The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) marked a significant advancement in international human rights law by establishing a global standard for disability-specific protections.[1] Although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) ratified the CRPD in 2016, following the recommendation of the UN Commission of Inquiry, it continues to systematically violate the rights of persons with disabilities through widespread discrimination, inadequate services, and severe mistreatment.[2] This essay aims to expose the grim reality of disability rights in North Korea, drawing from reports and testimonies to reveal systemic abuses, which starkly contrast with the regime’s superficial efforts to project a standard compliant image. The true measure of any society can be found in how it treats its most vulnerable members, and North Korea’s actions reveal a significant failure to uphold this principle.[3]

Limited Access and Discrimination

While North Korea’s ratification of the CRPD suggests a commitment to improving disability rights, the reality is starkly different. This divergence becomes evident when examining the limited access to resources and widespread discrimination faced by disabled individuals. Due to the secretive nature of the North Korean regime, specific statistics on the condition of people’s lives are difficult to obtain. However, the testimonies of escapees offer vital, firsthand insights into the harsh realities faced by disabled individuals in North Korea. These accounts are crucial and demand recognition, as they provide undeniable evidence of the systemic neglect and abuse that often goes unreported. Such voices are indispensable in understanding the actual conditions within the country.

Discrimination is pervasive in North Korea and is deeply engrained in societal attitudes that idolize physical strength and productivity as essential to the nation’s ideological and economic vitality.[4] This cultural norm exacerbates the marginalization and stigmatization of disabled individuals, who are viewed as failing to contribute to the regime’s vision of collective strength and self-reliance.[5] Such stigma is particularly harsh for women with disabilities, who face compounded discrimination due to gender biases.[6] As detailed in subsequent sections, reports reveal that people with disabilities in North Korea are often subjected to systemic isolation, which severely limits their social interactions and economic opportunities.  These practices are in direct violation of Article 5 of the CRPD, which ensures equal protection and non-discrimination for persons with disabilities.[7]

During her 2018 visit, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Catalina Devandas-Aguilar, encountered significant barriers in accessing comprehensive information about the status of disabled persons in North Korea.[8] She was not permitted to meet with representatives from various government departments or visit mental health services, limiting her ability to conduct a thorough assessment.[9] The few individuals with disabilities she met were under close supervision, which prevented any private or candid discussions.[10] This restricted access underscores the regime’s control over information and its reluctance to expose the true conditions faced by disabled individuals.

Inequitable Services and Rights

Systemic neglect extends beyond mere societal attitudes, infiltrating the distribution of services and rights. The disparity between urban and rural areas illustrates the pervasive presence of inequities in North Korea's infrastructure. While residents of Pyongyang enjoy relatively better services and protections, this privilege is conditional and fragile. North Korean escapee Lee Aeran recounted that families with disabled children are often expelled from the capital to rural areas in an attempt to maintain Pyongyang's image as an immaculate showcase.[11] This practice not only strips these families of better services but also exposes them to severe hardships, revealing the regime's prioritization of image over the well-being of its vulnerable citizens.[12]

Despite national efforts, such as the Korean Federation for the Protection of the Disabled (KFPD) working on a national plan to improve the rights of disabled persons, these initiatives often fail to reach or benefit individuals in rural areas.[13] For example, a source from North Hamgyong province reported that the government has been using disabled people to elicit sympathy from international donors for funding and to foster loyalty to Kim Jong Un and the state.[14] While a center for the disabled was built in Pyongyang under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, the facility primarily serves the children of the privileged class, who are taught to sing and dance to perform for visiting international audiences.[15]

Additionally, the government's collection of disability data through family doctors, while a step forward, lacks transparency and comprehensiveness.[16] Considering medical accessibility is centralized in the capital, most of the population, especially those in rural areas, are excluded from these statistics. This exclusion leads to an underrepresentation of the true extent of disabilities in the country.  These failures breach Article 2 of North Korea’s Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities, which guarantees state protection and assistance.[17] Such systemic issues highlight the urgent need for more inclusive policies that ensure equitable access to services and protections for disabled individuals across the entire country.

Personal Stories of Hardship

These systemic issues are not just statistical; they translate into real-life hardships for individuals. The personal stories of escapees like Ji Seong-Ho provide a stark illustration of the dire consequences of North Korea’s neglect of its disabled population. In his desperate quest for coal to exchange for food in the black markets, Ji Seong-Ho lost his left hand and foot after passing out from starvation and being run over by a train.[18] This traumatic event left him permanently disabled and without proper medical care or governmental support. In his testimony, he vividly recalled the horror of his mother's screams and the excruciating 4.5-hour surgery performed without anesthetics.[19] Ji Seong-Ho’s story illustrates the extreme risks North Koreans endure to survive and the severe toll on their physical, mental, and emotional well-being. However, his story did not end there, as his resilience and courage led him to participate in the 2018 U.S. State of the Union Address, where he later became a member of the ROK National Assembly and continued to advocate for the rights of people with disabilities. 

Additionally, disabled people in North Korea are often confined to their homes, where they lack access to rehabilitation services or necessary mobility aids. Maeng Hyo-shim, another North Korean escapee, recounted how her mother, unable to walk, only had a pair of crutches and relied entirely on her father's support to survive.[20] Their family was forced to live in isolation from society, underscoring the severe lack of state support and societal inclusion. This isolation violates Article 19 of the CRPD, which guarantees the right to live independently and be included in the community.[21]

Harsh Living Conditions

These narratives are further corroborated by reports of inhumane conditions in prison camps, where disabled individuals face egregious abuse and neglect.[22] The systemic discrimination within these facilities reflects a broader pattern of mistreatment. Segregation is strictly enforced, with individuals separated based on their disabilities.[23] Reports of "death rooms," where sick and disabled prisoners are left without medical care, underscore the extreme neglect and abuse they endure.[24] These practices violate Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which mandates protection from all forms of exploitation, violence, and abuse.[25]

The situation for women and children with disabilities is particularly dire. Widespread reports of infanticide of newborns with disabilities, coupled with exclusion from education and healthcare for those who survive, uncover severe systemic discrimination.[26] High levels of malnutrition further exacerbate physical and cognitive disabilities, compounding the challenges faced by these individuals.[27] This exclusion directly contravenes Article 24 of the CRPD, which guarantees the right to education for all persons with disabilities.[28]

Moreover, defectors report that individuals with conditions like dwarfism and intellectual disabilities are particularly targeted for forced sterilization and isolation, often under the guise of medical treatments.[29] These practices not only breach international human rights standards, including the right to health and reproductive rights, but also constitute cruel treatment under Article 16 of the CRPD.[30] The systemic neglect and abuse faced by disabled individuals in North Korea reveal a broader pattern of human rights violations, necessitating urgent international attention and intervention.

Government Policies and International Perceptions

The severity of these conditions is often masked by the North Korean government’s propaganda, which portrays a misleading image of inclusivity and care for disabled individuals. This section explores how the regime’s policies are perceived internationally and the underlying reality.

Despite legislative efforts, such as the 2003 Disability Law and participation in the 2012 London Paralympics, North Korea's actions towards people with disabilities appear largely disingenuous.[31] The government frequently uses disabled individuals for propaganda, showcasing superficial improvements to gain international favor while systemic issues persist. For example, state media has released images of disabled athletes winning medals in shooting and table tennis at a sporting event for people with disabilities.[32] Yet, residents, including people with disabilities, are outraged by this false propaganda, as many disabled individuals lack access to essential items like artificial limbs.[33] This exploitation aims to garner international sympathy and support, but North Korea fails to provide the necessary resources or opportunities that should accompany such sympathy. These measures are perceived as attempts to mask severe human rights abuses rather than genuine efforts to improve the lives of disabled individuals. Consequently, the country’s image-centric policies fail to address the underlying issues of discrimination, abuse, and neglect.

Defector testimonies and international reports draw chilling parallels between North Korea’s treatment of disabled individuals and Nazi-era crimes.[34] Accounts of forced migration, selective abortion, sterilization, infanticide, and targeted killings paint a grim picture of a regime that systematically dehumanizes its disabled population.[35] Such comparisons underscore the severity of the human rights violations occurring under the guise of state propaganda. These disturbing practices reveal the stark contrast between North Korea's international portrayal and the harrowing reality faced by its disabled citizens, underscoring the urgent need for genuine reform and international intervention.

Conclusion

The human rights situation for persons with disabilities in North Korea is dire, characterized by systemic discrimination, segregation, and abuse. North Korea’s ratification of the CRPD contrasts sharply with the severe violations experienced by its disabled population, which emphasizes a need for urgent reform. The international community must hold North Korea accountable for these abuses and advocate for genuine reforms, such as increasing international monitoring, providing targeted humanitarian aid, and fostering dialogue for internal reforms. Mahatma Gandhi once said, “The true measure of any society can be found in how it treats its most vulnerable members.”[36] It is imperative to uphold this principle and work towards a future where all individuals, including those with disabilities, live free from discrimination and abuse. The world cannot overlook the plight of disabled individuals in North Korea any longer; collective action and unwavering advocacy are crucial to securing their dignity and rights.
 
Bibliography
 
Hosaniak, Joanna. Status of Women's Rights in the Context of Socio-Economic Changes in the DPRK. Seoul: Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2013.

Kang, Hyok, and Philippe Grangereau. This is Paradise! My North Korean Childhood. London: Abacus, 2007.

Lord, Janet E. "Nothing to Celebrate: North Koreans with Disabilities." Foreign Policy in Focus 1, 2013.

Maeng, Hyo-shim. "Ask a North Korean: What Is North Korea Like for People with Disabilities?" NK News, April 18, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/ask-a-north-korean-what-is-north-korea-like-for-people-with-disabilities/.

McCurry, Justin. "Living with Disability in North Korea: 'It's Like a Prisoner's Life'." The Guardian, December 30, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/30/-sp-living-with-disability-north-korea.

Mohammed Hossain. "Not Surviving, but Thriving: Indexing to the Cost of Living." Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 30, no. 2, Winter 2023: 315-340.

Won, Jae-Chun, Janet E. Lord, Michael Ashley Stein, and Yosung Song. "Disability, Repressive Regimes, and Health Disparity: Assessing Country Conditions in North Korea." Hague Yearbook of International Law 27, 2014.

Radio Free Asia. "Disabled in North Korea Confined to Homes, Expelled From Capital." Radio Free Asia, June 13, 2007. Original reporting by Lee Aeran, Sung Woo Park, Naeri Kim, Changyoon Lee, Sookyung Lee, and Myeong Hwa Jang. RFA Korean service director: Jaehoon Ahn. Translated and researched by Greg Scarlatoiu. Written for the Web in English by Luisetta Mudie and edited by Sarah Jackson-Han. https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/nkorea_disabled-20070613.html.

Son, Hyemin. "North Korea Uses Disabled People to Attract Foreign Aid: Report." Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong. Radio Free Asia, December 4, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk-disabled-2019-12042019095625.html.

United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted on December 13, 2006, it entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515, p. 3. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities.
United Nations Human Rights Council. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." A/HRC/25/63, General Assembly, Twenty-fifth session, Agenda item 4, February 7, 2014. Accessed July 24, 2023. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/25/63.

United Nations. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on Her Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). EasyRead version. Prepared by Inspired Services Publishing Ltd. December 2017. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities.

Valerie Johnson is a Master's student at Lund University in Sweden, focusing on human rights access, international development, and governance, with a special interest in East Asia. Her three years teaching in South Korea deepened her understanding of the inter-Korean relationship, inspiring her human rights research. Her work centers on sexual minorities, incarcerated youth, and disabled individuals in North Korea. As an intern at HRNK, she hopes to contribute to North Korean human rights research and become a researcher and advocate for marginalized voices in East Asia.


[1] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515, p. 3. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities.
[2] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Accessed July 15, 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/A.HRC.37.56.Add.1_easytoread.pdf.
[3] Mohammed Hossain, "Not Surviving, but Thriving: Indexing to the Cost of Living," Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 30, no. 2 (Winter 2023): 315
[4] Jae-Chun Won; Janet E. Lord; Michael Ashley Stein; Yosung Song, "Disability,
Repressive Regimes, and Health Disparity: Assessing Country Conditions in North
Korea," Hague Yearbook of International Law 27 (2014) pg. 38
[5] Kang, H., and P. Grangereau. This is Paradise! My North Korean Childhood. London: Abacus, 2007.
[6] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Pg. 17
[7] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 5
[8] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Pg. 4
[9] Ibid. pg. 3
[10] Ibid. pg. 30
[11] Radio Free Asia. "Disabled in North Korea Confined to Homes, Expelled From Capital." Radio Free Asia, June 13, 2007
[12] Ibid.
[13] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Pg. 40
[14] Son, Hyemin. "North Korea Uses Disabled People to Attract Foreign Aid: Report." Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong. Radio Free Asia, December 4, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk-disabled-2019-12042019095625.html.
[15] Ibid.
[16] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Pg. 15
[17] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 2
[18] McCurry, Justin. "Living with Disability in North Korea: 'It's Like a Prisoner's Life'." The Guardian, December 30, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/30/-sp-living-with-disability-north-korea.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Maeng, Hyo-shim. "Ask a North Korean: What Is North Korea Like for People with Disabilities?" NK News, April 18, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/ask-a-north-korean-what-is-north-korea-like-for-people-with-disabilities/
[21] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 19
[22] United Nations Human Rights Council. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." A/HRC/25/63, General Assembly, Twenty-fifth session, Agenda item 4, February 7, 2014. Accessed [access date]. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/25/63
[23] Lord, Janet E. "Nothing to Celebrate: North Koreans with Disabilities." Foreign Policy in Focus 1 (2013) 
[24]Ibid. 
[25] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 16
[26] Hosaniak, J. Status of Women's Rights in the Context of Socio-Economic Changes in the DPRK. Seoul: Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2013.
[27] Lord, "Nothing to Celebrate: North Koreans with Disabilities,"
[28] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 24
[29] Jae-Chun Won; Janet E. Lord; Michael Ashley Stein; Yosung Song, "Disability,
Repressive Regimes, and Health Disparity: Assessing Country Conditions in North
Korea," Hague Yearbook of International Law 27 (2014) pg. 44
[30] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 16
[31]Son, Hyemin. "North Korea Uses Disabled People to Attract Foreign Aid: Report." Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong. Radio Free Asia, December 4, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk-disabled-2019-12042019095625.html.
[32] Son, Hyemin. "North Korea Uses Disabled People to Attract Foreign Aid: Report." Radio Free Asia, 2019
[33] Ibid.
[34] Lord, Janet E. "Nothing to Celebrate: North Koreans with Disabilities." Foreign Policy in Focus 1 (2013)
[35] United Nations Human Rights Council. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." A/HRC/25/63
[36] Mohammed Hossain, "Not Surviving, but Thriving: Indexing to the Cost of Living," Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 30, no. 2 (Winter 2023): 315

Introduction
 
The dangers posed by North Korea’s nuclear testing extend beyond immediate geopolitical tensions to significant human rights and environmental concerns. The nuclear tests conducted at North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear testing site have resulted in what is called “Tired Mountain Syndrome.” The short-term consequences of these tests may lead to the collapse of Mt. Mantap. However, the long-term effects may lead to an eruption of Mount Paektu, a mountain that is considered holy in North Korea.  North Korea’s nuclear testing poses more than just a national security problem. It endangers the human rights and human security of North Korea’s population. For instance, it is believed to have caused earthquakes that otherwise would not have occurred. If continued, nuclear testing at the Punggye-ri testing facility may contribute to the eruption of Mount Paektu or the collapse of Mt. Mantap, which could have catastrophic consequences for both North Korea and neighboring countries.[1] However, no nuclear scientist would report this to the Supreme Leader in fear of punishment.
 
Punggye-ri
 
The Punggye-ri nuclear test facility is North Korea’s sole known nuclear test site, located 17.2 km north of Punggye-ri village in North Hamgyong Province, on the southern slopes of Mount Mantap.[2] Extending 10 km south along a river valley, it was established in the early 2000s and hosted six underground nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and 2017, using two of four known tunnels.[3] Despite announcing its closure in 2018, recent evidence suggests the site is prepared for a seventh test, which could occur at any time. Notably, all six of North Korea's nuclear tests were conducted at the Punggye-ri site, situated in Kilju County in the northeastern part of the country. However, the most vulnerable group in North Korea remains its citizens, as they continue to be exposed to high levels of radioactive material coming from tests that are being conducted at Pungye-ri. Commercial satellite images of North Korea's Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in 2022 reveal ongoing operations throughout the facility.[4] The support infrastructure and instrumentation surrounding Tunnel No. 3 suggest it is ready for testing if a decision is made. Still, no significant activities, like increased vehicle traffic or personnel surges near the tunnel, would suggest an imminent test.[5] A satellite image of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility from April 2, 2024, reveals that the road to Tunnel No. 3's portal has been cleared of snow, indicating ongoing low-level activity.[6] This suggests North Korea is committed to maintaining Tunnel No. 3, and the overall facility and activity at Tunnel No. 3 is concerning, as North Korea has completed preparations for a seventh nuclear test there.
 
Tired Mountain Syndrome Effects
 
Tired mountain syndrome occurs when underground nuclear testing causes fractures and weakens the surrounding rock structure, leading to increased permeability and a higher risk of releasing radionuclides and radioactive contamination into the environment.[7] This contamination can have severe costs to people and their quality of life, including increased health risks such as cancer and other radiation-related illnesses. North Korean defectors from regions near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site displayed signs of possible radiation exposure.[8] In the event of Mt. Mantap’s collapse, due to the testing, the surrounding area will face a significant amount of debris exposure from the eruption, heavily damaging the environment, quality of life, and future crop harvest, potentially creating another famine and debris from the eruption extending past North Korea’s border as far as Japan. Exposure to harmful radioactive fallout can occur directly or indirectly. Radioactive material can enter the body if radioactive dust lands on the skin. Many people and animals in the downwind counties around the Nevada testing site in the United States were exposed to harmful toxins in this way. Inhalation of suspended radioactive material is also a significant risk in the downwind region. High-altitude winds can carry radioactive material far from the test site, depositing it on the ground if precipitation occurs.[9] In the case of Mt. Mantap, as tired mountain syndrome softens the soil, the soil is expected to travel down to where the population lives.  Although most farmland is not conducted in North Hamgyong province, satellite images show agricultural fields.[10] In the days following a nuclear test, radioactive material can settle on crops and pastures.[11] Continuation of the nuclear tests may exacerbate the process of the collapse of Mount Mantap, worsening the quality of life for the North Korean population. The environmental damage can also disrupt local ecosystems, contaminate water supplies, and lead to the displacement of communities, further deteriorating living conditions for the people living in North Korea.
 
Health risks
 
For the people of North Korea, the human health cost caused by radiation in the environment can be particularly severe and affect the people living there for generations. The country's limited healthcare infrastructure is ill-equipped to deal with radiation-related health issues, exacerbating the suffering of affected individuals. Regarding human health exposure, The United States exemplifies a substantial increase in thyroid cancer incidence over recent decades, primarily influenced by iodine irradiation.[12] Similar upward trends have been observed in other parts of the world and can be extended to North Korea. In 2017 and 2018, the Ministry of Unification and the Korea Institute of Radiological & Medical Sciences (KIRAMS) conducted radiation exposure tests on North Korean escapees from areas near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site.[13] A total of 40 individuals were tested, 30 in 2017 and 10 in 2018. The results showed that nine of them (4 in 2017 and 5 in 2018) exhibited worrying chromosomal abnormalities, representing 22.5 percent of the total tested.[14] In July 2016, escapees from Kilju County reported health issues. 13 individuals who had lived in Kilju County for several years following North Korea's first to third nuclear tests were among those who reported these health problems. In August 2016, Dr. Choi, a North Korean escapee, informed the media that these escapees were experiencing physical abnormalities, including headaches, weight loss, and decreased sensory function.[15]
Table 3 taken from Mapping the Risk and Effect of Radioactive Contamination of Groundwater Sources from the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in North Korea

Introduction

In the decades of isolation and authoritarian rule that have gripped North Korea since the end of the Korean War, the number of escapees fleeing the North and settling in different countries has steadily grown. Among the preferred destinations, the most popular is unsurprisingly South Korea, where North Korean escapees are granted automatic citizenship and receive support services from the government. This includes resettlement payment, training services, support programs, and housing assistance.[1] Additionally, escapees who are able to provide South Korean authorities with intelligence aiding the country’s security are entitled to a reward of $860,000, while other payments also being made for those who escape with weapons.[2] The support that the South Korean government provides to escapees is also generous and expensive, encompassing 12 weeks of adaptation training in a resettlement facility, upwards of $50,000 in settlement benefits and housing subsidies depending on the size of the household, and free public school and university education for children.[3]

North Koreans are therefore often drawn to the South as a destination, as many see it as a place where they will be welcomed as citizens and where they will be free from the authoritarian reality they face in the North. As a result, the number of North Korean escapees in South Korea was estimated by the  Ministry of Unification to be at 34,078 in December of 2023.[4] At the same time, North Korean escapees who resettle in South Korea face numerous challenges, and life in their new home entails many significant difficulties.

While resettled North Korean escapees in South Korea find themselves safe from the physical threats posed by the North Korean regime, the hardships many face in the new country are less noticeable in kind. Such challenges are broad in type and have resulted in North Korean escapees struggling to keep up with their fellow South Koreans in many aspects. One example relates to escapee adolescents under the age of 19, which comprise approximately 15% of the escapee population.[5] Among this group, North Korean escapee adolescents demonstrate high rates of faltering growth and compared to their South Korean peers, and studies have found that they are on average shorter and thinner, but also suffer from higher rates of obesity.[6] This is only one example of the physical disparities that are present among North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, and such challenges affect the future generations of these communities.

In order to understand the significance of such disparities, it remains necessary to examine the impact they have on the life of the resettled escapees. These challenges manifest in a number of ways, especially in defining economic, psychological, and cultural differences and struggles. Thus, it is only by examining such challenges and facilitating communication with escapees themselves that positive changes can be achieved to improve the lives of North Korean escapees in South Korea.

Economic Challenges

As perhaps the most visible form of difficulty faced by North Koreans in the South, economic challenges burden almost all of the escapees. As integrating North Koreans into the South Korean economy requires significant support from the government, South Korea provides extensive assistance through financial aid and various programs aimed at increasing self-sufficiency, such as vocational training.[7] Nevertheless, despite the existence of such programs, economic stability is not attainable for most North Korean escapees as many face harsh difficulties in their economic performance.

When compared to their South Korean counterparts, former North Koreans find themselves severely disadvantaged as the unemployment rate among them is approximately twice compared to the national average.[8] Additionally, 56% of North Korean escapees in South Korea are classified as being low-income and 25% qualify for the lowest income bracket subject to national basic livelihood subsidies, a figure which is six times higher than the rate of the South Korean population.[9]

Economic disparities are deeply rooted in multiple causes, including the background of these escapees arriving from North Korea. Many arrive with physical and mental scars that prevent them from settling into a new culture and which affect their ability to obtain and maintain a steady income.[10] Additionally, the different education and training received in North Korea is often incompatible with the job market and society in the South. A BBC interview with an escapee in 2021 discussed many of these issues, describing how many of the jobs available in South Korea are not compatible for the escapees, many of whom have never had to find a job and lack work experience or knowledge of many sectors of the job market.[11]

Financial literacy is another gap existing between North Korean escapees and South Koreans, as the former are significantly less financially literate than the latter.[12] Adapting to a vastly different capitalist society as opposed to a state-controlled command economy is a challenge that requires long-term adaptation and assistance. Nevertheless, North Korean escapees are faced with time constraints and are required to be accustomed to the South Korean model quite abruptly.

Another aspect of the economic challenge is integrating North Korean escapees into a vastly digitized South Korean society that is significantly different from the North. Learning to use modern information and communications technology such as Internet platforms remains a great challenge for many of the escapees who previously had no access to such technologies. Their difficulty in quickly adapting creates a digital divide between them and their South Korean counterparts which further exacerbates social inequality and prevents their smooth integration into a different society.[13] This is an additional contributing factor to the economic woes of North Korean escapees, especially as occupations in countries like South Korea demand higher levels of digital experience and education that escapees do not possess. Such challenges result in frequent low income levels and poor economic performance among North Korean escapees in the South, creating among them chronic feelings of loneliness and abandonment.

Psychological Challenges

Many North Korean escapees arrive in South Korea with psychological trauma that can represent a significant barrier to their resettlement and integration. The trauma and mental health issues escapees suffer stem from traumatic experiences endured in North Korea such as witnessing public executions and enduring human rights abuses as well as the overall state of anxiety that arise from settling in a new country while being separated from family and friends.[14] Additionally, escapees who travelled through different transit countries like China have often fallen victim to human trafficking, which includes gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage against women and girls.[15] Such traumatic experiences greatly affect the mental health of North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea and represent a difficult challenge to overcome.

Among the North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, rates of trauma and mental distress such as PTSD are significant. A study from 2022 found that, among 531 North Korean escapees interviewed, 81.4% suffered from trauma and 15.3% suffered from PTSD, a figure which is nine times higher than the average for South Koreans.[16] Additionally, 53% of escapees who visited hospitals for psychiatric problems after defection were diagnosed with PTSD and many had severe difficulties adapting to the South Korean society and suffered from a lower quality of life.[17] This demonstrates a direct correlation between these escapees’ mental health and their challenges for resettling to the new country.

Among the mental health challenges endured by former North Koreans, suicidal behaviour and suicidal thoughts are among the most concerning. While the suicide rate in South Korea is already one of the highest among OECD countries, the North Korean escapee community faces especially high suicide rates. A study from 2019 showed that 12.4% of escapees had the urge to commit suicide in the previous year and that the suicide rate among them is three times higher than that of the rest of the South Korean population.[18] Other mental health challenges endured by North Korean escapees also include major depressive disorder, agoraphobia[19], social phobia, and panic disorder. These issues can also be exacerbated by other sources in their new environments such as discrimination, cultural differences, and lack of access to resources like support networks or psychological help.[20]

The severe mental health challenges faced by many North Korean escapees additionally represent a significant barrier throughout their resettlement process in South Korea. Many of the escapees afflicted with PTSD, suicidal behaviour or ideation, depression, and other disorders find it difficult to settle into their new homes and build a new life when faced with these overwhelming challenges to their wellbeing. Another factor is the lack of knowledge on how to request assistance among escapees, as up to 70% of them do not know about counselling centres or psychologists from which to receive support.[21] Additionally, as mental health is an issue completely disregarded in North Korea, many escapees are unaware of their mental well-being or of how they could ask for and receive help.[22] As a result, understanding the importance of mental health among North Korean escapees remains a necessary component in their resettlement efforts and for their integration into South Korean society. Until this is accomplished, mental health remains a major challenge faced by escapees.

Cultural Challenges

The third and final challenge faced by North Korean escapees in South Korea lies in their ability to adapt and assimilate into South Korean society and the differences in economic system, technology, and social behaviour. In an effort not to stand out and face prejudice, many North Korean escapees feel pressured to conceal their identities and fit in, leading to greater insecurity and psychological distress as they try to conform, hide their North Korean roots, or intentionally distance themselves from the escapee community.[23] On the other hand, those who do not try to conform to the South Korean society or form bonds only within the escapee community find themselves isolated or discriminated against by the wider society for failing to assimilate.[24]

Discrimination against North Korean escapees by South Koreans also remains a major issue. Accounts from former North Koreans show that social stigma, mistreatment, and suspicion against them from South Koreans is prevalent among certain segments of the population, and it contributes to worsening mental health conditions among escapees.[25] Social stigma and prejudice also extends to discrimination in employment opportunities towards those with the North Korean accent while women and children – who make up the majority of the escapees – reported to have been victims of exploitation and bullying.[26] Discrimination also exists through the slight language barrier between northerners and southerners because, despite sharing a common language, differences persist in spelling, pronunciation, and accents.[27] This is another way in which North Korean escapees can be stigmatized and ostracized in South Korea, hindering their resettlement.

In addition to the issue of discrimination and to the pressure to quickly adapt to a new societal and cultural standard, North Korean escapees tend to avoid communicating their struggles or treatment as they fear being labeled as ungrateful or being targeted by far-right extremists who reject their resettlement and presence in South Korea.[28] As a result, many North Korean escapees who experience discrimination in their everyday lives are reluctant to speak out about their marginalization to avoid being regarded as unappreciative or undeserving of the governmental support they receive.[29]

In light of such challenges, the cultural unsettlement that many North Korean escapees endure is often suffered in silence. The struggles they face in adapting to a new culture and lifestyle, often in face of discrimination and inadequate support, heavily contributes to difficulties in building their new lives in the South and represents a less-discussed challenge that they must endure during their resettlement and adaptation.

Solutions and Conclusion

In light of challenges that North Korean escapees face once resettled in South Korea, it is evident that the more than 30,000 escapees in the country do not have an easy life. Despite the considerable funds that the South Korean government invests on resettling escapees, the transition from the authoritarian North to the South is not always as smooth as both the government and the escapees themselves would wish it to be. Crafting solutions to such issues would inevitably require direct involvement of the escapees, but some methods and strategies to tackle this issue have already been showcasing positive effects. Many of these solutions, such as a more effective and targeted investment of financial support, better education programs, and mental health resources for escapees, are obvious in their purpose while others remain unprioritized. At the same time, these solutions can have major positive impacts and are worth looking at.

The first solution could include the creation of a social support network to help the North Korean escapees. While offering financial support, employment opportunities, education, and training are essential, other measures are needed for achieving the successful integration of escapees in the South.[30] This could be accomplished by creating strong support networks for escapees, both with fellow North Koreans as well as with South Koreans, as the latter could help facilitate communication and smoothen their assimilation and integration processes.[31]

Another measure for the improvement of the integration process should specifically involve young escapees. Communication and collaboration between North Korean and South Korean students as a form of a school program is key in building relationships that benefit everyone.[32] This engagement may also help in debunking prejudices among the South Korean youth against North Korean escapees, encouraging engagement and understanding among the two.[33] These strategies may foster a critical effect in helping settle young escapees and ensure that they have the tools to thrive in their new homes.

The challenges that North Korean escapees continue to endure following their escape from the Kim regime remain difficult and overlooked. The efforts of the South Korean government in resettling most of the escapees is commendable, especially when this is a task most other countries do not fulfill. The U.S., for example, has accepted only about 220 North Korean escapees since 2006 while China has a history of forcefully repatriating escapees back to the North.[34] Yet, it is also clear that efforts to resettle escapees in the South and to help them assimilate into such a different society are not perfect, as escapees suffer from a number of hardships that are not yet being adequately addressed. These hardships, many of which stem from the culture shock of escaping North Korea, can be difficult and long-lasting to tackle. However, supporting North Korean escapees is not only essential for their resettlement but also to help them fulfill their potential. Otherwise, the financial struggles, mental health problems, and discrimination many escapees face upon their arrival will remain the exclusive reality faced by the North Korean community resettled in the South.

References

Bluth, Christoph. “The North Korean who went home: many defectors struggle against     discrimination in the South.” The Conversation. January 7, 2022. https://theconversation.com/the-north-korean-who-went-home-many-defectors-struggle-  against-discrimination-in-the-south-174366.

Cha, Sangmi and Jon Herskovitz. “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South.” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying- lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.

Couch, Christina. “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea.” PBS. February   16, 2017. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.

Kim, Hagyun and Kwanghyuk Kim. “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school   engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter-  Korean identity through a process of being one of them.” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 288-309. https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.

Kim, Minjung, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee. “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence from North Korean Refugees.” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2505-2527. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.

Kim, So-Yeong. Hye-Min Ku, and Seong-Woo Choi. “The growth status of North Korean refugee adolescents in South Korea: comparison with South Korean adolescents.” Annals of Human Biology 50, no. 1 (2023): 148-151. https://doi.org/10.1080/03014460.2023.2183988.

Kim, Hee Jin and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya. “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1188-1201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.

Koh, Ho Youn and Kyungmin Baek. “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees.” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 5-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.

Lee, Grace J. M. “It’s time for Canada to jumpstart efforts to support families fleeing North Korea.” Policy Options. August 28, 2023. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2023/north-korean-refugee-sponsorships.

Lee, Hyosun. “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea.” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318-344. https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.

Lee, Mi Kyung, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu. “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea.” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.

Lee, Yeon Jung. Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol,    Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee. “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea.” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-460. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.

Myeong, Hwayeon and Ahlam Lee. “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices.” British Educational   Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 872-899. https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.

Nam, Boyoung and Ijun Hong. “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea.” Violence Against Women (2023): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.

Nam, Boyoung. Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim. “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation.” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564-571. https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.

Nam, Boyoung, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong. “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea.” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024). https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.

Noh, Jin-Won, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu. “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey.” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 26-44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.

Park, Mi Yung. “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea.” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 271-287. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.

Park, Soim, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan. “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.

Shin, Hyonhee. “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life.”     Reuters. January 4, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.

“South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000.” BBC. March 5, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.

South Korean Ministry of Unification. “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors.”             https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.

Williams, Sophie. “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?” BBC. February 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.

Yu, Shieun, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo. “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees.” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1019-1029. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.

Andrew Chan is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy from the University of Toronto. Currently a research intern at HRNK, he is passionate and interested about matters of global security, global policy, and human rights issues.

[1] Hee Jin Kim and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya, “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1189, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.
[2] “South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000,” BBC, March 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.
[3] Sophie Williams, “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?,” BBC, February 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.
[4] South Korean Ministry of Unification, “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors,” (2023), https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.
[5] So-Yeong Kim, Hye-Min Ku, and Seong-Woo Choi, “The growth status of North Korean refugee adolescents in South Korea: comparison with South Korean adolescents,” Annals of Human Biology 50, no. 1 (2023): 148, https://doi.org/10.1080/03014460.2023.2183988.
[6] Ibid., 148-149.
[7] Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu, “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey,” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.
[8] Sangmi Cha and Jon Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South,” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying-lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.
[9] Hyonhee Shin, “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life,” Reuters, January 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.
[10] Cha and Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors.”
[11] Williams, “North Korean defectors.”
[12] Minjung Kim, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee, “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence
from North Korean Refugees,” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2522, https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.
[13] Ho Youn Koh and Kyungmin Baek, “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees,” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 6-7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.
[14] Boyoung Nam and Ijun Hong, “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea,” Violence Against Women (2023): 1, https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.
[15] Ibid., 2.
[16] Mi Kyung Lee, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu, “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea,” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022): 1, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.
[17] Ibid., 1-2.
[18] Boyoung Nam, Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim, “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564, https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.
[19] Agoraphobia is an anxiety disorder wherein the affected perceives their surrounding environment, unfamiliar spaces, or large crowds to be unsafe, causing them to become anxious and reluctant to leave their homes.
[20] Yeon Jung Lee, Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol, Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee, “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea,” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-453, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.
[21] Christina Couch, “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea,” PBS, February 16, 2017, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.
[22] Shieun Yu, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo, “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees,” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1020, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.
[23] Nam and Hong, “Trauma Exposure,” 4-10.
[24] Boyoung Nam, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong, “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea,” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024): 2, https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.
[25] Christoph Bluth, “The North Korean who went home: many defectors struggle against discrimination in the South,” The Conversation, January 7, 2022, https://theconversation.com/the-north-korean-who-went-home-many-defectors-struggle-against-discrimination-in-the-south-174366.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Mi Yung Park, “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea,” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 272, https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.
[28] Hyosun Lee, “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea,” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318, https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.
[29] Ibid., 336.
[30] Soim Park, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan, “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?,” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023): 1-2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.
[31] Ibid., 7-8.
[32] Hagyun Kim and Kwanghyuk Kim, “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter-Korean identity through a process of being one of them,” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 304-305, https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.
[33] Hwayeon Myeong and Ahlam Lee, “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices,” British Educational Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 894, https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.
[34] Grace J. M. Lee, “It’s time for Canada to jumpstart efforts to support families fleeing North Korea,” Policy Options, August 28, 2023, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2023/north-korean-refugee-sponsorships.

Introduction
 
For many, South Africa’s Apartheid evokes images of historical struggle and resilience immortalized in history books, while North Korea’s Songbun seems distant in the confines of a closed-off regime. Despite the vast geographical distance between the two countries, these seemingly disparate systems exhibit notable parallels in their mechanisms of oppression and control. As Nelson Mandela and countless others grappled with the chains of Apartheid in South Africa, North Koreans endured—and continue to suffer—the oppressive grasp of the Songbun system. Both Apartheid and Songbun are tainted by state-sanctioned discrimination and human rights abuses.
 
North Korea’s sociopolitical classification system, Songbun (성분), creates distinct classes under oppressive conditions, having an immeasurable and lasting impact on human rights with its highly destructive and repressive effects on the majority of the population. This system, which creates an oppressive society that is practically unparalleled in the contemporary world, consists of three classes that have been created and divided into over 50 categories.[1] As a system that is based on social status assigned to North Koreans at birth, the party-directed caste system is the primary cause of widespread discrimination and other human rights abuses.[2] The harsh reality in North Korea is that this system forces a third of the 23 million citizens into a form of slave labor, while the remainder is bound by loyalty to the regime.[3]
 
The concept of class struggle as the driving force of history can be traced to The Communist Manifesto, where Marx emphasizes that modern bourgeois society, emerging from the remnants of feudalism, has not eradicated class antagonisms. Instead, it has engendered new classes, forms of oppression, and struggles to supplant the old ones.
 
The Kim regime has deliberately established and upheld social hierarchies based on political loyalty. The Songbun system is crucial for understanding North Korean society and especially the mechanism of oppression that the ruling elite employs to protect and maintain political dominance.
​
Thus, this article delves into the historical contexts of the Songbun system in North Korea and the Apartheid system in South Africa, examining their origins, implementations, and societal impacts. It also draws comparisons and contrasts between the two systems by exploring the legal parallels, as both systems have been denounced as crimes against humanity under international law. Additionally, the article proposes strategies and recommends steps forward to approach and confront these systemic injustices and uphold human rights worldwide. Ultimately, the Kim regime has deliberately established and upheld social hierarchies based on political loyalty. The Songbun system is therefore crucial for understanding North Korean society and especially the mechanism of oppression that the ruling elite employs to protect and maintain political dominance.

North Korea’s Songbun System

North Korea first developed the Songbun system to consolidate Kim Il-sung’s rule by isolating, identifying, and controlling perceived political threats. Songbun, which translates as “ingredient” but also can mean “background,” categorizes every North Korean according to how politically reliable or dangerous they were believed to be, based on their family history. By utilizing this system, the regime isolated and purified Kim’s real and perceived enemies and rewarded his supporters.[4] The North Korean regime targeted those who had backgrounds in land ownership, business, religion, or collaboration with Japanese occupiers, branding them as “counterrevolutionaries” and subjecting them to execution, imprisonment, or relocation to remote mountainous regions.[5]
 
In 1957, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) formalized and intensified the Songbun system through proclamations and resolutions, implementing legislative measures such as Cabinet Decree No.149 to justify mass relocations on the grounds of internal security.[6] Key factors determining one’s Songbun include their ancestors’ socioeconomic status at the time of liberation in 1945, their actions during the Korean War (1950–53), and whether they had relatives in South Korea or China, as connections to the outside world were deemed detrimental to one’s loyalty to the Kim regime.[7] The Songbun classification process starts at birth for every North Korean, and children under 17 are classified according to their parents’ status.[8]
 
The Songbun system divides the population into three groups: the “Core,” comprising roughly 28% of the population, including revolutionaries and descendants of war heroes; the “Wavering” group, making up 45%, including individuals from diverse backgrounds such as former South Koreans or intellectuals; and the “Hostile” group, accounting for the remaining 27%, which encompasses descendants of landlords, capitalists, and those deemed politically opposed or associated with external forces. These classifications were meticulously maintained in individual files accessible through the digital system “Faithful Servant 2.0,” in 2019, facilitating government control and surveillance across all administrative levels.[9]
 
Songbun dominates all aspects of individuals’ lives in North Korea. Job assignments are determined by songbun, resulting in significant disparities in work conditions and social standing. Those with high Songbun have access to better educational opportunities, perpetuating privilege across generations. Songbun also significantly impacts family life, as marriage prospects and familial reputation are heavily influenced by it, leading to “intra-class” unions. Those with low songbun may face exile to remote regions, limiting their freedoms and economic opportunities. Furthermore, songbun determines access to food and healthcare, reinforcing class divisions and the dominance of the ruling elite. Despite its opacity, awareness of songbun pervades North Korean society, instilling fear and fostering compliance among the population. It serves as a powerful tool for regime control and maintaining power.[10]
 
According to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (COI), Songbun continues to be enforced by the Kim regime. Moreover, the “discrimination based on gender and songbun is employed as a means of maintaining a rigid social structure less likely to produce challenges to the political system”.[11]

South Africa’s Apartheid

In 1948, the National Party government in South Africa instituted Apartheid, which translates to "apartness" in Afrikaans. The Apartheid system was an organized system of racial segregation that required distinct living spaces, facilities, and restricted interaction between racial groups.[12] This system was distinct from previous segregation regimes in that it used a repressive governmental machinery to crush opposition and legally enforced racial isolation, disproportionately affecting non-White populations. Moreover, Apartheid consistently pushed the majority of the population to the margins of society based only on the color of their skin, leaving non-white people frequently in near destitution.[13] Apartheid institutionalized notions of racial “superiority” and “inferiority.”
 
The Population Registration Act was pivotal in Apartheid legislation, categorizing South Africans into racial groups (white, black, colored, and later Asian) that determined their social, political, educational, and economic opportunities. It formalized racial segregation and upheld the discriminatory practices, supported by complementing laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the Group Areas Act.[14] These rules prohibited interracial unions and divided people into four racial groups: white, black, Indian, and colored. Each group had specific neighborhoods they were allowed to reside in. While white South Africans continued to rule over urban areas, black South Africans were forced to relocate to their tribal homelands. Segregation was further cemented when Afrikaans was mandated as the language of instruction and administration.[15]
 
Despite relentless repression from the ruling government, anti-Apartheid sentiment gave rise to political movements opposing white supremacist ideologies. Prior to 1960, opposition to Apartheid was broad and varied. Along with Indian, Colored, White, and church-based groups, key organizations driving the battle were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), and the United Democratic Front (UDF)[16]. In particular, the African Native National Congress (SANNC), founded in 1912 as the South and later known as the ANC, advocated for South African black rights and played a central role in the anti-apartheid struggle, including the 1952 Defiance Campaign, before internal divisions led to the formation of the PAC in 1959.[17]
 
As domestic and international pressure to end Apartheid grew by the 1980s, political prisoners were freed and there were political negotiations that ultimately led to the founding of a non-racial democratic state in 1994. The end of Apartheid opened the door to creating a more inclusive society in which everyone could take an equal part in public life and governance.
 
North Korea’s Songbun System vs South Africa’s Apartheid
 
Similarities
 
North Korea’s Songbun system and South Africa’s Apartheid regime share striking similarities. Both relied on legislation and political documents to justify discriminatory practices. South Africa’s Population Registration Act of 1950 classified individuals into racial categories, dictating their social, political, and economic rights. Similarly, North Korea’s Songbun system categorized citizens based on perceived loyalty to the regime, influencing their access to resources and opportunities. Specifically, North Korea formalized discriminatory practices through directives such as the “On the Transformation of the Struggle with Counter-Revolutionary Elements into an All-People All-Party Movement” proclamation and the KWP’s May 30 Resolution. These measures are comparable to South Africa’s Population Registration Act.
 
In both South Africa and North Korea, the Apartheid and the Songbun regimes were used to justify the geographical segregation and establishment of localities limiting the freedom of oppressed black South Africans and North Korea’s hostile class.[18] In South Africa, Apartheid laws designated ‘Bantustans’ as homeland areas for black residents, stripping them of citizenship rights and forcing mass relocations.[19] Similarly, North Korea’s “hostile” class faces restricted movement and employment in isolated areas, akin to Apartheid’s spatial segregation.[20] Both regimes employed policies that disrupted families and communities, enduring social and economic hardships.
 
Both Apartheid and Songbun enacted laws that enforced large-scale racial or social segregation, dictating where people could live based on their designated category. They formalized classification systems with identity cards, specifying racial groups in South Africa and background and birth origin groups in North Korea. These categorizations were used to justify forced removals and relocations of marginalized groups to designated areas. Additionally, both states suppressed dissent through laws banning gatherings and organizations perceived as threats, while their education systems perpetuated labor divisions and social inequality. Furthermore, both systems facilitated the exploitation of labor, including instances of forced labor, domestically and sometimes internationally, further entrenching systemic inequities.
 
Differences
 
However, there are also significant differences between the two systems. South Africa’s Apartheid regime, characterized as a crime against humanity, focused primarily on enforcing racial segregation and discrimination through government legislation. Its laws institutionalized racial inequality by restricting the rights and freedoms of non-white South Africans, enforcing separate facilities, and imposing harsh penalties on those who resisted. The system aimed to maintain white minority rule and economic dominance, perpetuating systemic oppression and marginalization of black, colored, and Indian communities.
 
In contrast, North Korea’s crimes against humanity under the Songbun system target groups based on perceived political loyalty and family background. Songbun categorizes individuals into core, wavering, and hostile social classes, dictating access to resources and opportunities. The regime uses Songbun to control and oppress its population, rewarding loyalists while punishing perceived dissenters through systemic discrimination and severe human rights abuses. Unlike Apartheid, which was primarily race-based, North Korea’s system is based on political allegiance and social background, reflecting the regime’s draconian control over every aspect of citizens’ lives. Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that some racial elements are also involved in Songbun.[21] Chinese individuals within families are barred from the core class and can only advance to the wavering class through strict adherence to regime policies. Those with Japanese backgrounds[22] face even harsher discrimination, affecting their songbun classification and treatment in North Korean society, despite occasional exceptions based on exceptional talents or circumstances.[23]

Legal Parallels and Applicable Laws to Apartheid in North Korea

In particular based on discrimination against those of “impure” ethnic background, North Korea’s Songbun system could meet the criteria of contemporary apartheid under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which defines crimes against humanity as “inhumane acts committed within an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups, aimed at maintaining that regime,” including murder, enslavement, torture, and persecution based on various grounds.[24] While South Africa’s crimes predominantly revolved around Apartheid and North Korea’s around the persecution of identifiable groups, both systems exhibit severe human rights abuses consistent with these categories.

Three pivotal international treaties apply to collectively target the crime of Apartheid: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Apartheid Convention, and the Rome Statute.[25] The ICERD, which entered into force in 1966, sets out to eliminate racial discrimination and Apartheid practices by affirming states’ obligations to prevent and eradicate such injustices.[26] In a comparable manner, Apartheid is defined by the Apartheid Convention, which has been in effect since 1976, as systematic oppression through cruel acts that uphold racial dominance and include denial of fundamental rights and discriminatory laws.[27] The 1998 Rome Statute, entered into force in 2002, establishes Apartheid as a crime against humanity in relation to pervasive or organized assaults on civilian populations.[28] While it adopts the same standards as the Apartheid Convention, it faces difficulties in defining "racial group" in accordance with international law.

Specifically, Article 2(h) of the Rome Statute defines Apartheid as inhumane acts similar to those in paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute, occurring within an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression by one racial group over others, aimed at maintaining control. The North Korean regime employs its own form of racism, emphasizing Korean racial superiority over all others. The Songbun system in North Korea, akin to Apartheid, institutionalized racial discrimination and domination by the Kim regime, highlighting the superiority of the Korean race over others and disadvantageous individuals with Chinese or Japanese heritage or backgrounds.[29] These discriminatory practices, alongside documented survivor testimonies and reports, illustrate the systemic oppression and suffering inflicted by both regimes on their respective populations.
 
Some scholars contend that the inclusion of Apartheid in the Rome Statute, which achieved customary international law status and is considered jus cogens—a peremptory norm of international law—is pivotal.[30] They argue that the crime of Apartheid remains relevant and applicable globally, not limited to its original context in South Africa. John Dugard, a South African professor of international law, underscores this view, suggesting that while the Apartheid Convention may have initially targeted South Africa, it now serves as a broader instrument under international law, encompassing systemic racial discrimination in any context. Numerous international legal instruments support this interpretation, such as the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention and the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind, both of which recognize Apartheid as a crime that is not geographically bound but rather as a universal condemnation of institutionalized racial oppression.[31]
 
Additionally, as Apartheid should be universally condemned as a crime for its institutionalization of racial oppression, scholars have aimed to advance different policy suggestions for eradicating this crime from North Korea.  . B. R. Myers, an American professor of international studies at Dongseo University in South Korea, focuses on internal public communication (propaganda) in order to understand how the North Korean regime constructs ideological legitimacy. The emphasis on racial purity in the regime’s own internal pronouncements leads Myers to conclude that rather than being a failed communist state, North Korea derives its legitimacy from “the claim to superior might, race-purity, and resolve”.[32] Based on these observations and his own upbringing in Apartheid-era South Africa, Myers believes that engagement with North Korea is more effective, and its opposite, isolation.
 
However, other commentators who lean towards engagement with North Korea find the comparisons between North Korean racism and Apartheid-era South Africa very uncomfortable. Marcus Noland notes that their reaction is understandable: they find it simpler to justify engaging with “misguided socialists” rather than with “racially obsessed fascists”.[33] For Americans in this category, the discomfort is amplified by the similarities to Ronald Reagan’s failed [34]“constructive engagement” approach towards South Africa’s Apartheid regime, which parallels current discussions on engaging with the Kim regime.[35]
 
Conclusion: A Step Forward

Both systems––South Africa’s Apartheid and North Korea’s Songbun––have been scrutinized for violating international human rights norms. North Korean decrees and resolutions established systemic discrimination against perceived political rivals, while Apartheid's Population Registration Act and later laws reinforced racial discrimination. These actions, which represent the systematic marginalization and repression of specific groups in each community, have been denounced under international law as crimes against humanity.

The Songbun system has escaped international attention despite its substantial ramifications, partly because outsiders are reluctant to recognize its coercive nature and the state maintains secrecy. The system exerts a persistent influence on the day-to-day lives of North Koreans, including through the extremely unequal distribution of resources. As long as North Korea's repressive system and acts of torture, unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, and harsh prison conditions continue, the international community must hold the country accountable for these atrocities.

Nevertheless, the enforcement of international regulations and convention against North Korea’s violations continues to face numerous challenges relative to the necessary fulfillment of the notion of sovereignty. North Korea’s non-ratification or non-signatory status for these conventions, limited jurisdiction of the ICC, and the nature of North Korea as a rogue and dictatorial regime impede the international community to take concrete steps to alter the course of the ongoing violations. However, despite these challenges, international pressure, diplomatic efforts, and advocacy through international organizations remain important tools to promote compliance with international conventions and norms, including those related to human rights and discrimination, including discrimination on the grounds of race. As a first step in combating Apartheid in all its forms, the international community must hold North Korea accountable for its chronic violations of international treaties. This will help protect the fundamental rights of all North Koreans. In particular, when providing humanitarian aid to North Korea, the international community could take steps to ensure that aid reaches the most vulnerable groups, including those disadvantaged under the Songbun system; for instance, the WFP should “develop more stringent monitoring and seek to assure the right to food for all those who are hungry, including those in neglected rural areas, street children and the up to 120,000 men, women and children held in the kwanliso prison labor camps”.[36] This is not the end, but rather another step forward in the international investigation of North Korea’s violations of human rights, indicating to the country and the international community that rapid action is required. The urgency of these efforts is underscored by the profound and ongoing impact on the lives of North Koreans, demanding swift and decisive international action.

SoEun Park is currently a research intern with HRNK. She is an undergraduate student at Harvard University concentrating in Government and Sociology.

[1] Collins, R. & The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2012). Marked for life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s social classification system. In Marked for Life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s Social Classification System. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Robertson, P. (2020, October 28). North Korea’s caste system. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/05/north-koreas-caste-system#:~:text=Kim's%20government%20based%20each%20citizen's,War%2C%20from%201950%20to%201953.
[5] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Collins_Apartheid_Songbun_Final.pdf
[6] Ibid.
[7]  Ibid.
[8]  Ibid.
[9]  Ibid.
[10]  Ibid.
[11]  Ibid.
[12] AUHRM Project Focus Area: The Apartheid | African Union. (n.d.). https://au.int/en/auhrm-project-focus-area-apartheid#:~:text=The%20Apartheid%20
[13] A history of Apartheid in South Africa | South African History Online. (n.d.). https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa
[14] Ibid.
[15] AUHRM Project Focus Area: The Apartheid | African Union. (n.d.).
[16] A history of Apartheid in South Africa | South African History Online. (n.d.).
[17] Ibid.
[18] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Note: Kim Jong-Un’s mother is an ethnic Korean who previously lived in Japan and was born in Osaka, Japan. For political reasons, the regime cannot reveal this to the wider population.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. (n.d.). International Criminal Court. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf
[25] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity.
[26] International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. (1965, December 21). United Nations Human Rights. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-elimination-all-forms-racia
[27] United Nations General Assembly. (1974). International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. In United Nations General Assembly Resolution. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf
[28] United Nations. (n.d.). United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml
[29] Collins, R. R. N. K. & Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2021). South Africa’s Apartheid & North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in crimes against Humanity.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Noland, M. (2014, February 11). Myers, Apartheid, and Engagement with North Korea. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/myers-apartheid-and-engagement-north-korea
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] COHEN, R. (2015, April 21). Must UN Agencies Also Fail in North Korea? 38 North. https://www.38north.org/2015/04/rcohen042115/

            North Korea and its weapons of mass destruction continue to pose a significant challenge for the international community. Pyongyang has been subject to multiple rounds of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. However, these sanctions have yielded mixed results at best, as North Korea maintains its bellicose attitude and doubles down on weapons development.

            Over time, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have become more threatening to regional and global security, but it is increasingly clear that North Korea’s nuclear proliferation problem is also a human rights problem. UNSC Resolution 2397, adopted in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in 2017, notes in its preamble that that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles occur at the expense of North Koreans “by diverting critically needed resources… when they have great unmet needs.”[1]

            At the same time, North Korea has a track record of evading sanctions by engaging in illicit economic activities, using the proceeds earned from such activities to fund its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile tests. The regime has shown a continued disregard for the well-being of its citizens by prioritizing regime security and nuclear weapons over the human rights of its citizens.

            North Korea’s ability to evade sanctions is enabled in part by external actors. This essay explores the maritime aspects of international sanctions enforcement and Chinese interference in said enforcement. UNSC Resolution 2397 further tightened the existing sanctions regime on North Korea by introducing, among others, a limit of 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons on the supply, sale, or transfer of crude oil to North Korea and 500,000 barrels on refined petroleum products.[2] It also placed special emphasis on targeting North Korea’s sanctions evasion, noting that it “is illicitly exporting coal and other prohibited items through deceptive maritime practices and obtaining petroleum illegally through ship-to-ship transfers.”[3] This places an obligation on UN member states to prevent such behavior and implement UNSC resolutions. Without concerted efforts to enforce sanctions, North Korea will be emboldened to evade sanctions with impunity.

North Korea’s Maritime Sanctions Evasion and International Response

              Despite Resolution 2397’s explicit denouncement of North Korea’s illicit maritime activities, they continue unabated. The UN Panel of Experts described ship-to-ship transfers as “a primary method of sanctions evasion” in its annual report for 2019.[4] These transfers also involve “increasingly advanced evasion techniques,” such as:
The disguising of vessels through ship identity theft and false Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions… contrary to International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations governing safety of life at sea, which require that AIS be in operation at all times… Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of tankers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the use of small, unregistered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and the use of additional vessels for transshipment.[5]

            These methods obfuscate the movements and identity of vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers and their cargo, allowing North Korea to breach limits on restricted goods imposed by the UNSC. The transfers are mostly concentrated within the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, and also the East Sea, off the coasts of Russia and North Korea.[6]

            North Korea’s sanctions evasion has been met with greater international efforts to enforce these sanctions. In 2018, U.S. officials revealed plans to expand the interception of ships violating UN sanctions with an emphasis on detecting ship-to-ship transfers, engaging in coordination talks with regional partners to crack down on illicit maritime activity.[7] This led to the creation of the Pacific Security Maritime Exchange (PSMX), an information-sharing initiative to monitor North Korea’s illicit activities and coordinate actions with allies and partners, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.[8]

            PSMX prevents North Korean sanctions evasion by identifying smuggling ships and illicit trading activities, which raises the cost of sanctions evasion by forcing the regime to “create more intricate, expensive, and complicated smuggling networks” and helping to disband existing black market networks.[9] Participating countries also contribute by periodically deploying military resources, such as naval vessels and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, to patrol the regions where ship-to-ship transfers commonly occur. These deployments primarily involve maritime surveillance activities—observing and identifying vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers, documenting evidence, and reporting illicit activities.

            Some deployments are done explicitly for the purpose of supporting the PSMX, such as Canada’s Operation NEON and Australia’s Operation Argos, while other deployments are part of larger missions to the Pacific region in general, as with the United Kingdom.[10] The former deployments occur with more frequency and regularity. Canada, for instance, has recorded ten deployments in total,[11] with Australia recording twelve deployments of maritime patrol aircraft and nine deployments of naval vessels as of September 2023.[12] New Zealand, for its part, has deployed maritime patrol aircraft six times since 2018,[13] and has recently pledged to increase its contributions with more frequent flying missions and sending ships for the first time.[14]

China’s Attitude Towards UN Sanctions

            As a permanent member of the UNSC, China exercises significant influence over the passage of UNSC resolutions. A discussion on why it previously voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea and how it views those sanctions is warranted.

            The current sanctions literature views sanctions as having three different purposes: “to coerce a change in a target’s behavior; to constrain a target from engaging in a proscribed activity; or to signal and/or stigmatize a target or others about the violation of an international norm.”[15] These purposes can be and are often intertwined, but not all three are always pursued simultaneously. Sanctions are also interpreted differently by different actors. This is especially the case for multilateral sanctions like those enacted at the UN, where China often has different priorities from the other UNSC members.

            China has historically been protective of North Korea, a diplomatic legacy from the Korean War and the broader Cold War period. Today, it still resists calls to place more pressure on North Korea. However, North Korea’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons since 2006 have strained its relations with China on occasion, culminating in China’s support for UN sanctions on North Korea. Wenxin Li and Ji Young Kim  argue China’s attitude shift was due to two external factors and one domestic factor: North Korea’s increasingly aggressive military policy, which provoked Chinese condemnation and outrage; American outreach and negotiations to reach agreements on UNSC resolutions; and worsening domestic perceptions of North Korea in state media and public opinion.[16]

            Nevertheless, while China endorsed stricter measures against North Korea, it is wary of applying too much pressure, which could result in regime collapse. Furthermore, China does not view the nuclear issue in a vacuum, but as an extension of the China-U.S. relationship. Li and Kim note that China-North Korea relations have improved since 2018 while China-U.S. relations have worsened, adding that China’s softening attitude on sanctions “came from China’s lack of trust toward the United States rather than China’s support to North Korea’s nuclear policy.”[17] China interprets the imposition of UN sanctions differently, even as it criticized North Korea for raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

            This supports Catherine Jones’ observation that while UN sanctions on North Korea are conventionally viewed through the lens of coercion and constraint, China “has primarily employed sanctions as a signaling device.”[18] It displays its displeasure with North Korea’s actions and claims to comply with UNSC resolutions, but China’s uneven implementation of sanctions in practice sends mixed signals.[19] This undermines the integrity and effectiveness of the sanctions regime. Moreover, China has recently vetoed new sanctions and suggested lifting some sanctions.[20] This demonstrates to North Korea that it has little to worry about from its neighbor. The emphasis on signaling rather than coercing or constraining also means that China is less partial to enforcement efforts by other states, as demonstrated by Beijing’s hostile response.

China’s Harassment of Sanctioning States

            Since the deployment of military assets to patrol the East China Sea and monitor acts of sanctions evasion, various countries have reported being harassed by the Chinese military. This is primarily done through “buzzing,” where Chinese aircraft deliberately fly close to the intended target. One of the earliest occurrences was in October 2018, when Chinese aircraft reportedly flew too close to a Canadian maritime patrol aircraft and “used improper radio procedure and ‘improper language’,” with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand experiencing similar harassment.[21]

            Another instance occurred in June 2019, where Chinese ships and aircraft shadowed two Canadian ships deployed for sanctions enforcement after they left Vietnam for the East China Sea.[22] Later, two fighter jets flew within 300 meters of the ships at 30 meters above the ocean level.[23] While Canada described these initial events as not putting Canadian crew at risk and “not provocative, hazardous or unexpected,” China doubled down on the tactic in 2022. Canada reported that between April and May that year, Chinese aircraft harassed Canada’s maritime patrol aircraft several times, flying so close that the Chinese aircrew were “very clearly visible” and sometimes forcing the Canadian aircrew to modify their own flight path so as to avoid potential collisions.[24] The “buzzing” intensified once more in October 2023, with a jet coming within 5 meters of Canadian aircraft, maneuvering such that the aircraft was in the jet’s blind spot, and releasing “multiple flares while flying close.”[25]

            In one instance involving Australian divers, meanwhile, China employed other methods. When an Australian vessel deployed divers to remove fishing nets that were entangled in its propellers, a Chinese destroyer approached it and began operating its sonar, forcing the divers to get out of the water and causing minor injuries.[26] The most recent disruption occurred in early June, when a Dutch ship and marine patrol helicopter were approached by Chinese forces.[27] More of these “buzzing” incidents can be expected in the future, as long as efforts to enforce maritime sanctions continue.
​
            China publicly criticizes international deployments by framing them as intrusions on national security. It condemned Britain’s decision to sail a warship through the Taiwan Strait after completing sanctions enforcement operations, saying that this behavior “harbored evil intentions.”[28] In the same vein, it accused Canada of violating its airspace “in the name of implementing resolutions,”[29] called on Australia to “stop making trouble in front of China’s doorstep,”[30] and accused the Dutch of being heinous by “falsely claiming to be carrying out a U.N. mission” while infringing upon Chinese jurisdiction.[31]

            China cannot directly criticize the enforcement of sanctions, as this is equivalent to publicly opposing UNSC resolutions. This helps explain Beijing’s claims that countries are using these resolutions as a cover to engage in nefarious activities against China. However, the fact that vessels engaging in ship-to-ship transfers are being identified and reported to the UN belies such claims. New Zealand’s missions alone recorded the observation of four ship-to-ship transfers and thirty vessels of interest, and the reporting of thirty-three vessels suspected of violating UN sanctions.[32] There has also been communication with China regarding illicit practices within its waters and appeals for China to help stop North Korean sanctions evasion.[33]

Concluding Remarks

            China’s support for strengthening sanctions once led some to hope of potential U.S.-China cooperation on denuclearizing North Korea.[34] This is unlikely today, given tense bilateral relations, but it does not change the fact that Chinese cooperation was instrumental in effectively implementing sanctions. When China reduced trade with North Korea and enforced sanctions more strictly, the combined pressure forced North Korea to negotiate terms for de-escalation.[35] This demonstrates the continued utility of sanctions as a means of coercion, provided they are implemented adequately.
​
            Countering sanctions evasion is critical for ensuring that the coercive power of sanctions is not compromised.[36] Through its actions, however, China abets North Korea’s illicit maritime sanctions evasion by disrupting international sanctions enforcement initiatives. It is also signaling to North Korea that its actions will be protected from scrutiny. Improving sanctions enforcement strengthens the strategic capabilities of sanctions, allowing them to be deployed as reliable tools in conjunction with negotiations and other policy instruments.[37] Contrary to what China claims, it must be made clear that any adjustments to the sanctions regime depends on North Korea making concrete commitments for a negotiated settlement and, at minimum, refraining from further nuclear weapons testing or development.

Wu Yang is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, with concentrations in global security and foreign policy, as well as a regional concentration in East and Southeast Asian studies.
​
[1] United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2397 (22 December 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2397, 1.
[2] Ibid, 2.
[3] Ibid, 4.
[4] United Nation Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), UN Doc, S/2019/171, 7.
[5] Ibid, 5.
[6] Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “DPRK Maritime Sanctions Enforcement,” International Law Studies 96, no. 1 (May 12, 2020), 103, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol96/iss1/5.
[7] Matt Spetalnick, Phil Stewart, and David Brunnstrom, “EXCLUSIVE-U.S. Prepares High-Seas Crackdown on N.Korea Sanctions Evaders-Sources,” Reuters, February 25, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/oil/exclusive-us-prepares-high-seas-crackdown-on-nkorea-sanctions-evaders-sources-idUSL2N1QE0FN/.
[8] U.S. Department of State, “Pacific Security Maritime Exchange,” accessed June 14, 2024, https://www.state.gov/pacific-security-maritime-exchange/.
[9] Ibid.
[10] “Pacific Patrol Ships Begin Third Year Deployed Broadening Their Mission,” Royal Navy, September 12, 2023, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2023/september/12/20230912-pacific-patrol-ships-begin-third-year-deployed-broadening-their-mission.
[11] Department of National Defence, “Operation NEON,” Government of Canada, October 2, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html.
[12] Defence Media, “Defence joins international effort to enforce sanctions on North Korea,” Defence Australia, September 16, 2023, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2023-09-16/defence-joins-international-effort-enforce-sanctions-north-korea. At the time of writing, Australia has since participated in more deployments.
[13] “RNZAF P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrols Monitor Suspected Evasions of UNSC Sanctions against North Korea,” New Zealand Defence Force, June 11, 2024, https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/rnzaf-p-8a-poseidon-maritime-patrols-monitor-suspected-evasions-of-united-nations-security-council-sanctions-against-north-korea/.
[14] Lucy Craymer, “New Zealand Will Increase Its Military Contribution to N. Korea Sanctions Monitoring,” Reuters, June 18, 2024, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-will-increase-its-military-contribution-n-korea-sanctions-monitoring-2024-06-18/.
[15] Thomas J. Biersteker, Marcos Tourinho, and Sue E. Eckert, “Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions,” in Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action, ed. Marcos Tourinho, Sue E. Eckert, and Thomas J. Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 21, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.002.
[16] Wenxin Li and Ji Young Kim, “Not a Blood Alliance Anymore: China’s Evolving Policy toward UN Sanctions on North Korea,” Contemporary Security Policy 41, no. 4 (2020): 612-615, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1741143.
[17] Ibid, 624-625.
[18] Catherine Jones, “Sanctions as Tools to Signal, Constrain, and Coerce,” Asia Policy 13, no. 3 (2018): 20–21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26497785.
[19] Ibid, 21-23.
[20] Michelle Nichols, “China, Russia Veto U.S. Push for More U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” Reuters, May 26, 2022, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-russia-veto-us-push-more-un-sanctions-north-korea-2022-05-26/.
[21] Murray Brewster, “Canadian Surveillance Plane Buzzed by Chinese off North Korea, DND Reveals,” CBC News, December 19, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/chinese-korea-embargo-aircraft-buzzed-harassment-1.4953093.
[22] Murray Brewster, “Chinese Jets Buzzed Canadian Naval Ships in East China Sea,” CBC News, June 27, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-fighters-buzzed-regina-asterix-east-china-sea-1.5193149.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Department of National Defence, “Statement from the Canadian Armed Forces,” Government of Canada, June 1, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/statement-from-the-canadian-armed-forces.html.
[25] Murray Brewster, “Chinese Fighters Engaged in ‘unsafe’ Intercept of Canadian Surveillance Plane, Commander Says,” CBC News, October 16, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-air-force-intercept-aurora-surveillance-1.6997852.
[26] “Australia Says Its Navy Divers Were Likely Injured by the Chinese Navy’s ‘unsafe’ Use of Sonar,” AP News, November 18, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-australia-navy-sonar-divers-12a9e6f228aa81272b9b74b87e0489a1.
[27] Brad Lendon, “Chinese Military Harassed Dutch Warship Enforcing UN Sanctions on North Korea, Netherlands Says,” CNN, June 10, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/10/asia/chinese-military-harass-dutch-warship-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.
[28] “China Condemns Britain for Taiwan Strait Warship Mission,” Reuters, September 27, 2021, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/british-frigate-sails-through-taiwan-strait-2021-09-27/.
[29] Joon Ha Park and Lina Park, “China Accuses Canadian Plane of ‘Intruding’ during North Korea Sanctions Mission,” NK News, October 18, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/10/china-accuses-canadian-plane-of-intruding-during-north-korea-sanctions-mission/.
[30] Micah McCartney, “China Denies Injuring Australian Navy Divers with Sonar,” Newsweek, November 21, 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/china-denies-injuring-australian-navy-divers-sonar-1845644.
[31] “China’s Defence Ministry Says Dutch Ship Incident ‘Heinous,’” Reuters, June 11, 2024, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-defence-ministry-says-dutch-ship-incident-heinous-2024-06-11/.
[32] “RNZAF P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrols Monitor Suspected Evasions of UNSC Sanctions against North Korea.”
[33] Michelle Nichols, “Exclusive: G7, Others Ask China to Stop North Korea Sanctions Evasion in Its Waters,” Reuters, July 21, 2023, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/g7-others-ask-china-stop-north-korea-sanctions-evasion-its-waters-2023-07-21/.
[34] See Donald Rauch, “The US and Chinese Navies Have Already Fought Piracy Together - Now They Can Rein in North Korea.,” Foreign Policy, March 1, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/01/the-chinese-navy-can-give-north-korean-sanctions-bite/.
[35] Woo-Jun Min and Sukhee Han, “Economic Sanctions against North Korea: The Pivotal Role of US–China Cooperation,” International Area Studies Review 23, no. 2 (June 1, 2020): 190, https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865920901896.
[36] Christopher J. Watterson, “What next for Sanctions against North Korea?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 5 (2019): 247–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1654270.
[37] Thomas J. Biersteker and Zuzana Hudáková, “International Sanctions on North Korea: Are They Working?,” in Understanding Kim Jong-Un’s North Korea: Regime Dynamics, Negotiation, and Engagement, ed. Chung-in Moon and Robert Carlin (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2022), 201, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=3375721&site=ehost-live&ebv=EB&ppid=pp_185.