Elizabeth Chu

During my summer in Washington, DC, I had the opportunity to visit the Laogai Museum on the corner of 18th Street and T Street. It offers a one-of-a-kind exhibition showcasing the history and abuses of China’s vast network of prisons. I was appalled at the similarities of camp conditions between the Chinese laogai and the North Korean political prison camps. Derived from the Soviet gulag system in the 1950s, the political prison camps in North Korea and China were established for the purpose of containing political dissidence against their respective totalitarian governments. Over the last six decades, both systems have grossly perpetuated human rights abuses through the lack of due process, arbitrary detention, re-education, forced starvation and labor, torture, deaths in detention, and execution. The parallel between these two systems is undeniable. However, the North Korean and Chinese prison systems have evolved to possess several distinct characteristics. This article will focus on the implications of these key differences.

I will begin by providing brief context about the prisons. North Korea has two main types of detention facilities that house political prisoners, the kwan-li-so (penal labor colony) and the kyo-hwa-so (re-education prison labor camp); differences account for whether the entity is recognized by the state, which government body oversees it, the presence or absence of a sentence, the length of imprisonment, and the nature of the offense.[1] While the kwan-li-so detains solely political prisoners, prisoners of political and other criminal offenses are detained in the kyo-hwa-so labor camps. China has three main types of prisons: 1) laogai (convict labor); 2) laojiao (re-education through labor); and 3) jiuye (forced job placement).[2] Political prisoners are commonly found in the laojiao but can be detained in the laogai as well.[3] The system encompassing all three types can be referred to as laogai in common parlance.[4] In comparing the laogai and the laojiao, scholars have denoted that “[a]lthough the ways in which people find themselves in the two camps differ, the treatment in both camps is essentially the same.”[5] The complexities of the individual prisons, as well as the amalgamation of political prisoners with regular criminals further complicate the analysis of the two systems. For the purpose of fluidity in this article, I will refer to salient features of the overarching systems as a whole, unless otherwise indicated, when comparing the two entities.

Recognition by State

The North Korean and Chinese governments exercise extrajudicial means in detaining their criminals. The kwan-li-so is not recognized by North Korean law, resulting in an absence of due process in the legal system. “The North Korean government denies the existence of the kwanliso and has threatened prison guards, released inmates and communities near the camps with several reprisals if any information is disclosed.”[6] Due to the fact that the political prison camps are absent in North Korean criminal law, formal charges or trials are not deemed necessary for prisoners of the kwan-li-so. Furthermore, the friends, family, neighbors, and co-workers do not receive any information of those who have “disappeared into the mountains.”[7] Those sent to the kyo-hwa-so may undergo minimal judicial procedures and may be given fixed-term sentences.[8]

In a different vein, China’s labor reform camps were established when the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, and the accompanying laws were instituted in 1954 by the Act of the PRC for Reform Through Labor.[9] The laogai system is completely legal and all citizens, as well as the international community, are fully aware of its existence. Despite being formally recognized by the Chinese legal code, the authorities bypass the guaranteed judicial procedure for some. Those sent to the laojiao are typically imprisoned without trial for mostly ideological crimes for a period of up to three years.[10] Moreover, convicts can be tried without a defense lawyer in a country where the “defendant-to-conviction” rate is among the highest in the world.[11] Although one government acknowledges and the other effectively denies the existence of these political prisons, each continues to circumvent international norms and regulations to repress political deviants.

Composition of Prisoners

The composition of the prisoner population demonstrates the diverging function of the political prison systems. In North Korea, political prison camps achieved a central political objective of the “elimination of three generations of factionalists and class enemies.”[12] The political prison camps still exist primarily to ensure the total control of the people and the stability of the regime. Those who are perceived to possess counter-revolutionary attitudes or associations, including being guilty of what North Korean gulag expert David Hawk describes as “wrong-doing, wrong-thinking, wrong-knowledge, wrong-association, or the wrong-class background,” are taken to prison camps to reform through labor and re-education.[13] Crimes as trivial as sitting on a newspaper with a Kim’s face to being accused of interacting with Christians while trading to obtain basic necessities in China can quickly result in life in the prison camp.[14]

What is most distinct about the North Korean penal system is the concept of guilt by association, or yeon-jwa-je. Kim Il-sung stated in 1972, “Factionalists or enemies of class, whoever they are, their seed must be eliminated through three generations.”[15] This practice of collective punishment results in the immediate conviction and purge of entire families. A recent report by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) claimed that three out of ten political prison camp inmates were incarcerated under this system.[16] Yeon-jwa-je creates a culture of distrust and paranoia, especially among family and friends. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu refers to it as an “anachronistic” repressive system of feudal inspiration.[17] The regime uses this method to exercise ultimate social control over the population to ensure the deepest loyalty and obedience towards the leadership.

The purpose of the laogai and the types of prisoners detained in them have transformed over the past several decades. Official Communist Party documents from the 1950s bluntly state that the laogai is “[t]he process of labor reform of criminals which essentially is an effective method of purging and eliminating all criminals and counterrevolutionaries.”[18] Historically, the Chinese Communist Party has imprisoned political foes as well as people on grounds of religious affiliation and ethnicity.[19] In 1988, the Ministry of Justice altered the definition by publishing a criminal reform handbook. The summary defines the functions of the laogai concretely as fulfilling tasks in the following three fields: 1) punishing criminals and putting them under surveillance; 2) reforming criminals; and, 3) organizing criminals in labor and production, thus creating wealth for the society.[20] This new purpose clearly avoids politically charged terminology and acknowledges another aspect of the laogai—the economic incentive. Whereas the majority of prisoners were perceived counterrevolutionaries or reactionaries in the 1960s and 1970s, at present the government claims that only 0.46% of the prison population is made up of political dissidents.[21] Needless to say, this number should not be accepted as absolute. China’s human rights record has been admonished for years and the government has responded to the international community’s criticisms. It should be noted, however, that there has been a shift in the composition of types of prisoners in the laogai system. Despite the growing prison population in China, due to increased drug use and rising crime rates, the allegedly decreasing detainment of political criminals is resulting in the normalization of the use of prison camps for legitimate criminal rehabilitation.[22]

Capital Gains

Inmates from the Chinese and North Korean gulags are required to meet work quotas and labor 12 or more hours per day, six or seven days a week.[23] As each government does not publish accurate information regarding profits from their cryptic prison operations, reliable statistics are difficult to find. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that these operations provide financial gains. According to satellite imagery analysis conducted by the HRNK and AllSource Analysis, mining facilities have been identified in at least half of the existing kwan-li-so.[24] In North Korea, the coal mined goes to nearby plants for electricity, and lumber goes to mountainsides to furnish various government buildings and offices. The agricultural production feeds the prison population (although not well).[25] Moreover, “[a]lthough mining activity at the kwanliso may not be directly tied to the export industry, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) stated that forced labor in the kwanliso contributes to ‘at a minimal cost...the realization of politically important economic objectives including energy generation and the provision of supplies to the security forces.’”[26]

The kyo-hwa-so prison camps, which detain a majority of economic or violent criminals, as well as some political prisoners, are also associated with operating coal and copper mines. Although numbers are not specified, the COI concluded that the labor exacted from inmates meets the criteria for “enslavement” and “forced labor output of the [ordinary] prisons, including precious ores and other goods destined for export, provide the state with important foreign currency earning[s] needed to sustain the political system.”[27] Through grueling forced labor in the prison camps, the Kim regime is able to yield economic gains for the maintenance of the state.

The laogai system is a reliable source of revenue for the People’s Republic of China. The inmates labor to manufacture a variety of goods ranging from textiles to weapons and industrial machinery.[28] Human rights groups estimate that $100 million worth of Chinese prison goods have been exported annually.[29] Harry Wu, a camp survivor and founder of the Laogai Research Foundation (LRF), has discovered 120 products on the international market traceable to the laogai, even though international law forbids their trade.[30] According to the LRF, there are 314 businesses listed in the Dun & Bradstreet databases which are clearly linked to Laogai  camps.[31] While the camps irrevocably create revenue for the state, the “productive nature and increased marketization of laogai camps does not mean that laogai camps are particularly profitable nor does it mean that the Chinese government relies on them as a large source of revenue.”[32] In 1988, the goods produced accounted for only 0.4% of China’s GDP.[33] The network of laogai function simultaneously as a means of criminal rehabilitation, political repression, and revenue generation.[34]

Consumer products are not the sole source of revenue for the government; China also profits from the execution of prisoners. There is no conclusive evidence that executions conducted in North Korea may serve the same purpose. The North Korean authorities largely utilize public and secret executions to instill fear and discourage dissidence inside and outside of the prison camps. Escape attempts are punished by public execution, sometimes by hanging, but more often by firing squad. The prisoners are compelled to assemble and witness the executions at close range.”[35] Execution in the camps serves as both a disciplinary measure and a deterrent.

Contrastingly, executions in laogai are conducted at a larger scale and possess an additional monetary incentive. Amnesty International claimed that in 2014, China continued to execute more than the rest of the world combined and sentenced thousands to death.[36] “The renewable source of prisoner organs provides the Chinese government with a strong economic incentive to sell human organs to foreign buyers,” with foreigners paying as much as $200,000 for an organ transplant.[37] Some Chinese transplant specialists estimate that up to 99% of the organs used for transplant surgeries in China come from prison cadavers.[38] The Chinese government has developed a “highly lucrative, yet clandestine market for the sale of prisoner organs,” which in turn leads to the mistreatment of prisoners.[39]

Furthermore, laws in China permit the removal of organs from prisoners, as evident in the 1984 Provisions. The rules allow for the use of dead bodies and organs, if and only if, they are: 1) uncollected dead bodies or the ones that the family members refuse to collect; 2) condemned criminals who volunteer to give their dead bodies or organs to medical institutions; and 3) upon approval of the family members.[40] With over 68 capital offenses, each rule leaves plenty of room for coercion and corruption towards a vulnerable population. Moreover, the 1984 Provisions rank the order recipients of extracted organs should be treated, favoring the affluent and powerful.[41] Although the profit from these illicit activities cannot be quantified, it is clear that the laogai generates capital for the authorities through the execution of inmates. The Chinese and North Korean governments have succeeded in what the Soviet gulags failed to do. Namely, they have learned to kill two birds with one stone by capitalizing on the incarceration of millions.

Prospect for Change

There has been progress, albeit gradual, towards human rights for the people of China and North Korea due to the increasing attention of the international community and information made available through satellite imagery and testimonials of defectors. The approach towards either is distinctive due to the inherent differences between the North Korean and Chinese systems. Given the economic undertone of the prison systems in China, human rights advocates have targeted the industry and have taken action against the trade of laogai products, already deemed illegal by U.S. trade laws. Harry Wu has submitted evidence to outlaw products which continue to find their way to U.S. markets. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency has issued 26 detention orders on such products since 1991.[42] It is unknown how many products continue to be traded today.

In the case of North Korea, a country infamous for systemic human rights violations and illicit activity, the international community has increased the severity of sanctions. In 2014, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on the human rights situation in North Korea published a report of the egregious human rights violations of the regime, including the existence and operation of the political prison camps. Earlier this year, the UN Security Council imposed Resolution 2270, which some media networks deemed as the “toughest” sanctions against the Hermit Kingdom.[43] Last August, the UNSC passed the even tougher Resolution 2371. Furthermore, the U.S. government has made “remarkable strides towards accountability for the Kim regime’s human rights abuses.” The unprecedented amount of pressure is demonstrated by the recent North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, as well as the U.S. Department of State and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioning of 11 individuals, including leader Kim Jong-un.[44] The impact of these sanctions on the average North Korean and the impact on causing change in the political prison camps is yet to be determined, if it occurs at all.

The governments of China and North Korea created their individualized forms of the Soviet gulag to ensure power and stability within their respective countries, yet the function of these institutions are changing with time. Some scholars believe that change is happening and “as conditions in China broadly improve so do those in the laogai.”[45] However, there remain at least two areas in which the laogai system is failing to make drastic improvements, including the ongoing detainment of thousands of political prisoners and sentencing laojiao prisoners without trial. The Chinese government should acknowledge and address these human rights abuses by providing the opportunity for representation and a fair trial.

Conditions in North Korea, however, are only deteriorating. North Korea continues to carry out widespread, grave violations of human rights by violating the right to food, freedom of expression, the right to life, freedom of movement, and conducting torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, discrimination, enforced disappearances, and the full range of violations associated with the prison camps. As demonstrated by the former Soviet example, so long as the totalitarian government stays in power, these repressive mechanisms will remain as well.


[1]                  David Hawk, designed by Rosa Park, “Kwan-li-so vs. Kyo-hwa-so,” NK Hidden Gulag, last modified 2016, http://www.nkhiddengulag.org/kwan-li-so-vs-kyo-hwa-so.html Edition (Washington, DC, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2015).
[2]                  Ramin Pejan, “Laogai: ‘Reform Through Labor’ in China,” Human Rights Brief 7, 2 (2000), https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v7i2/laogai.htm.
[3]                  Michael Pareles, “Hard Times, Hard Labor: Prison Labor Reform in China from 1978 to Present,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 61, p. 3 (2006), http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal61/china3.pdf.
[4]                  Ibid.
[5]                  Jasmine Koehn, “The Continuation of Slavery in the Modern World: The People’s Republic of China and Forced Labor Practices,” Human Rights & Human Welfare, Human Rights in China (2009), http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/china/SlaveryChina.pdf.
[6]                  Roberta Cohen, “Human Rights and Humanitarian Planning for Crisis in North Korea,” International Journal of Korean Studies Fall / Winter 2015 (2016), 3, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Roberta-Cohen-NK-art-reunification.pdf.
[7]                  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, Second Edition (Washington, DC, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012), 29-30.
[8]                  Ibid, 83-84.
[9]                  Melissa Pearson Fruge, “The Laogai and Violations of International Human Rights Law: A Mandate for the Laogai Charter,” Santa Clara Law Review 38, 2, Art. 4 (1998), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1451&context=lawreview.
[10]               See footnote 3.
[11]               See footnote 3.
[12]               United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Twenty-fifth Session, Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, (2014), para. 1061.
[13]               See footnote 7, 25.
[14]               Ibid, 25.
[15]               Ibid, 29.
[16]               Kim Jeong-woo, ““North Korea Guilt by Association (yeon-jwa-je), an Anachronistic Human Rights Violation” Human Rights Experts,” Voice of America (Korean service), August 2, 2016, http://www.voakorea.com/a/3444508.html.
[17]               Ibid.
[18]               Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, Fourth Session, Hearing on Chinese Prison System “Laogai”, (1995), http://library.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/laogai.pdf.
[19]               Nathan A. Adams IV, “A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious Liberty Beyond the Border,” 33, 1, Article 1 (2000), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1457&context=cilj.
[20]               See footnote 18.
[21]               See footnote 9.
[22]               See footnote 3.
[23]               See footnote 7, 32 and footnote 3.
[24]               Kim Kwang-jin, Gulag, Inc.: The Use of Forced Labor in North Korea's Export Industries (Washington, DC, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2016), 33.
[25]               See footnote 7, 31-32.
[26]               See footnote 24, 34.
[27]               Ibid, 37.
[28]               See footnote 3.
[29]               See footnote 9.
[30]               Emmy Chang, “Murderous Favored Nation, A Review of Troublemaker: One Man’s Crusade Against China’s Cruelty, by Harry Wu with George Vecsey,” Yale Free Press (1997), http://yalefreepress.sites.yale.edu/news/murderous-favored-nation.
[31]               Laogai Research Foundation, Laogai Forced Labor Camps Listed in Dun & Bradstreet Databases, (2008), http://www.laogai.org/system/files/u1/Laogai-DB-Report.pdf.
[32]               See footnote 3.
[33]               See footnote 3.
[34]               See footnote 3.
[35]               See footnote 7, 33.
[36]               Amnesty International, “Death Sentences and Executions 2014,” (Amnesty International Ltd, 2015), 26.
[37]               Joan E. Hemphill, “China’s Practice of Procuring Organs from Executed Prisoners: Human Rights Groups Must Narrowly Tailor Their Criticism and Endorse the Chinese Constitution to End Abuses,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association, (2007), https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/595/16PacRimLPolyJ431.pdf;sequence=1. 437-438.
[38]               Ibid, 435.
[39]               Ibid, 435.
[40]               Jessica Neagle, “China Profits from Prisoners: Organ Procurement and the Ethical Issue of Consent,” (Master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2009), 18-20.
[41]               Ibid, 18-20.
[42]               Laogai Research Foundation, “Laogai Factsheet,” https://laogai.org/system/files/lrf_laogai_factsheet.pdf.
[43]               Yoon Min-sik, “UN Passes Toughest Sanctions Against North Korea,” The Korea Herald, March 2, 2016, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160302000075.
[44]               Amanda Mortwedt Oh, “The Human Rights Factor: Changes Under Kim Jong-un,” HRNK Insider, August 15, 2016, http://www.hrnkinsider.org/2016/08/the-human-rights-factor-changes-under.html.
[45]               See footnote 3.

By Dacia Pajé
Edited by Rosa Park
 
INTRODUCTION

“The Twenty-Year Review of implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action concludes that no country has fully achieved gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment,” states Mr. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Chair of the 61st session of the Commission on the Status of Women (UN CSW),[1] which will take place from March 13 to 24, 2017 with the title of “Women’s Economic Empowerment in the Changing World of Work”.

But repression of women in North Korea is on a scale hardly seen in recent history. For the first time, North Korean women will be addressed as a UN CSW topic, and a parallel event will be held by the Working Group on North Korean Women entitled “North Korean Refugee Women: Destitution and Human Trafficking in China.” The situation facing North Korean women has gotten worse and solutions are hard to find. When it comes to human rights in North Korea, the international community is much more aware today of the severe abuses in the country, but it is difficult to intervene in search of redress in such a closed and repressive state.

The “Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” presented to the Human Rights Council on February 7, 2014, recognizes the great gender inequality throughout the country. Women are suffering egregious abuses and violence.[2] North Korea is also facing an increase in domestic violence and the great economic crisis with consequent poverty and starvation “have resulted in women and girls becoming vulnerable to trafficking and increased engagement in transactional sex and prostitution.”[3]

After the Great Famine in the 1990s, thousands of male soldiers starved to death and women from 17 to 20 years of age were required to enlist in order to fill the ranks. Now, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is composed of about half a million women. Even if joining the KPA for a woman means improvements in her social status, women face a completely different set of obstacles in life from that of their male counterparts, often ending up as sex slaves for their senior officers.[4]

Moreover, high-ranking Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) officials can benefit from the so called “satisfaction” or “pleasure” squads (man-jok-jo)—a group of young women and girls expected to satisfy any request, from dancing and singing to becoming concubines—established by Kim Il-sung. In 2011, after Kim Jong-il passed away, the “pleasure” squad was disbanded, and now Kim Jong-un is believed to be reforming it.[5] Soldiers are regularly becoming customers for prostitutes and in order to afford them, they raid civilian homes.[6] The worst treatment is in the political prison camps, where guards and officials rape girls and women, and then kill them in order to conceal the crimes.[7]

The objectification, abuse, and rape of women are also increasing the number of sexually transmitted diseases, which is becoming a serious issue among soldiers in the KPA. Inspections and restrictions have been imposed, but never truly implemented. “The Kim Jong-un regime is keeping quiet about the crisis of sexually transmitted diseases in the North Korean military. He does not ask for outside help because the existence of this kind of crisis among his soldiers is extremely embarrassing.” [8]

This insecure, dangerous, and humiliating life pushes woman of all ages to flee from the country, looking for a better life. According to statistics by South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, the number of female refugees in 2016 amounted to 1,119, in comparison to 299 male refugees.[9]

While men, completely controlled by the regime, end up working for the government or the army, women normally stay at home after they have children and are not considered “important” in the patriarchal North Korean society, especially in the rural areas. According to Greg Scarlatoiu, the Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), “Once they get married, North Korean women no longer have to spend as much time working in public mobilization campaigns, and they have more time to dedicate to the home front … so, it is primarily women who get arrested and imprisoned for having crossed the border without government approval, or for perceived wrongdoing at the markets.”[10]

Since the Great Famine of the 1990s, women have become more involved in the black markets as well as the quasi-legal markets. They ended up becoming powerful, not only economically (controlling and dealing with the illegal markets to make a living), but they also engage in contact with the outside world—mostly China—to learn that a different life is possible once they cross the border. Unfortunately, they cannot know the extent to which the path towards freedom is distant and difficult beyond the dangerous crossing of the Sino-North Korean border.

What happens to them once they leave North Korea? Unless they are lucky and able to reach freedom, the possible consequences can be summarized into two categories: human trafficking or prison camps.

1. Human Trafficking

According to the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2016, sexual exploitation is the most common form of human trafficking and the victims are predominantly women and girls.[11] Sexual exploitation of North Korean women by the Chinese is a well-known international issue. Between 70 to 90% of the North Korean women crossing the border—of an estimated total of 100,000 to 200,000 North Korean defectors in China—suffer from abuses by the Chinese guards along the border and are targeted by Chinese marriage brokers.[12] Chinese traffickers usually prefer young girls since they can be sold at higher prices to men in the Chinese countryside. The one-child policy (which is now a two-child policy) and the cultural preference for male babies have led to a shortage of marriage-age Chinese women.[13]  

Many times, women who cross the border are sold as ‘wives” or start working as sex workers in boarding houses, living under physical, sexual, mental, and emotional abuse.[14] There is no possibility for them to ask for help. Especially, after the decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system, the relations between the Chinese and the South Korean governments are worsening. China is intensifying the repatriation of North Korean refugees, considered “illegal economic migrants” in the country, in violation of its legal obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 2007 Refugees Protection and International Migration document.[15]
As a matter of fact, pursuant to these documents, North Korean refugees legally qualify as political refugees and refugees sur place, as they face a credible fear of prosecution and punishments upon their forcible repatriation to North Korea.

As a result, North Korean female refugees rely completely on their “husband,” having no access to health care or other State assistance, which puts them in an even more precarious situation, facing physical abuse or sexual exploitation.[16] Many are forced to accept the slave-wife condition in disguise,[17] or they can continue on the road of escape by trying to reach other countries in Southeast Asia, where they will, yet again, face inhumane conditions.

2. Prison Camps

North Korean women are overwhelmed by abuse: outside North Korea, where they are considered as sexual objects and bargaining chips, and inside North Korea, where they are deprived of every single human right listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination against Women, to which North Korea is a party.
Even if the Chinese police are easily corruptible, they have the power to repatriate North Korean refugees back to North Korea, where they are likely to face harsh interrogation, imprisonment, and even death in prison camps and other detention facilities.

According to HRNK’s report, “North Korea: Kyo-hwa-so No. 12, Jongo-ri,” that detention facility has increased its detainee population, from 1,500 in the late 1990s to 5,000 in recent years. Satellite imagery shows that in 2009, the camp was expanded,[18] adding a women’s section, which means that the number of female prisoners is increasing due to repatriation from China.[19] Defectors are punished with detention, tortured during interrogations and sent to kwan-li-so or kyo-hwa-so prison camps, where they undergo forced labor for the regime under terrible conditions.

In prison camps, women are not treated differently from men: they are given the same meager rations of food and forced to do the same hard labor. To make matters worse, the terrible living conditions lead to sexual exploitation, where women sell themselves in order to obtain more food or less work.[20] However, if they become pregnant, they are punished with execution or forced abortion. “It is the rape survivor who is punished,” says Blaine Harden[21]. The same happens to women who become pregnant in China. In order to prevent them from giving birth to half-Chinese babies, they are forced to have an abortion, or just as appalling, to commit infanticide.[22]

CONCLUSION

Child marriage, forced abortion, rape, and sexual abuse are all main topics in the UN’s Agenda for Gender Equality, one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). North Korea clearly needs decisive interventions and significant help in this sense.

Women are persecuted both in their closed and isolated country and once they try to escape from it. They are victims of internationally recognized crimes against humanity and even once they reach South Korea, they have to spend a long period of time in isolation while undergoing significant psychological and physical rehabilitation before being introduced to South Korean society. Many feel unaccepted and disrespected in a country they believed would give them a better life.

North Korean women should be considered a target population by the international community for external information entering the country. During the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly, 93 Governments accepted the UN Women’s project, “Planet 50-50 by 2030: Step It Up for Gender Equality,” which asks for national commitment and action in favor of gender equality.[23] Clearly, domestic intervention is still unimaginable in North Korea and very difficult to expect under the Kim regime. However, with UN Women’s declaration that there is the need to listen to female refugees’ and migrants’ experiences and voices, North Korean women should not be forgotten or ignored. Their participation in the 61st session of the UN CSW would be a start.

The UN policy for Gender Equality should be directed at the Chinese government in particular. As a matter of fact, they have obligations towards the international community on the gender equality issue since they have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). For this reason, China should re-evaluate and improve its policy on its borders with North Korea and, above all, should stop repatriating North Korean refugees, which aids North Korea in its human rights denial.

Quoting Michael Kirby, Chair of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: “Last century, the world was faced with the Nazi ideology… It used terror, discrimination and extermination in concentration camps to achieve its ends… The world said ‘never again.’ It proclaimed the Charter of the United Nations. It declared universal human rights as our shared destiny… Here we are in the 21st century. And yet we are faced with a remaining and shameful scourge that afflicts the world today. We can no longer afford to remain oblivious to it, nor impotent to act against it.”[24]
The international community set itself admirable goals to reach by 2030 and it is working hard in order to achieve them. North Korea must not be left behind while reaching for these goals.

[1] Video message from H.E. Mr. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, December 21, 2016, http://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/csw61-2017
[2] The “Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, 2014, p.8. par. 34-35: “[…] Discrimination against women remains pervasive in all aspects of society [...]”; […] Sexual and gender-based violence against women is prevalent throughout all areas of society. Victims are not afforded protection from the State, support services or recourse to justice […]”.
[3] Ibid, par. 36.
[4]Burleigh, Michael, “Tyrant Kim's mini-skirted robot army: The tightly-drilled ranks of female soldiers who serve on North Korea's front line,” Dailymail, Published July 29, 2013, Updated July 30, 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2381052/Kim-Jong-Uns-mini-skirted-robot-army-North-Koreas-female-soldiers.html
[5] Fox News World, “North Korea reportedly recruiting women to join ‘pleasure squads’ for Kim Jong Un,” April 3, 2015.
[6] “Sex in the North Korean army,” NF - New Focus, April 13, 2013, http://newfocusintl.com/sex-in-the-north-korean-army/
[7] Reilly, Jill, “Raped by officials then executed so they stay silent: Horrific secrets of North Korea's gulags revealed - and the satellite images which prove secret camps are still growing,” Daily Mail, Publisehd December 4, 2013, Updtaed February 23, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2518152/North-Korean-prison-camp-officials-raped-women-killed-secret.html
[8] “Sex in the North Korean army,” NF - New Focus, April 13, 2013, http://newfocusintl.com/sex-in-the-north-korean-army/
[9] As stated by the ROK Ministry of Unification, December 2016, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1440
[10] Power, John, “More Women Face North Korean Prison Camp: Report”, Diplomat, The, Semptember 02, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/more-women-face-north-korean-prison-camp-report/[11] “Global Report on Trafficking in Persons”, UNODC – Unite Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, December 2016, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2016_Global_Report_on_Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf
[12] Olivia Enos and Hayoung Yoo, “north Korean Women Live Desperate Lives, Even After Escape”, The Daily Signal, November 9, 2016, http://dailysignal.com/2016/11/09/north-korean-women-live-desperate-lives-even-after-escape/
[13] Overturned in October 2015, after 35 years.
[14] Lives for sale. Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, (The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2009), 16.
[15] Insider, The Human Rights Factor: Changes Under Kim Jong-un, by Amanda Mortwedt Oh, August 15, 2016
[16] Jillian “JJ” Janflone, Graduate Director, “Women for Wives: State Enabled Exploitation in China and North Korea”, Human Trafficking Center Blog, February 24, 2016, http://humantraffickingcenter.org/women-for-wives/
[17] Being married to a Chinese man does not give them the Chinese nationality and they are still considered illegal.
[18] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Mike Eley, “North Korea: Kyo-hwa-so No. 12, Jongo-ri,” The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, August 29, 2016, http://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/ASA_HRNK_Camp12_201608_v10_LR.pdf
[19] Russell, George, “Kim regime expands secret prison camp for women forcibly returned from China,” Fox News World, September 19, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/09/18/kim-regime-expands-secret-prison-camp-for-women-forcibly-returned-from-china.html[20] Hawk, David, The Hidden Gulag: The lives and voices of “Those who are sent to the mountains”, (The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, second edition, 2012),34.,.
[21] Michele Lent Hirsch, associate editor, “The fine line between ‘obedience’ and rape in North Korea”, Women Under Siege, May 17, 2012, http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/the-fine-line-between-obedience-and-rape-in-north-korea
[22] Ibid, 122-123.
[23] 71st Session of the General Assembly, UN Women, http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/general-assembly
[24] Michael Kirby at the 25th session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva, March 17, 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14385&LangID=E

By Chloë Sherliker, HRNK intern
​

The forced expatriation of North Korean labor forces to Russia and China has been happening since 1967.[1] In an attempt to generate much needed hard currency for the Kim regime, it is estimated that over 46,000 Koreans have been exported as labor forces to more than forty different countries.[2] North Koreans working in certain professions—loggers, miners, and seamstresses—have produced around 7-8% of North Korea’s total exports profits, while up to 90% of the workers’ salaries are repatriated to Pyongyang. It is estimated that this forced labor scheme earns North Korea $150 million to $230 million USD per year.[3]
 
Most North Koreans work in China, and Russia. Others countries include the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Libya, and Malaysia. Yet, a recent Vice documentary highlighted the significant number of North Koreans employed, both legally and illegally, for companies within the EU.[4] High wages within the EU makes the dispatching of workers there a financially significant area for North Korea.[5] With over 800 workers believed to be involved in the shipbuilding and construction sectors, the majority is concentrated within Poland. However, North Korean laborers can also be found in other European countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Malta, Austria, and the Czech Republic.[6]
 
While a small number of North Koreans have been found to be working illegally, the majority have work permits and legally fit the requirements to work within EU states like Poland and the Czech Republic. Currently, thirty-two Polish companies have North Koreans registered as employees[7]. In the Czech Republic, despite media attention and sanctions resulting in the decision to stop issuing employment visas from 2006, a few hundred North Koreans have continued to work in Czech factories.[8] Legally, the North Korean workers appear to present no problems. They are well organized and “obedient,” causing few problems both in and out of the workplace.
 
The employment of North Koreans within the EU, however, provides financial support to an oppressive dictatorial regime and allows the North Korean government to extend their internal oppression of human rights overseas. Attempts have been made by foreign journalists to learn more about the lives of the North Koreans in Europe. Most were unable to even speak to them. Even if a nearby minder does not demand for communication to cease immediately, workers are often afraid to speak out about their living conditions, their opinions regarding North Korea, and perhaps most notably, about how much money they receive for their work.[9]
 
Through Vice’s documentary, Cash for Kim: North Korean Forced Laborers in Poland, it is clear that the working environment North Koreans endure directly violates international standards of labor laws regarding health, safety, salary, and working hours. Hidden cameras reveal the daily life of the North Korean workers and a few hurried interviews conducted with the workers give brief insight into the lack of basic rights the workers have. North Korean workers in Poland are said to work twelve-hour shifts during weekdays, with a shorter shift of seven hours on Saturdays. They are not permitted to speak to anyone outside of their workplace; they are transported to work via bus in the early morning and return to their shared house in the evening. They are unable to interact with the locals of the host country and have no access to mobile phones and the Internet. A minder will bring food and other provisions for the workers directly to their home.[10] Attempts to approach North Korean women in the Czech Republic also proved to be rather futile. Rare conversations with the workers were limited to a few minutes at most.[11] Upon arrival in their new country, their passports are taken from them and communication with their families in North Korea is extremely limited. Perhaps most importantly, aside from a meager amount for living expenses, many North Korean workers do not receive compensation for their work. Many of the North Koreans interviewed stated that they had no idea how much they received or if they received wages at all.
 
This strict control of all aspects of workers’ life and failure to pay North Koreans for their work defies basic labor rights defined both in North Korea’s own domestic labor laws, and by international organizations such as the UN and the International Labor Organization (ILO). North Korea’s Labor Protection Law (LPL) states that the state “shall strictly enforce the principle of eight hours of labor, eight hours of rest and eight hours of study in workers’ daily labor structure” and that “The authorities, management and social collectives should regularize workers’ labor, normalize their study and guarantee their rest by properly combining labor, rest and study.”[12]  Similarly, all EU countries that have been listed by the UN as employing North Korean workers are members of the ILO.[13] Therefore, they are subject to the principles listed within the ILO Constitution, which guarantee basic labor rights, such as “a rest period of at least 24 consecutive hours every seven days” and “a maximum of eight hours [worked] per day”.[14] It is also worth noting that under Article 6 of the Rome Convention, employees are “to be governed by the law of the state in which the employee habitually carries out his work.”[15] Any North Korean workers employed in an EU country then must follow that country’s respective labor laws.[16]
 
In Article 7 of the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it is stated that member states must ensure that workers are entitled to “Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind” alongside “safe and healthy working conditions.”[17] It also states that workers have the right to “Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.”[18] Polish law complies with this standard: Polish workers are entitled to a minimum of twenty days of paid holiday and may work up to forty hours in a working week (eight hours per day).[19] Similarly, Czech workers can expect to work a forty-hour week with Malta enforcing a forty-one hour working week.[20], [21]If employed by a Polish company, then North Koreans should expect to receive the same amount of paid holiday as a Polish worker.
 
North Korea is one of the few states that is not a member of the ILO. As an internationally recognized organization, however, the ILO may be used as a standard for defining basic labor rights regardless of the country’s membership status. North Korean domestic legislation—the  Socialist Labor Law (SLL), the Labor Protection Law (LPL), and the North Korean Constitution—does not appear to actively oppose standards provided by the ILO. For example, Article 70 of North Korea’s Constitution guarantees that workers will be “paid in accordance with the quantity and quality of their work.”[22] Similarly, the LPL declares dedication to ensuring workers’ health and safety in Article 1, with Article 33 to 34 noting the need to provide safety equipment and suitable clothing for those in particular professions, such as logging and mining, “free of charge or at a fee.”[23]
 
Yet, the existence of these North Koreans working abroad demonstrates how the word of the Kim family overshadows North Korean law. As foreign currency is needed in order to maintain Kim Jong-un’s Royal Economy and the practice of giftpolitik,[24] North Koreans are continually undergoing forced labor to uphold the North Korean regime, despite the cost to their basic human rights. Article 56 of the Socialist Labor Law states that the government holds a responsibility “to provide conditions for a safe workplace.” [25] Vice’s investigation of North Korean worker Chon Kyong-Su most distinctively demonstrates how North Korea is actively selling the free labor of their citizens for profit, regardless of their domestic legislation. While welding pipes in a Polish shipyard in 2014, Chon’s highly flammable clothing, which had been provided for him by the Polish company Armex, caught fire. Though Chon managed to escape from the tank in which he was working, he died of his injuries a day later with 95% of his body burned. Like his co-workers, Chon had been working seventy-hour weeks, far exceeding the maximum permitted hours.[26] He died in a foreign country, away from a family he had been unable to contact, due to the willingness of a negligent European country to employ cheap labor.
 
It is natural then to question how North Korea has been permitted to consistently violate international law within the EU in order to generate revenue to prop up the Kim regime. The European Commission states that it is committed to “promot[ing] social progress and improv[ing] the living and working conditions of the peoples of Europe.” [27] Yet, the use of slave labor in countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic contradicts this. Vice presented evidence that the European Commission said it was ignorant of any form of “modern slavery” within the EU in May 2016. However, since June 29, 2016, the Commission now states that it is “aware of reports on alleged violations of the human rights of citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) working abroad” and that countries employing North Koreans must take action against forced labor.[28] Excuses of providing the chance to teach about democracy and lies about pay distribution have enabled companies to continue their access to the North Korean workforce thus far. Through secret cameras, Cecylia Kowalska, head of Polish company Armex, was filmed declaring that “In our company, everyone receives their money in person, and gets to keep it, too.” [29] Cyril Svoboda, minister of Foreign Affairs for the Czech Republic until 2006, reportedly stated that he personally believed “that these women can learn some democratic
rules and use them after they get back to North Korea” through working in Europe.”[30]
 
However, the change in position of the European Commission since the release of Vice’s documentary highlights the importance of spreading knowledge regarding North Korean forced labor. Despite issuing 156 work visas and 482 work permits in 2015, Poland recently announced that it would stop employing North Koreans as a consequence of North Korea’s nuclear testing in January and February 2016.[31] The Czech shoe company SAM also decided to end their employment of North Koreans after receiving negative reactions from its Western European customers.[32] Although these decisions by the Polish and the Czech appeared to be somewhat reluctant—a result of deciding to abide by UN sanctions rather than opposing a totalitarian system—Malta’s recent decision to deny visa extensions to North Koreans working within the country seems to be more promising. Increased media attention within South Korea and Malta itself led the government in Malta to end their contracts in response to human rights concerns.23
 
In order to cease North Korea’s exploitation of its citizens, not just within the EU, but also globally, international pressure can be seen as a prerequisite. Through media outlets such as Vice, and an increase in interest and knowledge regarding North Korean labor amongst the public, ILO countries may be further pressured to comply with labor standards. Both the living standards of North Korean workers abroad and how the money generated is used within North Korea must be emphasized. With domestic pressure, member states of the ILO may feel more obligated to follow the standards presented by the ILO and end their support for modern forced labor.


References

[1] Larkin, Michael, Interview: Behind North Korea’s Use of 'Slave Labor' Greg Scarlatoiu on North Korea’s use of forced labor to sustain the regime. The Diplomat. 2015. Accessed 07/22/2016:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/interview-behind-north-koreas-use-of-slave-labor/.

[2] Saeme, Kim, and Burt, James . The Will of the State: North Korean Forced Labour, 35. 2015. Accessed 07/22/2016:
https://www.eahrnk.org/articles/policy.../19_4b1a0fbf02616db45b8db3d4cd7f291e.

[3] North Korea’s Forced Labor Enterprise: A State-Sponsored Marketplace in Human Trafficking. Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, 3, 2015. ( Statement of Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea) Accessed 08/08/2016:
https://www.hrnk.org/events/congressional-hearings-view.php?id=11

[4] Vice. Cash for Kim: North Korean Forced Labourers in Poland. 2016. Accessed 07/22/2016:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SPjKs8NuY4s

[5] Boonen et all. North Korean Forced Labour in the EU: How the Supply of a Captive DPRK Workforce Fits Our Demand for Cheap Labor. Slaves to the System Project, Leiden Asia Centre, 5. 2016.

[6] Ryall, Julian. Polish firms employing North Korean 'slave labourers' benefit from EU aid. The Telegraph. 2016. Accessed 07/22/2016:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/31/polish-firms-employing-north-korean-slave-labourers-benefit-from/.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Hulpachová, Markéta. Working overtime: North Korean migrants labour in Czech factories after visas expired The Prague Post. 2008. Accessed 07/22/2016:
http://www.thepraguepost.com/articles/2008/03/19/working-overtime.php.

[9] Vice, op. cit.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Jelínková, Marie.The North Koreans in the Czech Republic: The Silent Workers. Migration Online: Focus on Central and Eastern Europe, Multicultural Center Prague, 1. 2006. Accessed 07/22/2016:
http://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/f76c21488a048c95bc0a5f12deece153/MJelinkova_NorthKoreans_in_CZ.pdf.

[12] Human Rights Watch. North Korea: Workers’ Rights at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 2006, 3.
Accessed 08/03/2016:
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/korea1006/korea1006web.pdf

[13] International Labor Organization. Alphabetical list of ILO member countries (187 countries). 2016. Accessed 07/22/2016:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm.

[14] International Labor Organization.. International Labour Standards on Working time. 2016. Accessed 08/03/2016:
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/working-time/lang--en/index.htm

[15] Löwisch, Mafred. Labour Law in Europe: International Labour Law (Conflict of Laws) Ritsumeikan Law Review, no.20, 2003. 114. Accessed 07/22/2016:
www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/law/lex/rlr20/Manfred101.pdf.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Kim and Burt, op.cit.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Jaroslawska, Kalina. How much time a week do you work in Poland? Polish Labor Law Blog. 2012. Accessed 07/22/2016:
http://polishemploymentlaw.com/index.php/2012/03/30/how-much-time-a-week-do-you-work-in-poland/.

[20] Czech Invest, Labor Regulation. 2016. Accessed 07/22/2016:
http://www.czechinvest.org/data/files/fs-09--regulations-73-en.pdf

[21] Eurofound. Working time in the European Union: Malta. European Observatory of Working Life. 2009. Accessed 08/03/2016:
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-contributions/malta/working-time-in-the-european-union-malta

[22]  DPRK’S Socialist Constitution, Chapter 5 Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens. The People’s Korea, 1998, 18. Accessed 08/03/2016:
http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/nkorea.pdf

[23]  Kim and Burt, op. cit.

[24] Kim, Kwang-Jin. Gulag, Inc: The Use of Forced Labor in North Korea’s Export Industries. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Translated by Raymond Ha. 2016, 41.

[25] Ibid.

[26]  Vice, op. cit.

[27]  European Commission. Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion:  Laws. Accessed 07/22/2016:
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157.

[28] European Parliament, Parliamentary questions. 2016. Accessed 07/22/2016
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=P-2016-004172&language=EN

[29] Vice, op.cit.

[30] Jelínková, op.cit.

[31] Shim, Elizabeth. Poland banned North Korea workers after provocations, Warsaw says UPI 2016. Accessed 07/22/2016:
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/06/07/Poland-banned-North-Korea-workers-after-provocations-Warsaw-says/1311465318997/.

[32] Jelínková, op. cit., 4.
23  Ware, Doug G. Malta denied work visas to North Koreans as human rights advocates push for change. UPI 2016. Accessed /07/29/2016:
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/07/28/Malta-denied-work-visas-for-North-Koreans-over-alleged-slave-abuses-tied-to-nuke-program/7041469732215/. 

By Caroline Welling, former HRNK intern

Introduction
 
On January 11, 2016, Elena Racheva presented her book, 58th Uneliminated, at the Woodrow Wilson Center. 58th Uneliminated discusses the deplorable conditions in the Soviet Union’s Gulag during Joseph Stalin’s reign of terror through various testimonies from survivors and former employees of the Gulag. These testimonies also serve as important representations of Russia’s transition from a former Communist state to today’s society. Racheva’s book ultimately portrays a Russian society that has not effectively transitioned to provide justice or closure to its gulag victims. Yet, Post-Soviet Russia stands in stark contrast to its ally North Korea. Despite Russia’s inability or unwillingness to fully repair its past, it has transitioned away from Communism; a success story which North Korea, a country where up to 120,000 victims are held in political prison camps, cannot claim. As a result, there is still time to draw careful comparisons between the two countries and learn transitional justice lessons for North Korea’s gulag victims.
 
This post will focus on the insufficiency of transitional justice that has been afforded to the innocent victims of the Soviet Gulag. The Soviet and post-Soviet situation will then be compared to North Korea’s current gulag system and the absence of transparency or accountability for North Korea’s deplorable human rights record. [1]
 
Stalin’s Gulag
 
The Soviet gulag was first established under Vladimir Lenin following the Bolshevik Revolution. GULAG is actually a Russian acronym for (Glavnoye upravleniye lagerey), which means "Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies of the Soviet Secret Police" [2]. Under the Gulag system, corrective labor camps were created to eliminate and isolate people perceived to be socially dangerous, mainly disruptive class-aliens whose actions and ways of thinking were deemed to be obstructing the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat [3]. The camps contained several million inmates who were arrested and forced off their land in 1929 as part of Stalin’s Five Year Plan, an attempt to force a 20% annual increase in the Soviet Union’s industrial output and to collectivize agriculture. The camps centered on the complete disregard for the humanity of the prisoners and the obstinate efforts to attempt to fulfill the Plan. As a result, many people were held as political prisoners; others were imprisoned for petty offenses. The conditions in the camps were extremely harsh, with prisoners working long hours and receiving inadequate food rations and insufficient clothing. The diabolical living conditions in which these individuals were confined resulted in the death of nearly a quarter of the Gulag prisoners during the war years. [4].
 
Whilst writing her book, Racheva discovered that the Gulag subculture remains prevalent in many rural parts of Russia today, with many Russians being unable to change their habits and ways of thinking from the Gulag era.  It became apparent to her that recognition had not been given to the innocent victims that were imprisoned in the Gulag, as most crimes that were committed up until 1953 had been completely displaced from mass consciousness. Racheva remarked that only a few memorials had been constructed to commemorate the innocent victims of Stalin’s labor camps. The decades of institutionalized political violence have not been chronicled; hence no collective or individual responsibility has been determined.
 
Additionally, there appears to be a lack of general understanding and education for former prisoners to process this horrific event in their lives. Many names of those that were repressed have been forgotten in today’s Russia, with many showing disinterest or indifference towards the history of the Gulag. Little, if any mention is made of what happened during Stalin’s reign or what occurred in the Gulag. It became clear to Racheva that many victims had omitted or refused to tell their loved ones, relatives, and neighbours that they had been, in fact, prisoners and had been held in the Gulag.
 
There are many reasons as to why former prisoners of the Gulag were reluctant to tell their own children about their experiences. Many wanted to protect their children from the brutality that they had experienced. They did not want their children knowing that they had suffered. It also appears as if many had omitted to tell their children out of fear for their safety or well-being. Many of the interviewees believed that if someone knew that they had been in the Gulag, their children would not be able to have an education or a prosperous career. The way of life in Russia is treacherous and laborious for many, and so it is not difficult to fathom that many former victims are unwilling to describe their experiences in the Gulag as they are spending their time trying to cope with life today [5].
 
In addition to the victims, Racheva also interviewed former prisoner camp guards and found that lack of accountability and remorse for the atrocities that occurred in the Gulag remains a constant reality for them. Many former perpetrators that Racheva interviewed expressed no remorse and stated that they felt that they had done nothing wrong; that they were doing simply what they were commanded to do. One might infer that Russia, as a country, has failed in its responsibility as a State to completely ensure that the older generation realize that the actions of the perpetrators were not only wrong but also criminal.
 
North Korea’s Gulag
 
North Korea also has a similar gulag-like prison camp system to that which was established during Stalin’s reign in the former Soviet Union. The situation in North Korea’s political prison camps is so dire that comparisons have been made to both the Soviet Gulag and the Nazi Holocaust. The prison camps in North Korea have been fraught with human rights violations. Those who are perceived as posing a threat to the regime are sent to the prison camps. Due to North Korea’s practice of guilt by association, three generations of entire families are imprisoned for the alleged political crime of a single family member, and they face dire conditions, extreme starvation, forced labor, executions, torture, and rape [6].
 
The human rights record in North Korea has not been subject to serious internal review; hence dominant collective national narratives are normally assessed in positive terms [7]. Furthermore, North Korea has vehemently denied that any political prison camps exist and has continued to assert that its citizens have their human rights guaranteed.
 
The secrecy that surrounds mass atrocities in Russia is similar to what is currently occurring in North Korea. Prisoners who are released from the prison camps are required to publicly pledge their loyalty and appreciation to the regime. Prisoners are sworn to secrecy and must promise not to disclose information about the camps to those outside [8].  North Korea is characterized by its expanded use of secrecy coupled with terror in order to control and manipulate mass opinion amongst its citizens. North Korea is the world’s most secretive and inaccessible country today and continues to refuse access to human rights monitors, and journalists rarely conduct impartial reporting. [9] North Korea’s repressive regime, therefore, makes it very difficult to acquire information, and efforts to seek accountability face significant hurdles [10]. The difficulty of changing collective consciousness has been exacerbated by the structural deficit of knowledge about the prison camps in North Korea; the geography and location of the gulags in North Korea is unknown to most North Koreans.
 
The rest of the world has only begun to find out in recent years about North Korea’s gulags through investigations by human rights NGOs and a UN Commission of Inquiry report released in February 2014. Among such NGOs, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) distinguished itself by using satellite imagery for the first time to investigate the camps through its landmark report “Hidden Gulag” (2003). For the past 13 years, HRNK has released multiple reports on North Korea’s prison camps. HRNK has worked on many projects to highlight these camps and to provide information to the public about location, conditions, prisoners, human rights abuses, and any changes seen through high-resolution satellite images [11].  Despite such efforts, the culture of secrecy surrounding North Korea’s political prison camps has had a huge and lasting impact on the construction of collective memory in relation to mass violence [12].
 
North Korea and Post-Soviet Russia
 
Little attempt has been made in post-Soviet Russia to confront its mass political violence, and no such attempt has been made in North Korea. The political culture in Russia and North Korea means that neither country has come to terms with its repression. Cynicism has grown throughout Russia due to years of widespread political corruption, theft of public assets, and the rapid erosion of the standard of living. This has generated a society that is nostalgic for its idealized past and one that is less critical of Stalin rather than a society that has faced its historical reality [13]. Both societies can be characterized by a non-transparent political system, lack of accountability, prohibition of public discussion of the repression, and little sensitivity towards human suffering. Therefore, the problem lies in the fact that neither Russia nor North Korea has established democratic traditions that balance individual rights with collective responsibilities.
 
Unfortunately, this is unsurprising given that in the 25 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been no government inquiries, public debates, open trials, or reconciliation commissions [14]. There have only been a few attempts at transitional justice to prosecute those who were responsible for designing and administrating the Soviet concentration camp system, and therefore it has proven to be difficult to draw lines of accountability in Russia [15]. For example, amendments to laws were made in 1991 that removed the possibility of claiming financial compensation for pain or suffering received whilst being a prisoner in the Gulag. Therefore, those who had experienced moral anguish have been unable to receive compensation, and this perpetuates the social stigma attached to these individuals who are still being viewed as ‘enemies of the people’ [16]. Russia’s post-repressive society has failed to completely recognize the benefits of moving toward democratization and has evidently failed in restorative and retributive justice efforts.
 
HRNK’s Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu points out that, however, “as corrupt, violent, repressive, and opaque as Putin’s Russia is today, the differences between Russia and North Korea are immense.” For one, North Korean regime adamantly refuses to admit that political prison camps exist, whereas some attempts have been made in Russia to ensure that there is a general awareness that the camps, in fact, existed. For example, textbooks in Russia ambiguously refer to concentration camps. Furthermore, public awareness of the Gulag in Russia has been drawn from various sources. Soviet archives began opening in the early 1990s, which resulted in the publication of archival document collections and publication series that contain first-hand accounts of life in the Gulag [17]. Writers have contributed to the public criticism of Stalinism and fostered an acute awareness of a collective trauma. Writers such as Solzhenitsyn exposed the horrors of the Gulag and emphasized the pivotal role that Stalin played in creating a regime of mass repression. Although there are not many, there are a handful of private monuments and museums that have been erected and scattered around Russia to commemorate former prisoners of the Gulag.
 
In addition, after Nikita Khruschev’s 1956 ‘Secret Speech,’ in which he condemned Stalin’s crimes to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, Russia went through a process of ‘De-Stalinization’. Under Khruschev, Stalin was deemed responsible for the widespread repression and mass atrocities of the Gulag, and Stalin’s policy of purge and murder was discontinued. Stalin was denounced for the crimes that he had perpetrated, including the imprisonment, torture, and execution of individuals on false charges [18].  De-Stalinization meant that secret police tactics were erased, forced labor camps were closed, legal procedures were restored, and there was a greater degree of meaningful public discussion over what had occurred during Stalin’s reign [19].  
 
Efforts to enforce transitional justice in post-Soviet Russian society has seen the emergence of a partially independent civil society with social movements and protests occurring from time to time. For example, the Public Chamber was established under Vladimir Putin in 2004 to make the interaction between civil society and the state easier by creating an official framework in which individuals can express their suggestions [20]. Civil society organizations have made recommendations for the state admission of state culpability and demanded a ‘federal program’ to study terror and ensure that discussions center around not only the victims, but also the criminals who perpetrated the crimes in the Gulag [21]. Such organizations have seen real achievements in cementing collective memory in Russia by providing legal support to rehabilitation procedures, contributing to the erection of memorials, and publishing lists of victims [22]. Furthermore, the ‘Commission to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russian Federation Interests’ was established in 2009 to look at manipulated facts or misrepresentations of past events [23]. And by the end of 2001, 4.5 million political prisoners had been rehabilitated in Russia through the National Rehabilitation Commission [24].
 
Based on the testimonies from 58th Uneliminated, however, more can and should be done so that the Russian government intervenes to promote the recognition of its society’s traumatic past, specifically for the victims of the Gulag.
 
Conclusion
 
The administration of stern justice to perpetrators of injustice, as well as social integration and social rehabilitation of the victims of injustice, seem unlikely until the collapse of the Kim regime and the end of the military dictatorship that prides itself on its rule of terror. Nevertheless, it remains incumbent on new governments that have been preceded by repressive regimes to assess past crimes, memorialize victims through acknowledgement and compensation, and condemn past practices.
 
Despite transitional justice being scarce and limited in Russia, the changes that have been made in Post-Soviet Russia might offer a precedent for North Korea when the time comes for it to transition. Even though the reparations in Russia might be deemed to be simply ‘symbolic,’ no such measures have been implemented in North Korea. In order to protect human rights, the narrative presentation in both North Korea and Russia must consist of accurate facts and authentic perceptions of what occurred. Eyewitness testimonies, like those in Racheva’s book, for example, as well as survivor testimonies from prison camps, will be instrumental in reconstructing narratives and understanding what happened in those camps.
 
Without institutional recognition of the damage suffered by the victims, pacified collective memory will continue to be the norm in North Korea.  In order to challenge mainstream history and to recognize the terror that has been inflicted in North Korea and in the Russian Gulag, a fundamental change needs to occur at the political level, where we move from a system of governance that devalues human rights towards one that prioritizes a democratic ethos [25].
 
References
 
[1]  For more information on the event in which Racheva presented her book (GULAG: Gone But Not Forgotten) see: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/gulag-gone-not-forgotten.
 
[2]  Russiapedia. “Of Russian Origin: The GULAG.” RT Russiapedia. 2011. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://russiapedia.rt.com/of-russian-origin/the-gulag/.

[3]  Applebaum, Anne, Ms. Gulag: A History. 1st ed. New York City: Doubleday Publishing, 2003.
 
[4]  Applebaum, Anne, Ms. “Gulag: Understanding the Magnitude of What Happened.” The Heritage Foundation. October 16, 2003. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/gulag-understanding-the-magnitude-of-what-happened.
 
[5]  Gershman, Carl. “The Kim Regime’s Atrocities, and the Road Ahead.” World Affairs Journal. March 5, 2014. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/kim-regimes-atrocities-and-road-ahead.
 
[6]  Hawk, David, Mr. The Hidden Gulag: The Lives and Voices of “Those Who are Sent to the Mountains” 2nd ed. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012.
 
[7]  See Footnote 5.
 
[8] ICRtoP. “Crisis in North Korea.” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-north-korea.
 
[9] HRNK has produced numerous publications on North Korea’s Gulag system from satellite imagery. For more information, please read The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps; North Korea’s Camp No. 22; North Korea’s Camp No. 25; and Imagery Analysis of Camp 15 “Yodok” Closure of the “Revolutionizing Zone”.
 
[10] See Footnote 6.
 
[11] See Footnote 6,
 
[12] Gulag History. “Emerging from the Gulag.” Gulag History: Soviet Forced Labor Camps and the Struggle for Freedom. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://gulaghistory.org/nps/onlineexhibit/after/emerging.php,
 
[13]  See Footnote 5
 
[14] Adler, Nanci, Ms. “ “The Bright Past”, or Whose (Hi)story? Challenges in Russia and Serbia Today.” Filozofija I Drustvo 23, no. 4 (2012): 119-38. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2012/0353-57381204119A.pdf.
 
 
[15] Anstett, Elisabeth. “Memory of Political Repression in Post-Soviet Russia: The Example of the Gulag.” Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence. September 13, 2011. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://www.massviolence.org/Memory-of-political-repression-in-post-Soviet-Russia-the#outil_sommaire_1
 
[16] See Footnote 1.
 
[17] See Footnote 18
 
[18] Viola, Lynne. "The Gray Zone." The Nation. September 25, 2003. Accessed February 29, 2016. http://www.thenation.com/article/gray-zone/.
 
[19] "De-Stalinzation." The History Connection. Accessed February 29, 2016. http://www.thehistoryconnection.com/De-Stalinization.html.
 
[20] Seckin, Ecem. "The Development of Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia." Academia. January 2015. Accessed February 29, 2016. http://www.academia.edu/11487764/The_Development_of_Civil_Society_in_Post-Soviet_Russia.
 
[21] See Footnote 5.
 
[22] See Footnote 6.
 
[23] See Footnote 5.

[24] Applebaum, Anne. "The Gulag: Lest We Forget." Hoover Institution. January 30, 2005. Accessed February 29, 2016. http://www.hoover.org/research/gulag-lest-we-forget.
 
[25]  Hong, Seong-Phil. “Transitional Justice in North Korea: Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. August 20, 2010. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://csis.org/files/publication/110124_Transitional_Justice_North-Korea.pdf.

“Every religious believer is regarded as being an enemy of the state, a hostile and impure element, an agent of the United States (if Christian), and a counter-revolutionary for whom only discrimination, punishment, isolation, and even execution are the proper forms of treatment by the regime”[1]
 
While Pyongyang was once known as the “Jerusalem of the East,” today North Korea not only denies its citizens religious freedom but also actively persecutes people of faith. In fact, religious persecution has been a central part of North Korean policy since the inception of the regime. As early as before the Korean War, the government executed, exiled, and incarcerated religious individuals. Robert Collins explains, “Not only was there an effort to suppress religion from the outset of the socialist revolution, but there was a whole-scale effort to eliminate all religion and practitioners from North Korean society.”[2] One report estimates that 400,000 religious people were executed or sent to political prisons from 1958 to 1960. In 1962, Kim Il-sung announced that all clergymen above the rank of deacon had been executed and religious laypersons had been reformed through labor or imprisoned.[3]
 
The regime’s socio-political classification system called “songbun” also targets religion. Specific songbun categories designate those who believed in Protestant Christianity, Catholicism, Buddhism, and the Chong-do religion at the end of the Korean War and their descendants. All of these groups fall into the “hostile class,” which singles them out for dangerous jobs, limited educational opportunities, less access to food, poor living conditions, special state surveillance, and harsher punishment for crimes.[4]
 
In order to enact its brutal policy of religious persecution, the regime goes to great lengths to track down those practicing their faith in secret. The State Security Department trains its agents to infiltrate secret religious meetings, pose as religious leaders, and lure in people of faith by hosting fake religious gatherings. They then interrogate and often torture those arrested to obtain the names of other religious people.[5] North Korean escapee Jung Gwang-il recalls being imprisoned with Christians who had participated in a secret home church during his time in a kwan-li-so (political prison camp).[6] The leader of their church had been executed, and some of the more devoted members were condemned to forced labor for life.

In addition to practicing religion within North Korea, converting or even having contact with Christians while in China has dire consequences for North Koreans if they are caught and forcibly repatriated. During harsh interrogations involving starvation and torture, former detainees report being asked whether they met any Christians in China or visited a Christian church. Escapees report that admitting either of these acts results in execution or imprisonment in a kwan-li-so or kyo-hwa-so (prison labor camp).[7] One former detainee recalled that “two women confessed to having converted to Christianity while in China and were taken away by police agents, who told the remaining women that the two Christian converts had been executed and that the rest of the women should consider themselves warned.”[8] Another reported, “Recently, many North Korean refugees have Bibles with them when they are repatriated. If they are caught carrying a Bible, they are punished. In North Korea, you can get away with murder if you have good connections. However, if you get caught carrying a Bible, there is no way to save your life.”[9]

The Kim government targets religion because it perceives all faiths as threats to the regime’s cult of personality and totalitarian control. One escapee explains, “You can consider the entire North Korean society as some sort of religious group with the religious leader being Kim Il-sung and their Bible being the Juche or self-reliance ideology…So if the North Koreans start to realize that Kim Il-sung might not be the real god and there might be some other god out there then it’s not a good thing for the leadership.”[1]
 
If you are interested in learning more about religious discrimination in North Korea, please see HRNK’s Marked For Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System, and for more information on North Korea’s prison camp system, which contains many religious prisoners, check out The Hidden Gulag, Second Edition.
 

By Grace Wright, HRNK Research Intern

 

[1] Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification
System (Washington, D.C.: HRNK, 2012), 78.
​
[2] Ibid., 78-79.
 
[3] United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (February 7, 2014), 69.

[4] Collins, Marked for Life, 113, 117.

[5] United Nations, Report of the detailed findings, 71-72.
 
[6] Mr. Jung was imprisoned in North Korea’s Kwan-li-so No. 15 Yodok (Camp 15). He contributed to HRNK’s report on the prison camps, entitled, The Hidden Gulag IV: Gender Repression & Prisoner Disappearances. See pages 29-30 of that report.

[7] David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag Second Edition (Washington, D.C.: HRNK, 2012),
120.

[8] Ibid., 137.
 
[9]  United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, A Prison Without
Bars: Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations ofFreedom of Religion
or Belief in North Korea (2008), 10.

[10] United Nations, Report of the detailed findings, 68.

The Hidden Gulag series by David Hawk (for HRNK) has been a benchmark in the field of human rights research on North Korea, primarily because of its synthesis of former prisoner testimony and satellite imagery of North Korea’s prison camps. At the time (in the early 2000s), this was a union that was much more difficult to bring about than it appeared.

Previously, the only way to obtain open source satellite images of North Korea was through two private commercial satellite companies. Before these could even be obtained, however, Hawk needed to know where to look. Former North Korean prisoners in Seoul had to identify where the prison camps in North Korea were located. In order to do this, they used old declassified military maps of North Korea, which Hawk had to order and then ship to South Korea. It was only after these maps were shipped back to the United States with the camp locations marked that modern commercial satellite footage could be ordered. This new footage was then sent back to South Korea, where camp locations would be confirmed by the former prisoners. Often times, the imagery would slightly miss the mark, showing imagery of the nearest town rather than the camp itself, in which case the process had to be repeated.

North Korea is obviously an isolated nation, and it is important to recognize the unique ways in which information flows out of it. In the past, North Korea had an almost complete and total information blackout. As a result, human rights researchers such as David Hawk found themselves in the “odd situation, only being able to find out about human rights violations...between two to five years after violations occur,” when the prisoners finally escape. As a result, “we’re constantly playing catch-up,” Hawk laments. This flow of new information is one reason it is important to have new updates to Hidden Gulag. 

In the past few years, however, the flow of information out of North Korea has become more substantial. For instance, cell phones are often smuggled into North Korea and are used by media and escapees alike in order to contact those still residing in North Korea. Defections, despite recent regime crackdowns, have become much more efficient. When a defection is purchased, one can arrive in South Korea in a matter of months, weeks, or even days, depending on the price paid to brokers for the defection. All of this, when combined with the precise and instantaneous nature of satellite technologies, has made the process of obtaining information from inside North Korea much easier for those like David Hawk.

In the most recent update, Hidden Gulag IV: Gender Repression & Prisoner Disappearances, Hawk was able to confirm the addition of a women’s section to Jongo-ri, a prison that was male-exclusive at the time of the previous Hidden Gulag updates. HRNK and David Hawk also worked with AllSource Analysis (ASA), a satellite imagery analysis company, to supplement Google Earth and former prisoner testimony. ASA provided high-resolution image maps of North Korea’s prison camps, something not available on Google Earth.

Going forward, satellite imagery technology, combined with analysis from HRNK’s partner, ASA, will only become more precise, allowing Hawk and others to do more accurate work, and help provide a clearer picture of the human rights abuses inside North Korea. If you’re interested in David Hawk’s work for HRNK, watch this excerpt from our interview with him: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QgsTlbJr5Bg.

To access the Hidden Gulag series and other HRNK publications, click here.
​
By HRNK Research Intern Christopher Motola 

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) was the first organization to combine satellite imagery and escapee testimony to report on North Korea’s vast system of unlawful imprisonment, in the first Hidden Gulag report by David Hawk, published in 2003. HRNK has continued to use satellite imagery in its investigation and monitoring of North Korea’s political prison camps, most recently through a partnership with Colorado-based satellite imagery company AllSource Analysis (ASA).

Now it appears that HRNK’s satellite imagery-based reporting has become so well-known that it is being used by conspiracy theorists keen on concocting bizarre stories. It seems that satellite images from HRNK’s Hidden Gulag reports were used as “evidence” to “prove” that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been secretly building… concentration camps in America (!). Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) published an article stating that James Meigs, then editor-in-chief of Popular Mechanics, noticed the images used by conspiracy theorists were actual images of forced-labor and political prison camps in North Korea.[1] The article reports that “the images, according to Popular Mechanics, were taken from a Washington D.C.-based human rights group’s report exposing North Korea’s hidden prison camps.”[2] The image is on page 118 of The Hidden Gulag. The image has absolutely nothing to do with the imaginary “FEMA camps.” It is actually an image of Kyo-hwa-so (Political Prison Camp) No.1 in Kaechon.

Conspiracy theorists further claimed that “there is a minimum of one confirmed concentration camp built on American soil in rural Wyoming.” They stated that such pictures were “accidentally released by the Department of Homeland security.” The fact is that these images were simply taken from The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps. Though the images were slightly altered, they were initially published by the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea to raise awareness of North Korea’s gulags.[3] An estimated 400,000 people have died in North Korea’s political prison camp system since its establishment in the 1950s. Currently, there are 120,000 prisoners held inside the camps, in some instances members of three generations of the same family, detained together pursuant to yeon-jwa-je, a system of guilt-by-association inspired by feudal practices.
​
Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK’s executive director said: “In a strange kind of way, the misuse of our satellite imagery by conspiracy theorists is troubling, but at the same time testament to the quality, breadth and depth of our public information campaigns. By the time your work has become the stuff of conspiracy theories, you know you must be doing something right…” Scarlatoiu further added: “In recent months, we have seen bizarre claims by self-proclaimed ‘Korea watchers,’ who have placed HRNK at the center of ‘conspiracy theories’ ranging from goofy to loopy. Individuals who seem to have become mentally unhinged went as far as to claim that the DMZ landmines that maimed two South Korean servicemen in early August were planted not by the Korean People’s Army, but by… human rights groups keen on regime change…”

By HRNK Intern Suhwan (Alma) Seo


[1] Mark Potok & Don Terry, “Margins to Mainstream,” Southern Poverty Law Center, October 27, 2015, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2015/margins-mainstream.

[2] Link to the Popular Mechanics article: http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a12805/4312850/.

[3] Additional images taken from HRNK’s reports on North Korea’s prison camps were altered and used to show “evidence” of camps in Wyoming: http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/esp_sociopol_FEMA02.htm. These images depict the following prison camps in North Korea: 1) Kyo-hwa-so No. 1 Kaechon (p. 118 of Hidden Gulag); 2) Kwan-li-so No.22 Haengyong (p.114 of Hidden Gulag); 3) Kwan-li-so No. 18 Bukchang (p. 103 of Hidden Gulag); and 4) South Sinuiju Detention Center (p. 119 of Hidden Gulag).

​The Guardian recently reported on the lavish renovations at North Korea’s May Day Stadium, the largest stadium in the world. 

The changes, including a brand new soccer training annex and FIFA logos on the walls, are just the latest example of North Korea’s push to modernize its sports facilities. Of course, this is yet another sign of North Korea’s aspirations to host part of the World Cup and Olympic Games, or even the entire competition. This serves its overall goal of gaining credibility and  international respect for its athletics.

North Korea has an interesting history when it comes to athletics. Included in this is a multitude of Olympic gold medals, as well as a surpassing of expectations in the 1966 World Cup, in which the North Korean team made its way to the quarterfinals. North Korean athletes who succeed come back home as revered heroes and receive rewards in the form of  money, or gifts of some sort, usually a car.

These victories are extremely important to the regime in North Korea, where “any success [by North Korean athletes at the Olympics] will be used extensively for propaganda purposes" in order to bolster the cult of personality surrounding Kim Jong-un, as Executive Director of HRNK Greg Scarlatoiu explained. Unfortunately, North Korean athletes and coaches face serious consequences if they do not perform to the regime’s expectations. North Korean law actually dictates that:
 
“A person who does not rightly select athletes for important competitions, resulting in serious consequences shall be punished by short-term labour for less than two years. In cases where the person commits a grave offence, he or she shall be punished by reform through labour for less than five years.”
                        -Article 206 (Unjust Selection of Athletes) of the 2009 DPRK Criminal Code
 
The luckiest of the losing athletes who return to North Korea are faced with public humiliations, as was the case with the 2010 World Cup Team,  accused of failure and betrayal of the regime. The team’s coach, Kim Jong-hun, was even stripped of his party membership and sentenced to hard labor at a construction site as punishment.  

Others have fared even worse, and there have been various reports of failed athletes being sent to the political prison camps as punishment for their performances. According to the Chosun Ilbo, “A South Korean intelligence source said, ‘[i]n the past, North Korean athletes and coaches who performed badly were sent to prison camps.’” Even the victors of the 1966 World Cup were allegedly subjected to political purges the following year by Kim Il-Sung, where many wound up being sent to prison camps. Prisoners of these camps face terrible conditions and unspeakable horrors. In 2002, documentarian Nicholas Bonner released the film, The Game of Their Lives, chronicling the victory of the 1966 World Cup team over Italy. The film features interviews with seven members of the team who are alive and well in North Korea. However, other team member’s whereabouts are unknown.
 
If North Korea wishes to gain the respect of the international community, it must do so with real and meaningful changes, starting first and foremost with drastic reform of its prison system. No matter how large, elegant, or modern North Korea’s new sports facilities may look, they will never be able to fully mask the atrocities that they attempt to hide. 

By HRNK Research Intern Christopher Motola

Radio Free Asia (RFA) recently reported that a new central policy was issued to North Korean healthcare workers on October 8, 2015, directing gynecologists not to perform abortions or implant birth control devices in their patients, and stating that birth control measures are illegal. Evidence suggests, however, that forced abortions are carried out in North Korea’s detention facilities, especially when the unborn baby is suspected to be “half-Chinese.” As HRNK has uncovered repeatedly in its research and reports, most recently in The Hidden Gulag IV: Gender Repression & Prisoner Disappearances by David Hawk, forced abortions are just one horrifying tactic the North Korean regime implements against women, something Mr. Hawk refers to in his report as a component of “gender repression.” Ms. Kim Min-ji, a former North Korean prisoner interviewed by Hawk, witnessed forced abortions during both of her forcible repatriations from China to North Korea. “The first time, in 2008, a pregnant woman was forced to take some medicine, after which the baby was aborted. The second time, in 2012, the holding center authorities had a baby surgically removed from the womb of a woman who was in the ‘last days of pregnancy.’ The baby was killed.”[1]

While this post is not meant to analyze the pros and cons of a state ban on abortion, it is meant to highlight the hypocrisy and discrepancy created by this reportedly new anti-abortion and family planning policy and the inhuman practice of committing forced abortions inside North Korea’s detention facilities. According to one RFA source, “‘Punishments for those who perform illegal abortions and use contraceptive devices are already in place, but this new policy bans all kinds of abortions and birth control procedures, including even those performed at hospitals.’” Reported punishments for violating this policy include imprisonment for up to three years and heavy fines. Although the article predicts that the policy will not be effective in curbing these practices, it also highlights the apparent rationale behind the Kim regime’s policy: to hinder a “rapidly” declining birthrate.[2]

Data from The World Bank, however, suggests a slowly declining birth rate as opposed to a “rapidly” declining birth rate. According to the data, in 2012, North Korea hit its lowest birth rate at 14.36 births per 1,000 people, but interestingly, the CIA’s World Factbook estimates that North Korea’s current birth rate in 2015 is actually 14.52 births/1,000, indicating a slight increase. When contrasted with South Korea’s birth rate, which has also declined since the 1960s and had a 2013 rate of 8.6 births per 1,000 people, as the graph below depicts, North Korea has a higher birth rate. On its face, the new anti-abortion and birth control policy may be about countering a low birth rate in North Korea, but the regime may have other incentives for controlling its people in this way. As HRNK’s Executive Director, Greg Scarlatoiu, suggests, perhaps the policy has been implemented to “artificially increase the population, currently half that of South Korea's.”

The World Bank’s data showing North Korea’s declining birth rate over the years.
Credit: theGlobalEconomy.com[3]

The World Bank’s data showing South Korea’s declining birth rate over the years.
Credit: theGlobalEconomy.com[4]

In striking contrast to this anti-abortion policy, though, former North Korean prisoner testimony documented in HRNK’s reports, such as in the aforementioned The Hidden Gulag IV (2015) and in The Hidden Gulag Second Edition (2012), and also published on this site under the “Victims” tab, tells the gruesome memories of severe trauma faced by former political prisoners. Mrs. Bang Mi-sun, during her pretrial detention experience in North Korea, recalled that:

In early 2002, at Musan An-jeon-bu, there was a group of ten pregnant women who were going to be taken to the local hospital to abort their “half-Chinese” babies. One twenty-one year old, who was seven months pregnant, refused to go to the hospital to give up the baby growing inside her. The guards put her on the floor on her back and placed a board over her swollen womb, and pistol-whipped two male prisoners until they agreed to jump up and down on the board. After five minutes or so, the baby was aborted, and the woman was taken to the hospital where she died. Mrs. Bang learned of her death when she was taken to the hospital for more treatments for her infected leg.

Mrs. Bang Mi-Sun, former North Korean political prisoner, showing her scarred leg.
© Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)

Testimony from the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (UN COI) produced more of the same shocking stories of forced abortions in North Korea’s detention facilities reminiscent of the Nazi concentration camps. One witness recollected:

…there was this pregnant woman who was about 9 months pregnant. She worked all day. The babies who were born were usually dead, but in this case the baby was born alive. The baby was crying as it was born; we were so curious, this was the first time we saw a baby being born. So we were watching this baby and we were so happy. But suddenly we heard the footsteps. The security agent came in and this agent of the Bowibu [State Security Department] said that… usually when a baby is born we would wash it in a bowl of water, but this agent told us to put the baby in the water upside down. So the mother was begging. ‘I was told that I would not be able to have the baby, but I actually got lucky and got pregnant so let me keep the baby, please forgive me’, but this agent kept beating this woman, the mother who just gave birth. And the baby, since it was just born, it was just crying. And the mother, with her shaking hands she picked up the baby and she put the baby face down in the water. The baby stopped crying and we saw this water bubble coming out of the mouth of the baby. And there was an old lady who helped with the labour, she picked up the baby from the bowl of water and left the room quietly. So those kind of things repeatedly happened. That was in the detention centre in the city of Chongjin of Hamgyong Province.[5]
 
Unfortunately, the State’s efforts to control life and death in North Korea amount to, at the least, a disproportionate impact on women, characterized as gender discrimination and repression, and at the most, sexual violence in the prison camps at such a gravity to constitute crimes against humanity. The findings of the UN COI concluded the same in its 2014 report: “In the political prison camps of [North Korea], the inmate population has been gradually eliminated through deliberate starvation, forced labour, executions, torture, rape and the denial of reproductive rights enforced through punishment, forced abortion and infanticide….These crimes against humanity entail extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence…” (emphasis added). The violent and inhuman state-sanctioned practice of forced abortions inside the detention facilities “regularly subject[s] women to a level of intentional and severe mental and physical suffering that satisfies the threshold of torture as defined under article 7 of the ICCPR.”[6] Furthermore, forced abortions violate the right of physical integrity and security of person, as well as sexual and reproductive rights.[7]

Clearly, the North Korean regime does not consider its inmate population as entitled to the same rights as its regular citizens, even when it comes to imposing restrictions on birth control and abortion. The UN COI noted that North Korea even contravenes its own domestic law, “which prohibits the detention of women three months before or seven months after giving birth.”[8] This almost inherent discrimination is further exacerbated by the regime’s social class system, known as songbun, which views prisoners, particularly political prisoners, as having the lowest songbun (the hostile class) and the least perceived loyalty to the regime.

The North Korean regime might improve its declining birth rate if, for one, it stopped the horrendous practice of forced abortions inside its prison camps and did not detain innocent minors or pregnant women. Of course, for its regular citizens, creating a better economy–including providing adequate amounts of food and lowering the costs associated with schooling–would likely increase its birth rate too. In this case, adhering to basic human rights norms would give the regime what it wants: more North Korean citizens. Instead, the regime has chosen yet another method of controlling its citizens with this new policy that hypocritically ignores the ongoing state practice of forced abortions inside North Korea’s prison camp system. The North Korean regime is effectively ‘shooting itself in the foot’ by continuing to victimize women and unborn children inside its prison walls.
 
​
By HRNK Project Officer Amanda Mortwedt Oh



[1] David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag IV: Gender Repression & Prisoner Disappearances, 121 (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2015), available at https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hawk_HiddenGulag4_FINAL.pdf.

[2] The CIA’s World Factbook estimates that North Korea’s birth rate in for 2015 is 14.52 births/1,000 population,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2054.html#kn.
 
[3] North Korea Birth rate, TheGlobalEconomy.com, accessed October 22, 2015, http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/North-Korea/Birth_rate/.
 
[4] South Korea Birth rate, TheGlobalEconomy.com, accessed October 22, 2015, http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/South-Korea/Birth_rate/.

[5] Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Human Rights Council, 25th sess., Agenda Item 4, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, 126 (7 February 2014), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.

[6] Id. Article 1 of the Convention against Torture, which also informs the definition of torture under ICCPR, article 7, defines torture as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. On the recognition of forced abortion as an act of torture see the reports of successive Special Rapporteurs on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, A/HRC/22/53 (2013), para. 48; A/HRC/7/3, para. 69. See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, para. 11.

[7] Id. See Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.4, paras. 45, 49. See also Beijing Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference for Women (1995), para. 115; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 19, A/47/38, para. 22; CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6, para. 32.

[8] Id. at 126, citing The People’s Safety Enforcement Law (1992), Article 50, Clause 3.