offenses had declined by 61.11% since 2016.[46] However, considering that North Korea enforced strong border control measures in response to COVID-19,[47][48] this decline may reflect North Korea’s extreme quarantine measures rather than a fundamental shift in policy.
 
North Korean narcotrafficking can also be examined through information from South Korean sources. In 2012, Representative Yoon Sang-hyun of the National Assembly stated that more than half of the narcotics entering South Korea originated from North Korea.[49] The problem has only grown in recent years. The number of maritime narcotrafficking interdictions by South Korea’s Coast Guard increased from 56 in 2016 to 962 in 2022.[50] According to figures from the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office, the amount of confiscated heroin increased from 0.74g in the first half of 2020 to 1,210.26g in the first half of 2021, while the amount of seized methamphetamine jumped from 28,114.19g in the first half of 2020 to 93,065g in the first half of 2021.[51] These figures do not provide specific information about narcotrafficking originating from North Korea. However, given the past frequency of indictments and announcements by South Korean authorities implicating North Korea in narcotrafficking incidents, it is plausible that North Korea is involved in these developments.
 
North Korea’s Narcotrafficking: Recent Developments
 
Kim Jong-un has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with China on drug-related issues. In particular, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) passed a new counter-narcotics law in July 2021. Compared to the 2004 and 2013 amendments that only included clauses related to the punishment of the production and trafficking of narcotics, this new law has a special provision that specifically refers to the prevention of narcotics usage and related crimes.[52] Considering the statements and relevant data from Chinese officials in the three northeastern provinces and from North Korean refugees, however, the new law is unlikely to have a meaningful impact.
 
The severity of narcotics usage among North Koreans may be attributed to state-sponsored narcotics production and distribution, a dilapidated healthcare system, food insecurity, and the rise in demand and distribution of narcotics throughout North Korea and its vicinity. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the famine in the 1990s devastated North Korea’s economy, public distribution system, and public health infrastructure. More North Koreans turned to illicit substances to evade hunger, illness, and pain.[53]
 
The severity of the issue is indicated by the testimony of a former North Korean counternarcotics prosecutor, who stated in a 2021 article that roughly 30 percent of the North Korean population has abused illicit substances. The problem is not solely restricted to adults. This former prosecutor testified that she had even witnessed seven-year-olds abusing narcotics.[54] A study by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights in 2018 reached similar conclusions regarding the percentage of the population affected by drug abuse.[55] The gravity of the problem has also been well described in testimony from Chinese law enforcement. Yanbian police officers stated in a 2014 study that most North Korean households stored at least 2 grams of narcotics as first-aid medicine.[56]
 
To stabilize the region and to counter the spread of narcotics in northeast China, Chinese authorities initiated a cooperative investigation with South Korean authorities in 2011.[57] South Korea and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Enforcement of Criminal Laws for transnational crimes. However, compared to China's existing transnational counter-narcotic measures with ASEAN countries—ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD)—Sino-South Korean cooperation on transnational crimes is not as well structured. Chinese authorities have often demonstrated a lack of cooperation in terms of the South Korean authorities’ requests for extradition and investigations of transnational crimes.[58] Furthermore, it has been alleged that Chinese authorities have been hesitant to actively apprehend North Korean operators based on shifting bilateral relations and the geopolitical climate.[59]
 
Concluding Remarks
 
North Korea’s narcotrafficking not only affects China, but also impacts South Korea, which has been experiencing an increase in methamphetamine-related cases. South Korean police and prosecutors have frequently referred to narcotrafficking cases involving narcotics originating from North Korea, with references to North Korea’s Ministry of State Security.[60]
 
On October 26, 2022, South Korea’s President Yoon and the ruling People Power Party (PPP) declared a war on drugs.[61] Earlier this year, there were revelations about a methamphetamine blackmail scheme targeting minors at a cram-school in Seoul, with the methamphetamine originating from China.[62] South Korea has been experiencing an increase in methamphetamine-related narcotrafficking cases, some of which may plausibly involve North Korea and other TCOs.
 
While cooperation between China and South Korea is needed to effectively address this issue, it is unclear whether such cooperation will be forthcoming. Consider, for example, the lack of cooperation thus far between the United States and China regarding the fentanyl crisis.[63] The current geopolitical environment does not appear to be conducive to significant bilateral cooperation between Seoul and Beijing on narcotrafficking, including narcotics originating from North Korea.
 
Jong-Min Lee is a Master of Arts in Law & Diplomacy candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, pursuing a concentration in International Security and Public International Law. He is a graduate of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, where he pursued a concentration in Security Policy and Global Public Health.

[1] Kim Yejin, “마약 들고 탈북 추정...북한 남성 시신 발견해 조사 중” [Suspected to have escaped from North Korea with Narcotics... Authorities are Investigating after the Body of a Deceased North Korean Man is Found], Segye Ilbo, May 27, 2023. https://m.segye.com/view/20230527505240.
[2] Thae Yong-ho, “북한에 마약 많이 퍼졌다는 소문 돌지만... 실제론 철저히 단속” [Despite the Rumors of Prevalence of Narcotics in North Korea, the Authorities have Responded with Strict Measures], Chosun Ilbo, April 27, 2023. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/04/26/2019042602028.html.
[3] “Letter from Norwegian Police Security Service to Foreign Ministry, “The North Korean Embassy-Illegal Import and Distribution of Spirits, Cigarettes, etc.,” The Wilson Center Digital Archive, March 28, 2017. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/letter-norwegian-police-security-service-foreign-ministry-north-korean-embassy-illegal?_ga=2.196974126.321082836.1627586055-1512673604.1622236090&_gac=1.219723243.1626069560.Cj0KCQjwraqHBhDsARIsAKuGZeGaI3t0CVh5E0--v3SlEoOhNqLnVITICdtPvYlXg9PqOfLDsdfu8zsaAuF6EALw_wcB.
[4] William Bach, “Drugs, Counterfeiting, and Arms Trade: The North Korean Connection,” 2001-2009 Archive for the U.S. Department of State, May 20, 2003. https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/21044.htm.
[5] Hwang Hyung-joon, “양귀비 직접 재배해 마약 제조’…북한군의 ‘백도라지 사업’” [Producing Narcotics through Cultivating own Poppy Plantations…Korean People’s Army’s “White Bellflower Project”], Dong-A Ilbo, December 8, 2008. https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20081208/8668334/1.
[6] Jang Won-jae, “장원재의 북한 요지경: ‘마약의 나라’ 북한 주민의 30%가 마약 상복” [Country of Narcotics: 30% of North Korean Population Abuses Narcotics], Monthly Chosun, November 2019.
http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?ctcd=&nNewsNumb=201911100048.
[7] Lee Hong, “추적! 평양發 마약 커넥션의 내막 국가기관이 헤로인ㆍ필로폰 밀조ㆍ밀매를 주관하는 세계 유일의 사례 연구” [Drug Ring Originating from Pyongyang, Research on the World’s Only Narco-State, the Drug Rings’ Connection to North Korea’s State-led Production and Smuggling of Heroin and Methamphetamine], Monthly Chosun, July 2003.
http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?ctcd=&nNewsNumb=200307100056.
[8] Michael Miklaucic and Moisés Naím, “The Criminal State,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, eds. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2013), 164–65. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf.
[9] Yang Jung-ah, “황장엽 ‘김정일 비자금 마카오-광저우 두 곳에서 관리” [Hwang Jang-yeop says Kim Jong-il’s Slush Funds are managed in Macau and Guangzhou], Daily NK, January 16, 2006. https://www.dailynk.com/%ED%99%A9%EC%9E%A5%EC%97%BD-%EA%B9%80%EC%A0%95%EC%9D%BC-%EB%B9%84%EC%9E%90%EA%B8%88-%EB%A7%88%EC%B9%B4%EC%98%A4%EA%B4%91%EC%A0%80%EC%9A%B0/.
[10] Jang, “Country of Narcotics.”
[11] Ed Barnes, “Flourishing Poppy Fields Outside Prison Camps Are Heroin Cash Crop for North Korea,” Fox News, May 10, 2011.
https://www.foxnews.com/world/flourishing-poppy-fields-outside-prison-camps-are-heroin-cash-crop-for-north-korea.
[12] Jang, “Country of Narcotics."
[13] Jung Hee-sang, “한국 기술자 2명, 북한에서 마약 제조” [Two South Koreans are Producing Narcotics in North Korea],
Sisa Journal, November 11, 2001. https://www.sisajournal.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=79131.
[14] Liu Yang, “两名韩国人在中国东北地区贩毒 分获死刑及死缓” [Two South Koreans Sentenced to Death for Narcotrafficking in Northeast China], Sohu, August 14, 2012. http://news.sohu.com/20120814/n350626755.shtml.
[15] Liu Li, “家禁毒委、公安部公布近期破获的十起毒品大案” [The National Narcotic Control Commission and the Ministry of Public Safety’s Ten Major Counter-Narcotics Sting Operations], China Central Television, June 25, 2008. http://news.cctv.com/society/20080625/106509.shtml.
[16] Jung, “Two South Koreans are Producing Narcotics in North Korea.”
[17] Joo Seong-ha, “마약에 빠진 북한… ‘동네마다 얼음 파는 집’” [North Korea on Drugs… ‘Prevalence of Methamphetamine’], Dong-A Ilbo, May 25, 2019. https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20190525/95690028/1.
[18] Bach, “Drugs, Counterfeiting, and Arms Trade.”
[19] David L. Asher, “Policy Forum 05-92A: The North Korean Criminal State, its Ties to Organized Crime, and the Possibility of WMD Proliferation.”, Nautilus Institute, November 15, 2005. https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/the-north-korean-criminal-state-its-ties-to-organized-crime-and-the-possibility-of-wmd-proliferation/?msclkid=808ba4d8b6db11ecbe8709e0f0316cb3.
[20] Miklaucic and Naím, “The Criminal State,” 164–65.
[21] Yang Ok-kyung et al., “Bukhan jumin-ui mayak sayong mit jungdok” [North Korea’s Illegal Drug Use and Abuse: Current Situation and Solutions], Dong-A Yeongu 37, no. 1 (2018):  233–70. https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART002323057.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Oh Gyeong-seob et al., White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2021 (Seoul, Korea: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2021), 45–56. https://www.kinu.or.kr/main/module/report/view.do?idx=837&nav_code=mai1674786121.
[24] Rosette Adel, “Sebastian: Drugs in Bilibid come from China, North Korea,” Philstar Global, October 10, 2016.
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/10/10/1632237/sebastian-drugs-bilibid-come-china-north-korea.
[25] Doug Struck, “Heroin Trail Leads to North Korea,” The Washington Post, May 12, 2003. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/05/12/heroin-trail-leads-to-north-korea/017fa657-ce96-4eae-b44e-16f9376816ff/.
[26] Son Hye-min, “북 보위성 소속 마약밀수조직 중국 공안에 체포돼” [Drug Ring under North Korea’s Ministry of State Security Operatives have been Apprehended by the Chinese Ministry of Public Safety], Radio Free Asia, May 24, 2019.
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/ne-hm-05242019090806.html.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Sari Horwitz, “5 Extradited in Plot to Import North Korean Meth to U.S.,” The Washington Post, November 20, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/5-extradited-in-plot-to-import-north-korean-meth-to-us/2013/11/20/4a2a3840-5222-11e3-9e2c-e1d01116fd98_story.html.
[29] “중국 지린성, 북-중 마약밀매 거점부상” [Jilin Province of China has become the epicenter of Sino-North Korean Narcotrafficking], VOA News, January 26, 2010. https://www.voakorea.com/a/a-35-2010-01-26-voa22-91428629/1331770.html.
[30] Wang Jiawei et al., “朝鲜攻陷东北” [North Korea Narcotics Took Over Northeast China], Wenmi, October 24, 2022.
https://www.wenmi.com/article/pzv4j903t2ri.html.
[31] U.S. Department of State, 2017 INCSR-Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control (as Submitted to Congress), March 2, 2017, 143. https://www.state.gov/2017-incsr-volume-i-drug-and-chemical-control-as-submitted-to-congress/.
[32] Choi Won-gi, “북한 사회의 마약 실태” [The Drug Problem in North Korea], VOA Korea, August 11, 2010. https://www.voakorea.com/a/nk-drug-100462074/1347301.html.
[33] Lee Dong-hwi, “북한産 필로폰 국내 유통시킨 19명 검거” [Nineteen Individuals Arrested for Distributing North Korean Meth], Chosun Ilbo, October 10, 2019. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/10/08/2019100800156.html.
[34] Lee Jang-hoon, “북한 노동당 39호실의 외화벌이 사업” [Korean Workers’ Party Bureau 39’s Foreign Currency Operations], Monthly Chosun, August 2015. http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?ctcd=&nNewsNumb=201508100036.
[35] Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Illicit: North Korea’s Evolving Operations to Earn Hard Currency (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2014), 85–88. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/SCG-FINAL-FINAL.pdf.
[36] Li Cong, “Drugged by Comrades,” Global Times, March 12, 2013. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201303/767651.shtml.
[37] Kim Kyong-chan et al., “Joongguk dongbuk jiyeok hanguk gwallyeon mayak beomjoe wa boisu pishing beomjoe ui siltae mit daeung bangan-e gwanhan yeongu” [The Research and Legal Studies on the Policy and the Trends of Drug and Voice Phishing Crime Related to Koreans in Northeast China] (Seoul, Korea: Korea Institute of Criminology, 2014), 100. https://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE02393421. 
[38] Ibid., 63.
[39] “길림성 마약 170여키로그람 집중소각” [Jilin Province Incinerates 170kg Worth of Narcotics], People’s Network, June 24, 2015. http://korean.people.com.cn/85524/15516533.html.
[40] Joo, “North Korea on Drugs.”
[41] Shannon Tiezzi, “China's War on Drugs,” The Diplomat, May 29, 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/chinas-war-on-drugs/.
[42]  “习近平对禁毒工作作出重要指示强调 坚持厉行禁毒方针 打好禁毒人民战争 推动禁毒工作不断取得新成效” [President Xi Jinping Issues Important Instructions and Expects Effective Results on Counter-Narcotic Efforts and Declares People’s War on Drugs], Xinhua, June 23, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-06/23/c_1126150124.htm.
[43] Aksu District Public Security Bureau Cyber Division, 《2019年中国毒品形势报告》发布（附全文） [China’s National Drug Situation Report 2019 (Full Text)], Baidu, June 25, 2020. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1670462119974013484&wfr=spider&for=pc.
[44] Author’s finding from researching major Chinese internet portals and state media outlets.
[45] Steven Lee Myers and Jane Perlez, “Kim Jong-Un Met with Xi Jinping in Secret Beijing Visit,” The New York Times, March 27, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/world/asia/kim-jong-un-china-north-korea.html.
[46] Zhou Xianzhong et al., “市法院发布禁毒工作白皮书（2016-2020）” [City Court Releases White Paper on Anti-drug Work (2016-2020)], Shenyang Net, June 23, 2021. https://news.syd.com.cn/system/2021/06/23/011925533.shtml.
[47] Jesse Jonson, “North Korea Closes Borders to All Foreign Tourists as New Coronavirus Spreads from China,” The Japan Times, January 22, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/01/22/asia-pacific/science-health-asia-pacific/north-korea-closes-borders-all-foreign-tourists-coronavirus-china/.
[48] Ji Jeong-eun, “North Korea Accepts Pandemic Aid, but Border with China Remains Closed,” Radio Free Asia, October 7, 2021.  https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/aid-10072021191235.html.
[49] Jung Ah-ran, “윤상현 ‘국내반입 마약 절반 이상이 북한산’” [Rep. Yoon Sang-hyun: ‘More than half of the Narcotics in South Korea originates from North Korea’], Yonhap News, February 6, 2012. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20120206062000001.
[50] Republic of Korea Coast Guard, “지표서비스 나라 지표-마약사범 단속 현황” [Statistics on Apprehension and Crackdown of Narcotraffickers], January 9, 2023. https://www.index.go.kr/unity/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do;jsessionid=9HQEWIWkUeP6_phzbGwjMQS57_jVe8jh8hoZrYhQ.node11?idx_cd=A0001.
[51] Supreme Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Korea, “2021년 6월 마약류 월간동향” [2021 June Report: Monthly Trends for Narcotrafficking], July 23, 2023. https://www.spo.go.kr/site/spo/ex/board/List.do?cbIdx=1201. 
[52] Lee Myong-cheol, “북, 마약사범 급증에 ‘마약범죄방지법’ 새로 제정” [North Korea Newly Adopts ‘Drug Crime Prevention Act’ to Counter Increase of Narcotic-Related Offenders], Radio Free Asia, August 3, 2021. https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/ne-lm-08032021091443.html.
[53] Yang et al., “North Korea’s Illegal Drug Use and Abuse.”
[54] Ahn Yong-hyun, “주민 30% 마약...한류에 푹빠져’ 김정은이 말한 '악성암' 北 덮쳤다” [30% of the Population Suspected to Abuse Narcotics, Absorbed in Korean Wave; ‘Terminal Cancer’ Mentioned by Kim Jong-un has Struck North Korea], Chosun Ilbo, July 23, 2021. https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2021/07/23/ER57Y5DENZGILNAAW7V2KLDAUM/.
[55] Koo Eun-hyung, “이관형 “북한은 왜? <北 주민 30%... 마약 경험?>” [Why has 30% of North Koreans Experienced Narcotics?], MBC News, December 19, 2016. https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/unity/4186812_29114.html. 
[56] Kim et al., “The Research and Legal Studies on the Policy and the Trends of Drug and Voice Phishing Crime Related to Koreans in Northeast China,” 97.
[57] Yoon Wan-jun, “[단독]中, 북한산 마약에 뿔났다” [Exclusive: China Infuriated over North Korean Narcotics], Dong-A Ilbo, July 5, 2011. https://www.donga.com/news/Inter/article/all/20110705/38547901/1.
[58] Song Young-ji, “Han joong hyeongsa sabeop gongjo-eui munjaejeom-gwa gaesun bangan” [Problems in International Mutual Assistance between Korea and China and the Improvement Plan], Kangwon Law Review 59 (2020): 263–94. 
https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART002567640.
[59] Son Hye-min, “China Uncovers North Korean State-Sponsored Drug Ring after Arrests,” Radio Free Asia, October 11, 2020.  https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk-china-meth-agents-05282019164756.html.
[60] For example, see Park Hyun-jun, “검찰, 北에 포섭돼 마약판매 시도 50대 구속기소” [Prosecution Service Indicts 50-year-old for Attempting to Sell Narcotics on North Korea’s Behalf], Asia Business Daily, May 25, 2010. http://cm.asiae.co.kr/article/2010052516351574974. 
[61] Lee Sung-eun, “Yoon, PPP Declare War on Drugs,” Korea JoongAng Daily, October 26, 2022. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/10/26/national/socialAffairs/korea-drugs-drug-smuggling/20221026184624813.html. 
[62] Jun Ji-hye, “Police Request Chinese Authorities’ Assistance in Drug-Laced Drinks Case,” The Korea Times, April 10, 2023.
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/05/113_348773.html.
[63] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “China’s Role in the Fentanyl Crisis,” The Brookings Institute, March 31, 2023. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-role-in-the-fentanyl-crisis/.