By Jiwoo (Katie) Choi, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, Research Associate
 
Until the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1948, following the end of the Second World War, the people of North and South Korea were united by the same history and culture for thousands of years. Over the 70 years since the division, the two countries have taken almost opposite paths, resulting in their citizens living in completely different political, economic, and cultural environments. One of the most noticeable differences is the level of public corruption. According to the most recent corruption indices by Trace International and Transparency International, South Korea has consistently ranked between 20th and 40th place, while North Korea has been at the bottom of the list of 180-200 countries, making it one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
 
Evaluating the accurate status of corruption in North Korea is challenging. Over the decades, the measurement of corruption has evolved (e.g., perceptions, surveys, estimates from direct observation, graft estimation by subtraction, estimates from market inference). However, there remains little consensus about the magnitude of a country’s corruption due to the highly heterogeneous and multidimensional nature of these estimates.[1] Furthermore, objectively assessing the true extent of North Korea’s corruption is difficult due to the lack of available information for the international audience and the secretive nature of the country. Consequently, it seems inevitable to rely heavily on testimonies and experiences of North Korean defectors, even though perception-based measures may not accurately reflect the level of corruption.

1.Before the Economic Collapse of the Mid-1990s  

It is widely known that autocrats often utilize corruption not only to accumulate wealth but also to reward loyalists and political supporters. Putative anti-corruption efforts are likely a cover for purging rivals and consolidating power.[2] In other words, autocrats can use anti-corruption policies as an excuse to eliminate their enemies and gain more control over the government. However, curbing corruption has been a major agenda item for some “high-performing” authoritarian regimes, such as China and Singapore, for economic development, political stability or international image, and their anti-corruption success is too common to be considered exceptional.[3]
 
At the end of the Second World War, Korea regained independence after 35 years of Japanese rule. However, in 1945, the Yalta Conference agreements divided the Korean Peninsula into two separate countries. Both were poor and characterized by rampant corruption. Newly independent countries often witness high levels of corruption due to underdeveloped governance and opportunities for individuals to exploit the system for personal gain in their politically unstable and developing environments.[4] After the Korean War (1950-1953), both North and South Korea focused on reconstruction of their war-torn countries while grappling with absolute poverty, each competing to prove the superiority of their respective systems.
 
Under these circumstances, political corruption was fairly well curbed under Kim Il-sung’s regime from the 1950s until the 1980s.[5] Kim Il-sung, the first autocratic leader of North Korea, eagerly pursued economic development, not only as part of his ideological commitment to creating a modern socialist state but also to win the inter-Korean competition.[6] He considered corruption a threat to the economy and fought it with the Anti-Corruption Campaign, Anti-Waste Campaign (1952), and the Self-Confession Campaign (1955).[7] In the 1950s, North Korea arguably battled corruption more successfully than its southern counterpart.[8] Anti-corruption campaigns by autocrats often become a means to eliminate their political enemies or to consolidate their own power. However, these developmental imperatives have the potential to stimulate highly authoritarian regimes to curb corruption. Kim Il-sung’s campaigns successfully contributed to post-war reconstruction and rapid development, resulting in higher economic development in North Korea compared to the South until the 1970s.[9] This suggests that structural factors such as regime type might be insufficient to predict a country’s tolerance for corruption. However, Kim Il-sung's anti-corruption policies had structural limitations as they did not rely on the conventional democratic approach such as the rule of law, checks and balances, elections, and government transparency.
 
In South Korea during the same period, political corruption was rampant under military governments until 1992. Despite considerable efforts to achieve self-reliance through critical national industries such as chemicals and steel, the pervasive network of relationships facilitated corruption. The growth of international trade and business made bribes highly beneficial to company owners, granting them access to profitable contracts.[10] Conventional theories suggest that corruption is detrimental to economic growth, but it can sometimes counteract rigid procedures and bureaucratic governments.[11] This approach contributed to South Korea’s post-war prosperity, as business owners played a significant role in transforming a poor agrarian market into the world’s 10th-largest industrial economy despite the negative aspects of corruption.

2. After the Economic Collapse of the Mid-1990s  

Since the economic collapse of North Korea in the 1990s, corruption has rapidly spread and penetrated the daily lives of its people. Bribery has become a common practice among North Koreans for various activities, such as moving residences, engaging in commercial activities, issuing documents, using medical facilities, receiving job assignments, entering schools, and seeking overseas assignments.[12] Bribery and corruption lead to significant human rights concerns in several ways, including access to basic necessities (food, healthcare, shelter, and work), arbitrary arrest and detention, inhumane treatment in detention facilities, vulnerability to exploitation (especially for women), and lack of rule of law. The kleptocratic government mandates and perpetuates corruption through centralized power, a patronage system, lack of transparency, forced labor and exploitation, leading to severe human rights concerns. As a result, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recognized corruption as a serious human rights problem in North Korea and analyzed the state’s kleptocracy as a form of corruption.[13]
 
While it is not possible to explain the corruption status of North Korea by analyzing a single theory or factor, it remains meaningful to compare the corruption in both Koreas from political, economic, and socio-cultural perspectives.

A. Authoritarianism versus Democracy / Centrally-planned Economy versus Capitalism  

In the mid-1990s, the North Korean economy, including its state-run public distribution system, collapsed, partly due to “traumatic” events such as the sudden withdrawal of Soviet support after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) and a devastating famine (1994–1998). The death of Kim Il-sung in 1994 also triggered additional political instability in the country. These circumstances led to corruption becoming a ubiquitous and structuralized problem, rampant in many sectors of economic and social life.[14] Pyongyang’s leadership required new sources of revenue, resulting in the regime deeply engaging in illegal activities abroad, including cybercrime, crypto theft, counterfeiting, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking. Such activities continue today and represent major sources of revenue for the country’s leadership. These illegal activities are closely related to corruption, both as a symptom and a driver of the pervasive corruption within the regime. They involve high-ranking officials’ misuse of state power and resources, and they undermine the rule of law.
 
Low wages in the public sector have further contributed to corruption.[15] The crisis of the 1990s pushed even party officials to the brink of starvation, exacerbating bribery and embezzlement driven by desperation rather than greed. The breakdown of the public distribution system led to widespread embezzlement by citizens and officials with access to state resources. Jonathan Corrado, Director of Policy of the Korea Society stated, “The low salaries of state officials and a lack of oversight meant that people, especially those participating in the informal or market economy, are quite vulnerable."[16] For many, corruption has become a survival strategy, as their wages seldom reach the barest subsistence level.[17]
 
In the 1990s, North Korea was forced to accept de facto marketization, which facilitated corruption as beneficial to the regime, representing a major source of revenue for the leadership.[18] The regime initially tried to suppress marketization for maintaining control over economy and political stability, but failed due to undeniable economic necessity and its role in facilitating economic recovery.[19] In 2002, Kim Jong-il’s regime partly formalized economic liberalization through a set of agricultural and financial reforms[20] to impose post hoc control over the market.[21] In the marketized economy, various forms of corruption became financial wins for not only the regime and officials but also for the individuals involved in market activities. New wealthy entrepreneurs, called “donju”, are said to be an invisible hand of economic development. They have a corrupt symbiotic relationship with the regime and officials, allowing them to bypass restrictions on market activities and gain access to state assets. Pseudo-state enterprises, which are state-owned on paper but controlled by private interests in practice,[22] also tie themselves to the regime as their activities lack a legal framework.[23] From an economic point of view, the corruption of these actors seems to help grease the wheels of a highly regulated economy. Additionally, marketization forced citizens to work in informal black markets, known as jangmadang, and engage in illegal activities to survive. They often had to bribe officials to access and sell food and healthcare products.
 
According to a 2019 survey by the Korea Society, 68% of North Korean defectors spent 10-30% of their incomes on bribery.[24] North Korean people are trapped in a vicious cycle of deprivation and repression, with corruption being one of the few ways to escape this oppressive situation.[25] This reflects the desperate measures people must take to navigate an oppressive system that fails to uphold their basic rights and dignity. This economic burden exacerbates poverty and restricts their ability to improve living conditions, directly impacting fundamental human rights. It creates an environment where human rights are routinely violated, and citizens have little recourse to legal protection. Bribery entrenches social inequality, as those who cannot afford to pay bribes are denied essential services and face harsher treatment.[26] This disparity further marginalizes vulnerable populations, including women and children. Corruption in North Korea is both a symptom and a cause of the broader human rights crisis.
 
In contrast, South Korea inaugurated its first civilian government in 1992 and elected its first opposition president in 1997. Since then, institutional reforms have strengthened democracy, civil rights, and governance quality. The peaceful transition of governments through voting and programmatic competition between the two major political parties has continued. Good governance reforms (1993-2007) led to tangible improvements in transparency (including political finances), corruption control, and governance norms, replacing favoritism and nepotism.[27]
 
Even though South Korea exerted considerable effort to achieve economic development and self-reliance based on critical national industries, the vicious circle of close relationships continued to facilitate corruption. The growth of international trade and business made bribes highly beneficial to company owners by giving them access to profitable contracts. However, after the 1997 financial crisis, civil governments focused on economic reforms, partly due to pressure from the International Monetary Fund’s bailout loan, aimed at enhancing “rapid growth and reduced inequality”[28] in the corporate, labor, and financial sectors. Economic growth and well-established education systems expanded the middle class, while civil organizations and the vibrant civil society also played a significant role in restraining the malfeasance of corporations and officials.[29] These reforms also enhanced accountability and transparency in corporate governance and contributed to market competition and equitable wealth distribution.[30]

B. Rule of Law and Judicial Justice  

Corruption tends to increase where the legal system fails to provide sanctions and penalties for bribed officials. For several years, North Korea has received the worst scores on Trace International’s assessment of ‘Anti-bribery Deterrence and Enforcement’. Due to the absence of the rule of law, high-ranking officials have broad discretionary powers, motivating their clients to gain and retain their goodwill by paying bribes.[31] Additionally, the constant threat of arbitrary arrest and prosecution provides law enforcement officials with opportunities to extort money from citizens desperate to avoid inhumane legal actions.[32] According to KINU’s 2019 white paper, there were many reports of bribery and corruption during investigations, preliminary examinations, and in detention facilities, as well as by judges and prosecutors during trials.[33] The 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry report also states that “the vast majority of inmates are victims of arbitrary detention, since they are imprisoned without trial or on the basis of a trial that fails to respect the due process and fair trial guarantees set out in international law.”[34]
 
Ever since he took power in 2011, Kim Jong-un has launched several ‘merciless’ anti-corruption campaigns targeting party officials. However, these crackdowns exclusively focused on keeping mid-level officials from siphoning money that would otherwise flow to higher-ups.[35] There were no systematic efforts to control and curb corruption to ensure the protection and fair treatment of North Korean citizens. This indicates the extent to which tolerance for corruption can shift even within the same totalitarian regime, depending on changes in the economic situation and political needs. This is why simple theories based on regime type or culture cannot predict cross-national variations in corruption.
 
In this respect, North Korea and South Korea remain in stark contrast. The most impressive change after the governance reforms (1993-2007) in South Korea is the frequent prosecution and imprisonment of the political and economic elite. For example, four former presidents, as well as former members of the National Assembly and ministers, were sentenced to prison, and another former president committed suicide amid a corruption investigation into his family. The courts have also found many top executives guilty of corruption related to presidents and politicians. Despite concerns that some politicians have used corruption investigations for political revenge, South Korea has impressed the international community with its effective anti-corruption policy and a law enforcement system that is unprecedentedly responsive to public opinion.[36]
 
In addition, the South Korean government amended the Public Service Ethics Act in 2015 to ensure the fairness of official authorities by preventing conflicts of interest. They also enacted the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act in 2015, which set low ceilings on financial benefits regardless of whether the benefits were related to official duties. These legal and institutional changes strengthened the anti-corruption stance by enhancing citizens’ perception and sensitivity to corruption, creating a virtuous circle of rule of law.

C. Other Conventional “Democratic” Factors  

As mentioned above, the anti-corruption policies of the Kim family had structural limitations because they lacked conventional democratic approaches, unlike South Korea. Although political corruption was rampant under military governments until 1992 in South Korea, the seeds of improved political, economic, and social corruption control were sown and began to grow during this period. For example, land reforms in 1948-1950 changed the class structure by dissolving the landed aristocracy, contributing to a relatively equal distribution of wealth.[37] The rapid expansion of education also established the fundamentals of ethical awareness and integrity, leading to anti-authoritarian movements by students and intellectuals in the 1960s-1980s.[38] Gradual civil service reform, including the expansion of civil service examinations, enhanced merit-based bureaucratic recruitment and promotion from the 1950s to the 1990s.[39]
 
Unfortunately, the Kim family’s anti-corruption campaigns and efforts did not go beyond the framework of authoritarianism and failed to lay the basis for establishing systematic structures that suppress corruption. The absence of democratic factors in North Korea has resulted in systemic corruption, repression, and widespread human rights abuses, where human rights are routinely violated. In contrast, the seeds of fundamental changes have blossomed since the mid-1990s in South Korea, and the levels of corruption in the two countries have become completely different.
 
Concluding Remarks
 
The political and economic systems of both Koreas remain fundamentally different today: democracy versus authoritarianism, and capitalism versus a centrally-planned economy. There are notable differences in their socio-economic structures, such as the nature of bureaucracy, prevailing governance norms, rule of law and law enforcement, distribution of wealth, political party systems, and the stability of civil society. Institutional theory emphasizes these factors as a means of understanding how corruption might become entrenched in society.[40] Additional considerations include a country’s tolerance for corruption and the perception of corruption by officials and citizens.[41] Nevertheless, anti-corruption reforms do not happen naturally in accordance with a specific political or economic system and are not just a byproduct of economic development – they remain a gradual process that requires a change in both structural conditions and people’s perceptions.
 
In summary, pervasive corruption in North Korea has profound and extensive impacts on the human rights of its people. The lack of rule of law and the widespread need for bribery to access basic necessities like food, healthcare, and legal protection perpetuate a cycle of deprivation and repression.[42] High-ranking officials exercise broad discretionary powers, leading to systemic abuse and exploitation of ordinary citizens.[43] The absence of democratic institutions and transparent governance means there are no effective mechanisms to hold corrupt officials accountable or protect the rights of citizens. This environment of impunity allows corruption to flourish, undermining efforts to improve living conditions and human rights in North Korea.[44] Addressing corruption in North Korea requires not only structural reforms but also a fundamental shift in the perception and tolerance of corruption among both officials and citizens. International pressure and support for human rights initiatives can play a crucial role in advocating for these changes. Ultimately, the fight against corruption is essential for ensuring the dignity, freedom, and well-being of the North Korean people.


[1] Benjamin A. Olken and Rohini Pande. “Corruption in Developing Countries.” Annual Review of Economics, 2012. https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-110917.
[2] Christopher Carothers. “Combating Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes.” Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, 2019.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson. “Causes of corruption: History, geography and government.” Journal of Policy Modeling, Volume 32, Issue 4, 2010.
[5] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.” Journal of East Asian Studies, 22(1), 2022.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
[10] Tanzi, Vito. “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scop, and Cures.” International Monetary Found, May 1998. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9863.pdf
[11] Bajpai, Rajni and Myers,C. Bernard. “Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption.” World Bank Group. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/235541600116631094/Enhancing-Government-Effectiveness-and-Transparency-The-Fight-Against-Corruption.
[12] Kyu-chang Lee, Sookyung Kim, Ji Sun Yee, Eun Mee Jeong, Yejoon Rim. “White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2020.” Korea Institute for National Unification, September 2020. https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/module/report/view.do?idx=113738&nav_code=eng1674806000
[13] Joshua Stanton. “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea.” The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023. https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Root_of_All_Evil.pdf.
[14] Changyong Choi and Balazs Szalontai. “The Challenge of Corruption Control in a Post-Unification Korea: Lessons from Germany and the Former Soviet Bloc.” SSRN, 2020.
[15] Vito Tanzi. “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scop, and Cures.”
[16] Taeksung Oh. “North Korea's Corruption Perception Index ranks at the lowest in the world - the Prevalence of bribery compulsion(북한 부패인식지수 세계 최하위권, 뇌물 강요 만연),” VOA Korea. January 29, 2021. https://www.voakorea.com/a/korea_korea-social-issues_corruption-north-korea/6055808.html&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1688014176050971&usg=AOvVaw3Zghn3YahRFF7h3evkgOEF.
[17] Daily NK. “KPA Corruption: A Necessary Evil?.” April 6, 2015. https://www.dailynk.com/english/kpa-corruption-a-necessary-evil/; Daily NK, “In sanctioned North Korea, bribery problem worsens.” January 9, 2018. https://www.dailynk.com/english/in-sanctioned-north-korea-bribery/.
[18] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Marcus Noland. “Transition from the Bottom-Up: Institutional Change in North Korea.” Comparative Economic Studies, 48(2), February 2006.
[22] Andrei Lankov. “The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia.” Oxford University Press, 2015. 
[23] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
[24] Taeksung Oh. “North Korea's Corruption Perception Index ranks at the lowest in the world - the Prevalence of bribery compulsion.”
[25] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Price Is Rights: The Violation of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” May 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/KP/ ThePriceIsRights_EN.pdf.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Jong-sung You. “Process-tracing paper: Development of Corruption Control in South Korea”. Australian National University. Jul 2015. https://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Process-Tracing-of-Corruption-Control-in-South-Korea.pdf.  
[28] World Bank. “The East Asian Miracle.” Oxford University Press, 1993. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/975081468244550798/pdf/multi-page.pdf.
[29] Jong-sung You. “Process-tracing paper: Development of Corruption Control in South Korea.”
[30] Ibid.
[31] Young-Ja Park. “Informal Political System in North Korea: Systematic Corruption of ‘Power-Wealth Symbiosis’.” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 24:1, 2015.
[32] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Price Is Rights: The Violation of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
[33] U.S. Department of State. “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2020.
https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/.
[34] Report of the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea -­ A/HRC/25/63. A.HRC.25.63.doc (live.com)
[35] Ethan Jewell. “North Korea the world’s most corrupt country for 3rd straight year: Report.” NK News. Nov 16, 2022. https://www.nknews.org/2022/11/north-korea-the-worlds-most-corrupt-country-for-3rd-straight-year-report/.
[36] Carothers C. “Corruption Control in Authoritarian South Korea. In: Corruption Control in Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from East Asia.” Cambridge University Press. 2022.
[37] Jong-sung You.  “Process-tracing paper: Development of Corruption Control in South Korea.”
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Knowledge tools for academics and professionals. Module Series on Anti-Corruption: Module 4 Public Sector Corruption.”
[41] Ibid.
[42] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Price Is Rights: The Violation of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
[43] Ibid.
[44] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”

Introduction: North Korea’s Cyber Operations
 
North Korea has increasingly relied on sophisticated cyber operations to evade international sanctions and fund its nuclear and missile programs. The regime employs thousands of IT workers abroad under false identities, exploiting the global IT outsourcing market to generate income through illicit means.[1] These cyber activities date back to the 1991 Gulf War, leading to the establishment of organizations like the Reconnaissance General Bureau and Bureau 121, which conduct cyber espionage and theft.[2] As a result, cybercrime has become a crucial revenue source, with North Korean hackers reportedly stealing up to $2 billion, operating anonymously and effectively to support the regime's military ambitions.[3]
 
Growing Technological Proficiency & The Mechanisms of Deception

The growth of cybercrimes and the use of IT workers have profoundly transformed the country’s education and economic system with a heavy focus on information technology. Post-secondary institutions in North Korea have more than 300 graduates yearly who specialize in hacking, cyber warfare, and other technological proficiency.[4] They are sent abroad by officers of units such as Bureau 121 to countries with less stringent enforcement of international sanctions, such as China, Russia, or Southeast Asian nations. By operating from these locations, they can conduct cyber operations, including hacking financial institutions or cryptocurrency exchanges, without drawing immediate attention from international authorities. They often also use VPNs and residential proxies to obscure their locations, making it difficult for companies to detect their IP addresses.[5]
 
Additionally, they resort to various deceptions to establish credibility, such as forging documents and identities, creating fake professional profiles on platforms like LinkedIn, and hiring nationals to pose as them in interviews and meetings.[6][7] Their mode of operation is part of a larger strategy of using social engineering, loopholes in the financial system and showy cyber-attacks. Thus, the quality of work produced by North Korean IT professionals is constantly improving, leading to their growing reputation in the global market.[8]
 
Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic and the shift to remote work facilitated the hiring of North Korean workers abroad, especially in China and Russia. In recent months, North Koreans have used advanced coding languages and AI images, stolen identities, and other digital ruse tactics to gain employment, access to company data, and infiltrate the networks of Western targets.[9][10] In other words, their tech capabilities are dynamic and adaptable to a changing cyberspace. Therefore, as the DPRK's cyber capabilities continue to improve, so does the threat landscape internationally, leading to new and complex challenges for international security.
 
North Korea’s Objectives

1. Revenue Generation Strategy

North Korea's deployment of IT workers is driven by a strategic need to generate revenue in the face of crippling international sanctions. For several years now, North Korea has been shut out of traditional sources of hard currency earnings, most of all the weapons sales that have financed its military capability.[11] The regime turned to the global IT outsourcing market to compensate for this shortfall.
 
As early as 2015, the remote work model has been used by North Korea to infiltrate companies across the world – with reports from the South Korean and U.S suggesting that thousands of North Korean IT workers are now deployed worldwide, many of whom bring in more than $300,000 each annually by securing employment under false identities.[12] As the IT market is expected to surpass $500 billion by 2024,[13] it is little wonder that the DPRK's pandering to military ambitions – its nuclear weapons and missile programmes – have been firmly underpinned by the flow of hard currency.
 
2. Access to Sensitive Information & Potential for Extortion

The implications of North Korea's access to sensitive information are significant. The regime's attention to accessing critical information is reflected in its targeting of the defence, pharmaceutical and technology sectors. In 2016, North Korean hackers compromised the South Korean Defense Integrated Data Center, stealing 234 gigabytes of classified military documents, such as war plans.[14] Such intelligence improves North Korea's defence posture by offering insights into its adversaries' contingencies. Likewise, the regime has sought information on nuclear technologies. In 2019, the Kimsuky hacking group breached the network of a nuclear power plant in Kundakulam, India, to obtain proprietary information on reactors based on thorium, an element widely found in North Korea.[15] These activities show that its workers often focus on obtaining information related to countries' national security that can benefit North Korea's military strategies.
 
The ability to extort can be particularly acute, as they also have access to critical company systems. Targeting banks through cryptocurrency exchanges emphasizes the decentralized nature of cryptocurrency – it is difficult to trace and can often be quickly converted into other forms of cash.[16] The FBI reported cases where North Korean workers, after being discovered and fired, had threatened companies with extortion, leveraging the access they had to high-value code or critical systems.[17] This kind of ransomware is potentially even more pernicious, combining established criminal playbooks with the unique capabilities that come with their outsider positions.[18]
 
The Advantages of the IT Market

1. Low Detection Risk

One reason that North Korean cyber operations pose a low detection risk is that IT workers have been sent overseas by the regime for conducting cyber operations in a manner meant to give the impression that they are foreign nationals. By operating from territory outside of the Korean Peninsula, North Korean hackers can originate attacks that do not clearly implicate their country, making attribution and investigation of threats to both the private sector and law-enforcement agencies substantially more challenging.[19]
 
One common deceptive tactic is using proxy servers and other infected networks in third countries so that hackers can perform attacks through a third party and obscure their fingerprints. This further complicates legal jurisdiction issues as it creates ambiguity regarding which nation's laws apply to the cyber activities being conducted. This obfuscation makes it challenging for law enforcement agencies to pursue legal action, as the attacks may originate from a location that does not have clear ties to the perpetrators or may not cooperate with investigations.[20] For example, in the 2016 Bangladesh Bank hack, North Korean hackers made unauthorized transactions in the SWIFT system using multiple international servers, and they could hide behind other countries’ networks.[21]
 
North Korean operatives also probe global cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Countries with weaker defence systems, such as those from Southeast Asia, much of Africa, and Latin America, are easy targets for penetrating other countries.[22][23] Tracing hacking back to these developing countries is remains challenging, serving as North Korean “safe space” for cyber operations. North Korean hackers reportedly operate from China and Russia, too. In these cases, the operatives can blend into local populations and exploit less developed cybersecurity infrastructures.[24]
 
2. Facilitation by Foreigner Individuals

A key component of North Korea’s cybercrimes involves foreign nationals, who knowingly or unknowingly help North Korean operatives obtain jobs and access sensitive corporate networks. Such facilitators are able to get around security measures designed to prevent foreign workers from being hired, such as creating fabricated national addresses where shipping company equipment can be delivered and where infrastructure can be established to make it appear as though the North Koreans are working from inside the country, creating national based bank accounts for payroll purposes, helping with job searches and using stolen or forged I.D.s, and even attending virtual interviews with prospective employers on North Korean workers’ behalf to obscure their identities.[25][26]
 
One example in the U.S. involved a ‘laptop farm’ – a deployment of computers rented by North Korean workers from the U.S. that served as their employees’ network connections. Others are involved in creating fake identities on US-based freelancer sites and winning lucrative ‘gigs’ from the U.S. In all these cases, the key ingredient of North Korean success against the U.S. was US-based facilitators, many of whom were motivated by ideology or a fundamental lack of sophistication in differentiating between good and evil.[27][28]
 
3. Cryptocurrency as a Target and Tool

North Korea's IT workers play a crucial role in the regime's financial operations, strategically allocating and moving funds through cryptocurrencies. These digital currencies have become the most important international currency for the regime, enabling workers to get paid and facilitating the shift of cash around them, a process that confounds international investigators. The regime then recycles the money to finance its own development programmes, weapons of mass destruction, and military programmes.[29]
 
The Human Rights Abuses

The broader context of these cyber operations is deeply rooted in North Korea's systematic human rights abuses. Although there are little to no sources of the specific abuses IT workers endure, there is much on the overall exploitation of North Korean workers.[30] They are simultaneously depicted as valuable contributors to the global economy and as victims of exploitation and coercion, as well as of the paternalistic regime that confines them. DPRK’s workers experience forced labour, unfair working conditions and psychological or emotional damage, all under the control of the Kim regime.[31] Perhaps the most flagrant abuse is their condition as forced labourers. Workers might be sent abroad coercively, and their suitability for the work assigned is based on personal connections and loyalty to the regime rather than professional qualifications. Those who refuse or try to escape face persecution, imprisonment or even execution for treason.[32] Besides working for long hours and living in harsh conditions, a substantial percentage of their earnings is never received as they are sent directly to the government, further cementing the workers’ dependence on the regime, and funding the regime’s choice of priorities – including its nuclear weapons programme.[33]
 
The psychological burden is high, with a prevalence of mental health issues due to the secretive nature of their job, which puts them on the edge of fear regarding being outed as defectors. Isolation and the absence of supportive networks have the effect of intensifying emotional distress and inducing a sense of hopelessness.[34]
 
Exacerbating their situation is the fact that North Korean workers abroad are often not legally registered in the countries where they work, or they are employed in nations that do not adhere to international labor standards, such as China and Russia. As a result, these workers lack any real legal recourse in the face of mistreatment or abuse. Even when local officials are aware of these violations, they may be bribed to turn a blind eye.[35] Additionally, North Korean workers tend to remain secretive and have no viable means to report labor or human rights violations to local authorities.[36] Thus, a lack of legal redress creates a culture of impunity.
 
Broader Impacts for Business and Global Cybersecurity
 
North Korea’s infiltration of IT workers into global businesses poses significant cybersecurity risks, including data theft, intellectual property theft, ransomware attacks, and potential control over critical infrastructure. Companies employing these operatives, knowingly or unknowingly, face legal liabilities, severe fines, and reputational damage for violating sanctions.[37][38] This highlights the need for rigorous identity verification, employment vetting, and compliance with regulations through due diligence and proper training.
 
Additionally, North Korea’s tactics expose broader vulnerabilities in global cybersecurity, potentially inspiring similar actions by other malicious actors. The corruption of trust and security has global ramifications. If a business computer is hacked on the other side of the world, the ramifications can cascade through its supply chains and erode customer trust everywhere. The shift to remote work has intensified these risks, as companies often prioritize speed over thorough vetting, allowing North Korean operatives to exploit gaps in security.[39]
 
 
Mitigating the Threat

To mitigate the risks of hiring North Korean IT workers, companies should adopt a comprehensive security strategy that includes layers of counterintelligence checks, identity verification during recruitment and onboarding, educating HR staff on threats, and fostering a culture of vigilance.[40][41] Critical measures include monitoring networks for unusual activity, auditing third-party staffing practices, and staying informed about advisories from government agencies. In response, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S have committed to intelligence sharing and the creation of senior-level working groups for consultation and coordination on cyber-related matters.[42] Coordinated sanctions targeting North Korean entities and individuals engaging in cybercriminal activities have also been issued by the U.S., with E.U.[43]
 
Finally, enhancing public-private partnerships to bolster business defences and investing in robust cybersecurity infrastructure will further support these efforts. Developing comprehensive legal frameworks and fostering cybersecurity awareness are essential components of a broader strategy to address and deter cyber threats. Overall, these countermeasures reflect a multifaceted approach that combines enhanced cybersecurity protocols, international collaboration, and targeted legislation to address and mitigate the risks posed by North Korean cyber operations.
 
Conclusion

North Korea's strategic deployment of IT workers abroad has emerged as a pivotal component of its cyber operations, enabling the regime to circumvent international sanctions and fund its military ambitions, particularly in nuclear and missile development. By leveraging sophisticated cyber tactics, including deception and the exploitation of global IT markets, North Korean operatives have successfully infiltrated companies worldwide, posing significant risks to cybersecurity and ethical business practices. The intersection of human rights abuses forced labour, and the moral implications of outsourcing to North Korean workers underscores the complexity of this issue. As the threat landscape evolves, businesses must adopt robust security measures, enhance due diligence, and foster international cooperation to mitigate the risks posed by North Korean cyber activities. Addressing these challenges requires a concerted effort from governments, businesses, and civil society to ensure that the pursuit of economic opportunities does not come at the expense of human rights and global security.
 
 
Bibliography
 
Caesar, Ed. “The Incredible Rise of North Korea’s Hacking Army.” The New Yorker, April 19, 2021. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/26/the-incredible-rise-of-north-koreas-hacking-army.

Chafetz, Glenn. “Fox in the Henhouse: The Growing Harms of North Korea’s Remote It Workforce.” – The Diplomat, May 21, 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/fox-in-the-henhouse-the-growing-harms-of-north-koreas-remote-it-workforce/.

Corera, Gordon. “North Korea Hackers Trying to Steal Nuclear Secrets- US, UK Warn.” BBC News, July 25, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjl6p3wj52no.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Leverages U.S.-Based Individuals to Defraud U.S. Businesses and Generate Revenue.” Public Service Announcement, May 16, 2024. https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2024/PSA240516.

Gao, Jie. Hardening the Shield Against North Korea’s “All-Purpose Sword”: An Evolving North             Korean Cyber Threat and Its Policy Responses. Georgetown: Georgetown Center for Security Studies. http://hdl.handle.net/10822/1086540.

Greig, Jonathan. “US Offers $5 Million for Info on North Korean It Workers Involved in Job Fraud.” Cyber Security News | The Record, May 16, 2024. https://therecord.media/north-korea-it-workers-accused-money-laundering-5million-reward.

The Internal Revenue Servic. “Charges and Seizures Brought in Fraud Scheme Aimed at Denying Revenue for Workers Associated with North Korea.” Internal Revenue Service, May 16, 2024.https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/charges-and-seizures-brought-in-fraud-scheme-aimed-at-denying-revenue-for-workers-associated-with-north-korea.

Joe.smith. “Italian Animation Studio to Pay $538K Fine for Outsourcing Work to North Korea: NK News.” NK News - North Korea News, June 27, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/06/italian-animation-studio-to-pay-538k-fine-for-outsourcing-work-to-north-korea/.

Legare, Robert. “U.S. Citizen Accused of Conspiring with North Korean It Workers to Infiltrate 300 U.S. Companies and Get Remote Tech Jobs, Feds Say.” CBS News, May 16, 2024. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-citizen-north-korean-it-workers-infiltrate-u-s-companies-remote-tech-jobs/.

Lyngaas, Sean. “Tennessee Man Arrested for Allegedly Using It Worker Scheme to Raise Money for North Korea’s Weapons Program | CNN Politics.” CNN, August 8, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/08/politics/north-korea-fraud-tennessee-man-arrested/index.html.

Marlow, Iain. “North Koreans Worked Remotely for US Firms to Fund Missiles.” Bloomberg.com, May 16, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-16/north-koreans-worked-remotely-for-us-firms-to-fund-missiles?embedded-checkout=true.

Nah, Liang Tuang. “North Korean Hackers: Vigilance Against Better Than Underestimation Of.”
North Korean Review 19, no. 1 (2023): 91–98. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27217098.

Park, Bora. “A Way Forward to Counter North Korea’s Evolving Cyber Threats.” A Way forward to Counter North Korea’s Evolving Cyber Threats, November 27, 2023. https://www.globalnk.org/commentary/view?cd=COM000129.

Weisensee, Nils. “North Korean Hacker Masquerades as It Worker in Elaborate Infiltration Attempt.” NK News - North Korea News, July 24, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/07/north-korean-hacker-masquerades-as-it-worker-in-elaborate-infiltration-attempt/.

Wilson, Tom. “Exclusive: North Korean Hackers Sent Stolen Crypto to Wallet Used by Asian Payment Firm | Reuters.” Exclusive: North Korean hackers sent stolen crypto to wallet used by Asian payment firm, July 15, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/north-korean-hackers-sent-stolen-crypto-wallet-used-by-asian-payment-firm-2024-07-15/.

Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea.” 2024. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea.

Yong, Lee Sang. “North Korean Workers Abroad Can’t Escape the Regime’s Human Rights Abuses.” – The Diplomat, March 14, 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/north-korean-workers-abroad-cant-escape-the-regimes-human-rights-abuses/.
 


[1]Bora Park, “A Way Forward to Counter North Korea’s Evolving Cyber Threats,” Global NK, November 27, 2023, https://www.globalnk.org/commentary/view?cd=COM000129.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.
[4] Park, “A Way Forward to Counter North Korea’s Evolving Cyber Threats.”
[5] Jonathan Greig, “US Offers $5 Million for Info on North Korean It Workers Involved in Job Fraud,” The Record, May 16, 2024, https://therecord.media/north-korea-it-workers-accused-money-laundering-5million-reward.
[6] Robert Legare, “U.S. Citizen Accused of Conspiring with North Korean It Workers to Infiltrate 300 U.S. Companies and Get Remote Tech Jobs, Feds Say,” CBS News, May 16, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-citizen-north-korean-it-workers-infiltrate-u-s-companies-remote-tech-jobs/.
[7] Iain Marlow, “North Koreans Worked Remotely for US Firms to Fund Missiles,” Bloomberg.com, May 16, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-16/north-koreans-worked-remotely-for-us-firms-to-fund-missiles?embedded-checkout=true.
[8] Marlow, “North Koreans Worked Remotely for US Firms to Fund Missiles.”
[9] Nils Weisensee, “North Korean Hacker Masquerades as It Worker in Elaborate Infiltration Attempt,” NK News, July 24, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/07/north-korean-hacker-masquerades-as-it-worker-in-elaborate-infiltration-attempt/.
[10] Glenn Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse: The Growing Harms of North Korea’s Remote It Workforce,” The Diplomat, May 21, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/fox-in-the-henhouse-the-growing-harms-of-north-koreas-remote-it-workforce/.
[11] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[12] Greig, “US Offers $5 Million for Info on North Korean It Workers
[13] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] The Internal Revenue Service, “Charges and Seizures Brought in Fraud Scheme Aimed at Denying Revenue for Workers Associated with North Korea,” May 16, 2024, https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/charges-and-seizures-brought-in-fraud-scheme-aimed-at-denying-revenue-for-workers-associated-with-north-korea.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Gao, “Hardening the Shield Against North Korea’s.”
[22] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[23] Tom Wilson, “Exclusive: North Korean Hackers Sent Stolen Crypto to Wallet Used by Asian Payment Firm | Reuters,” Reuters, July 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/north-korean-hackers-sent-stolen-crypto-wallet-used-by-asian-payment-firm-2024-07-15/.
[24] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[25] The Internal Revenue Service, “Charges and Seizures Brought in Fraud Scheme.”
[26] Legare, “U.S. Citizen Accused of Conspiring with North Korean It Workers.”
[27] The Internal Revenue Service, “Charges and Seizures Brought in Fraud Scheme.”
[28] Sean Lyngaas, “Tennessee Man Arrested for Allegedly Using It Worker Scheme to Raise Money for North Korea’s Weapons Program,” CNN, August 8, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/08/politics/north-korea-fraud-tennessee-man-arrested/index.html.
[29] Wilson, “Exclusive: North Korean Hackers Sent Stolen Crypto.”
[30] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea,” 2024, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea.
[31] Caesar, “The Incredible Rise of North Korea’s Hacking Army.”
[32] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea.”
[33] Ibid.
[34] Caesar, “The Incredible Rise of North Korea’s Hacking Army.”
[35] Lee Sang Yong, “North Korean Workers Abroad Can’t Escape the Regime’s Human Rights Abuses,” – The Diplomat, March 14, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/north-korean-workers-abroad-cant-escape-the-regimes-human-rights-abuses/.
[36] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea.”
[37] Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Leverages U.S.-Based Individuals to Defraud U.S. Businesses and Generate Revenue,” May 16, 2024, https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2024/PSA240516.
[38] Gordon Corera, “North Korea Hackers Trying to Steal Nuclear Secrets- US, UK Warn,” BBC News, July 25, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjl6p3wj52no.
[39] Legare, “U.S. Citizen Accused of Conspiring with North Korean It Workers.”
[40] Chafetz, “Fox in the Henhouse.”
[41] Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Leverages.”
[42] Tuang. “North Korean Hackers.’
[43] Corera, “North Korea Hackers.”

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) marked a significant advancement in international human rights law by establishing a global standard for disability-specific protections.[1] Although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) ratified the CRPD in 2016, following the recommendation of the UN Commission of Inquiry, it continues to systematically violate the rights of persons with disabilities through widespread discrimination, inadequate services, and severe mistreatment.[2] This essay aims to expose the grim reality of disability rights in North Korea, drawing from reports and testimonies to reveal systemic abuses, which starkly contrast with the regime’s superficial efforts to project a standard compliant image. The true measure of any society can be found in how it treats its most vulnerable members, and North Korea’s actions reveal a significant failure to uphold this principle.[3]

Limited Access and Discrimination

While North Korea’s ratification of the CRPD suggests a commitment to improving disability rights, the reality is starkly different. This divergence becomes evident when examining the limited access to resources and widespread discrimination faced by disabled individuals. Due to the secretive nature of the North Korean regime, specific statistics on the condition of people’s lives are difficult to obtain. However, the testimonies of escapees offer vital, firsthand insights into the harsh realities faced by disabled individuals in North Korea. These accounts are crucial and demand recognition, as they provide undeniable evidence of the systemic neglect and abuse that often goes unreported. Such voices are indispensable in understanding the actual conditions within the country.

Discrimination is pervasive in North Korea and is deeply engrained in societal attitudes that idolize physical strength and productivity as essential to the nation’s ideological and economic vitality.[4] This cultural norm exacerbates the marginalization and stigmatization of disabled individuals, who are viewed as failing to contribute to the regime’s vision of collective strength and self-reliance.[5] Such stigma is particularly harsh for women with disabilities, who face compounded discrimination due to gender biases.[6] As detailed in subsequent sections, reports reveal that people with disabilities in North Korea are often subjected to systemic isolation, which severely limits their social interactions and economic opportunities.  These practices are in direct violation of Article 5 of the CRPD, which ensures equal protection and non-discrimination for persons with disabilities.[7]

During her 2018 visit, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Catalina Devandas-Aguilar, encountered significant barriers in accessing comprehensive information about the status of disabled persons in North Korea.[8] She was not permitted to meet with representatives from various government departments or visit mental health services, limiting her ability to conduct a thorough assessment.[9] The few individuals with disabilities she met were under close supervision, which prevented any private or candid discussions.[10] This restricted access underscores the regime’s control over information and its reluctance to expose the true conditions faced by disabled individuals.

Inequitable Services and Rights

Systemic neglect extends beyond mere societal attitudes, infiltrating the distribution of services and rights. The disparity between urban and rural areas illustrates the pervasive presence of inequities in North Korea's infrastructure. While residents of Pyongyang enjoy relatively better services and protections, this privilege is conditional and fragile. North Korean escapee Lee Aeran recounted that families with disabled children are often expelled from the capital to rural areas in an attempt to maintain Pyongyang's image as an immaculate showcase.[11] This practice not only strips these families of better services but also exposes them to severe hardships, revealing the regime's prioritization of image over the well-being of its vulnerable citizens.[12]

Despite national efforts, such as the Korean Federation for the Protection of the Disabled (KFPD) working on a national plan to improve the rights of disabled persons, these initiatives often fail to reach or benefit individuals in rural areas.[13] For example, a source from North Hamgyong province reported that the government has been using disabled people to elicit sympathy from international donors for funding and to foster loyalty to Kim Jong Un and the state.[14] While a center for the disabled was built in Pyongyang under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, the facility primarily serves the children of the privileged class, who are taught to sing and dance to perform for visiting international audiences.[15]

Additionally, the government's collection of disability data through family doctors, while a step forward, lacks transparency and comprehensiveness.[16] Considering medical accessibility is centralized in the capital, most of the population, especially those in rural areas, are excluded from these statistics. This exclusion leads to an underrepresentation of the true extent of disabilities in the country.  These failures breach Article 2 of North Korea’s Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities, which guarantees state protection and assistance.[17] Such systemic issues highlight the urgent need for more inclusive policies that ensure equitable access to services and protections for disabled individuals across the entire country.

Personal Stories of Hardship

These systemic issues are not just statistical; they translate into real-life hardships for individuals. The personal stories of escapees like Ji Seong-Ho provide a stark illustration of the dire consequences of North Korea’s neglect of its disabled population. In his desperate quest for coal to exchange for food in the black markets, Ji Seong-Ho lost his left hand and foot after passing out from starvation and being run over by a train.[18] This traumatic event left him permanently disabled and without proper medical care or governmental support. In his testimony, he vividly recalled the horror of his mother's screams and the excruciating 4.5-hour surgery performed without anesthetics.[19] Ji Seong-Ho’s story illustrates the extreme risks North Koreans endure to survive and the severe toll on their physical, mental, and emotional well-being. However, his story did not end there, as his resilience and courage led him to participate in the 2018 U.S. State of the Union Address, where he later became a member of the ROK National Assembly and continued to advocate for the rights of people with disabilities. 

Additionally, disabled people in North Korea are often confined to their homes, where they lack access to rehabilitation services or necessary mobility aids. Maeng Hyo-shim, another North Korean escapee, recounted how her mother, unable to walk, only had a pair of crutches and relied entirely on her father's support to survive.[20] Their family was forced to live in isolation from society, underscoring the severe lack of state support and societal inclusion. This isolation violates Article 19 of the CRPD, which guarantees the right to live independently and be included in the community.[21]

Harsh Living Conditions

These narratives are further corroborated by reports of inhumane conditions in prison camps, where disabled individuals face egregious abuse and neglect.[22] The systemic discrimination within these facilities reflects a broader pattern of mistreatment. Segregation is strictly enforced, with individuals separated based on their disabilities.[23] Reports of "death rooms," where sick and disabled prisoners are left without medical care, underscore the extreme neglect and abuse they endure.[24] These practices violate Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which mandates protection from all forms of exploitation, violence, and abuse.[25]

The situation for women and children with disabilities is particularly dire. Widespread reports of infanticide of newborns with disabilities, coupled with exclusion from education and healthcare for those who survive, uncover severe systemic discrimination.[26] High levels of malnutrition further exacerbate physical and cognitive disabilities, compounding the challenges faced by these individuals.[27] This exclusion directly contravenes Article 24 of the CRPD, which guarantees the right to education for all persons with disabilities.[28]

Moreover, defectors report that individuals with conditions like dwarfism and intellectual disabilities are particularly targeted for forced sterilization and isolation, often under the guise of medical treatments.[29] These practices not only breach international human rights standards, including the right to health and reproductive rights, but also constitute cruel treatment under Article 16 of the CRPD.[30] The systemic neglect and abuse faced by disabled individuals in North Korea reveal a broader pattern of human rights violations, necessitating urgent international attention and intervention.

Government Policies and International Perceptions

The severity of these conditions is often masked by the North Korean government’s propaganda, which portrays a misleading image of inclusivity and care for disabled individuals. This section explores how the regime’s policies are perceived internationally and the underlying reality.

Despite legislative efforts, such as the 2003 Disability Law and participation in the 2012 London Paralympics, North Korea's actions towards people with disabilities appear largely disingenuous.[31] The government frequently uses disabled individuals for propaganda, showcasing superficial improvements to gain international favor while systemic issues persist. For example, state media has released images of disabled athletes winning medals in shooting and table tennis at a sporting event for people with disabilities.[32] Yet, residents, including people with disabilities, are outraged by this false propaganda, as many disabled individuals lack access to essential items like artificial limbs.[33] This exploitation aims to garner international sympathy and support, but North Korea fails to provide the necessary resources or opportunities that should accompany such sympathy. These measures are perceived as attempts to mask severe human rights abuses rather than genuine efforts to improve the lives of disabled individuals. Consequently, the country’s image-centric policies fail to address the underlying issues of discrimination, abuse, and neglect.

Defector testimonies and international reports draw chilling parallels between North Korea’s treatment of disabled individuals and Nazi-era crimes.[34] Accounts of forced migration, selective abortion, sterilization, infanticide, and targeted killings paint a grim picture of a regime that systematically dehumanizes its disabled population.[35] Such comparisons underscore the severity of the human rights violations occurring under the guise of state propaganda. These disturbing practices reveal the stark contrast between North Korea's international portrayal and the harrowing reality faced by its disabled citizens, underscoring the urgent need for genuine reform and international intervention.

Conclusion

The human rights situation for persons with disabilities in North Korea is dire, characterized by systemic discrimination, segregation, and abuse. North Korea’s ratification of the CRPD contrasts sharply with the severe violations experienced by its disabled population, which emphasizes a need for urgent reform. The international community must hold North Korea accountable for these abuses and advocate for genuine reforms, such as increasing international monitoring, providing targeted humanitarian aid, and fostering dialogue for internal reforms. Mahatma Gandhi once said, “The true measure of any society can be found in how it treats its most vulnerable members.”[36] It is imperative to uphold this principle and work towards a future where all individuals, including those with disabilities, live free from discrimination and abuse. The world cannot overlook the plight of disabled individuals in North Korea any longer; collective action and unwavering advocacy are crucial to securing their dignity and rights.
 
Bibliography
 
Hosaniak, Joanna. Status of Women's Rights in the Context of Socio-Economic Changes in the DPRK. Seoul: Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2013.

Kang, Hyok, and Philippe Grangereau. This is Paradise! My North Korean Childhood. London: Abacus, 2007.

Lord, Janet E. "Nothing to Celebrate: North Koreans with Disabilities." Foreign Policy in Focus 1, 2013.

Maeng, Hyo-shim. "Ask a North Korean: What Is North Korea Like for People with Disabilities?" NK News, April 18, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/ask-a-north-korean-what-is-north-korea-like-for-people-with-disabilities/.

McCurry, Justin. "Living with Disability in North Korea: 'It's Like a Prisoner's Life'." The Guardian, December 30, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/30/-sp-living-with-disability-north-korea.

Mohammed Hossain. "Not Surviving, but Thriving: Indexing to the Cost of Living." Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 30, no. 2, Winter 2023: 315-340.

Won, Jae-Chun, Janet E. Lord, Michael Ashley Stein, and Yosung Song. "Disability, Repressive Regimes, and Health Disparity: Assessing Country Conditions in North Korea." Hague Yearbook of International Law 27, 2014.

Radio Free Asia. "Disabled in North Korea Confined to Homes, Expelled From Capital." Radio Free Asia, June 13, 2007. Original reporting by Lee Aeran, Sung Woo Park, Naeri Kim, Changyoon Lee, Sookyung Lee, and Myeong Hwa Jang. RFA Korean service director: Jaehoon Ahn. Translated and researched by Greg Scarlatoiu. Written for the Web in English by Luisetta Mudie and edited by Sarah Jackson-Han. https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/nkorea_disabled-20070613.html.

Son, Hyemin. "North Korea Uses Disabled People to Attract Foreign Aid: Report." Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong. Radio Free Asia, December 4, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk-disabled-2019-12042019095625.html.

United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted on December 13, 2006, it entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515, p. 3. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities.
United Nations Human Rights Council. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." A/HRC/25/63, General Assembly, Twenty-fifth session, Agenda item 4, February 7, 2014. Accessed July 24, 2023. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/25/63.

United Nations. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on Her Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). EasyRead version. Prepared by Inspired Services Publishing Ltd. December 2017. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities.

Valerie Johnson is a Master's student at Lund University in Sweden, focusing on human rights access, international development, and governance, with a special interest in East Asia. Her three years teaching in South Korea deepened her understanding of the inter-Korean relationship, inspiring her human rights research. Her work centers on sexual minorities, incarcerated youth, and disabled individuals in North Korea. As an intern at HRNK, she hopes to contribute to North Korean human rights research and become a researcher and advocate for marginalized voices in East Asia.


[1] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515, p. 3. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities.
[2] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Accessed July 15, 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/A.HRC.37.56.Add.1_easytoread.pdf.
[3] Mohammed Hossain, "Not Surviving, but Thriving: Indexing to the Cost of Living," Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 30, no. 2 (Winter 2023): 315
[4] Jae-Chun Won; Janet E. Lord; Michael Ashley Stein; Yosung Song, "Disability,
Repressive Regimes, and Health Disparity: Assessing Country Conditions in North
Korea," Hague Yearbook of International Law 27 (2014) pg. 38
[5] Kang, H., and P. Grangereau. This is Paradise! My North Korean Childhood. London: Abacus, 2007.
[6] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Pg. 17
[7] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 5
[8] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Pg. 4
[9] Ibid. pg. 3
[10] Ibid. pg. 30
[11] Radio Free Asia. "Disabled in North Korea Confined to Homes, Expelled From Capital." Radio Free Asia, June 13, 2007
[12] Ibid.
[13] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Pg. 40
[14] Son, Hyemin. "North Korea Uses Disabled People to Attract Foreign Aid: Report." Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong. Radio Free Asia, December 4, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk-disabled-2019-12042019095625.html.
[15] Ibid.
[16] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities on her visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/37/56/Add.1). 2018. Pg. 15
[17] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 2
[18] McCurry, Justin. "Living with Disability in North Korea: 'It's Like a Prisoner's Life'." The Guardian, December 30, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/30/-sp-living-with-disability-north-korea.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Maeng, Hyo-shim. "Ask a North Korean: What Is North Korea Like for People with Disabilities?" NK News, April 18, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/ask-a-north-korean-what-is-north-korea-like-for-people-with-disabilities/
[21] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 19
[22] United Nations Human Rights Council. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." A/HRC/25/63, General Assembly, Twenty-fifth session, Agenda item 4, February 7, 2014. Accessed [access date]. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/25/63
[23] Lord, Janet E. "Nothing to Celebrate: North Koreans with Disabilities." Foreign Policy in Focus 1 (2013) 
[24]Ibid. 
[25] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 16
[26] Hosaniak, J. Status of Women's Rights in the Context of Socio-Economic Changes in the DPRK. Seoul: Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2013.
[27] Lord, "Nothing to Celebrate: North Koreans with Disabilities,"
[28] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 24
[29] Jae-Chun Won; Janet E. Lord; Michael Ashley Stein; Yosung Song, "Disability,
Repressive Regimes, and Health Disparity: Assessing Country Conditions in North
Korea," Hague Yearbook of International Law 27 (2014) pg. 44
[30] United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted December 13, 2006, entered into force on May 3, 2008. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2515. Article 16
[31]Son, Hyemin. "North Korea Uses Disabled People to Attract Foreign Aid: Report." Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong. Radio Free Asia, December 4, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk-disabled-2019-12042019095625.html.
[32] Son, Hyemin. "North Korea Uses Disabled People to Attract Foreign Aid: Report." Radio Free Asia, 2019
[33] Ibid.
[34] Lord, Janet E. "Nothing to Celebrate: North Koreans with Disabilities." Foreign Policy in Focus 1 (2013)
[35] United Nations Human Rights Council. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." A/HRC/25/63
[36] Mohammed Hossain, "Not Surviving, but Thriving: Indexing to the Cost of Living," Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 30, no. 2 (Winter 2023): 315

Introduction
 
The dangers posed by North Korea’s nuclear testing extend beyond immediate geopolitical tensions to significant human rights and environmental concerns. The nuclear tests conducted at North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear testing site have resulted in what is called “Tired Mountain Syndrome.” The short-term consequences of these tests may lead to the collapse of Mt. Mantap. However, the long-term effects may lead to an eruption of Mount Paektu, a mountain that is considered holy in North Korea.  North Korea’s nuclear testing poses more than just a national security problem. It endangers the human rights and human security of North Korea’s population. For instance, it is believed to have caused earthquakes that otherwise would not have occurred. If continued, nuclear testing at the Punggye-ri testing facility may contribute to the eruption of Mount Paektu or the collapse of Mt. Mantap, which could have catastrophic consequences for both North Korea and neighboring countries.[1] However, no nuclear scientist would report this to the Supreme Leader in fear of punishment.
 
Punggye-ri
 
The Punggye-ri nuclear test facility is North Korea’s sole known nuclear test site, located 17.2 km north of Punggye-ri village in North Hamgyong Province, on the southern slopes of Mount Mantap.[2] Extending 10 km south along a river valley, it was established in the early 2000s and hosted six underground nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and 2017, using two of four known tunnels.[3] Despite announcing its closure in 2018, recent evidence suggests the site is prepared for a seventh test, which could occur at any time. Notably, all six of North Korea's nuclear tests were conducted at the Punggye-ri site, situated in Kilju County in the northeastern part of the country. However, the most vulnerable group in North Korea remains its citizens, as they continue to be exposed to high levels of radioactive material coming from tests that are being conducted at Pungye-ri. Commercial satellite images of North Korea's Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in 2022 reveal ongoing operations throughout the facility.[4] The support infrastructure and instrumentation surrounding Tunnel No. 3 suggest it is ready for testing if a decision is made. Still, no significant activities, like increased vehicle traffic or personnel surges near the tunnel, would suggest an imminent test.[5] A satellite image of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility from April 2, 2024, reveals that the road to Tunnel No. 3's portal has been cleared of snow, indicating ongoing low-level activity.[6] This suggests North Korea is committed to maintaining Tunnel No. 3, and the overall facility and activity at Tunnel No. 3 is concerning, as North Korea has completed preparations for a seventh nuclear test there.
 
Tired Mountain Syndrome Effects
 
Tired mountain syndrome occurs when underground nuclear testing causes fractures and weakens the surrounding rock structure, leading to increased permeability and a higher risk of releasing radionuclides and radioactive contamination into the environment.[7] This contamination can have severe costs to people and their quality of life, including increased health risks such as cancer and other radiation-related illnesses. North Korean defectors from regions near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site displayed signs of possible radiation exposure.[8] In the event of Mt. Mantap’s collapse, due to the testing, the surrounding area will face a significant amount of debris exposure from the eruption, heavily damaging the environment, quality of life, and future crop harvest, potentially creating another famine and debris from the eruption extending past North Korea’s border as far as Japan. Exposure to harmful radioactive fallout can occur directly or indirectly. Radioactive material can enter the body if radioactive dust lands on the skin. Many people and animals in the downwind counties around the Nevada testing site in the United States were exposed to harmful toxins in this way. Inhalation of suspended radioactive material is also a significant risk in the downwind region. High-altitude winds can carry radioactive material far from the test site, depositing it on the ground if precipitation occurs.[9] In the case of Mt. Mantap, as tired mountain syndrome softens the soil, the soil is expected to travel down to where the population lives.  Although most farmland is not conducted in North Hamgyong province, satellite images show agricultural fields.[10] In the days following a nuclear test, radioactive material can settle on crops and pastures.[11] Continuation of the nuclear tests may exacerbate the process of the collapse of Mount Mantap, worsening the quality of life for the North Korean population. The environmental damage can also disrupt local ecosystems, contaminate water supplies, and lead to the displacement of communities, further deteriorating living conditions for the people living in North Korea.
 
Health risks
 
For the people of North Korea, the human health cost caused by radiation in the environment can be particularly severe and affect the people living there for generations. The country's limited healthcare infrastructure is ill-equipped to deal with radiation-related health issues, exacerbating the suffering of affected individuals. Regarding human health exposure, The United States exemplifies a substantial increase in thyroid cancer incidence over recent decades, primarily influenced by iodine irradiation.[12] Similar upward trends have been observed in other parts of the world and can be extended to North Korea. In 2017 and 2018, the Ministry of Unification and the Korea Institute of Radiological & Medical Sciences (KIRAMS) conducted radiation exposure tests on North Korean escapees from areas near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site.[13] A total of 40 individuals were tested, 30 in 2017 and 10 in 2018. The results showed that nine of them (4 in 2017 and 5 in 2018) exhibited worrying chromosomal abnormalities, representing 22.5 percent of the total tested.[14] In July 2016, escapees from Kilju County reported health issues. 13 individuals who had lived in Kilju County for several years following North Korea's first to third nuclear tests were among those who reported these health problems. In August 2016, Dr. Choi, a North Korean escapee, informed the media that these escapees were experiencing physical abnormalities, including headaches, weight loss, and decreased sensory function.[15]
Table 3 taken from Mapping the Risk and Effect of Radioactive Contamination of Groundwater Sources from the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in North Korea

Introduction

In the decades of isolation and authoritarian rule that have gripped North Korea since the end of the Korean War, the number of escapees fleeing the North and settling in different countries has steadily grown. Among the preferred destinations, the most popular is unsurprisingly South Korea, where North Korean escapees are granted automatic citizenship and receive support services from the government. This includes resettlement payment, training services, support programs, and housing assistance.[1] Additionally, escapees who are able to provide South Korean authorities with intelligence aiding the country’s security are entitled to a reward of $860,000, while other payments also being made for those who escape with weapons.[2] The support that the South Korean government provides to escapees is also generous and expensive, encompassing 12 weeks of adaptation training in a resettlement facility, upwards of $50,000 in settlement benefits and housing subsidies depending on the size of the household, and free public school and university education for children.[3]

North Koreans are therefore often drawn to the South as a destination, as many see it as a place where they will be welcomed as citizens and where they will be free from the authoritarian reality they face in the North. As a result, the number of North Korean escapees in South Korea was estimated by the  Ministry of Unification to be at 34,078 in December of 2023.[4] At the same time, North Korean escapees who resettle in South Korea face numerous challenges, and life in their new home entails many significant difficulties.

While resettled North Korean escapees in South Korea find themselves safe from the physical threats posed by the North Korean regime, the hardships many face in the new country are less noticeable in kind. Such challenges are broad in type and have resulted in North Korean escapees struggling to keep up with their fellow South Koreans in many aspects. One example relates to escapee adolescents under the age of 19, which comprise approximately 15% of the escapee population.[5] Among this group, North Korean escapee adolescents demonstrate high rates of faltering growth and compared to their South Korean peers, and studies have found that they are on average shorter and thinner, but also suffer from higher rates of obesity.[6] This is only one example of the physical disparities that are present among North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, and such challenges affect the future generations of these communities.

In order to understand the significance of such disparities, it remains necessary to examine the impact they have on the life of the resettled escapees. These challenges manifest in a number of ways, especially in defining economic, psychological, and cultural differences and struggles. Thus, it is only by examining such challenges and facilitating communication with escapees themselves that positive changes can be achieved to improve the lives of North Korean escapees in South Korea.

Economic Challenges

As perhaps the most visible form of difficulty faced by North Koreans in the South, economic challenges burden almost all of the escapees. As integrating North Koreans into the South Korean economy requires significant support from the government, South Korea provides extensive assistance through financial aid and various programs aimed at increasing self-sufficiency, such as vocational training.[7] Nevertheless, despite the existence of such programs, economic stability is not attainable for most North Korean escapees as many face harsh difficulties in their economic performance.

When compared to their South Korean counterparts, former North Koreans find themselves severely disadvantaged as the unemployment rate among them is approximately twice compared to the national average.[8] Additionally, 56% of North Korean escapees in South Korea are classified as being low-income and 25% qualify for the lowest income bracket subject to national basic livelihood subsidies, a figure which is six times higher than the rate of the South Korean population.[9]

Economic disparities are deeply rooted in multiple causes, including the background of these escapees arriving from North Korea. Many arrive with physical and mental scars that prevent them from settling into a new culture and which affect their ability to obtain and maintain a steady income.[10] Additionally, the different education and training received in North Korea is often incompatible with the job market and society in the South. A BBC interview with an escapee in 2021 discussed many of these issues, describing how many of the jobs available in South Korea are not compatible for the escapees, many of whom have never had to find a job and lack work experience or knowledge of many sectors of the job market.[11]

Financial literacy is another gap existing between North Korean escapees and South Koreans, as the former are significantly less financially literate than the latter.[12] Adapting to a vastly different capitalist society as opposed to a state-controlled command economy is a challenge that requires long-term adaptation and assistance. Nevertheless, North Korean escapees are faced with time constraints and are required to be accustomed to the South Korean model quite abruptly.

Another aspect of the economic challenge is integrating North Korean escapees into a vastly digitized South Korean society that is significantly different from the North. Learning to use modern information and communications technology such as Internet platforms remains a great challenge for many of the escapees who previously had no access to such technologies. Their difficulty in quickly adapting creates a digital divide between them and their South Korean counterparts which further exacerbates social inequality and prevents their smooth integration into a different society.[13] This is an additional contributing factor to the economic woes of North Korean escapees, especially as occupations in countries like South Korea demand higher levels of digital experience and education that escapees do not possess. Such challenges result in frequent low income levels and poor economic performance among North Korean escapees in the South, creating among them chronic feelings of loneliness and abandonment.

Psychological Challenges

Many North Korean escapees arrive in South Korea with psychological trauma that can represent a significant barrier to their resettlement and integration. The trauma and mental health issues escapees suffer stem from traumatic experiences endured in North Korea such as witnessing public executions and enduring human rights abuses as well as the overall state of anxiety that arise from settling in a new country while being separated from family and friends.[14] Additionally, escapees who travelled through different transit countries like China have often fallen victim to human trafficking, which includes gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage against women and girls.[15] Such traumatic experiences greatly affect the mental health of North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea and represent a difficult challenge to overcome.

Among the North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, rates of trauma and mental distress such as PTSD are significant. A study from 2022 found that, among 531 North Korean escapees interviewed, 81.4% suffered from trauma and 15.3% suffered from PTSD, a figure which is nine times higher than the average for South Koreans.[16] Additionally, 53% of escapees who visited hospitals for psychiatric problems after defection were diagnosed with PTSD and many had severe difficulties adapting to the South Korean society and suffered from a lower quality of life.[17] This demonstrates a direct correlation between these escapees’ mental health and their challenges for resettling to the new country.

Among the mental health challenges endured by former North Koreans, suicidal behaviour and suicidal thoughts are among the most concerning. While the suicide rate in South Korea is already one of the highest among OECD countries, the North Korean escapee community faces especially high suicide rates. A study from 2019 showed that 12.4% of escapees had the urge to commit suicide in the previous year and that the suicide rate among them is three times higher than that of the rest of the South Korean population.[18] Other mental health challenges endured by North Korean escapees also include major depressive disorder, agoraphobia[19], social phobia, and panic disorder. These issues can also be exacerbated by other sources in their new environments such as discrimination, cultural differences, and lack of access to resources like support networks or psychological help.[20]

The severe mental health challenges faced by many North Korean escapees additionally represent a significant barrier throughout their resettlement process in South Korea. Many of the escapees afflicted with PTSD, suicidal behaviour or ideation, depression, and other disorders find it difficult to settle into their new homes and build a new life when faced with these overwhelming challenges to their wellbeing. Another factor is the lack of knowledge on how to request assistance among escapees, as up to 70% of them do not know about counselling centres or psychologists from which to receive support.[21] Additionally, as mental health is an issue completely disregarded in North Korea, many escapees are unaware of their mental well-being or of how they could ask for and receive help.[22] As a result, understanding the importance of mental health among North Korean escapees remains a necessary component in their resettlement efforts and for their integration into South Korean society. Until this is accomplished, mental health remains a major challenge faced by escapees.

Cultural Challenges

The third and final challenge faced by North Korean escapees in South Korea lies in their ability to adapt and assimilate into South Korean society and the differences in economic system, technology, and social behaviour. In an effort not to stand out and face prejudice, many North Korean escapees feel pressured to conceal their identities and fit in, leading to greater insecurity and psychological distress as they try to conform, hide their North Korean roots, or intentionally distance themselves from the escapee community.[23] On the other hand, those who do not try to conform to the South Korean society or form bonds only within the escapee community find themselves isolated or discriminated against by the wider society for failing to assimilate.[24]

Discrimination against North Korean escapees by South Koreans also remains a major issue. Accounts from former North Koreans show that social stigma, mistreatment, and suspicion against them from South Koreans is prevalent among certain segments of the population, and it contributes to worsening mental health conditions among escapees.[25] Social stigma and prejudice also extends to discrimination in employment opportunities towards those with the North Korean accent while women and children – who make up the majority of the escapees – reported to have been victims of exploitation and bullying.[26] Discrimination also exists through the slight language barrier between northerners and southerners because, despite sharing a common language, differences persist in spelling, pronunciation, and accents.[27] This is another way in which North Korean escapees can be stigmatized and ostracized in South Korea, hindering their resettlement.

In addition to the issue of discrimination and to the pressure to quickly adapt to a new societal and cultural standard, North Korean escapees tend to avoid communicating their struggles or treatment as they fear being labeled as ungrateful or being targeted by far-right extremists who reject their resettlement and presence in South Korea.[28] As a result, many North Korean escapees who experience discrimination in their everyday lives are reluctant to speak out about their marginalization to avoid being regarded as unappreciative or undeserving of the governmental support they receive.[29]

In light of such challenges, the cultural unsettlement that many North Korean escapees endure is often suffered in silence. The struggles they face in adapting to a new culture and lifestyle, often in face of discrimination and inadequate support, heavily contributes to difficulties in building their new lives in the South and represents a less-discussed challenge that they must endure during their resettlement and adaptation.

Solutions and Conclusion

In light of challenges that North Korean escapees face once resettled in South Korea, it is evident that the more than 30,000 escapees in the country do not have an easy life. Despite the considerable funds that the South Korean government invests on resettling escapees, the transition from the authoritarian North to the South is not always as smooth as both the government and the escapees themselves would wish it to be. Crafting solutions to such issues would inevitably require direct involvement of the escapees, but some methods and strategies to tackle this issue have already been showcasing positive effects. Many of these solutions, such as a more effective and targeted investment of financial support, better education programs, and mental health resources for escapees, are obvious in their purpose while others remain unprioritized. At the same time, these solutions can have major positive impacts and are worth looking at.

The first solution could include the creation of a social support network to help the North Korean escapees. While offering financial support, employment opportunities, education, and training are essential, other measures are needed for achieving the successful integration of escapees in the South.[30] This could be accomplished by creating strong support networks for escapees, both with fellow North Koreans as well as with South Koreans, as the latter could help facilitate communication and smoothen their assimilation and integration processes.[31]

Another measure for the improvement of the integration process should specifically involve young escapees. Communication and collaboration between North Korean and South Korean students as a form of a school program is key in building relationships that benefit everyone.[32] This engagement may also help in debunking prejudices among the South Korean youth against North Korean escapees, encouraging engagement and understanding among the two.[33] These strategies may foster a critical effect in helping settle young escapees and ensure that they have the tools to thrive in their new homes.

The challenges that North Korean escapees continue to endure following their escape from the Kim regime remain difficult and overlooked. The efforts of the South Korean government in resettling most of the escapees is commendable, especially when this is a task most other countries do not fulfill. The U.S., for example, has accepted only about 220 North Korean escapees since 2006 while China has a history of forcefully repatriating escapees back to the North.[34] Yet, it is also clear that efforts to resettle escapees in the South and to help them assimilate into such a different society are not perfect, as escapees suffer from a number of hardships that are not yet being adequately addressed. These hardships, many of which stem from the culture shock of escaping North Korea, can be difficult and long-lasting to tackle. However, supporting North Korean escapees is not only essential for their resettlement but also to help them fulfill their potential. Otherwise, the financial struggles, mental health problems, and discrimination many escapees face upon their arrival will remain the exclusive reality faced by the North Korean community resettled in the South.

References

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Cha, Sangmi and Jon Herskovitz. “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South.” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying- lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.

Couch, Christina. “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea.” PBS. February   16, 2017. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.

Kim, Hagyun and Kwanghyuk Kim. “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school   engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter-  Korean identity through a process of being one of them.” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 288-309. https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.

Kim, Minjung, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee. “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence from North Korean Refugees.” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2505-2527. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.

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Kim, Hee Jin and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya. “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1188-1201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.

Koh, Ho Youn and Kyungmin Baek. “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees.” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 5-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.

Lee, Grace J. M. “It’s time for Canada to jumpstart efforts to support families fleeing North Korea.” Policy Options. August 28, 2023. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2023/north-korean-refugee-sponsorships.

Lee, Hyosun. “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea.” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318-344. https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.

Lee, Mi Kyung, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu. “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea.” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.

Lee, Yeon Jung. Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol,    Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee. “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea.” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-460. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.

Myeong, Hwayeon and Ahlam Lee. “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices.” British Educational   Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 872-899. https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.

Nam, Boyoung and Ijun Hong. “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea.” Violence Against Women (2023): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.

Nam, Boyoung. Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim. “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation.” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564-571. https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.

Nam, Boyoung, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong. “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea.” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024). https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.

Noh, Jin-Won, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu. “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey.” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 26-44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.

Park, Mi Yung. “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea.” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 271-287. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.

Park, Soim, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan. “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.

Shin, Hyonhee. “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life.”     Reuters. January 4, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.

“South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000.” BBC. March 5, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.

South Korean Ministry of Unification. “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors.”             https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.

Williams, Sophie. “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?” BBC. February 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.

Yu, Shieun, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo. “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees.” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1019-1029. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.

Andrew Chan is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy from the University of Toronto. Currently a research intern at HRNK, he is passionate and interested about matters of global security, global policy, and human rights issues.

[1] Hee Jin Kim and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya, “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1189, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.
[2] “South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000,” BBC, March 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.
[3] Sophie Williams, “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?,” BBC, February 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.
[4] South Korean Ministry of Unification, “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors,” (2023), https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.
[5] So-Yeong Kim, Hye-Min Ku, and Seong-Woo Choi, “The growth status of North Korean refugee adolescents in South Korea: comparison with South Korean adolescents,” Annals of Human Biology 50, no. 1 (2023): 148, https://doi.org/10.1080/03014460.2023.2183988.
[6] Ibid., 148-149.
[7] Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu, “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey,” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.
[8] Sangmi Cha and Jon Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South,” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying-lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.
[9] Hyonhee Shin, “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life,” Reuters, January 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.
[10] Cha and Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors.”
[11] Williams, “North Korean defectors.”
[12] Minjung Kim, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee, “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence
from North Korean Refugees,” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2522, https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.
[13] Ho Youn Koh and Kyungmin Baek, “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees,” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 6-7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.
[14] Boyoung Nam and Ijun Hong, “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea,” Violence Against Women (2023): 1, https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.
[15] Ibid., 2.
[16] Mi Kyung Lee, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu, “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea,” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022): 1, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.
[17] Ibid., 1-2.
[18] Boyoung Nam, Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim, “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564, https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.
[19] Agoraphobia is an anxiety disorder wherein the affected perceives their surrounding environment, unfamiliar spaces, or large crowds to be unsafe, causing them to become anxious and reluctant to leave their homes.
[20] Yeon Jung Lee, Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol, Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee, “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea,” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-453, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.
[21] Christina Couch, “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea,” PBS, February 16, 2017, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.
[22] Shieun Yu, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo, “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees,” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1020, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.
[23] Nam and Hong, “Trauma Exposure,” 4-10.
[24] Boyoung Nam, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong, “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea,” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024): 2, https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.
[25] Christoph Bluth, “The North Korean who went home: many defectors struggle against discrimination in the South,” The Conversation, January 7, 2022, https://theconversation.com/the-north-korean-who-went-home-many-defectors-struggle-against-discrimination-in-the-south-174366.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Mi Yung Park, “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea,” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 272, https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.
[28] Hyosun Lee, “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea,” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318, https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.
[29] Ibid., 336.
[30] Soim Park, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan, “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?,” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023): 1-2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.
[31] Ibid., 7-8.
[32] Hagyun Kim and Kwanghyuk Kim, “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter-Korean identity through a process of being one of them,” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 304-305, https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.
[33] Hwayeon Myeong and Ahlam Lee, “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices,” British Educational Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 894, https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.
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