By Tessa Aguilar, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, HRNK Research Associate

Introduction
               The phenomenon of globalization has generated critical transformations in the international landscape, reshaping the dynamics between states and redefining their global images. This is observed in the rising wave of the ‘Asian Ascendancy,’ most commonly known as increasingly popular Asian cultural exchanges, creating a surge in the hybridity of Western and Asian trends in the contemporary period. This globalized effort is defined by a plethora of Asian countries, the most notable drivers within the twenty-first century including China, Japan, South Korea, and India. More specifically, Asian Ascendancy is the mother concept of the increasingly popular Hallyu, also called the Korean Wave. This cultural boom has allowed increasing mass media exposure of South Korean entertainment, principles, and traditions, redefining current definitions and influence of Westernization. Yet, despite a growing global preference for Asian media, this does not imply that all Asian states are positively featured in the media: What are the dynamics of Asian states that have yet to fully embrace this Ascendancy? How do these states further shift their application relative to a personal socio-cultural agenda?

               In this context, North Korea, an autocratic regime notorious for its isolation and infamous socialist-dynastic political agenda, is the leading actor to apply the Asian Ascendancy to publicizing current propaganda, reinforcing its ideology in the geopolitical environment, and attempting to shift its global perception into a better light. This article presents an analysis of the Korean Wave impact on globalization as part of the broader Asian Ascendancy movement and explores how North Korea has leveraged the cultural exports of the Korean Wave to reconstruct its own global perception.

Asian Ascendancy: The Emergence of Hallyu and its Influence in North Korea

               Asian Ascendancy first emerged in the later twentieth century. Following the end of the Cold War, an increased demand for interconnectedness among societies sparked the Asian Ascendancy through the usage of media distribution amidst the age of technological innovation. Originally intended to combat the “unjust control by the Western developed nations,” Asian Ascendancy continues to reshape the narrative and global dominance of Asian culture and lifestyle.[1] Through this phenomenon, globalization has improved through increased communications fueled by multilateral dialogues and cultural expansion. In turn, globalization has been promoting increasing tolerance of international diversity while discouraging aggression and ultimately fueling interconnectedness and more robust diplomatic relations between nations.[2] Currently, China is notably spearheading this Ascendancy movement, as it expresses the highest development in cultural expansion, facilitating the exchange of multilateral dialogues, and income generation.[3] For instance, the 2008 Beijing Olympics aided in the triumph of Asian perceptions. Entrusting China to host the Games helped “undermine the perception of Western economic prowess,”[4] prompting the reevaluation of Asia’s efficiency and ability to express political disputes and historical resentments.

               One of the leading representatives of Asian Ascendancy has been Hallyu, a term coined in the late 1990s, and translated as the “[South] Korean Wave,” which emerged as a significant influence in recent entertainment and communications development. Essentially, Hallyu is an innovative hybridization of “Westernized modernity” and “Asian sentimentality” in South Korean television, music, and art.[5] As most are aware, younger audiences—from teenagers to thirty-year-old adults and even older—indulge in South Korean media, such as Korean dramas and K-Pop, due to the unique freedom of expression it signifies. The mass popularity of Hallyu is also utilized by the South Korean government, characterized as a form of soft power intended to fulfill the political agenda of “complex interdependence,” boosting the state’s global image and popularity across multiple regions.[6] However, this does not constitute a wholehearted embrace of South Korean culture, as states driven by authoritarianism and one-man dictatorships view this ascendancy as a threat to regime legitimacy and sovereignty.

               The rise of Hallyu has prompted a clash of ideology and support in North Korea. Interestingly, South Korean media was prominent in North Korea even before the Korean Wave.[7] Given the exponential increase of Hallyu and South Korean media consumption, North Korea has demonstrated a multifaceted approach to combating and embracing this dynamic. Therefore, North Korea’s utilization of Hallyu and the broader Asian Ascendancy movement offers insight into its operationalization to navigate the complexities of globalization, further reshaping its global perception. It also highlights the interplay between soft power, cultural exports, and global influence within Asian Ascendancy. North Korea’s response to Hallyu demonstrates significant strategizing around the threat posed by South Korean culture to its authoritarian regime. While the regime may seek to manage perceptions of modernity through tightly curated content, it cannot replicate or co-opt Hallyu, which is fundamentally South Korean—rooted in artistic freedom, internet culture, and Western influences such as hip-hop and global capitalism.
​
                Even so, this strategic mimicry must not be mistaken for cultural openness. In reality, the Kim regime has declared Hallyu a grave ideological threat—so severe that mere possession of South Korean media can lead to imprisonment or execution. The regime’s efforts to control this “cultural contagion” reflect not an interest in integration, but fear of exposure to the freedoms symbolized by the other Korea.

The People’s Embrace and North Korea’s Strategic Response

               Hallyu has been accepted and consumed by North Korea’s people but rejected by its regime and official propaganda. The burgeoning interest in South Korean media among North Korean people derives from a shared ethnic and cultural affiliation.[8] This kinship has cultivated a favorable response among North Korean citizens, partly responsible for a notable increase in defection rates since 1998. A discernible pattern emerges: the greater the consumption of South Korean media by North Korean citizens, the higher the propensity for individuals to defect, demonstrating the impact of cultural liberty and freedom of expression within these media sources.[9] Due to Hallyu, North Koreans receive a sense of hope and empowerment despite being confined to the constraints of an authoritarian, patriarchal society driven by the Juche self-reliance ideology.[10]

               Surprisingly, at times, the DPRK has responded to Hallyu’s components. In 2018, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un formally invited K-Pop musicians—such as Red Velvet, Seohyun from Girls’ Generation, and even Cho Yong-pil—to perform a combination of selected South Korean and traditional North Korean songs at Pyongyang’s “Spring is Coming” concert.[11] This concert would be the last performance by South Korean singers for the coming years due to escalating inter-Korean tensions. While this was truly a shocking invitation, this event should not be misinterpreted as an embrace of Hallyu by the North Korean regime. Instead, it functioned as a temporary, performative gesture aligned with inter-Korean diplomacy at the time—a diplomatic exception rather than a rule. The regime’s cultural policy remains deeply hostile to Hallyu, evidenced by the enactment of the Anti-Reactionary Thought Law in 2020, which punishes Hallyu consumption with prison or even execution.

               The “Sally Parks [송아 SongA Channel]” YouTube channel is particularly significant to North Korea’s intriguing media platforms, not as an extension of Hallyu, but rather as a strategic counter-narrative aimed at offsetting its global influence and soft power reach. Presented through the lens of an eleven-year-old girl named Song-A, this channel showcases her lifestyle in Pyongyang. Song-A provides English-spoken vlogs that offer glimpses into her educational pursuits, ardent basketball practices, and occasional immersion in the arts and English language learning. She has additionally highlighted major North Korean attractions, such as the Munsu Water Park and the 75th-anniversary celebration of the Children’s Union.[12]

                Nevertheless, discerning minds raise pertinent questions about the legitimacy of these vlogs. While these videos serve as an extended form of North Korean propaganda, leveraging the presence of a young girl to elicit sentiment among a global audience raises concerns regarding the authenticity of daily life depicted in North Korea. For instance, Song-A resides in Pyongyang, North Korea’s most developed and wealthiest city, masking the reality of the underdeveloped infrastructure among rural regions. In addition, Song-A’s contrived and rehearsed speech patterns, coupled with the perfection of the environments portrayed, posits doubts about the authenticity of this content. Rather than promoting cultural openness, the channel appears to appropriate the visual language and tone of youth-driven content associated with Hallyu, despite lacking the essential freedoms and influences—especially those from Western genres like hip-hop—that define Hallyu’s authenticity and global reach. Most significantly, these videos have minimal enforcement of North Korean principles. This is likely North Korea’s attempt to engage with the global society through falsely curated content, operating under the presumption that mimicking accessible and globally appealing formats will increase international tolerance or sympathy for the regime’s political endeavors.

Unyielding Walls and Suppressed Waves

               Despite the increasing global visibility of Hallyu and its influence across borders, North Korea’s domestic response has remained aggressively oppositional, characterized by forced ideological compliance, severe punishments for cultural subversion, and a persistent media blackout. Rather than demonstrating growth in the realm of cultural exchange, the regime has intensified efforts to insulate its population from the influence of foreign media, particularly the subversive allure of South Korean entertainment. This is evident in North Korea’s rigid censorship, demolition of cultural diplomacy infrastructure, and the establishment of laws targeting “reactionary” content.

               The straggled opportunities for North Korean tourism operations with South Korea are at an all-time low, even suffering demolition. Specifically, the early 2000s Mount Gumgang tourism project, constructed through the Sunshine Policy by the Hyundai Corporation, is being dismantled.[13] Initially meant to foster inter-Korean engagement, the project was terminated in 2008 due to the shooting death of 53-year-old South Korean tourist Park Wang-ja on a North Korean beach. Years later, North Korea began to take down South Korean facilities at Mount Gumgang.[14]

               Additionally, the North Korean regime has adopted a draconian stance toward its citizens’ consumption of South Korean media. In 2020, the regime introduced the Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act, a doctrine that rigorously enforced punishments for individuals found to be engaging with South Korean media.[15] These penalties range from arduous labor sentences and even the death penalty, depending on whether one is just a consumer or a distributor of South Korean media. For instance, individuals of any age who use “capitalist” terminology—such as referring to one’s spouse as “wife” instead of “dongji” (comrade)—face up to fifteen years of arduous labor at a labor camp.[16] Meanwhile, the death penalty is strictly enforced for those caught distributing South Korean media. Even teenagers have been executed for possessing or sharing K-Dramas, reflecting the regime’s zero-tolerance policy toward cultural infiltration.[17]

               As of 2023, North Korea continues to impose stringent ideological mandates. The intensity of this mandate is exemplified by the directive for citizens to read a minimum of 10,000 pages of propaganda for the year. This requirement urges citizens to read nearly thirty pages of propaganda each day. North Korean citizens are required to diligently journal their daily readings, as this will be presented to the party organization at the end of the year.[18] Despite acknowledging the lackluster nature of propaganda when faced with the allure of South Korean media, compliance with such measures is non-negotiable, as the consequences of nonconformity are severe and even fatal.

               Hallyu’s suppression is not merely cultural—it is a pillar of North Korea’s domestic security policy. By strictly controlling its citizens’ exposure to external influences, North Korea seeks to safeguard its grip on power and negate potential challenges to its authoritarian regime. This implies that the DPRK is adamantly attempting to impose a domestic media and information monopoly. Somehow, similar attempts target international audiences as well, but with a very limited, if any, degree of success.

Contrasting Paths: North and South Korea’s Ideological Implications on Hallyu

               The rise of Hallyu as part of the Asian Ascendancy movement delves into key values that provide a comparative analysis of North and South Korean values. Both states contain a Korean ethnic nexus yet take separate approaches to their responses to Asian Ascendancy through principles of nationalism, secularism, and the role of religion in education.

               North and South Korea exhibit strong nationalist sentiments—albeit with distinct manifestations. Firmly grounded in ethnic nationalism, South Korean nationalism is augmented by a sense of modernity and success achieved within a globalizing world. It is additionally fueled by desires for economic growth and international recognition, making it particularly receptive to the usage of cultural exports for diplomacy and global branding. Therefore, the rise of  Hallyu was embraced by South Korea as both a cultural movement and an instrument of soft power, aiding the country to assert itself across international dimensions. After all, which state would refuse the opportunity to further establish itself politically, economically, and socio-culturally through soft power mitigation?

               In contrast, North Korea fits the narrative that not all states are enthusiastic about cultural influence in global media. The regime’s nationalism is deeply intertwined with its Juche ideology and the personalist regime encompassing the state. This has resulted in a more cautious and restrictive response to Hallyu, as North Korea prefers to reinforce its own narrative established after the formation of the state following the Korean War. For example, this dynamic is observed in the enforcement of North Korea’s Chondoism in the later twentieth century. Chondoism, comprised of traditional Korean shamanism and Confucianism, was employed during Kim Il-Sung’s reign as a political scheme to bolster extreme patriotism in North Korea. It was additionally used as a bridge to reduce tensions with South Korea. However, South Korean officials declined this opportunity, as they recognized the regime’s ulterior motive to establish espionage in South Korean provinces.[19] The prominence of Chondoism in North Korea has recently diminished, due to strict pandemic policies implemented to limit the religious practice.

               Consequently, the role of secularism in North Korea has significantly diverged from the coexistence of religion with the cultural sphere, to cultist personalities. North Korea prohibits religious adherence upon any citizen and hails the Kim dynasty as the ‘saviors’ of the domestic population’s quality of life. It establishes a form of “hard secularism” through the worship of the Kim dynasty, manipulating the traditional secularist dynamic for states to protect religion from extremist distortion while enabling critical thought and information.[20] This repressive structure of secularism stands in contrast to the pluralistic religious tolerance observed in South Korea, where Christian, Buddhist, and other spiritual influences have helped shape the moral themes and creative choices found in some K-dramas and music.[21]While Hallyu does not explicitly promote religion, the cultural values embedded in its narratives—such as community, family, personal redemption, and moral responsibility—often connect with South Korea’s faith-informed social fabric. This newfound role of secularism in North Korea in the twenty-first century is vastly different compared to the promotion of South Korea’s faith-based religious principles in Hallyu.

               North Korea’s current approach to media censorship and suppression presents significant implications for the ideological framework of Hallyu and the Asian Ascendancy in contemporary globalization. It redefines the national and global perspective of state sovereignty and individualism in an ever-evolving society. Unfortunately, amidst a booming era of vibrant Asian culture and philosophy, North Korea is far too concerned with ensuring its own national legitimacy. It is not ready to embrace Hallyu and the broader Asian Ascendancy movement for the benefit of its people and society. Fundamentally, the Kim regime understands that Hallyu cannot be ideologically sanitized or replicated. It is precisely the fusion of liberal modernity, digital connectivity, and Western cultural expressions that renders it irreconcilable with North Korea’s closed, patriarchal state.

Concluding Remarks            

               As the currents of globalization once swept across the international sphere, the phenomenon of Asian Ascendancy and Hallyu stood as a powerful geopolitical force that forged new dynamics and statecraft between Western nations and the global perceptions of Asian cultures. This article discussed North Korea’s strategic employment of Hallyu to reshape its global image, as the regime weaves a carefully curated facade, blurring reality with fiction. Yet, beneath this spectacle lies the narrative of suppression and censorship. While South Korea cemented its role as the creator, distributor, and motivator of Hallyu, North Korea has remained entrenched in the institutionalization of Juche, strictly guarding its populace from the alluring charms of Hallyu, ultimately exemplifying the persistence of regressive forces in contempt of the new wave of globalized cultural exchanges. In an era increasingly marked by nationalist and protectionist currents, North Korea’s refusal to engage with cultural pluralism sinks it to even deeper isolationism. 

Tessa Aguilar is a distinguished graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles, where she earned her Bachelor’s degree in Political Science with a concentration in International Relations, complemented by minors in Global Studies and East Asian Studies. Her academic research is centered on inter-Korean political dynamics, with an emphasis on alleviating interstate animosities through the recognition and reconciliation of historical narratives. She also investigates the strategic deployment of soft power initiatives through modern entertainment and media, with a focus on the international ramifications of state-driven censorship and narrative control.

[1] Osman, Amber, Muhammad Imtiaz Subhani, and Syed Akif Hasan, “Asian Ascendancy: Media in the Age of Globalization.” SpringerPlus 2, no. 1 (2013): 2.
[2] Ibid., 3.
[3] Ibid., 5
[4] J.A. Mangan, “The New Asia: Global Transformation, Regional Ascendancy, and Metaphorical Modernity.” The Triple Asian Olympics - Asia Rising, 2018: 2234.
[5] Gunjoo Jang and Won K. Paik, “Korean Wave as Tool for Korea’s New Cultural Diplomacy,” Advances in Applied Sociology 2, no. 3 (2012): 201.
[6] Ibid., 197.
[7] Ka Young Chung, “Media as Soft Power: The Role of the South Korean Media in North Korea,” The Journal of International Communication 25, no. 1 (2018): 140.
[8] Ibid., 149
[9] Bianca Milanowitsch, “Mapping the Presence of the Korean Wave in North Korea,” International Quarterly for Asian Studies 48, no. 3–4 (2017): 280.
[10] Ibid., 279.
[11] The Guardian, “South Korean K-Pop Stars Perform for Kim Jong-Un in Pyongyang,” Guardian News and Media, April 1, 2018.
[12] YouTube, “Song A’s Life ‘Munsu Water Park Part 2’ |송아|,” YouTube, July 30, 2022.
[13] Samuel Seongseop Kim and Bruce Prideaux, “An Investigation of the Relationship between South Korean Domestic Public Opinion, Tourism Development in North Korea and a Role for Tourism in Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” Tourism Management 27, no. 1 (2006): 125.
[14] Soo-yeon Kim, “Seoul Voices Regret over NK’s Removal of S. Korean-Built Facilities at Mount Geumgang Resort,” Yonhap News Agency, October 18, 2022.
[15] Seulkee Jang, “Daily NK Acquires Full Text of the Anti-Reactionary Thought Law,” Daily NK, March 21, 2023.
[16] Jieun Kim, “Talking like ‘Capitalist’ South Koreans Can Lead to Prison or Death in North Korea,” Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2023.
[17] Hyemin Son, “North Korean Parents Will Be Punished If Their Children Watch Foreign Media Even Once,” Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2023.
[18] Hyemin Son, “North Korea Orders Citizens to Read 10,000 Pages of Propaganda This Year,” Radio Free Asia, April 28, 2023.
[19] Nicolas Levi, “How North Korea Embraced an Obscure Religion as a Tool for Korean Unification,” NK News - North Korea News, June 22, 2023.
[20] Lynn Davies, “One Size Does Not Fit All: Complexity, Religion, Secularism and Education,” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 34, no. 2 (2014): 191.
[21] Ali, Ghada Mohamed,“2 Composers of K-Drama’s OST Explain Their Approaches.” Korea.net, June 30, 2023.

Bibliography

Ali, Ghada Mohamed. 2023. “2 Composers of K-Drama’s OST Explain Their Approaches.” Korea.net. June 30, 2023. https://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/HonoraryReporters/view?articleId=234751. 

Chung, Ka Young. 2018. “Media as Soft Power: The Role of the South Korean Media in North Korea.” The Journal of International Communication 25 (1): 137–57. doi:10.1080/13216597.2018.1533878.

Davies, Lynn. 2014. “One Size Does Not Fit All: Complexity, Religion, Secularism and Education.” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 34 (2): 184–99. doi:10.1080/02188791.2013.875647.

Jang, Gunjoo, and Won K. Paik. 2012. “Korean Wave as Tool for Korea’s New Cultural Diplomacy.” Advances in Applied Sociology 02 (03): 196–202. doi:10.4236/aasoci.2012.23026.

Jang, Seulkee. 2023. “Daily NK Acquires Full Text of the Anti-Reactionary Thought Law.” Daily NK, March 21. https://www.dailynk.com/english/daily-nk-acquires-full-text-of-the-anti-reactionary-thought-law. 

Kim, Jieun. 2023. “Talking like ‘capitalist’ South Koreans Can Lead to Prison or Death in North Korea.” Radio Free Asia. March 22. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/seoul-mal-03222023114700.html.  

Kim, Samuel Seongseop, and Bruce Prideaux. 2006. “An Investigation of the Relationship between South Korean Domestic Public Opinion, Tourism Development in North Korea and a Role for Tourism in Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula.” Tourism Management 27 (1): 124–37, doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2004.08.001. 

Levi, Nicolas. 2023. “How North Korea Embraced an Obscure Religion as a Tool for Korean Unification: NK News.” NK News - North Korea News. June 22. https://www.nknews.org/2023/06/how-north-korea-embraced-an-obscure-religion-as-a-tool-for-korean-unification/. 

Milanowitsch, Bianca. 2017. “Mapping the Presence of the Korean Wave in North Korea.” International Quarterly for Asian Studies (IQAS), 48(3-4), 273-284. https://doi.org/10.11588/iqas.2017.3-4.7444. 

Osman, Amber, Muhammad Imtiaz Subhani, and Syed Akif Hasan. 2013. “Asian Ascendancy: Media in the Age of Globalization.” SpringerPlus 2 (1). doi:10.1186/2193-1801-2-646.

Mangan, J.A. 2018. “The New Asia: Global Transformation, Regional Ascendancy, and Metaphorical Modernity.” The Triple Asian Olympics - Asia Rising, 23–33. doi:10.4324/9780203720431-9.

Son, Hyemin. 2023. “North Korea Orders Citizens to Read 10,000 Pages of Propaganda This Year.” Radio Free Asia. April 28. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/10000_pages-04282023093517.html.   

Son, Hyemin. 2023. “North Korean Parents Will Be Punished If Their Children Watch Foreign Media Even Once.” Radio Free Asia. February 23. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/parents-02232023162227.html. 

The Guardian. 2018. “South Korean K-Pop Stars Perform for Kim Jong-Un in Pyongyang.” Guardian News and Media, April 1. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/01/south-korean-k-pop-stars-perform-for-kim-jong-un-in-pyongyang. 

Kim, Soo-yeon. 2022. “Seoul Voices Regret over NK’s Removal of S. Korean-Built Facilities at Mount Geumgang Resort.” Yonhap News Agency, October 18. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221018004000325. 

YouTube. “Sally Parks [송아 Songa Channel].” YouTube, https://youtube.com/@sallyparkssongachannel7794.   

YouTube. 2023. “Song A’s Life ‘I Am Famous!!’|송아|.” YouTube, June 13. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5LqqgvcgYo. 

YouTube. 2022. “Song A’s Life ‘Munsu Water Park Part 2’ |송아|.” YouTube, July 30. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNhoAhUaAAU.

By Ryan Rohrbach, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, HRNK Research Associate

Introduction
          North Korea’s unpredictable responses to the international community’s efforts to curb human rights violations and maintain peace in East Asia stem from the Korean Peninsula’s unique historical context. The influence of North Korea’s 19th-20th century history has just seldom been isolated and analyzed to explain why North Korea commits its current transgressions. North Korea’s most concerning and recent actions include the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the manufacturing and selling of arms to Russia for use in the invasion of Ukraine, and the dispatch of North Korean troops to the Russian military for use in the conflict in Ukraine. At the heart of North Korea’s aggression stands the North Korean people who are unjustly imprisoned and exploited for labor and scientific advancement with disregard for the state’s human rights and economic obligations. Policymakers, advocacy organizations, and academics must fully understand the domestic motivations of the Kim regime to effectively combat North Korea’s aggression and human rights violations. However, in recent years, with the exception of reports authored by Robert Collins and other HRNK authors, analyses of North Korea’s domestic politics have slowed and policymakers have become discouraged as many view North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development as seemingly “unstoppable.”[1]

            Often responding unpredictably and abnormally to coercive policy initiative from U.S.-aligned nations, the durability of the Kim regime has posed several questions to the international community. First, why do North Korea and South Korea have such different political systems? Second, why has the Kim regime proved to be stable despite North Korea’s history of economic woes and natural disasters? Lastly, what policies can the U.S. and its allies take to stop and reverse the long-term effects of the Kim regime’s systemic human rights violations on North Korea’s future sociopolitical and economic development?

          The sociopolitical history of North Korea and South Korea undoubtedly affects the form that the current North Korean and South Korean polity take. Naturally, answers to these questions should be approached through analyses of North Korea’s divergent sociopolitical development from the human rights-respecting polity that comprised the whole Korean Peninsula to the current authoritarian polity occupying the Korean Peninsula north of the 38th parallel. To reinvigorate efforts to understand North Korea, I suggest a new avenue for analysis of the development of the North Korean polity and society: post-colonial theory. Post-colonial theory is a group of theories that describe the general political, economic, and social development of states that are former colonies of the previous world’s empires. The field of post-colonial studies offers many relatively uncontested theories. Compared to states that were never subjected to the rule of a metropole, former colonies are significantly more vulnerable to authoritarianism, experience lower GDP growth rates, are more likely to develop socialist economies, and are less socioeconomically developed.[2] Post-colonial governments are also more likely to pursue predatory policies while legislative initiatives are inhibited by high degrees of social factionalism.[3] The predisposition of former colonies to these general patterns of political development caused by its identity as a former colony is known as the former colony’s “colonial legacy.”[4] With the history of having been colonized by the Empire of Japan, post-colonial theory largely explains the development of North Korea into its current state.

The Problem: A Lack of Information and Decreasing Motivation

          The goals of explaining why the North Korean polity developed so into today’s state and finding solutions to rectify the Kim regime’s human rights violations motivate many organizations, academics, and policymakers. However, progress on the search for answers to these questions is stalling for many reasons. Since the beginning of the Coronavirus Pandemic, there has been a dearth of breakthroughs in academic research on variables that are associated with increasing or decreasing levels of democracy and sociopolitical development. Academics’ primary research foci have recently shifted from democracy and development to public opinion, political psychology, predictive legislative politics, and election politics.[5] Subsequently, conflicts in the Middle East and Europe have largely taken the attention of the international community from the Kim regime’s human rights violations. Increasing numbers of international issues requiring the attention of analysts and policymakers decreases the focus with which analysts and policymakers can approach North Korea-related problems. Coupled with the ever present lack of new information on domestic North Korean politics and the slowing pace of North Korean politics that began in the late 2010s, many policymakers have become discouraged from confronting remaining questions about North Korea.

            Advocacy organizations and academics must remain empathetic to the discouragement of policymakers and the public. However, policymakers, academics, and advocacy organizations must reevaluate, respecify, and redouble their efforts to understand North Korea’s sociopolitical development. To find an answer to these questions, governments must articulate clear objectives and continue to pursue policies that are unequivocally effective in promoting a state’s respect for human rights and good governance. The international community’s lack of effective policymaking and political coordination towards promoting respect for human rights by the Kim regime and good governance by the North Korean polity has allowed North Korea to commit more brazen and contentious acts such as sending troops to aid Russia in its conflict with Ukraine. Nebulous policy objectives have discouraged US administrations from pursuing well defined, comprehensive, long-term, and unequivocally effective policy.

Comparative Analyses of Both Koreas through Post-Colonial Theory

          The decline of communism and the end of the Cold War in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East reduced the intensity of academic studies on the impact of a state’s historical identity on that state’s modern government. However, I believe that comparing the post-colonial sociopolitical and economic development of South Korea and North Korea will provide novel answers to policymakers’ questions. Through facile consideration of South Korea and North Korea in post-colonial theory, South Korea’s development into a bureaucratic democracy with a strong capitalist economy was less likely than South Korea’s theoretical development into an authoritarian socialist state like contemporary North Korea. The discontinuity of South Korea and North Korea’s development raises the question about why South Korea and North Korea developed into states with very different modern identities.

          In post-colonial theory, the identity of the colonial power and the length of the colonization are the variables with the largest impact on the size of the autocracy-promoting effect of a state’s colonial legacy on the state’s post-colonial government. North Korea and South Korea were unified and subjugated to the same colonial administration for the same length of time. Given the inexplicability of South Korea’s current political and economy strength through post-colonial theory, it is incredibly important to compare South Korea’s rejection of its colonial legacy and consequent development into a bureaucratic capitalist democracy with North Korea’s development of a socialist and authoritarian polity. Transparent access to records of the South Korean government’s development enables comparisons of North Korea’s development in the context of North Korea and South Korea’s shared identity as a former colony of the Empire of Japan.

            Many post-colonial theory case studies have been conducted on African and Latin American countries that were previous colonies of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other European states. The prodigious literature on post-colonial analyses of African and Latin American states should serve as a guide for future post-colonial analyses of North Korea and South Korea. It was a study on the connection between socialism and anti-colonial nationalism in Africa that first averred a link between socialism, anti-colonial nationalism, and a state’s colonial legacy.[6] Through comparisons of settler-colonies such as South Africa and non-settler colonies such as the DRC, academics also established the link between a state’s colonial legacy, the strength of the state’s social institutions, and the state’s level of socioeconomic development.[7]

            Of considerable importance in post-colonial analyses of North Korea and South Korea is the mid-1900s Communist Party in South Korea. The role of Communism in early South Korean society is important to understand for many reasons. According to post-colonial theory, South Korea’s moderate- to large-sized Communist faction was likely a byproduct of South Korea’s experience under Japanese rule. During South Korea’s era as a trustee of the U.S. and incipient independent rule, the rise of Communism in South Korea was a major policy issue that spurred South Korean leaders to act in autocratic fashion. In the unified Korea before August 1945, communities inhabiting modern North Korea and South Korea subscribed to the same Communist faction. Understanding of the link between South Korea’s colonial legacy and the ideology, resources, and network of Communism in early South Korea can be applied to explain the political dynamics of early North Korea, as South Korea’s early post-1945 Communist faction was very similar to North Korea’s early post-1945 Communist faction. Post-colonial analyses of Communism in South Korea and North Korea should also serve as a guide for comparative analyses of many other major parts of South Korea and North Korea’s society, government, and economy.
 
Concluding Remarks

          Academics’ quest to attain further understanding of the inner workings of North Korea, advocates’ goals to end and prevent further human rights violations by the North Korean government, and policymakers’ promotion of peace and economic stability in East Asia have all been stalled by the North Korean polity’s harmful domestic and international actions. A lack of progress towards academics, advocates, and policymakers’ goals has disenchanted the South Korean public, the international community, and many governments. No comprehensive analyses on South Korea or North Korea through post-colonial theory have been published, despite clear reasons to explain and resolve the authoritarianism and human rights abuses of the North Korean government through North Korea and South Korea’s shared history as a colony of the Empire of Japan.

          Explanations of North Korea’s development are enabled by South Korea’s miraculous development into a durable capitalist bureaucratic democracy. In the context of post-colonial theory, South Korea’s democratic development is less easily explained than North Korea’s autocratic development. However, comparing the sociopolitical development of North Korea and South Korea will offer insight into how South Korea rejected its colonial legacy and developed into a strong democracy. These analyses should also prescribe new policy tools to promote democracy and humanitarian economic policies in North Korea.
​
            Post-colonial theory was primarily constructed through analyses of European colonialism in Africa and Latin America. However, post-colonial theory concludes that the identity of the colonial power and the length of the colonization are the most important variables in determining the effect of colonialism’s legacy on a former colony. North Korea and South Korea were subjected to the same colonial power for the same length of time. In the case of North Korea and South Korea, the time and identity variables are constant. This enables valid comparative analyses of the sociopolitical and economic development of North Korea and South Korea through post-colonial theory.

            Comparative analyses of North Korea and South Korea should be constructed through prior analyses of European colonialism in Africa and Latin America. These analyses will describe the factors that led to South Korea’s development into a durable capitalist bureaucratic democracy. The results of analyses of North Korea and South Korea’s development should objectively describe how South Korea’s democracy was achieved. These factors will serve as a roadmap for policymakers to promote humane economic policies and democracy in North Korea by respecifying the policies imposed on North Korea by the U.S. and its allies.


[1] Hamre, John, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Victor Cha, Katrin Fraser Katz, Andy Lim, and Ellen Kim. “Recommendations on North Korea Policy & Extended Deterrence.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 19, 2023

[2] Sørli, Mirjam E., Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Strand. 2005. "Why Is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East?" The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (1): 146.; Grier, Robin M. 1999. "Colonial Legacies and Economic Growth." Public Choice 98 (3/4): 317-335.; Viegi, Nicola. 2016. "The Economics of Decolonisation: Institutions, Education and Elite Formation." Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 63 (147): 63.

[3] Diamond, Larry Jay, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1995. Politics in developing countries: comparing experiences with democracy. 2nd ed. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers. 42-43.; Bernhard, Michael, Christopher Reenock, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. "The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival." International Studies Quarterly 48 (1): 225-250.; Young, Crawford. 1994. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 278-290.; Abernethy, David. 2000. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 367.

[4] Grier, Robin. 1999.

[5] This shift is evident through a review of major political science and international relations journals from 2020 onwards. Major journals include the American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, International Organizations, International Studies Quarterly, and tangentially, Political Methodology.

[6] Young, Crawford. 1982. Ideology and Development in Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 98.

[7] Viegi, Nicola. 2016. 63.

Ryan Rohrbach is an incoming PhD student in political science at Washington University in St. Louis. He is an alumnus of the University at Buffalo, where he received his bachelor’s degree in political science and international studies in 2024. His research focuses on developing academics and the US government’s understanding of the impact of international relations on states’ domestic governance of human rights and protest movements. He hopes to reach this goal through the expansion of statistical methods used to model Poisson-distributed data and advocacy for the use of sophisticated research methods in non-academic political science research. He believes these efforts will ultimately provide novel solutions through which the North Korean regime’s autocratic and human rights abuses can be addressed and stopped. 

Abernethy, David. 2000. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bernhard, Michael, Christopher Reenock, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. "The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival." International Studies Quarterly 48 (1): 225-250. 
Diamond, Larry Jay, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1995. Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. 2nd ed. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers.
Grier, Robin M. 1999. "Colonial Legacies and Economic Growth." Public Choice 98 (3/4): 317-335. 
Hamre, John, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Victor Cha, Katrin Fraser Katz, Andy Lim, and Ellen Kim. “Recommendations on North Korea Policy & Extended Deterrence.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 19, 2023. 
Sørli, Mirjam E., Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Strand. 2005. "Why Is There so Much Conflict in the Middle East?" The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (1): 141-165. 
Viegi, Nicola. 2016. "The Economics of Decolonisation: Institutions, Education and Elite Formation." Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 63 (147): 61-79. 
Young, Crawford. 1994. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Young, Crawford. 1982. Ideology and Development in Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

By Valerie Johnson, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, Research Associate

In today’s world, where a photo can instantly be shared across borders, it’s easy to forget that exposure can come with serious risks for some people. For North Korean athletes Ri Jong-sik and Kim Kum-yong, who attended the Paris 2024 Olympics after a 12-year absence, a simple selfie came with unimaginable consequences, potentially threatening their safety, their freedom, or even their lives. What seemed like a heartwarming moment of friendship—smiling alongside their South Korean and Chinese counterparts—was more than just a symbol of unity after years of division. For the North Korean athletes, it came with significant personal risk and made the simple gesture far more dangerous than it seemed.

The selfie, part of a campaign supported by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Samsung, highlights how international events can unite athletes in ways that are praised worldwide but regarded with suspicion and fear in authoritarian countries like North Korea.[1] In North Korea, where the Kim regime tightly controls every aspect of people’s lives, even small interactions with foreigners – and especially South Koreans – are viewed as dangerous acts of rebellion.[2] Reports suggest that Ri and Kim are currently undergoing “ideological cleansing,” which might involve imprisoning, executing, or internally exiling individuals deemed a threat to North Korea’s “socialist order.”[3] This alarming possibility raises critical questions about the responsibility of international organizations like the IOC to protect vulnerable athletes, particularly those from authoritarian states such as North Korea.

Sports Diplomacy: A History of Unity and Tension

To grasp the full significance of the viral selfie, it is essential to consider it within the larger context of sports diplomacy between North and South Korea. Despite being still at war, the two nations have often used international sporting events as a stage for symbolic acts of unity, with mixed outcomes over the years.

North Korea’s participation in the 1966 World Cup is one of the earliest and most significant examples of sports diplomacy. Despite the country's isolation, the tournament provided a rare opportunity for the regime to engage with the outside world.[4] After their historic win against Italy in 1966, North Korean footballers were initially hailed as national heroes. However, they were later subjected to ideological criticism and harsh treatment due to concerns over interactions with foreign players and exposure to non-socialist influences.[5] Some reports indicate that the players were relocated to rural areas under harsh conditions as part of this punishment.[6] These actions underscore the ongoing risks faced by North Korean athletes upon their return from international events, particularly when they engage in social interactions with foreigners​.

The 1988 Seoul Olympics marked another critical moment in Korean sports diplomacy, though it was riddled with tension. South Korea, with backing from the IOC, aimed to boost its global image through the Games. However, this push unintentionally further isolated North Korea. Negotiations to involve North Korea in co-hosting Olympic events ultimately failed due to conflicting demands, including North Korea's request to host several key sports in Pyongyang and rename the Games as the 'Korea Pyongyang Seoul Olympic Games,' which were rejected.[7] North Korea’s exclusion and subsequent boycott led to heightened tensions and even a terrorist attack against the South, the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 over the Andaman Sea in 1987 being linked to North Korea’s attempt to sabotage the Games.[8] This example highlights how international sporting events can sometimes further intensify political tensions instead of easing them.

More recently, the 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang represented a brief thaw in relations between North and South Korea. Athletes from both countries marched under a unified flag and formed a joint women’s ice hockey team, celebrated as a step toward peace.[9] However, like past efforts in sports diplomacy, these moments of unity were short-lived. The complexities of diplomacy between the two Koreas showcase that while sports can help build connections, they rarely address the deeper political and ideological divisions between them and remain short-lived.

The political tensions between North and South Korea remain deeply entrenched, far beyond the world of sports. International sporting events have often become arenas for soft diplomacy, where gestures of unity can carry significant consequences. For athletes like Ri and Kim, their participation goes beyond symbolism; it’s a risky step into a space where every action is closely monitored and judged through the strict lens of ideological loyalty.

The IOC's Responsibility: A Delicate Balance

The IOC has long portrayed the Olympics as a neutral space where athletes from all nations can unite under ideals of peace and unity.[10] But this idealized view of global sports diplomacy often ignores the real dangers faced by athletes from repressive regimes like North Korea. While most athletes enjoy the freedom to express themselves and engage with others at these events, North Korean athletes live in a different reality, where unsanctioned interactions, even something as simple as a selfie, can result in harsh punishment back in their home country.

The IOC’s role goes beyond simply organizing events; it must protect athletes from potential physical and political harm. This responsibility was made clear at the Paris 2024 Olympics when a diplomatic mistake occurred during the opening ceremony: South Korea was mistakenly introduced as North Korea.[11] What might seem like a minor error to some carried significant political weight, emphasizing the delicate relationship between the two Koreas. Mistakes like these can escalate tensions, particularly on such a global stage, reminding us that organizations like the IOC must be mindful of the complexities involved in these political relationships.

The IOC has always promoted global unity, but unity without protection remains meaningless. To genuinely uphold the values of the Olympic movement, the IOC must take concrete action—implementing post-event safety checks, creating anonymous reporting systems, and working closely with human rights organizations to monitor athletes' well-being. For athletes like Ri and Kim, whose simple participation in a selfie was seen by their government as defiance, these safeguards aren’t just symbolic but vital. If the IOC fails to act, it risks being complicit in their potential suffering.

Pre-Event Briefings: Equipping Athletes to Navigate Diplomatic Complexities

Along with protective measures, the IOC should introduce mandatory pre-event briefings for all athletes, focusing on cultural and political awareness. These briefings would be a vital educational tool and help athletes understand the risks their peers from repressive regimes might face. By offering guidance on navigating sensitive interactions, such as the impact of social media exposure or unsanctioned contact with athletes from rival nations, the IOC can help prevent athletes from inadvertently sparking diplomatic or political issues.

For example, athletes could be informed about the specific risks North Korean athletes face and the severe consequences even a tiny gesture of camaraderie might have for them. By promoting a deeper understanding of the global context in which these athletes compete, the IOC can help reduce those risks to ensure that the Olympic spirit of respect and friendship is upheld without putting vulnerable participants in danger. These pre-event briefings would shield athletes from unintended political consequences and foster a greater cultural awareness and responsibility among all participants.

Media and the Double-Edged Sword of Global Exposure

Social media, though a powerful way to promote the values of the Olympics, can also be a double-edged sword, amplifying the risks for athletes from repressive regimes.[12] The viral spread of the selfie featuring Ri and Kim, which was shared across platforms worldwide, increased their visibility to international audiences as well as the North Korean regime.[13] Each like, share, and repost heightened the likelihood of their actions to be perceived as disloyal, putting their lives at even greater risk.

Ella McPherson, a media and human rights scholar, notes that while "social media can empower advocacy by breaking down traditional barriers to visibility, it also exposes vulnerable individuals to increased scrutiny and danger."[14] The case of Ri and Kim perfectly illustrates this paradox. Their selfie with Chinese and South Korean athletes symbolized unity and sportsmanship to the world, but it was seen as incriminating evidence by their government. This shows how, in authoritarian states, global visibility can be turned into a tool for repression.

Media outlets also need to acknowledge the ethical responsibility of their coverage. While celebrating viral moments, they must be aware of the risks that such exposure can pose to vulnerable athletes. Journalists must report and do so thoughtfully, ensuring their stories don’t unintentionally contribute to the repression they seek to highlight. Their coverage must be grounded in context, nuance, and, most importantly, compassion.

Beyond Paris: A Broader Call for Change

The Paris 2024 Olympics is just one example of a more extensive and ongoing issue. It reminds us that international events involving athletes from isolated or authoritarian regimes carry significant risks, even as they aim to promote global unity. The challenges faced by athletes like Ri and Kim are not unique to one event, nor are they isolated incidents. As we continue encouraging more reclusive nations to engage in international forums, we must understand that the responsibility doesn’t stop at one competition or celebration.

The risks for these athletes persist in every international space, whether it’s the Olympics, the World Cup, or other global gatherings. The dangers they face, from heightened scrutiny to the possibility of severe punishment upon returning home, are ever-present. Our concern cannot be temporary or selective. The safety structures and safeguards previously discussed must be applied consistently across all global platforms for inclusion and to genuinely protect those most vulnerable.

Ultimately, the goal of fostering unity through international sports should never come at the expense of individual human rights or the personal safety of athletes. In a world where a single photo can ignite global conversations, we must ask ourselves: Are we spreading hope or unintentionally fueling oppression? For athletes like Ri and Kim, the stakes are far greater than winning a medal; they and their families could face life-altering consequences. Only through informed and empathetic engagement can we ensure that our attempts to build bridges don’t become tools of division and harm.

A Lasting Reality Beyond the Spotlight

Many will remember the Paris 2024 Olympics with joy, unity, and global celebration. However, for athletes like Ri Jong-sik and Kim Kum-yong, the Olympics closing ceremony didn’t signal the end of their struggle. Once the media spotlight dims and the world moves on to the next big story, the harsh reality for these athletes continues. The viral selfie that briefly captivated the world may be forgotten, but the consequences for those living under authoritarian regimes endure long after the applause dies down.

In these quieter moments—when the cameras are gone, and the world’s attention shifts elsewhere—the true responsibility of organizations like the IOC and the global community becomes even more critical. Protecting athletes like Ri and Kim shouldn’t be a temporary concern, tied only to the duration of the Games. Instead, it must be an ongoing commitment grounded in sustained action and fundamental protections.

Valerie Johnson is an HRNK research intern and second-year master’s student at Lund University in Sweden, seeking a degree in Human Rights Studies. She particularly focuses on human rights access, international development policy, and good governance.


[1] Reddy, Shreyas. "Activists Call for Efforts to Protect North Korean Olympians after Viral Selfie." NK News, September 4, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/activists-call-for-efforts-to-protect-north-korean-olympians-after-viral-selfie/
[2] Kim, Ja-ah, and Park Su-hyeon. "North Korean Athletes' Victory Selfies Raise Red Flags in Pyongyang." Chosun Ilbo, August 22, 2024. https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/08/22/QNJLMFSNQJFWZCHN7SUHF3V5KY/.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Radchenko, Sergey. "It's Not Enough to Win: The Seoul Olympics and the Roots of North Korea’s Isolation." The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1243-1262. https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2012.677036.
[5] Spezza, Gianluca. "North Korea and the Revolutionary Football of 1966." NK News, 17 April 2015, www.nknews.org/2015/04/north-korea-and-the-revolutionary-football-of-1966/.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Radchenko, Sergey. "It's Not Enough to Win: The Seoul Olympics and the Roots of North Korea's Isolation." The International Journal of the History of Sport, 29(9), 2012
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Yoon, Lina. "North Korean Olympian Selfies Spotlight Rights Crisis: Repression of Athletes Shows Overwhelming Ideological Control at Home and Abroad." Human Rights Watch, September 2, 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/02/north-korean-olympian-selfies-spotlight-rights-crisis
[11] Wertheimer, Tiffany. "South Korea Wrongly Introduced as North Korea at Olympics." BBC News, July 26, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cmj2r1403jpo.
[12] McPherson, Ella. "Social Media and Human Rights Advocacy." In The Routledge Companion to Media and Human Rights, edited by Howard Tumber and Silvio Waisbord, 2017. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315619835-27.
[13] Reddy, Shreyas. "Activists Call for Efforts to Protect North Korean Olympians after Viral Selfie." NK News, September 4, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/activists-call-for-efforts-to-protect-north-korean-olympians-after-viral-selfie/
[14] McPherson, Ella. "Social Media and Human Rights Advocacy." In The Routledge Companion to Media and Human Rights, edited by Howard Tumber and Silvio Waisbord, 2017. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315619835-27.

By Jiwoo (Katie) Choi, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, Research Associate
 
Until the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1948, following the end of the Second World War, the people of North and South Korea were united by the same history and culture for thousands of years. Over the 70 years since the division, the two countries have taken almost opposite paths, resulting in their citizens living in completely different political, economic, and cultural environments. One of the most noticeable differences is the level of public corruption. According to the most recent corruption indices by Trace International and Transparency International, South Korea has consistently ranked between 20th and 40th place, while North Korea has been at the bottom of the list of 180-200 countries, making it one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
 
Evaluating the accurate status of corruption in North Korea is challenging. Over the decades, the measurement of corruption has evolved (e.g., perceptions, surveys, estimates from direct observation, graft estimation by subtraction, estimates from market inference). However, there remains little consensus about the magnitude of a country’s corruption due to the highly heterogeneous and multidimensional nature of these estimates.[1] Furthermore, objectively assessing the true extent of North Korea’s corruption is difficult due to the lack of available information for the international audience and the secretive nature of the country. Consequently, it seems inevitable to rely heavily on testimonies and experiences of North Korean defectors, even though perception-based measures may not accurately reflect the level of corruption.

1.Before the Economic Collapse of the Mid-1990s  

It is widely known that autocrats often utilize corruption not only to accumulate wealth but also to reward loyalists and political supporters. Putative anti-corruption efforts are likely a cover for purging rivals and consolidating power.[2] In other words, autocrats can use anti-corruption policies as an excuse to eliminate their enemies and gain more control over the government. However, curbing corruption has been a major agenda item for some “high-performing” authoritarian regimes, such as China and Singapore, for economic development, political stability or international image, and their anti-corruption success is too common to be considered exceptional.[3]
 
At the end of the Second World War, Korea regained independence after 35 years of Japanese rule. However, in 1945, the Yalta Conference agreements divided the Korean Peninsula into two separate countries. Both were poor and characterized by rampant corruption. Newly independent countries often witness high levels of corruption due to underdeveloped governance and opportunities for individuals to exploit the system for personal gain in their politically unstable and developing environments.[4] After the Korean War (1950-1953), both North and South Korea focused on reconstruction of their war-torn countries while grappling with absolute poverty, each competing to prove the superiority of their respective systems.
 
Under these circumstances, political corruption was fairly well curbed under Kim Il-sung’s regime from the 1950s until the 1980s.[5] Kim Il-sung, the first autocratic leader of North Korea, eagerly pursued economic development, not only as part of his ideological commitment to creating a modern socialist state but also to win the inter-Korean competition.[6] He considered corruption a threat to the economy and fought it with the Anti-Corruption Campaign, Anti-Waste Campaign (1952), and the Self-Confession Campaign (1955).[7] In the 1950s, North Korea arguably battled corruption more successfully than its southern counterpart.[8] Anti-corruption campaigns by autocrats often become a means to eliminate their political enemies or to consolidate their own power. However, these developmental imperatives have the potential to stimulate highly authoritarian regimes to curb corruption. Kim Il-sung’s campaigns successfully contributed to post-war reconstruction and rapid development, resulting in higher economic development in North Korea compared to the South until the 1970s.[9] This suggests that structural factors such as regime type might be insufficient to predict a country’s tolerance for corruption. However, Kim Il-sung's anti-corruption policies had structural limitations as they did not rely on the conventional democratic approach such as the rule of law, checks and balances, elections, and government transparency.
 
In South Korea during the same period, political corruption was rampant under military governments until 1992. Despite considerable efforts to achieve self-reliance through critical national industries such as chemicals and steel, the pervasive network of relationships facilitated corruption. The growth of international trade and business made bribes highly beneficial to company owners, granting them access to profitable contracts.[10] Conventional theories suggest that corruption is detrimental to economic growth, but it can sometimes counteract rigid procedures and bureaucratic governments.[11] This approach contributed to South Korea’s post-war prosperity, as business owners played a significant role in transforming a poor agrarian market into the world’s 10th-largest industrial economy despite the negative aspects of corruption.

2. After the Economic Collapse of the Mid-1990s  

Since the economic collapse of North Korea in the 1990s, corruption has rapidly spread and penetrated the daily lives of its people. Bribery has become a common practice among North Koreans for various activities, such as moving residences, engaging in commercial activities, issuing documents, using medical facilities, receiving job assignments, entering schools, and seeking overseas assignments.[12] Bribery and corruption lead to significant human rights concerns in several ways, including access to basic necessities (food, healthcare, shelter, and work), arbitrary arrest and detention, inhumane treatment in detention facilities, vulnerability to exploitation (especially for women), and lack of rule of law. The kleptocratic government mandates and perpetuates corruption through centralized power, a patronage system, lack of transparency, forced labor and exploitation, leading to severe human rights concerns. As a result, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recognized corruption as a serious human rights problem in North Korea and analyzed the state’s kleptocracy as a form of corruption.[13]
 
While it is not possible to explain the corruption status of North Korea by analyzing a single theory or factor, it remains meaningful to compare the corruption in both Koreas from political, economic, and socio-cultural perspectives.

A. Authoritarianism versus Democracy / Centrally-planned Economy versus Capitalism  

In the mid-1990s, the North Korean economy, including its state-run public distribution system, collapsed, partly due to “traumatic” events such as the sudden withdrawal of Soviet support after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) and a devastating famine (1994–1998). The death of Kim Il-sung in 1994 also triggered additional political instability in the country. These circumstances led to corruption becoming a ubiquitous and structuralized problem, rampant in many sectors of economic and social life.[14] Pyongyang’s leadership required new sources of revenue, resulting in the regime deeply engaging in illegal activities abroad, including cybercrime, crypto theft, counterfeiting, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking. Such activities continue today and represent major sources of revenue for the country’s leadership. These illegal activities are closely related to corruption, both as a symptom and a driver of the pervasive corruption within the regime. They involve high-ranking officials’ misuse of state power and resources, and they undermine the rule of law.
 
Low wages in the public sector have further contributed to corruption.[15] The crisis of the 1990s pushed even party officials to the brink of starvation, exacerbating bribery and embezzlement driven by desperation rather than greed. The breakdown of the public distribution system led to widespread embezzlement by citizens and officials with access to state resources. Jonathan Corrado, Director of Policy of the Korea Society stated, “The low salaries of state officials and a lack of oversight meant that people, especially those participating in the informal or market economy, are quite vulnerable."[16] For many, corruption has become a survival strategy, as their wages seldom reach the barest subsistence level.[17]
 
In the 1990s, North Korea was forced to accept de facto marketization, which facilitated corruption as beneficial to the regime, representing a major source of revenue for the leadership.[18] The regime initially tried to suppress marketization for maintaining control over economy and political stability, but failed due to undeniable economic necessity and its role in facilitating economic recovery.[19] In 2002, Kim Jong-il’s regime partly formalized economic liberalization through a set of agricultural and financial reforms[20] to impose post hoc control over the market.[21] In the marketized economy, various forms of corruption became financial wins for not only the regime and officials but also for the individuals involved in market activities. New wealthy entrepreneurs, called “donju”, are said to be an invisible hand of economic development. They have a corrupt symbiotic relationship with the regime and officials, allowing them to bypass restrictions on market activities and gain access to state assets. Pseudo-state enterprises, which are state-owned on paper but controlled by private interests in practice,[22] also tie themselves to the regime as their activities lack a legal framework.[23] From an economic point of view, the corruption of these actors seems to help grease the wheels of a highly regulated economy. Additionally, marketization forced citizens to work in informal black markets, known as jangmadang, and engage in illegal activities to survive. They often had to bribe officials to access and sell food and healthcare products.
 
According to a 2019 survey by the Korea Society, 68% of North Korean defectors spent 10-30% of their incomes on bribery.[24] North Korean people are trapped in a vicious cycle of deprivation and repression, with corruption being one of the few ways to escape this oppressive situation.[25] This reflects the desperate measures people must take to navigate an oppressive system that fails to uphold their basic rights and dignity. This economic burden exacerbates poverty and restricts their ability to improve living conditions, directly impacting fundamental human rights. It creates an environment where human rights are routinely violated, and citizens have little recourse to legal protection. Bribery entrenches social inequality, as those who cannot afford to pay bribes are denied essential services and face harsher treatment.[26] This disparity further marginalizes vulnerable populations, including women and children. Corruption in North Korea is both a symptom and a cause of the broader human rights crisis.
 
In contrast, South Korea inaugurated its first civilian government in 1992 and elected its first opposition president in 1997. Since then, institutional reforms have strengthened democracy, civil rights, and governance quality. The peaceful transition of governments through voting and programmatic competition between the two major political parties has continued. Good governance reforms (1993-2007) led to tangible improvements in transparency (including political finances), corruption control, and governance norms, replacing favoritism and nepotism.[27]
 
Even though South Korea exerted considerable effort to achieve economic development and self-reliance based on critical national industries, the vicious circle of close relationships continued to facilitate corruption. The growth of international trade and business made bribes highly beneficial to company owners by giving them access to profitable contracts. However, after the 1997 financial crisis, civil governments focused on economic reforms, partly due to pressure from the International Monetary Fund’s bailout loan, aimed at enhancing “rapid growth and reduced inequality”[28] in the corporate, labor, and financial sectors. Economic growth and well-established education systems expanded the middle class, while civil organizations and the vibrant civil society also played a significant role in restraining the malfeasance of corporations and officials.[29] These reforms also enhanced accountability and transparency in corporate governance and contributed to market competition and equitable wealth distribution.[30]

B. Rule of Law and Judicial Justice  

Corruption tends to increase where the legal system fails to provide sanctions and penalties for bribed officials. For several years, North Korea has received the worst scores on Trace International’s assessment of ‘Anti-bribery Deterrence and Enforcement’. Due to the absence of the rule of law, high-ranking officials have broad discretionary powers, motivating their clients to gain and retain their goodwill by paying bribes.[31] Additionally, the constant threat of arbitrary arrest and prosecution provides law enforcement officials with opportunities to extort money from citizens desperate to avoid inhumane legal actions.[32] According to KINU’s 2019 white paper, there were many reports of bribery and corruption during investigations, preliminary examinations, and in detention facilities, as well as by judges and prosecutors during trials.[33] The 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry report also states that “the vast majority of inmates are victims of arbitrary detention, since they are imprisoned without trial or on the basis of a trial that fails to respect the due process and fair trial guarantees set out in international law.”[34]
 
Ever since he took power in 2011, Kim Jong-un has launched several ‘merciless’ anti-corruption campaigns targeting party officials. However, these crackdowns exclusively focused on keeping mid-level officials from siphoning money that would otherwise flow to higher-ups.[35] There were no systematic efforts to control and curb corruption to ensure the protection and fair treatment of North Korean citizens. This indicates the extent to which tolerance for corruption can shift even within the same totalitarian regime, depending on changes in the economic situation and political needs. This is why simple theories based on regime type or culture cannot predict cross-national variations in corruption.
 
In this respect, North Korea and South Korea remain in stark contrast. The most impressive change after the governance reforms (1993-2007) in South Korea is the frequent prosecution and imprisonment of the political and economic elite. For example, four former presidents, as well as former members of the National Assembly and ministers, were sentenced to prison, and another former president committed suicide amid a corruption investigation into his family. The courts have also found many top executives guilty of corruption related to presidents and politicians. Despite concerns that some politicians have used corruption investigations for political revenge, South Korea has impressed the international community with its effective anti-corruption policy and a law enforcement system that is unprecedentedly responsive to public opinion.[36]
 
In addition, the South Korean government amended the Public Service Ethics Act in 2015 to ensure the fairness of official authorities by preventing conflicts of interest. They also enacted the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act in 2015, which set low ceilings on financial benefits regardless of whether the benefits were related to official duties. These legal and institutional changes strengthened the anti-corruption stance by enhancing citizens’ perception and sensitivity to corruption, creating a virtuous circle of rule of law.

C. Other Conventional “Democratic” Factors  

As mentioned above, the anti-corruption policies of the Kim family had structural limitations because they lacked conventional democratic approaches, unlike South Korea. Although political corruption was rampant under military governments until 1992 in South Korea, the seeds of improved political, economic, and social corruption control were sown and began to grow during this period. For example, land reforms in 1948-1950 changed the class structure by dissolving the landed aristocracy, contributing to a relatively equal distribution of wealth.[37] The rapid expansion of education also established the fundamentals of ethical awareness and integrity, leading to anti-authoritarian movements by students and intellectuals in the 1960s-1980s.[38] Gradual civil service reform, including the expansion of civil service examinations, enhanced merit-based bureaucratic recruitment and promotion from the 1950s to the 1990s.[39]
 
Unfortunately, the Kim family’s anti-corruption campaigns and efforts did not go beyond the framework of authoritarianism and failed to lay the basis for establishing systematic structures that suppress corruption. The absence of democratic factors in North Korea has resulted in systemic corruption, repression, and widespread human rights abuses, where human rights are routinely violated. In contrast, the seeds of fundamental changes have blossomed since the mid-1990s in South Korea, and the levels of corruption in the two countries have become completely different.
 
Concluding Remarks
 
The political and economic systems of both Koreas remain fundamentally different today: democracy versus authoritarianism, and capitalism versus a centrally-planned economy. There are notable differences in their socio-economic structures, such as the nature of bureaucracy, prevailing governance norms, rule of law and law enforcement, distribution of wealth, political party systems, and the stability of civil society. Institutional theory emphasizes these factors as a means of understanding how corruption might become entrenched in society.[40] Additional considerations include a country’s tolerance for corruption and the perception of corruption by officials and citizens.[41] Nevertheless, anti-corruption reforms do not happen naturally in accordance with a specific political or economic system and are not just a byproduct of economic development – they remain a gradual process that requires a change in both structural conditions and people’s perceptions.
 
In summary, pervasive corruption in North Korea has profound and extensive impacts on the human rights of its people. The lack of rule of law and the widespread need for bribery to access basic necessities like food, healthcare, and legal protection perpetuate a cycle of deprivation and repression.[42] High-ranking officials exercise broad discretionary powers, leading to systemic abuse and exploitation of ordinary citizens.[43] The absence of democratic institutions and transparent governance means there are no effective mechanisms to hold corrupt officials accountable or protect the rights of citizens. This environment of impunity allows corruption to flourish, undermining efforts to improve living conditions and human rights in North Korea.[44] Addressing corruption in North Korea requires not only structural reforms but also a fundamental shift in the perception and tolerance of corruption among both officials and citizens. International pressure and support for human rights initiatives can play a crucial role in advocating for these changes. Ultimately, the fight against corruption is essential for ensuring the dignity, freedom, and well-being of the North Korean people.


[1] Benjamin A. Olken and Rohini Pande. “Corruption in Developing Countries.” Annual Review of Economics, 2012. https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-110917.
[2] Christopher Carothers. “Combating Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes.” Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, 2019.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson. “Causes of corruption: History, geography and government.” Journal of Policy Modeling, Volume 32, Issue 4, 2010.
[5] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.” Journal of East Asian Studies, 22(1), 2022.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
[10] Tanzi, Vito. “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scop, and Cures.” International Monetary Found, May 1998. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9863.pdf
[11] Bajpai, Rajni and Myers,C. Bernard. “Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption.” World Bank Group. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/235541600116631094/Enhancing-Government-Effectiveness-and-Transparency-The-Fight-Against-Corruption.
[12] Kyu-chang Lee, Sookyung Kim, Ji Sun Yee, Eun Mee Jeong, Yejoon Rim. “White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2020.” Korea Institute for National Unification, September 2020. https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/module/report/view.do?idx=113738&nav_code=eng1674806000
[13] Joshua Stanton. “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea.” The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023. https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Root_of_All_Evil.pdf.
[14] Changyong Choi and Balazs Szalontai. “The Challenge of Corruption Control in a Post-Unification Korea: Lessons from Germany and the Former Soviet Bloc.” SSRN, 2020.
[15] Vito Tanzi. “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scop, and Cures.”
[16] Taeksung Oh. “North Korea's Corruption Perception Index ranks at the lowest in the world - the Prevalence of bribery compulsion(북한 부패인식지수 세계 최하위권, 뇌물 강요 만연),” VOA Korea. January 29, 2021. https://www.voakorea.com/a/korea_korea-social-issues_corruption-north-korea/6055808.html&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1688014176050971&usg=AOvVaw3Zghn3YahRFF7h3evkgOEF.
[17] Daily NK. “KPA Corruption: A Necessary Evil?.” April 6, 2015. https://www.dailynk.com/english/kpa-corruption-a-necessary-evil/; Daily NK, “In sanctioned North Korea, bribery problem worsens.” January 9, 2018. https://www.dailynk.com/english/in-sanctioned-north-korea-bribery/.
[18] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Marcus Noland. “Transition from the Bottom-Up: Institutional Change in North Korea.” Comparative Economic Studies, 48(2), February 2006.
[22] Andrei Lankov. “The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia.” Oxford University Press, 2015. 
[23] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
[24] Taeksung Oh. “North Korea's Corruption Perception Index ranks at the lowest in the world - the Prevalence of bribery compulsion.”
[25] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Price Is Rights: The Violation of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” May 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/KP/ ThePriceIsRights_EN.pdf.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Jong-sung You. “Process-tracing paper: Development of Corruption Control in South Korea”. Australian National University. Jul 2015. https://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Process-Tracing-of-Corruption-Control-in-South-Korea.pdf.  
[28] World Bank. “The East Asian Miracle.” Oxford University Press, 1993. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/975081468244550798/pdf/multi-page.pdf.
[29] Jong-sung You. “Process-tracing paper: Development of Corruption Control in South Korea.”
[30] Ibid.
[31] Young-Ja Park. “Informal Political System in North Korea: Systematic Corruption of ‘Power-Wealth Symbiosis’.” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 24:1, 2015.
[32] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Price Is Rights: The Violation of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
[33] U.S. Department of State. “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2020.
https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/.
[34] Report of the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea -­ A/HRC/25/63. A.HRC.25.63.doc (live.com)
[35] Ethan Jewell. “North Korea the world’s most corrupt country for 3rd straight year: Report.” NK News. Nov 16, 2022. https://www.nknews.org/2022/11/north-korea-the-worlds-most-corrupt-country-for-3rd-straight-year-report/.
[36] Carothers C. “Corruption Control in Authoritarian South Korea. In: Corruption Control in Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from East Asia.” Cambridge University Press. 2022.
[37] Jong-sung You.  “Process-tracing paper: Development of Corruption Control in South Korea.”
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Knowledge tools for academics and professionals. Module Series on Anti-Corruption: Module 4 Public Sector Corruption.”
[41] Ibid.
[42] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Price Is Rights: The Violation of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
[43] Ibid.
[44] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”

Introduction: North Korea’s Cyber Operations
 
North Korea has increasingly relied on sophisticated cyber operations to evade international sanctions and fund its nuclear and missile programs. The regime employs thousands of IT workers abroad under false identities, exploiting the global IT outsourcing market to generate income through illicit means.[1] These cyber activities date back to the 1991 Gulf War, leading to the establishment of organizations like the Reconnaissance General Bureau and Bureau 121, which conduct cyber espionage and theft.[2] As a result, cybercrime has become a crucial revenue source, with North Korean hackers reportedly stealing up to $2 billion, operating anonymously and effectively to support the regime's military ambitions.[3]
 
Growing Technological Proficiency & The Mechanisms of Deception

The growth of cybercrimes and the use of IT workers have profoundly transformed the country’s education and economic system with a heavy focus on information technology. Post-secondary institutions in North Korea have more than 300 graduates yearly who specialize in hacking, cyber warfare, and other technological proficiency.[4] They are sent abroad by officers of units such as Bureau 121 to countries with less stringent enforcement of international sanctions, such as China, Russia, or Southeast Asian nations. By operating from these locations, they can conduct cyber operations, including hacking financial institutions or cryptocurrency exchanges, without drawing immediate attention from international authorities. They often also use VPNs and residential proxies to obscure their locations, making it difficult for companies to detect their IP addresses.[5]
 
Additionally, they resort to various deceptions to establish credibility, such as forging documents and identities, creating fake professional profiles on platforms like LinkedIn, and hiring nationals to pose as them in interviews and meetings.[6][7] Their mode of operation is part of a larger strategy of using social engineering, loopholes in the financial system and showy cyber-attacks. Thus, the quality of work produced by North Korean IT professionals is constantly improving, leading to their growing reputation in the global market.[8]
 
Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic and the shift to remote work facilitated the hiring of North Korean workers abroad, especially in China and Russia. In recent months, North Koreans have used advanced coding languages and AI images, stolen identities, and other digital ruse tactics to gain employment, access to company data, and infiltrate the networks of Western targets.[9][10] In other words, their tech capabilities are dynamic and adaptable to a changing cyberspace. Therefore, as the DPRK's cyber capabilities continue to improve, so does the threat landscape internationally, leading to new and complex challenges for international security.
 
North Korea’s Objectives

1. Revenue Generation Strategy

North Korea's deployment of IT workers is driven by a strategic need to generate revenue in the face of crippling international sanctions. For several years now, North Korea has been shut out of traditional sources of hard currency earnings, most of all the weapons sales that have financed its military capability.[11] The regime turned to the global IT outsourcing market to compensate for this shortfall.
 
As early as 2015, the remote work model has been used by North Korea to infiltrate companies across the world – with reports from the South Korean and U.S suggesting that thousands of North Korean IT workers are now deployed worldwide, many of whom bring in more than $300,000 each annually by securing employment under false identities.[12] As the IT market is expected to surpass $500 billion by 2024,[13] it is little wonder that the DPRK's pandering to military ambitions – its nuclear weapons and missile programmes – have been firmly underpinned by the flow of hard currency.
 
2. Access to Sensitive Information & Potential for Extortion

The implications of North Korea's access to sensitive information are significant. The regime's attention to accessing critical information is reflected in its targeting of the defence, pharmaceutical and technology sectors. In 2016, North Korean hackers compromised the South Korean Defense Integrated Data Center, stealing 234 gigabytes of classified military documents, such as war plans.[14] Such intelligence improves North Korea's defence posture by offering insights into its adversaries' contingencies. Likewise, the regime has sought information on nuclear technologies. In 2019, the Kimsuky hacking group breached the network of a nuclear power plant in Kundakulam, India, to obtain proprietary information on reactors based on thorium, an element widely found in North Korea.[15] These activities show that its workers often focus on obtaining information related to countries' national security that can benefit North Korea's military strategies.
 
The ability to extort can be particularly acute, as they also have access to critical company systems. Targeting banks through cryptocurrency exchanges emphasizes the decentralized nature of cryptocurrency – it is difficult to trace and can often be quickly converted into other forms of cash.[16] The FBI reported cases where North Korean workers, after being discovered and fired, had threatened companies with extortion, leveraging the access they had to high-value code or critical systems.[17] This kind of ransomware is potentially even more pernicious, combining established criminal playbooks with the unique capabilities that come with their outsider positions.[18]
 
The Advantages of the IT Market

1. Low Detection Risk

One reason that North Korean cyber operations pose a low detection risk is that IT workers have been sent overseas by the regime for conducting cyber operations in a manner meant to give the impression that they are foreign nationals. By operating from territory outside of the Korean Peninsula, North Korean hackers can originate attacks that do not clearly implicate their country, making attribution and investigation of threats to both the private sector and law-enforcement agencies substantially more challenging.[19]
 
One common deceptive tactic is using proxy servers and other infected networks in third countries so that hackers can perform attacks through a third party and obscure their fingerprints. This further complicates legal jurisdiction issues as it creates ambiguity regarding which nation's laws apply to the cyber activities being conducted. This obfuscation makes it challenging for law enforcement agencies to pursue legal action, as the attacks may originate from a location that does not have clear ties to the perpetrators or may not cooperate with investigations.[20] For example, in the 2016 Bangladesh Bank hack, North Korean hackers made unauthorized transactions in the SWIFT system using multiple international servers, and they could hide behind other countries’ networks.[21]
 
North Korean operatives also probe global cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Countries with weaker defence systems, such as those from Southeast Asia, much of Africa, and Latin America, are easy targets for penetrating other countries.[22][23] Tracing hacking back to these developing countries is remains challenging, serving as North Korean “safe space” for cyber operations. North Korean hackers reportedly operate from China and Russia, too. In these cases, the operatives can blend into local populations and exploit less developed cybersecurity infrastructures.[24]
 
2. Facilitation by Foreigner Individuals

A key component of North Korea’s cybercrimes involves foreign nationals, who knowingly or unknowingly help North Korean operatives obtain jobs and access sensitive corporate networks. Such facilitators are able to get around security measures designed to prevent foreign workers from being hired, such as creating fabricated national addresses where shipping company equipment can be delivered and where infrastructure can be established to make it appear as though the North Koreans are working from inside the country, creating national based bank accounts for payroll purposes, helping with job searches and using stolen or forged I.D.s, and even attending virtual interviews with prospective employers on North Korean workers’ behalf to obscure their identities.[25][26]
 
One example in the U.S. involved a ‘laptop farm’ – a deployment of computers rented by North Korean workers from the U.S. that served as their employees’ network connections. Others are involved in creating fake identities on US-based freelancer sites and winning lucrative ‘gigs’ from the U.S. In all these cases, the key ingredient of North Korean success against the U.S. was US-based facilitators, many of whom were motivated by ideology or a fundamental lack of sophistication in differentiating between good and evil.[27][28]
 
3. Cryptocurrency as a Target and Tool

North Korea's IT workers play a crucial role in the regime's financial operations, strategically allocating and moving funds through cryptocurrencies. These digital currencies have become the most important international currency for the regime, enabling workers to get paid and facilitating the shift of cash around them, a process that confounds international investigators. The regime then recycles the money to finance its own development programmes, weapons of mass destruction, and military programmes.[29]
 
The Human Rights Abuses

The broader context of these cyber operations is deeply rooted in North Korea's systematic human rights abuses. Although there are little to no sources of the specific abuses IT workers endure, there is much on the overall exploitation of North Korean workers.[30] They are simultaneously depicted as valuable contributors to the global economy and as victims of exploitation and coercion, as well as of the paternalistic regime that confines them. DPRK’s workers experience forced labour, unfair working conditions and psychological or emotional damage, all under the control of the Kim regime.[31] Perhaps the most flagrant abuse is their condition as forced labourers. Workers might be sent abroad coercively, and their suitability for the work assigned is based on personal connections and loyalty to the regime rather than professional qualifications. Those who refuse or try to escape face persecution, imprisonment or even execution for treason.[32] Besides working for long hours and living in harsh conditions, a substantial percentage of their earnings is never received as they are sent directly to the government, further cementing the workers’ dependence on the regime, and funding the regime’s choice of priorities – including its nuclear weapons programme.[33]
 
The psychological burden is high, with a prevalence of mental health issues due to the secretive nature of their job, which puts them on the edge of fear regarding being outed as defectors. Isolation and the absence of supportive networks have the effect of intensifying emotional distress and inducing a sense of hopelessness.[34]
 
Exacerbating their situation is the fact that North Korean workers abroad are often not legally registered in the countries where they work, or they are employed in nations that do not adhere to international labor standards, such as China and Russia. As a result, these workers lack any real legal recourse in the face of mistreatment or abuse. Even when local officials are aware of these violations, they may be bribed to turn a blind eye.[35] Additionally, North Korean workers tend to remain secretive and have no viable means to report labor or human rights violations to local authorities.[36] Thus, a lack of legal redress creates a culture of impunity.
 
Broader Impacts for Business and Global Cybersecurity
 
North Korea’s infiltration of IT workers into global businesses poses significant cybersecurity risks, including data theft, intellectual property theft, ransomware attacks, and potential control over critical infrastructure. Companies employing these operatives, knowingly or unknowingly, face legal liabilities, severe fines, and reputational damage for violating sanctions.[37][38] This highlights the need for rigorous identity verification, employment vetting, and compliance with regulations through due diligence and proper training.
 
Additionally, North Korea’s tactics expose broader vulnerabilities in global cybersecurity, potentially inspiring similar actions by other malicious actors. The corruption of trust and security has global ramifications. If a business computer is hacked on the other side of the world, the ramifications can cascade through its supply chains and erode customer trust everywhere. The shift to remote work has intensified these risks, as companies often prioritize speed over thorough vetting, allowing North Korean operatives to exploit gaps in security.[39]
 
 
Mitigating the Threat

To mitigate the risks of hiring North Korean IT workers, companies should adopt a comprehensive security strategy that includes layers of counterintelligence checks, identity verification during recruitment and onboarding, educating HR staff on threats, and fostering a culture of vigilance.[40][41] Critical measures include monitoring networks for unusual activity, auditing third-party staffing practices, and staying informed about advisories from government agencies. In response, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S have committed to intelligence sharing and the creation of senior-level working groups for consultation and coordination on cyber-related matters.[42] Coordinated sanctions targeting North Korean entities and individuals engaging in cybercriminal activities have also been issued by the U.S., with E.U.[43]
 
Finally, enhancing public-private partnerships to bolster business defences and investing in robust cybersecurity infrastructure will further support these efforts. Developing comprehensive legal frameworks and fostering cybersecurity awareness are essential components of a broader strategy to address and deter cyber threats. Overall, these countermeasures reflect a multifaceted approach that combines enhanced cybersecurity protocols, international collaboration, and targeted legislation to address and mitigate the risks posed by North Korean cyber operations.
 
Conclusion

North Korea's strategic deployment of IT workers abroad has emerged as a pivotal component of its cyber operations, enabling the regime to circumvent international sanctions and fund its military ambitions, particularly in nuclear and missile development. By leveraging sophisticated cyber tactics, including deception and the exploitation of global IT markets, North Korean operatives have successfully infiltrated companies worldwide, posing significant risks to cybersecurity and ethical business practices. The intersection of human rights abuses forced labour, and the moral implications of outsourcing to North Korean workers underscores the complexity of this issue. As the threat landscape evolves, businesses must adopt robust security measures, enhance due diligence, and foster international cooperation to mitigate the risks posed by North Korean cyber activities. Addressing these challenges requires a concerted effort from governments, businesses, and civil society to ensure that the pursuit of economic opportunities does not come at the expense of human rights and global security.
 
 
Bibliography
 
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Gao, Jie. Hardening the Shield Against North Korea’s “All-Purpose Sword”: An Evolving North             Korean Cyber Threat and Its Policy Responses. Georgetown: Georgetown Center for Security Studies. http://hdl.handle.net/10822/1086540.

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The Internal Revenue Servic. “Charges and Seizures Brought in Fraud Scheme Aimed at Denying Revenue for Workers Associated with North Korea.” Internal Revenue Service, May 16, 2024.https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/charges-and-seizures-brought-in-fraud-scheme-aimed-at-denying-revenue-for-workers-associated-with-north-korea.

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[1]Bora Park, “A Way Forward to Counter North Korea’s Evolving Cyber Threats,” Global NK, November 27, 2023, https://www.globalnk.org/commentary/view?cd=COM000129.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.
[4] Park, “A Way Forward to Counter North Korea’s Evolving Cyber Threats.”
[5] Jonathan Greig, “US Offers $5 Million for Info on North Korean It Workers Involved in Job Fraud,” The Record, May 16, 2024, https://therecord.media/north-korea-it-workers-accused-money-laundering-5million-reward.
[6] Robert Legare, “U.S. Citizen Accused of Conspiring with North Korean It Workers to Infiltrate 300 U.S. Companies and Get Remote Tech Jobs, Feds Say,” CBS News, May 16, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-citizen-north-korean-it-workers-infiltrate-u-s-companies-remote-tech-jobs/.
[7] Iain Marlow, “North Koreans Worked Remotely for US Firms to Fund Missiles,” Bloomberg.com, May 16, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-16/north-koreans-worked-remotely-for-us-firms-to-fund-missiles?embedded-checkout=true.
[8] Marlow, “North Koreans Worked Remotely for US Firms to Fund Missiles.”
[9] Nils Weisensee, “North Korean Hacker Masquerades as It Worker in Elaborate Infiltration Attempt,” NK News, July 24, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/07/north-korean-hacker-masquerades-as-it-worker-in-elaborate-infiltration-attempt/.
[10] Glenn Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse: The Growing Harms of North Korea’s Remote It Workforce,” The Diplomat, May 21, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/fox-in-the-henhouse-the-growing-harms-of-north-koreas-remote-it-workforce/.
[11] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[12] Greig, “US Offers $5 Million for Info on North Korean It Workers
[13] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] The Internal Revenue Service, “Charges and Seizures Brought in Fraud Scheme Aimed at Denying Revenue for Workers Associated with North Korea,” May 16, 2024, https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/charges-and-seizures-brought-in-fraud-scheme-aimed-at-denying-revenue-for-workers-associated-with-north-korea.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Gao, “Hardening the Shield Against North Korea’s.”
[22] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[23] Tom Wilson, “Exclusive: North Korean Hackers Sent Stolen Crypto to Wallet Used by Asian Payment Firm | Reuters,” Reuters, July 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/north-korean-hackers-sent-stolen-crypto-wallet-used-by-asian-payment-firm-2024-07-15/.
[24] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[25] The Internal Revenue Service, “Charges and Seizures Brought in Fraud Scheme.”
[26] Legare, “U.S. Citizen Accused of Conspiring with North Korean It Workers.”
[27] The Internal Revenue Service, “Charges and Seizures Brought in Fraud Scheme.”
[28] Sean Lyngaas, “Tennessee Man Arrested for Allegedly Using It Worker Scheme to Raise Money for North Korea’s Weapons Program,” CNN, August 8, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/08/politics/north-korea-fraud-tennessee-man-arrested/index.html.
[29] Wilson, “Exclusive: North Korean Hackers Sent Stolen Crypto.”
[30] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea,” 2024, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea.
[31] Caesar, “The Incredible Rise of North Korea’s Hacking Army.”
[32] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea.”
[33] Ibid.
[34] Caesar, “The Incredible Rise of North Korea’s Hacking Army.”
[35] Lee Sang Yong, “North Korean Workers Abroad Can’t Escape the Regime’s Human Rights Abuses,” – The Diplomat, March 14, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/north-korean-workers-abroad-cant-escape-the-regimes-human-rights-abuses/.
[36] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea.”
[37] Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Leverages U.S.-Based Individuals to Defraud U.S. Businesses and Generate Revenue,” May 16, 2024, https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2024/PSA240516.
[38] Gordon Corera, “North Korea Hackers Trying to Steal Nuclear Secrets- US, UK Warn,” BBC News, July 25, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjl6p3wj52no.
[39] Legare, “U.S. Citizen Accused of Conspiring with North Korean It Workers.”
[40] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[41] Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Leverages.”
[42] Tuang. “North Korean Hackers.’
[43] Corera, “North Korea Hackers.”