By Samantha Clark, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President & CEO

          When Zimbabwe got independence from white-minority rule in 1980, its new head of state Robert Mugabe was faced with the challenge of consolidating the country while ensuring that he remained firmly in place. Instead of seeking primary advice and support from Western countries, Mugabe looked to Kim Il-sung, North Korea's first leader and founder. He ruled an authoritarian regime centered on very strict discipline, one party, and a  personality cult. Their relationship created one of the most anomalous and notable alliances of the later Cold War. North Korea gave military training, templates of ideology, and grand monuments to Zimbabwe. But these presents also facilitated one of the darkest periods in Zimbabwean history: the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980s.

          The origins of the North Korea–Zimbabwe alliance can be traced back to the 1970s, during Zimbabwe’s long fight for independence. At that time, the country was called Rhodesia and was ruled by a white-minority government under Prime Minister Ian Smith. Two major African nationalist groups led the struggle against Smith’s regime. The first was Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), whose military wing was known as the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The second was Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which had its own armed wing. Foreign powers lined up behind these movements. The Soviet Union backed ZAPU, while North Korea chose to support Mugabe’s ZANU. Pyongyang supplied ZANLA with weapons and training, which built trust between Mugabe and Kim Il-sung well before Zimbabwe gained independence (Young 2018). This early support gave North Korea an advantage over other outside powers when Mugabe came to power in 1980. Both Mugabe and Kim believed that armed struggle, revolutionary vigilance, and collective discipline were the true foundations of political legitimacy, which made the two leaders natural allies (Young 2018).

          Mugabe looked up to North Korea further after independence. In 1980, he went to Pyongyang to witness a meeting of the Korean Workers' Party and listened as Kim Il-sung declared that he would be succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-il. Mugabe valued North Korea's land reform, whereby farms had been “allocated” to peasants working on collective farms, and its concept of "self-reliance" (Juche). He also liked the huge mass games, where large numbers of North Korean kids exercised gymnastics and danced in unison to display their loyalty to the leader. These demonstrations of unity were precisely what Mugabe sought to have at home in Zimbabwe. Upon his return to Harare, he went so far as to set up a Juche study center at the University of Zimbabwe to teach students about North Korea's ideology (Young 2018).
 
          The most significant part of the relationship in terms of impact, however, was in the military sphere. Soon after independence, Mugabe requested North Korea's help in creating an elite force under his direct command. Kim Il-sung agreed, and in 1981 North Korean instructors visited Zimbabwe to train the new brigade, which would come to be known as the Fifth Brigade. As opposed to the remainder of the military, the Fifth Brigade was instructed by Mugabe alone. Its training emphasized unrestrained devotion to the ruling party and loyalty to the president, like the "single-minded unity" that is taught in the Korean People's Army (Young 2018). By 1985, the brigade had grown to around 20,000 soldiers and became one of Mugabe’s most powerful tools.

          Not long after its creation, the Fifth Brigade turned its guns inward. From 1983 to 1987, the unit ran a terror campaign in Matabeleland, a region where support for Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU was strong. Known as Gukurahundi—a Shona phrase meaning “the early rain that washes away the chaff”—the government claimed it was a security operation against dissidents. It became a massacre of civilians. Around 20,000 people were killed, and very sadly many more were tortured, raped, or forced into reeducation camps. These years remain among the darkest chapters in Zimbabwe’s history. North Korea did not carry out the killings directly. However, by training the Fifth Brigade, it had given Robert Mugabe the tools to crush political opposition on a massive scale. Many distinctive features of the North Korean regime were transplanted to Zimbabwe (Young 2018).

          North Korea also helped design buildings in Zimbabwe. The state construction firm of North Korea, Mansudae Overseas Projects, constructed and designed Harare's National Heroes' Acre, a large monument complex to commemorate individuals who participated in the struggle for independence. The project was completed in 1982 and has large statues, large stone stairways, and an eternal flame, and it is a replica of monuments in Pyongyang. Like much of Mansudae's African work, it was constructed by North Korean laborers for the most part, under conditions akin to forced labor (van der Hoog 2018). The Heroes' Acre was both a monument and a political declaration, acknowledging Mugabe as the rightful victor of a heroic struggle.

          Cumulatively, the export of military skills and mega-architecture captures the way North Korea did business in Africa. On the surface, Pyongyang was a supporter of anti-colonialist movements, joining hands with new independent nations in opposition to imperialism. These alliances served to advance North Korean interests via the establishment of building contracts, weapons sales, and the spread of its ideology beyond its territory (van der Hoog 2018). Zimbabwe was Pyongyang's closest supporter in this policy, and Mugabe's personal admiration of Kim Il Sung helped to sustain it. Despite worldwide condemnation of Zimbabwe for the Gukurahundi massacres and despite growing global condemnation of North Korea for its foreign interventions, the alliance continued. Mugabe continued to publicly praise Pyongyang, and even in the 2000s Juche books could be found in Zimbabwean government offices (Young 2018). For North Korea, the preservation of its ties to Harare showed that it still had allies in the Global South, even as it grew increasingly isolated elsewhere. For Mugabe, Pyongyang was a symbol of authoritarian longevity and a sign of support he had amassed when he had ascended to power.
 
          The Zimbabwe experience illustrates the human rights effects of North Korea's foreign alliances. While “legitimized” as an alleged representative of “anti-imperialist solidarity,” in practice Pyongyang exported repressive practices associated with authoritarianism. In Zimbabwe, the Fifth Brigade was deployed as a tool of mass terror, and Mansudae's monuments legitimized a political culture revolving around a personality cult. These legacies illustrate how Cold War alliances left deep-seated wounds to African domestic politics.
 
          Today everyone is debating whether sanctions are effective against North Korea. They are not, as Zimbabwean lessons teach how difficult it is to prevent North Korea's activities elsewhere. Despite decades of sanctions, North Korea remained active in Africa with cultural cooperation, infrastructure projects, and clandestine defense ties. Zimbabwe illustrates how authoritarian governments exchange favors among themselves all over the world. It also points to the imperious need to document this history, so that the toll taken on human rights is not lost. For Zimbabwe, the Fifth Brigade is one of its darkest post-independence tales. For North Korea, the alliance shows how much power it wielded once—and as a reminder of the devastation authoritarian unity can cause.
 
Samantha Clark is an undergraduate at William & Mary studying Government and History. Her areas of focus are North Korean relations with Africa and the human rights consequences of authoritarian alliances. Recently, she was a research intern at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).
 
Works Cited
Kuo, Jaewon. “An Exploratory Analysis of North Korea’s Relationship with Africa.” North Korean Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2019, pp. 61–78.
Van der Hoog, Jonas. Uncovering North Korean Forced Labour in Africa: The Case of the Mansudae Overseas Project Group in Namibia. European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea, 2018.
Young, Benjamin R. “An Emotional Relationship: Trust, Admiration, and Fear in North Korea–Zimbabwe Relations, 1976–1988.” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 20, no. 4, 2018, pp. 6–31.

By Samantha Clark, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO of HRNK

Since the 1970s, Ethiopia has stood out as one of North Korea’s most enduring partners in Africa. Their cooperation has spanned decades, touching sectors from health to heavy weaponry. While the relationship is often presented publicly as a friendly partnership for development, deeper investigation reveals a complex and controversial bond — one that blurs the line between legitimate state cooperation and violations of United Nations sanctions. Ethiopia’s ongoing dependency on North Korean military technology, as documented by multiple reports and experts, underscores the challenges African nations face when historical alliances collide with modern international law.

Cold War Foundations

As Samuel Ramani notes in The Diplomat (2018), North Korea’s relationship with the Horn of Africa dates back to the Cold War, when Pyongyang provided military assistance to Ethiopia’s Derg regime. During the Ogaden War (1977–78), North Korea supported Ethiopia against Somalia by supplying ammunition, mortars, and training. This early partnership, grounded in ideological solidarity and mutual opposition to Western dominance, set the foundation for a defense-based relationship that continued long after the Cold War ended.

Over time, Ethiopia became one of North Korea’s most loyal military customers. Pyongyang provided munitions, armored vehicles, and technical training, enabling Ethiopia to build its domestic weapons industry. By the 1980s, this collaboration had produced two state-run factories: the Homicho Ammunition Industry and the Gafat Armament Engineering Industry.
According to Andrea Berger’s Foreign Affairs investigation, North Korea helped design, construct, and operate both facilities, allowing Ethiopia to reduce dependence on foreign arms suppliers. While this initially appeared as a strategic move toward self-sufficiency, it also entrenched long-term reliance on North Korean spare parts and technical expertise.

Industrial Cooperation Under Scrutiny

Ethiopia’s weapons factories became central to its military modernization. The Homicho Ammunition Industry, founded in 1987, produces small and heavy ammunition, tank shells, and rockets. Berger reports that Pyongyang’s involvement likely continued through the late 2000s, including the design of rocket-propelled grenade launchers and multiple rocket systems. However, this partnership grew increasingly problematic after UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) explicitly prohibited all arms-related transactions with North Korea, including technical assistance and spare parts.

Evidence compiled by the UN Panel of Experts in 2014 pointed to continuing links between North Korea and Homicho. The factory’s official supplier list included the Korea Mineral Trading General Corporation, believed to be a North Korean entity. Following the UN report’s publication, Homicho quietly deleted the reference from its website — a move that only deepened suspicion. As Berger notes, the “swift sanitization of its publicized suppliers list compounds suspicion that interaction between METEC and Pyongyang is continuing in breach of the current sanctions regime.”

A similar pattern appears in the Gafat Armament Engineering Industry, established in 1989. Originally tasked with producing AK-47s, Gafat was later upgraded to manufacture grenade launchers, artillery, and heavy weapons. Contracts between the Ethiopian government and the Korea Ryong Bong General Corporation — a sanctioned North Korean entity — were active as late as 2007. Ethiopian officials gave contradictory statements to U.S. diplomats about whether North Korean engineers were still “on the ground” after 2008. These inconsistencies raise serious questions about Ethiopia’s compliance with sanctions and the transparency of its defense industry.

Diplomacy and Development Narrative

Publicly, Ethiopian officials have downplayed military ties and emphasized peaceful cooperation. In a 2014 AllAfrica.com statement, President Mulatu Teshome urged both countries to “work for mutual benefits” in fields like health, irrigation, and mining. North Korea’s ambassador similarly praised the “historic friendship” between Addis Ababa and Pyongyang. This diplomatic messaging reflects Ethiopia’s effort to portray the partnership as developmental rather than militarized.

Yet, behind this rhetoric lies a persistent pattern of arms-related collaboration. Ethiopia’s dependence on North Korean spare parts, combined with its reluctance to open facilities like Homicho to U.S. inspection, suggests that the relationship has been driven more by defense pragmatism than by purely civilian aims. As Berger’s research highlights, the sunk costs in North Korean-designed factories make retooling prohibitively expensive, effectively locking Ethiopia into a relationship that is both technically and politically difficult to sever.

International Reactions

The global community has viewed Ethiopia’s actions with increasing concern. The European Parliament’s 2016 resolution condemned both Ethiopia’s human rights abuses and North Korea’s nuclear provocations, symbolically linking the two nations under a banner of international scrutiny. The United States has also applied quiet diplomatic pressure. According to U.S. Embassy cables from Addis Ababa (cited by Berger), American officials repeatedly urged Ethiopia to end contracts with Pyongyang. Although Ethiopian leaders occasionally promised cooperation, those assurances were often undermined by delayed inspections and evasive explanations.

Ramani argues that Ethiopia’s case illustrates how Cold War legacies can perpetuate sanction loopholes: “Despite positive signs emerging from Ethiopia, Cold War legacies, international isolation, and the region’s desire for cheap weaponry could ensure that clandestine links remain a blank spot in the UN sanctions regime.”

Analysis: Dependency and Denial

Ethiopia’s cooperation with North Korea exposes the paradox of post–Cold War statecraft in Africa. On one hand, the partnership advanced Ethiopia’s ambitions to develop a self-sustaining defense industry. On the other, it entrenched a cycle of dependence on sanctioned technology and opaque trade relationships. Even if current cooperation has diminished, the structural reliance on North Korean machinery and expertise may still place Ethiopia in technical violation of UN resolutions.

Furthermore, North Korea’s willingness to export arms manufacturing technology — even at the cost of future revenue — has enabled countries like Ethiopia to circumvent global arms restrictions. This “build it and they will come” model benefits both sides: Pyongyang earns foreign currency, while Addis Ababa strengthens its defense autonomy. However, such collaboration undermines the spirit of international sanctions and raises ethical questions about accountability in global arms production.

Connection to Bechtol’s Findings
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.’s research in the Cornell International Law Journal reinforces these concerns by highlighting how North Korea’s illicit financial and military networks extend deeply into Africa. Bechtol explains that Pyongyang uses front companies and small banks in countries such as China, Italy, Russia, and several African states to move funds, conceal arms transactions, and sustain its sanctions-evasion system. His analysis suggests that African partners — including Ethiopia — have been part of this broader web of covert cooperation. By embedding its military and financial operations in the region, North Korea not only circumvents UN restrictions but also secures political and economic footholds that complicate international enforcement efforts.
 
Conclusion

​Ethiopia’s long-standing relationship with North Korea is a reminder that historical alliances can outlast shifting political realities. What began as ideological solidarity has evolved into a web of economic pragmatism, industrial dependency, and legal ambiguity. Despite official claims of peaceful cooperation, evidence from the Homicho and Gafat factories suggests that military and technical ties may have continued well into the sanctioned era. Ethiopia’s challenge now lies in balancing its national interests with the demands of international law — and in deciding whether loyalty to an old ally is worth the growing cost of global scrutiny.

Samantha Clark is a former HRNK Research Intern and an undergraduate student at William & Mary, majoring in History and International Relations with a minor in Psychology. Her academic and professional interests focus on the international relations of North Korea, particularly its interactions with Africa and China.

References

• Andrea Berger, “Is Ethiopia Violating UN Sanctions Against North Korea?” Foreign Affairs, Dec. 23, 2014.
• Samuel Ramani, “North Korea’s Long History of Ties with the Horn of Africa.” The Diplomat, 2018.
• “Ethiopia, North Korea Need to Work for Mutual Benefits – President Mulatu.” AllAfrica.com, Nov. 27, 2014.
• “Belgium: Human Rights – EU Seamen Detained in India, Ethiopia and North Korea Nuclear Test.” MENA Report, Jan. 23, 2016.
• Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “North Korean Illicit Activities and Sanctions.” Cornell International Law Journal 51, no. 1 (2018): 181–217.

 

By Lianna Leung, Former HRNK Research Intern 
Edited by Diletta de Luca

          Each night in the North Korean city of Hyesan, a girl, “Kim”, would watch the lights flicker on in the Chinese village across the Yalu River. From the pitch-blackness of her own home, her confusion and unease grew: why did North Korea have no reliable electricity of its own? Though merely a simple observation sparked by childhood curiosity, decades later she would look back on those moments as emblematic of her growing disillusionment with the regime. Years of propaganda extolling the virtues of communism stood in sharp contrast to the inequality and resource deprivation she witnessed daily. As hunger and despair grew amidst a crumbling economy, her hopes for the future dwindled. At the age of 19, she escaped.
       Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans have followed Kim’s path, and roughly 34,000 have settled in South Korea[1]. The vast majority escape across the border to China, making the perilous water crossing at the Yalu or Tumen Rivers. Some remain there, living under constant fear of repatriation or trafficking. Others press onward through Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand to reach a diplomatic or consular mission that can facilitate their transfer to South Korea, as embassies in countries hostile to North Korean escapees are too closely guarded to access. Many spend days navigating dense jungles to cross the Mekong River into Thailand[2]. The journey is over 3,000 miles.
         The plight of North Koreans under the regime is widely recognized, yet the challenges do not end upon reaching safety in South Korea. Adjusting to life in one of the world’s most competitive and technologically advanced societies is daunting, especially for escapees carrying decades of trauma, gaps in education, and little preparation for capitalist life. To ease this transition, the South Korean government offers extensive programs providing financial, health, and academic support[3].
       This piece traces the North Korean escapee journey—from escape to arrival to resettlement in South Korea—through the stories of two refugees from Hyesan, both interviewed for this research. Referred to by surnames only, the perspectives of “Lee” and “Kim” are not meant to represent every escapee’s path, but rather to shine a light on the human dimension of the transition process.
 
Kim’s Story
 
          Kim first dreamed of escaping at the age of twelve. She had witnessed the failures of the North Korean regime, reflected literally in the failing power grid that left homes in darkness after sunset. After the disastrous currency reform in 2009, her dream became an imperative. Inflation soared—she could no longer afford basic necessities at the local market and began to starve. Kim had lost faith in the communist system; its promises of equality and prosperity had rung hollow for too long.
         Hoping for a better life in China, Kim tried to flee North Korea. Her first two attempts were failures, and on the third, she was apprehended by Chinese authorities shortly after crossing the border and repatriated back to North Korea. As punishment, she was imprisoned within one of North Korea’s notorious labor camps, where inmates endure torture, assault, and inhumane conditions[4]. “I was treated worse than an animal,” she later recounted. To secure her early release, her mother sold their house to finance a bribe to authorities. With no shelter and dwindling food options, Kim made a final desperate bid to escape. She knew another failed attempt could mean life imprisonment—or worse—but at the very least, choosing to leave accorded her agency and dignity.
          With the help of a broker, she and her mother successfully made it to China, but the freedom she had sought was denied once more. A thriving market in human trafficking exists in northern China, with men paying substantial sums to “buy” North Korean wives. Kim was exploited by such a transaction—once she reached China, she was introduced to a man and told she was to begin living with him immediately. Separated from her mother and alone in a foreign country, she was forced to rely on her new husband, living under the constant fear of repatriation. “I had no real freedom,” she said. “I couldn’t make choices.”
          Kim spent three years in China, during which she gave birth to a son. Children of North Korean escapees exist in legal limbo in China. Without papers from either country, they are left particularly vulnerable to forced repatriation to North Korea—as Kim had experienced in failed escape attempts—where many face imprisonment and xenophobic discrimination for their “tainted” Chinese blood. Fearing for her son’s future in China, Kim escaped once more. With her family, she crossed through Vietnam and Laos before finally reaching South Korea. There, for the first time in her life, the prospect of both survival and freedom felt real.
 
Lee’s Story
 
          Hyesan sits frozen at the Northern border of North Korea, where winter temperatures plummet to an average of -2°F (-18°C), making it one of the coldest places on the Korean Peninsula. In this harsh climate, rice cannot survive. Families like Lee’s subsisted on corn and potatoes, supplemented by wild vegetables foraged from the mountainsides during the brief growing season. “I never felt full,” Lee recalls of his childhood.
         Life was tightly bound by state ritual. School days began and ended with chants of pro-regime propaganda echoed by each student. At home, families dutifully cleaned the portraits of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il that adorned their walls, knowing that unannounced police inspections could occur at any moment to examine their condition. Yet because of Hyesan’s proximity to China, smuggled CD players and foreign media often made their way across the border, carrying with them glimpses of life beyond the Workers’ Party’s control. Lee remembers watching forbidden South Korean dramas, draping blankets over windows to conceal the glow of his television screen from neighbors, since consuming “reactionary culture” is an offense punishable with years of forced labor[5]. When freed from the obligations of work and study, Lee swam in the rivers that wound through his hometown. He lamented never visiting the ocean—in North Korea, travel for leisure is virtually nonexistent, and leaving one’s assigned city requires a special permit.
          Lee’s father reported to his state-mandated position, but the family’s actual survival depended on his mother’s business. In North Korea’s rigid patriarchal society, while men are tied to military or state-mandated jobs, women are left with greater freedom to participate in the flourishing black market economy. Lee’s mother frequently visited China to smuggle goods, generating enough income to keep food on the family’s table. However, as North Korean authorities began scrutinizing her activities, she recognized that discovery and imprisonment was becoming inevitable. She chose instead to remain in China, sending word through a broker that the family should follow. With their primary income source severed and starvation looming, fifteen-year-old Lee decided to escape.
         Lee’s family purchased the services of a broker to cross the border, but midway through the journey he demanded a higher fee, threatening to turn them over to Chinese police if they refused. Facing imminent repatriation, Lee fled, eventually finding refuge with a Korean pastor in Qingdao. Even then, he was constantly fearful of being caught and sent back to North Korea. “Living in China, you don’t have to worry about hunger,” Lee would later reflect, “but you’re always hiding.” For nine months, Lee lived in this liminal space between escape and safety. Ultimately, with the help of the pastor, Lee trekked across Laos and Thailand to reach the South Korean embassy in Bangkok, finally resettling in South Korea. During the escape, Lee’s sister was caught by Chinese authorities and repatriated to North Korea. He hasn’t heard from her since.
 
Initial Intelligence Inspection
 
          It is the official policy of the South Korean government that all North Koreans are entitled to birthright citizenship rights in South Korea[6]. Accordingly, South Korean embassies and consulates are obligated to accept North Koreans who seek protection and to facilitate their transfer to South Korea, where they enter a standardized resettlement process.
          Upon arrival, North Korean refugees are first transferred to the North Korean Refugee Protection Center in Siheung, Gyeonggi Province. There, they undergo extensive interrogation under the jurisdiction of the National Intelligence Service[7]. The investigation is grounded in genuine threats; in 2010, South Korean authorities arrested two alleged North Korean operatives who planned to infiltrate the nation and assassinate a high-profile defector[8]. The vetting process typically ranges from several days to several months, designed to verify that escapees do not pose security risks as potential spies or double agents. During this period, they undergo thorough background checks and detailed interviews regarding their personal histories, escape routes, and any intelligence they may possess[9]. The interrogation procedures are rigorous—the inspectors, no-nonsense. “I stayed in one room during the interrogation for over a week,” Lee recounted. “They pushed us, [asking] where I used to live, what I did, everything.”
          Kim was there for three months, during which she faced extensive questioning about minute details of her North Korean life, including the names of acquaintances, schools, and teachers. Despite the confined nature of the facility, Kim recalled feeling thankful for her safety; she was together with her son and had escaped the traumatic circumstances of her life in China.
 
Life at Hanawon
 
          Hanawon facilities, literally translating to “unity center,” serve as transitional institutions where North Korean escapees spend their next twelve weeks. The establishment of these centers emerged in response to the dramatic increase in refugee flows following North Korea's devastating famine during the 1990s, known as the “Arduous March.”[10] To address this crisis, South Korea created the Ministry of Unification, establishing an institutional framework to guide North Korean refugees’ integration into South Korean society.
          The first Hanawon opened its doors in 1999 and has since processed over 30,000 refugees who have resettled in the country[11]. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, significantly impacted refugee flows—numbers have reached historic lows due to border closures and intensified crackdowns by the Kim regime. In 2024, only 236 escapees entered the country, a stark contrast to the thousands who arrived annually in the early 2000s[12]. The program currently operates a facility in Anseong serving women and children, and another in Hwacheon dedicated to men.
       Hanawon’s mission encompasses two objectives: ensuring the physical and mental health of escapees, and preparing them to enter South Korean society through education and vocational training programs.
          The centers are equipped with medical facilities, including general hospitals and specialized mental health units. Many escapees suffer from severe depression and anxiety, stemming from trauma experienced in North Korea, the harrowing escape process, survivor's guilt from leaving family members behind, and uncertainty about their future prospects. Addressing these needs, Hanawon opened a center for mental health in 2018, providing professional individual and group therapy services[13].
           Refugees’ physical health is often substantially worse than that of their South Korean peers as well, with many suffering from vitamin deficiency and musculoskeletal diseases (MSK) after years of chronic malnutrition[14]. The dental health of escapees is particularly concerning—over 90% visit the on-site dental clinic, and ultimately 30-40% end up needing dental prosthesis treatment due to their limited access to healthcare in North Korea[15]. Kim herself recalled being in and out of the hospital with pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) for three years after she arrived in South Korea. “The most difficult part of it was taking pills all the time,” she recounted.
         Beyond healthcare provision, Hanawon addresses the challenge of enabling North Korean refugees to adapt to South Korean society. This process confronts vast disparities across multiple dimensions, including in technology, governance, and economic systems.
          Through a 400-hour curriculum, escapees learn skills most South Koreans take for granted: using ATMs and computers, recognizing and avoiding financial scams, and understanding democratic procedures[16]. Refugees are given a primer in history, including the true origins of the Korean War—launched by Kim Il-Sung’s invasion rather than “American aggression.” The North Korean education system is grounded in propaganda, often unjustly portraying South Korea and the West as antagonizers. For many escapees, confronting the reality that their education was based in falsehood is deeply unsettling. Lee, however, embraced the change. “South Koreans don’t lie about education,” he said. “So, I just accepted what I learned.”
          The most substantial component of the program, 162 hours, is dedicated to vocational training and career guidance[17]. North Korean escapees can take courses on cooking, nail art, baking, electronics manufacturing, and nursing, among others. While these programs historically emphasized blue-collar skills, the Ministry of Unification has worked to diversify career pathways, as North Koreans have long faced higher unemployment and lower annual salaries than their South Korean counterparts on average[18]. These efforts have yielded some progress: the monthly salary of escapees has risen steadily since 2011, and the salary gap with South Korean natives shrunk to 457,000 won ($328) in 2021, though there’s been little improvement in the quality of employment[19].
             Refugee experiences at Hanawon vary considerably. Lee found immense relief in having arrived safely in South Korea and took enjoyment in the amenities of the facility: “I could play soccer and table tennis, had access to the Internet, and got an education.” For him, the comfort of interacting with fellow North Koreans in a free society and exercising personal autonomy outweighed any concerns or boredom.
            Kim’s impression of her first few months was less rosy. She was overwhelmed with anxiety about what to make of her new life in South Korea, and recalled: “For the first few days, I couldn’t fall asleep because of concerns for the future.” The coursework on fraud and scams felt redundant given her years of navigating bribery and trafficking networks. “That kind of thing, you don’t need to teach me,” she said. And while Hanawon’s tightly controlled environment was meant to ease the transition, its restrictions often felt stifling. Residents were permitted to leave only under supervision, for organized visits to banks, stores, or government offices[20]. Kim’s favorite moments were brief opportunities to step outside alone, a freedom she had been denied during the initial months of security investigations.
 
Entering Society
 
            After leaving the Hanawon, North Korean escapees receive a base stipend, healthcare, subsidized housing arrangements, and support from regional “Hana Centers.”[21] Yet, this assistance is often capped at five years, creating pressure for refugees to secure immediate employment regardless of job quality. For those pursuing higher education, the government provides special admission pathways and tuition subsidies. Nevertheless, the dramatic education gap between South Koreans and North Koreans makes the transition especially difficult.
            In North Korea, rather than providing education as a tool of knowledge and self-empowerment, it serves to mold citizens into loyal and productive members of the state. Hundreds of hours are dedicated to learning the history and actions of individual leaders and studying “Juche” (or self-reliance) ideology. Even fundamental subjects such as math are tainted with propaganda. For instance, an exercise from a 2003 textbook read: “During the Fatherland Liberation War the brave uncles of the Korean People’s Army in one battle killed 374 American imperialist bastards, who are brutal robbers. The number of prisoners taken was 133 more than the number of American imperialist bastards killed. How many bastards were taken prisoner?”[22] In stark contrast, the South Korean system is globally recognized for its rigor, with lengthy school days, competitive testing and a strong emphasis on academic achievement. “It is difficult for North Korean escapees to compete with those who have been taking private education from the age of 3 or earlier,” said Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, a legal analyst at a North Korean human rights organization based in Seoul.
            Lee’s experience illustrates these challenges. Because his escape took years, he fell behind his age cohort and enrolled in a school exclusively for escapees. With government tuition support, he eventually studied political science at university. Kim was even further behind; she had failed to graduate middle school in North Korea. Despite demonstrating strong potential throughout elementary school, she was devastated when her family couldn’t afford the requisite bribe for admission into the more prestigious middle school. She dropped out of school entirely, disheartened that merit alone was worthless in the North Korean system. At age 23, while caring for an infant son, Kim began studying independently for middle and high school equivalency exams. For ten months, she studied relentlessly. “It was really hard, both physically and mentally,” she said. Ultimately, she passed, going on to enroll in an Education program in college. Yet the competitive nature of South Korean society left her exhausted, and she worked constantly to keep up with her peers. On top of that, she recalled the excruciating difficulty of spending so much time apart from her 3-year-old son—she only saw him briefly on weekends while relying on a community of nuns for weekday childcare.
         Even with state support, many refugees face profound social and psychological challenges. Research shows that roughly half of all North Korean escapees suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), often resulting from experiences such as witnessing public executions or enduring extreme stress during their escape[23]. Kim herself suffered from depression and anxiety but found mental health services inadequate for her needs. Though counseling was available, she felt uncomfortable revisiting triggering past experiences. “I had trauma, but I thought, ‘They can’t solve that for me’,” she explained.
             Beyond mental health, refugees also contend with societal prejudice. Despite government efforts to foster a sense of belonging for North Korean escapees, South Korean society can be unforgiving. Misconceptions about defectors remain pervasive: “Some South Koreans expect North Koreans to be lazy or uneducated or communist,” Lee said, mentioning that peers of his had been rejected from jobs explicitly because of their background.
          The transition process is filled with obstacles, but the most profound difficulty for both Lee and Kim arose from a fundamental difference between totalitarian and democratic society: the ability to make your own decisions. In North Korea, individual life trajectories are predetermined, largely based on your songbun (social status) rank[24]. Field of study, employment, and residential location are all closely dictated by the central government, leaving no room to deviate. In South Korea, by contrast, freedom comes with the burden of responsibility. “You are responsible for your life,” Lee said. “In North Korea, you don’t learn about responsibility, because the regime tells us what to do—to be loyal.”
         Kim found her newfound autonomy to be simultaneously liberating and paralyzing. She constantly feared making incorrect decisions and bearing the consequences of her choices. This anxiety manifested in her academic life, where she struggled to choose a major in college. Despite pressure from peers and advisors to pursue Nursing, a lucrative career, she chose to study Education. Though it was a daunting choice, Kim viewed education as not only a way to rebuild her own life, but also a means of giving back—of strengthening the community and nation she was now a part of.
          The challenges faced by Kim, Lee, and others reveal the structural gaps that remain in South Korea’s resettlement framework, which emphasizes short-term integration over long-term stability. The following recommendations highlight areas where policy can better address the mental health needs of North Korean refugees.
 
Recommendations
 
          The South Korean government has made immense strides in improving transition programs for North Korean refugees since their establishment. Hanawons have expanded their capacity, infrastructure, vocational training, and counseling services, incorporating feedback from civil society and escapee experiences. Nevertheless, sustained improvement requires greater emphasis on the long-term welfare of refugees, particularly in the areas of mental health and social integration.
          Pervasive mental illness is a critical concern among the escapee population. North Korean refugees have a suicide rate three times higher than that of South Korean citizens[25]. Although Hanawons are equipped with substantial mental health services, significant gaps remain in mental health literacy among refugees themselves.
          Cultural stigma compounds these challenges. East Asian societies traditionally maintain negative attitudes towards the use of therapy or other psychiatric assistance for mental health disorders. The combination of limited mental health knowledge in North Korea and persistent stigmatization within South Korean society creates barriers that prevent refugees from accessing potentially beneficial treatment. “This kind of support is a fairly new concept even for South Koreans,” explained Hee-Seok Shin. “So introducing [it] for North Korean escapees is still challenging.”
       Kim’s story exemplifies the impact of these constraints. Despite grappling with anxiety and depression, she found it difficult to seek help while also juggling part-time employment, study, childcare, and the demands of adapting to South Korea’s hyper-competitive society. Early detection of trauma at Hanawon, followed by sustained, individualized care, could provide a strong foundation for recovery. Researchers have suggested normalizing conversations about mental health in educational programming and training veteran North Korean escapees as peer counselors, allowing new arrivals to speak to someone with shared experiences[26]. Additionally, mental health professionals must acknowledge and study the specific barriers to resettlement faced by female escapees, many of whom have faced traumatic human trafficking or sexual exploitation during their journey to South Korea.
           Beyond individual health, longer-term integration is hindered by broader structural limitations in the resettlement programs. Although Hanawon delivers a wealth of information and training in a short period, support wanes once refugees leave the facility. Kim described the education style as overwhelming: “They provide a lot of information at once, but that’s not really helpful—you can’t just memorize all that.” She suggested that more gradual exposure to real-life challenges and interactions, while still under the safety of a controlled environment, would have been more beneficial. Lee voiced similar concerns, noting that the brief period of government protection does little to prepare refugees for the sustained difficulties of adjustment.
       Social integration remains another area for improvement. Discrimination—whether explicit or implicit—in employment, education, and daily life has been linked to lower self-esteem and greater disconnection from society among escapees[27]. Even forming friendships can be daunting. North Korean communities are accustomed to tightly knit social networks, where spontaneous visits to neighbors are common[28]. In contrast, South Korea’s urbanized, fast-paced lifestyle often leaves escapees feeling isolated. While Kim and Lee both developed friendships with South Korean peers, they admitted feeling far more comfortable among fellow North Koreans. As Lee explained: “Even though I am close to my South Korean friends, those kinds of stories about my childhood just don’t come out.”
     The government can play an important role in bridging this divide by fostering organic opportunities for North and South Koreans to connect. Such initiatives would not only help refugees build meaningful relationships but also challenge the biases that some South Korean citizens may hold. Public education and media campaigns could further reduce prejudice by humanizing the experiences of escapees. For example, the reality TV show Now on My Way to Meet You, which first aired in 2011, has given defectors a platform to share their stories[29]. While not without criticism, the program has broadened public empathy for the defector experience. Similar documentary and media projects that highlight the everyday lives of North Korean refugees could expand these positive outcomes.
 
Concluding Thoughts
 
          Support for North Korean escapees has been a long-standing policy in South Korea, but as newer generations grow increasingly distant from the historical memory of a unified peninsula, public attitudes may be shifting. “Younger South Koreans, especially women, tend to hold a more hostile view towards refugees and migrants,” observed Hee-Seok Shin. He expressed concern that South Korea’s tradition of acceptance and financial assistance for escapees may gradually diminish as the nation continues to evolve.
          For Kim and Lee, the support and opportunities provided in the South proved transformative. Lee pursued a career as a freelance journalist and radio producer, dedicating himself to advancing the cause of North Korean human rights. Both he and Kim were awarded Fulbright Scholarships to pursue master’s degrees in the United States, where they have shared their life stories publicly and advocated for confronting the North Korean regime’s repression.
       Sustaining and strengthening the government programs that enabled their success is imperative. The ordeals endured by escapees during both flight and resettlement are difficult to fathom, and they—along with future refugees—deserve the opportunity to build a life with what was unattainable in North Korea: autonomy and dignity. Yet privilege, as Lee reminds us through his own experience, is never without cost. Reflecting back on his own hardships, he invoked the words engraved on the Korean War Memorial, a constant reminder of the responsibility society must bear to uphold liberty: “Freedom is not free.”

Lianna Leung is a junior at Stanford University studying international relations, with a focus on East Asia. Originally from Berkeley, California, she is driven by a strong interest in human rights and sustainable development. She has pursued these interests through public sector internships, most recently at HRNK, as well as at the NGO International Bridges to Justice, where she supported criminal justice and legal training initiatives. Her research centers on China’s expanding geopolitical influence, including work with the Hoover Institution examining Chinese media influence in Africa. Through her academic and professional work, she hopes to build a career at the intersection of policy and law, advancing global justice.


[1] migrationpolicy.org. “Slipping through the Cracks in South Korea: The Uncertain Futures for the Children of North Korean Defectors,” June 26, 2025. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/north-korean-defector-children.
[2] migrationpolicy.org. “Slipping through the Cracks in South Korea: The Uncertain Futures for the Children of North Korean Defectors,” June 26, 2025. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/north-korean-defector-children.
[3] South Korean Ministry of Unification. “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors.” South Korea Ministry of Unification. Accessed August 21, 2025. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/%3B.
[4] Hawk, David R. “The Hidden Gulag: The Lives and Voices of ‘Those Who Are Sent to the Mountains.’” The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Accessed August 21, 2025. http://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_HiddenGulag2_Web_5-18.pdf.
[5] Civicus Monitor. “North Korea: New Restrictive Law on Language Issued While Regime Punishes Access to Foreign Media, International Calls.” Accessed August 21, 2025. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/north-korea-new-restrictive-law-on-language-issued-while-regime-punishes-access-to-foreign-media-international-calls/.
[6] Green, Christopher. “Improving North Korean Defector Integration in South Korea: Survey Findings and Recommendations - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.” 38 North, August 21, 2025. https://www.38north.org/2022/05/improving-north-korean-defector-integration-in-south-korea-survey-findings-and-recommendations/#_ftn1.
[7] Sung-mi, Ahn. “A Look inside the Revamped North Korean Defector Debriefing Center.” The Korea Herald, June 24, 2021. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/2638513.
[8] Branigan, Tania. “North Korean ‘spies’ Held over Alleged Mission to Assassinate Defector.” The Guardian, April 21, 2010. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/north-koreans-held-assassination-plot.
[9] Lartigue, Casey, Jr. “‘North Korean Refugees First Go through Hanawon?’ Myths and Misconceptions, Part 4.” The Korea Times, April 12, 2025. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20250412/north-korean-refugees-first-go-through-hanawon-myths-and-misconceptions-part-4.
[10] ———. “‘North Korean Refugees First Go through Hanawon?’ Myths and Misconceptions, Part 4.” The Korea Times, April 12, 2025. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/amp/opinion/20250412/north-korean-refugees-first-go-through-hanawon-myths-and-misconceptions-part-4?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[11] ———. “‘North Korean Refugees First Go through Hanawon?’ Myths and Misconceptions, Part 4.” The Korea Times, April 12, 2025. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/amp/opinion/20250412/north-korean-refugees-first-go-through-hanawon-myths-and-misconceptions-part-4?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[12] 통일부. “Policy on North Korean Defectors< Data & Statistics< South-North Relations< 통일부_영문.” Accessed August 22, 2025. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/.
[13] Da-gyum, Ji. “Inside Hanawon: How N. Korean Defectors Build a New Life in S. Korea.” The Korea Herald, July 10, 2022. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/2909270.
[14] Radio Free Asia. “In Mind, Body, North Koreans Still Suffer After They Defect.” May 9, 2007. https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/korea_defector-20070509.html.
[15] ———. “Inside Hanawon: How N. Korean Defectors Build a New Life in S. Korea.” The Korea Herald, July 10, 2022. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/2909270.
[16] ———. “Inside Hanawon: How North Korean Defectors Build a New Life in South Korea - Asia News Network.” Asia News NetworkAsia News Network, July 11, 2022. https://asianews.network/inside-hanawon-how-north-korean-defectors-build-a-new-life-in-south-korea/.
[17] ———. “Inside Hanawon: How North Korean Defectors Build a New Life in South Korea - Asia News Network.” Asia News NetworkAsia News Network, July 11, 2022. https://asianews.network/inside-hanawon-how-north-korean-defectors-build-a-new-life-in-south-korea/.
[18] Kang, Hami. “Barriers to Resettlement Success Among North Koreans: A Public Health Issue.” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 77–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/27267197.
[19] Yun-hwan, Chae. “N. Korean Defectors’ Average Monthly Wage at Nearly 2.3 Mln Won in 2021: Survey.” Yonhap News Agency, February 8, 2022. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220208005900325.
[20] ———. “‘North Korean Refugees First Go through Hanawon?’ Myths and Misconceptions, Part 4.” The Korea Times, April 12, 2025. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20250412/north-korean-refugees-first-go-through-hanawon-myths-and-misconceptions-part-4.
[21] 통일부. “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors< What We Do< 통일부_영문.” Accessed August 22, 2025. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.
[22] Lankov , Andrei. “Mathematics ― a La North Korea.” The Korea Times, August 28, 2011. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20110828/mathematics-a-la-north-korea.
[23] “Time Travelers: North Korean Defectors Resettling in South Korea.” Accessed August 21, 2025. https://libertyinnorthkorea.org/blog/time-travelers-north-korean-defectors-resettling-in-south-korea.
[24] HRNK. “Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System,” June 6, 2012. https://www.hrnk.org/documentations/marked-for-life-songbun-north-koreas-social-classification-system/.
[25] Kang, Hami. “Barriers to Resettlement Success Among North Koreans: A Public Health Issue.” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 77–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/27267197.
[26] Kang, Hami. “Barriers to Resettlement Success Among North Koreans: A Public Health Issue.” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 77–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/27267197.
[27] Kang, Hami. “Barriers to Resettlement Success Among North Koreans: A Public Health Issue.” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 77–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/27267197.
[28] “Time Travelers: North Korean Defectors Resettling in South Korea.” Accessed August 21, 2025. https://libertyinnorthkorea.org/blog/time-travelers-north-korean-defectors-resettling-in-south-korea.
[29] Kim, E. Tammy. “Where North and South Korea Meet: On TV.” The New York Times, May 8, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/magazine/korea-tv-reunification.html.

By Lim Yong-myong, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO of HRNK

          North Korea and Turkmenistan are both widely considered amongst the most oppressive regimes in the world.[1] While North Korea’s oppression is more well-known due to their repeated threats against many countries, including the United States, Turkmenistan’s oppressive system is far less studied and understood. This piece will compare the authoritarian regimes of North Korea and Turkmenistan, examining how each maintains control over its population.
 
          Turkmenistan, a post-Soviet country of 6 million people in Central Asia, is routinely rated as one of the least free countries in the world by Freedom House and The Economist’s Democracy Index. For almost two decades, the country has been ruled with an iron fist by the Berdimuhamedov Family. Before the Berdimuhamedov family, Turkmenistan was ruled by Saparmurat Niyazov, who famously banned car radios, ballet, and video games.[2] Elections in the country are largely for show, Turkmen citizens are restricted from leaving the country, freedom of speech and expression are almost non-existent, and the ruling family demands complete support from the people. Similarly, North Korea has been ruled by the Kim Family since 1948, who have presided over some of the most horrific human rights abuses of the modern world. From imprisoning entire families, forced labor camps, and no freedom of speech, to severe restrictions on access to food, health care, and economic opportunity, North Korea’s human rights abuses are numerous. 
 
          The authoritarianism of Turkmenistan and North Korea have similar origins. Turkmenistan's relationship with communism and authoritarianism began after the Russian Revolution of 1917, when Bolshevik forces extended control over Central Asia. By 1924, Turkmenistan became a Soviet Socialist Republic, integrating Marxist-Leninist principles with local governance. Soviet rule imposed collectivization, atheism, and centralized planning, deeply shaping Turkmen society until independence in 1991.
 
          North Korean communism emerged after Japan’s defeat in World War II, when Soviet forces occupied the North and installed Kim Il-sung, a former guerrilla fighter. Influenced by Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism, Kim established a one-party socialist state in 1948, blending communism with Korean nationalism and developing the Juche ideology of “self-reliance.”
 
Restrictions on Movement
           A key similarity between Turkmenistan and North Korea is that both heavily restrict their citizens from leaving their respective countries, which is in violation of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[3] It is a crime for North Koreans to leave the country without permission.[4] Similarly, Turkmenistan seeks to restrict its citizens from leaving the country. It is believed that Turkmen authorities are worried about their declining population because of emigration and decreasing birth rates, so they have attempted to make it harder for people to leave the country and for their citizens to remain abroad for an extended period of time. Starting in 2023, Turkmenistan ceased to renew passports of its citizens living abroad. This was done to try to force Turkmens living abroad to have to return to Turkmenistan, since having invalidated passports would force them to live illegally in their new country.[5] Additionally, Turkmenistan has taken measures to prohibit its citizens from leaving the country to attend foreign universities. It was also reported in 2018, that “young women were banned from leaving the country, and then all citizens under the age of 40 were removed from flights en masse.”[6]
 
Religious Persecution
               In Turkmenistan, Muslims and religious minorities face systematic persecution under the guise of combating extremism and enforcing mandatory military service. The government has accused numerous Muslims of “Islamic extremism,” subjecting them to closed trials, long prison sentences, and severe torture. These accusations are usually untrue, and the government levies those accusations against those they view as a threat to the regime. At the notorious Ovadan-Depe and Seydi Labor Camps, prisoners endure routine beatings, solitary confinement, and inhumane conditions. In one 2013 case, at least 20 Muslims were arrested and later tortured, with several dying in custody. Followers of the Kurdish theologian Said Nursi and Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen have also been targeted, particularly after the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. Dozens of Gülen supporters were imprisoned, tortured, and given lengthy sentences, some of whom died under suspicious circumstances.[7]
 
        Jehovah’s Witnesses, though not banned, are persecuted for their refusal to perform military service. Lacking a civilian alternative, conscientious objectors are criminalized under Article 219(1) of the Criminal Code. Since 2018, at least 22 Jehovah’s Witnesses have been imprisoned, with eight still held in the harsh Seydi Labor Camp. The state’s hostility includes threats, physical abuse, and extended sentences, as seen in the cases of Bahtiyar Atahanov and Serdar Dovletov. Despite mass presidential pardons, Jehovah’s Witnesses are excluded, and penalties have grown more severe. Conditions in detention are dire, with overcrowding, poor sanitation, and widespread illness such as tuberculosis. These actions reflect a broader campaign of religious repression, where beliefs outside state-sanctioned Islam or the military ethos are met with violence and imprisonment.[8]
 
        A 2020 white paper by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) documented 1,411 cases of religious persecution in North Korea between 2007 and July 2020, including 126 killings and 94 disappearances, based on defector testimonies and other sources.[9] While a few state-sanctioned religious institutions, such as churches, exist—mainly in Pyongyang—they are tightly controlled by the government and primarily serve as showcases for foreign visitors. Unauthorized religious activity is harshly punished, and citizens are encouraged to report anyone possessing religious materials or engaging in unapproved worship.
 
             Defectors report that religious practitioners live in fear, often hiding their beliefs even from close family, due to the risk of being labeled disloyal and subjected to arrest or worse. Some clandestine religious activity reportedly occurs, including the distribution of unapproved Christian materials, although the scope of underground churches remains uncertain.[10]
 
           The United States, which lacks diplomatic relations with North Korea, continues to raise concerns about religious freedom through multilateral forums and bilateral engagement with other nations. In December 2023, the U.S. co-sponsored a UN resolution condemning North Korea’s systemic and gross human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions of individuals practicing religion or free expression. Since 2001, North Korea has been designated a “Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act, with accompanying sanctions reaffirmed most recently in November 2022.[11]
 
Food Insecurity 
               Turkmenistan and North Korea both have issues with food insecurity; however, it appears that North Korea has worse food insecurity than Turkmenistan. According to Human Rights Watch, the average Turkmen family spends 70%-80% of their income on food. Additionally, many people “spend several hours a day waiting in lines for subsidized food, and the lines and unpredictability of food supply cause great stress.”[12] While food insecurity exists in Turkmenistan, it does not appear to be as severe as food insecurity in North Korea. Widespread famine has been documented in North Korea, while there are no reports of famine in Turkmenistan. In 2023, a BBC reporter interviewed a North Korean woman who said “she knew a family of three who had starved to death at home.”[13] Furthermore, a UN report from 2022 indicated that over 45% of North Koreans were undernourished.[14] A possible explanation for North Korea having more food insecurity is that Turkmenistan has immense natural gas wealth and has a rather small population, which likely makes it easier for the Turkmen regime to feed its people. At the same time, Turkmenistan appears more concerned about their international image than North Korea. Turkmenistan likely cares about its image because it needs markets to sell its natural gas, and if there were widely documented and publicized human rights abuses in the country, many Western nations may be less willing to import natural gas from the country.[15]
 
Censorship and Propaganda
          Another area where North Korea and Turkmenistan share many similarities is media and information. Media censorship and propaganda in North Korea and Turkmenistan serve as key tools for authoritarian control, yet they slightly differ in degree, strategy, and underlying ideology. In North Korea, the media is entirely state-owned and tightly regulated by the Korean Workers’ Party, with no access to foreign news or the global internet.[16] The regime maintains an isolated domestic intranet and uses propaganda to uphold the image of the Kim dynasty, promote Juche, and vilify foreign adversaries. Propaganda in Turkmenistan centers on the glorification of the president, especially under Saparmurat Niyazov and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, often portraying them as wise, athletic, and powerful. The content emphasizes Turkmen identity, nationalism, and neutrality in global affairs rather than external threats. While both regimes suppress dissent and flood public space with leader-focused propaganda, North Korea appears to enforce a deeper level of information control. Civil society and political activism are nearly non-existent in Turkmenistan and North Korea. Both countries have a cult of personality based around the ruling families. Statues, memorials, and folklore glorifying the leaders are put on display throughout both countries. And yet, Turkmenistan allows slightly more exposure to the outside world and uses softer cultural messaging. Ultimately, both states use media to construct political legitimacy and suppress alternative narratives, but North Korea's approach is more totalitarian and militarized, whereas Turkmenistan’s is more symbolic and personality driven. 
 
        The authoritarian origins of North Korea and Turkmenistan stem from different historical contexts, yet both were influenced by the Soviet Union, and its Stalinist ideology. North Korea’s authoritarian system was established in the aftermath of World War II, when the Korean Peninsula was divided and the Soviet Union installed Kim Il-sung as the leader of the northern zone in 1945. Kim quickly consolidated power, eliminated rivals, and founded a one-party state under the Korean Workers' Party. By the early 1950s, after the Korean War, North Korea had become a tightly controlled totalitarian regime centered around Kim’s cult of personality, reinforced by the ideology of Juche. In contrast, Turkmenistan’s authoritarianism emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Saparmurat Niyazov, the former Communist Party leader of the Turkmen SSR, declared himself president for life and rebranded himself as "Turkmenbashi" (Father of the Turkmen). Drawing on Soviet structures, he established a hyper-personalized dictatorship marked by extreme nationalism, heavy censorship, and a bizarre cult of personality. Niyazov wrote a book called the Ruhnama, which focused on ethics and Turkmen culture. For many years this book was treated as a religious text that was required to be taught in school. People even needed to pass an exam on their knowledge of the Ruhnama to get their driving license.[17] Unlike North Korea’s dynastic, militarized origins, Turkmenistan's authoritarianism grew out of a post-Soviet power vacuum and was less ideological, relying instead on personal loyalty, oil wealth, and state-controlled symbolism. While both regimes centralized power and suppressed dissent, North Korea’s origins are rooted in revolutionary communism and geopolitical division, whereas Turkmenistan’s stem from a post-colonial continuity of Soviet-style governance that has been transformed into a highly personalized autocracy.
 
Foreign Policy
          A key difference between North Korea and Turkmenistan is the way they approach foreign relations and security. Turkmenistan is an officially neutral state that seeks to maintain cordial relations with all countries. While Turkmenistan has been quite isolated for decades, it has maintained relations with all major countries. It also appears Turkmenistan is attempting to reduce its isolation from the world by increasing foreign investment and making it easier for tourists to visit the country.[18] This is in contrast to North Korea, which is hostile to many nations and poses challenges to global security. North Korea also supports various hostile actors that are opposed to the West, including Russia, Iran as well as Iran’s terrorist proxies.[19] The difference in how these two countries approach international relations is a key reason that North Korea is much more well-known on the global stage, albeit for sinister reasons. 
 
            In conclusion, North Korea and Turkmenistan represent two of the most repressive authoritarian regimes in the world, each of which has been shaped by distinct historical trajectories, but are regrettably united in their extreme curtailment of human rights and freedom. Both countries emerged from Soviet influence, with North Korea institutionalizing its totalitarianism in the wake of World War II and Turkmenistan developing its authoritarianism after the collapse of the USSR. Despite these different origins, both regimes rely on centralized power, personality cults, censorship, and brutal repression to maintain control. Their restrictions on emigration, suppression of religious freedom, and tight media control reflect systematic strategies to isolate their populations from external influences and crush dissent.
 
           However, key differences shape their global perception and internal dynamics. North Korea, with its militarized, dynastic dictatorship and aggressive foreign policy, is a constant source of international concern for many countries, including South Korea and the United States. Its severe food shortages, nuclear weapons program, and open hostility toward the West have placed it under intense global scrutiny. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, remains less visible on the world stage, partly due to its official neutrality, reliance on natural gas diplomacy, and softer approach to propaganda. Yet, beneath this quieter facade lies a similarly brutal system, where political opposition, religious minorities, and civil society are ruthlessly suppressed. 
 
          Ultimately, the comparison between North Korea and Turkmenistan reveals not only shared patterns of repression, but also how authoritarianism adapts to different political, economic, and cultural contexts. While North Korea exemplifies a closed, militaristic totalitarian regime, Turkmenistan illustrates how a resource-rich, personality-driven autocracy can maintain tight control without attracting the same level of international attention. Both cases serve as sobering reminders of the resilience and adaptability of authoritarianism, and the ongoing challenges facing efforts to promote human rights and freedom in deeply closed societies.
 
 

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Geigenberger, Laura. “North Korea ranks dead last in latest World Press Freedom Index”, Daily NK, May 4, 2023, https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-ranks-dead-last-latest-world-press-freedom-index/

Gorokhovskaia, Yana and Cathryn Grothe. “Freedom in the World 2025,” Freedom House,  2025, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/FITW_World2025digitalN.pdf  

Hassan, Tirana. “North Korea Events of 2023”, Human Rights Watch, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea#:~:text=North%20Korean%20law%20states%20that,between%20January%20and%20September%202023.

Ibragimova, Galiya. “Could a Woman End Turkmenistan’s International Isolation?”, Carnegie Endowment, June 27, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/06/turkmenistan-internal-power-shift?lang=en

Kalder, Kalder.  “A dictator's guide to the universe” The Guardian,  December 29, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2006/dec/29/adictatorsguidetotheunive

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[1] Yana Gorokhovskaia and Cathryn Grothe, “Freedom in the World 2025,” Freedom House,  2025, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/FITW_World2025digitalN.pdf  
[2] Tom Parfitt, “Bizarre, brutal and self-obsessed. Now time's up for Turkmenistan's dictator” The Guardian, December 21, 2006,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/22/tomparfitt.mainsection
[3] UN General Assembly, “Resolution 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A/RES/217(III)”, December 10, 1948, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
[4] Tirana Hassan, “North Korea Events of 2023”, Human Rights Watch, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea#:~:text=North%20Korean%20law%20states%20that,between%20January%20and%20September%202023.
[5] “Citizens of Turkmenistan Being Prevented From Flying Abroad”, Times of Central Asia, May 6, 2024,
https://timesca.com/citizens-of-turkmenistan-being-prevented-from-flying-abroad/
[6] Ibid.
[7] Jason Morton, “Religious Prisoners in Turkmenistan’s Gulag”, UNITED STATES COMMISSION on INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, August, 2020, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2020%20Religious%20Prisoners%20in%20Turkmenistans%20Gulag.pdf
[8] Ibid.
[9] “2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: North Korea”, U.S. Department of State, 2024, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/north-korea/
[10] Ibid.
[11] “2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: North Korea”, U.S. Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/north-korea/
[12] “Turkmenistan: Denial, Inaction Worsen Food Crisis”, Human Rights Watch, September 23, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/23/turkmenistan-denial-inaction-worsen-food-crisis
[13] Jean Mackenzie, “North Korea: Residents tell BBC of neighbours starving to death”, BBC, June 14, 2023,
 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65881803
[14] Kwak Yeon-soo, “46% of North Koreans undernourished, UN report says”,,The Korea Times, March 18, 2025, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20250318/46-of-north-koreans-undernourished-un-report-says
[15] “Turkmenistan is trying to come out of its shell”, Eurasianet, March 5, 2025, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-is-trying-to-come-out-of-its-shell
[16] Laura Geigenberger, “North Korea ranks dead last in latest World Press Freedom Index”, Daily NK, May 4, 2023, https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-ranks-dead-last-latest-world-press-freedom-index/
[17] Dan Kalder, “A dictator's guide to the universe” The Guardian,  December 29, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2006/dec/29/adictatorsguidetotheunive
[18] Galiya Ibragimova, “Could a Woman End Turkmenistan’s International Isolation?”, Carnegie Endowment, June 27, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/06/turkmenistan-internal-power-shift?lang=en
[19] Ellen Kim and Salamata Bah, “The DPRK-Hamas Relationship”, CSIS, March 27, 2024, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/dprk-hamas-relationship

By Sloane Thor
Edited by Diletta De Luca
​​
Introduction
          In recent years, dozens and hundreds of North Koreans have escaped their homeland and made the perilous passage across the Tumen River into China[1]. Many North Korean escapees flee from conditions defined by a chronic lack of food and rights due to the songbun system that leaves them disadvantaged and at risk of political persecution. Others leave to seek an income to maintain and support their families in North Korea (often to pay for medical treatment for a relative),[2] or to reunite with family that already left the country. Since the DMZ is full of landmines, the only way to reach freedom for these escapees is to go through China in order to eventually reach resettlement in South Korea.
          North Korean escapees are also vulnerable due to their status as illegal immigrants in China. The Chinese government does not grant refugee status or asylum to North Korean escapees, as it instead considers them illegal economic migrants.[3] This causes many North Koreans who cross the border into China to be subjected to exploitation due their undocumented status and the Chinese government’s refusal to implement the non-refoulement principle (outlined in the U.N.’s 1951 Refugee Convention), meaning that escapees who are caught will be forcibly repatriated back to North Korea where they will be heavily punished. They are often tortured and sent to prison camps for their defection, as it is seen as “treachery against the nation” by the North Korean Ministry of People’s Security.[4] North Korean escapees are not able to obtain working permits, or residency permits due to their “illegal”status in China.[5] This makes them dependent on Chinese citizens in order to obtain housing or work. Coupled with the lack of Chinese language skills, this leaves them extremely exploitable.
          North Korean female escapees are particularly easy targets for traffickers and brokers. They are easily manipulated due to age, status, risk of refoulment, and gender. The most prominent human rights abuses that befall North Korean women escapees are forced marriage, prostitution, and sexual slavery in the cyber realm.
 
The Vulnerability of North Korean Women
          The vulnerability of North Korean women makes them particularly easy targets for traffickers and brokers. Korean NGOs estimate that up to 80% of the female escapees become victims of human trafficking.[6] Victims are usually between the ages of 12 and 29 but some research reports victims as young as 9 years old.[7] Being undocumented and at the risk of refoulement makes it easy for traffickers to control them through threats of exposure to officials if they do not comply with their demands. The risk of refoulement means that victims of human trafficking are unable to ask for help or report to officials as they risk being sent back to North Korea and thus being treated worse than prior to escaping.
The undocumented status of North Korean women in China provides an environment where physical, sexual, mental, and emotional abuse are used to control the women to mold them into complaisant sex slaves. In a recent report published by Korea Future it is noted that North Korean women are subjected to “supplementary violence designed to induce compliance and delivered in the forms of starvation, physical beatings, and verbal threats of repatriation”.[8] This makes them easier to control and less likely to try to escape.

Arranged Marriages and the One-Child Policy
          30% of North Korean women who are trafficked in China are sold into forced marriages with Chinese men, often in rural areas.[9] This is because in China there is a high demand for young, sexually exploitable, and “marriage material” women as an effect of the “One-Child Policy”. This measure was enacted in 1979 and abolished in 2016, and it existed in a law that limited couples to only having one child as an attempt to curb a rapidly rising population. However, the policy resulted in a surplus of over 40 million boys[10] due to the male-dominated culture. The families tended to favor boys over girls as it was preferred to “have a male child to carry on the family’s name and inheritance.”[11] Thus, many Chinese women during this time were born in cities while few to none were born in rural areas as farm work was often carried out by men. This resulted in a high demand for brides in rural areas since the cities were far away and the Chinese women there were becoming educated and setting their sights on wealthier marriage partners This created a lucrative industry of “black-market brides” (trafficking victims from other countries) to remedy the vast gender imbalance, especially in rural areas of China.
Once a price is agreed upon by a broker and the soon-to-be Chinese husband, North Korean wives are relocated to the Chinese families who, fearing their escape,  heavily restrict their freedom of movement for weeks or months by withholding access to a mobile phone, the internet, or the ability to travel outside the property without a family member.[12] While in the village, North Korean women nevertheless are unlikely to be reported to the police or to other local authorities. Additionally, even if they are reported to local authorities, it remains highly unlikely that their presence is revealed to higher level officials. This can be due to bribes or the Chinese concept of guanxi, a system of social networks and relationships that facilitate deals and influence transactions. Guanxi, while an important part of Chinese culture, facilitates the trafficking industry by causing citizens to protect the illegal acts of others to gain favor or receive an advantage or benefit in return.
 
Prostitution and Brothels
          While forced marriage has long been the predominant fate for trafficked North Korean women, it has quickly been overtaken by prostitution. Korea Future estimates that prostitution in general accounts for about 6% of China’s GDP.[13] Currently, it is estimated that 50% of North Korean women who are trafficked in China are sold into brothels, karaoke bars, or other forms of forced prostitution.[14] Prostitution in China seems to be managed by criminal organizations who remain reliant upon the guanxi system and rarely operate nationwide as they prefer to opt for small regions or cities.[15] Many of these North Korean escapees work “in brothels masqueraded as entertainment or service venues, namely: bathhouses, saunas, karaoke bars, cafes, massage parlors, beauty parlors, barbershops, hair salons, small hotels, and restaurants”.[16] It is estimated that North Korean women engage with 2 to 4 men a night and are subjected to multiple forms of rape.[17] They are confined to the establishment and work under the instruction of a pimp or madam. In Shanghai, to avoid abduction by rival organizations and to signify ownership, some North Korean women are branded with tattoos, such as lions and butterflies.”[18] Criminal organizations work closely with corrupt or bribed officials to prevent the escape by the abducted North Korean escapees.[19]
 
The Chinese Cybersex Industry
          With the emergence of the internet, North Korean women who become trafficking victims have been increasingly sold into the cybersex industry. These women are trapped in small apartments with a handful of other women and are sexually assaulted or forced to perform graphic sexual acts via webcam online for paying male clientele.[20] “Unlike bars or brothels with a permanent address, cybersex trafficking victims can be moved to and abused in any location with an internet connection and a webcam, or just a mobile phone”.[21] The cybersex exploitation of North Korean victims takes place on platforms that can be “rudimentary, deliberately inconspicuous, or simply well-known and widely available video-chat services”.[22] The majority of clients utilizing these platforms, particularly chatrooms, tend to be from South Korea, where pornography and prostitution are illegal.[23]
          Off-camera, victims face “coercion, starvation, intimidation, and brutalization”.[24] They are forced to cover up bruises sustained from the acts performed or from abuse by their handler with makeup and cover up hair loss with wigs.[25] Many are often subjected to drug abuse in order to force them to work longer hours and “dull their shame”. [26] Their handlers often dangle the chance of freedom in front of them, telling them that they can go free once they have paid off their debt or the money it took to buy them. However, the women will never see a cent from their work and will not obtain freedom as they remain trapped in a vicious cycle of abuse.[27]

Concluding Remarks
          “Urgent and immediate action, which will run contrary to the prevailing politics of inter-Korean dialogue, is needed to save the lives of countless female North Korean refugees in China”.[28] China has been complicit when it comes to perpetrating and helping cover up human rights abuses against North Korean escapees within its own borders. It has notably become a hub and a destination country for human trafficking.[29] The usage of human trafficking, predominantly of vulnerable populations such as North Korean women, has been an unethical but easy remedy to the surplus of unmarried men left in the wake of the One-Child policy. China is notably a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 2003 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons put forth by the United Nations. Refusing to implement the non-refoulment principle violates the North Korean escapees’ fundamental human rights, from the right to a fair trial to protection from torture. By denying North Korean escapees the right to asylum and refusing to grant them the status of refugees, the Chinese government is directly responsible for the vulnerability and exploitation of North Korean people, particularly when it comes to women and children in their own country.
          As a signatory of multiple U.N. conventions to protect human rights and as a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council, it is of the utmost importance that China adhere to the bylaws it agreed to as it sets a precedent for other nations. The Chinese government should grant North Korean escapees the right to asylum in China as well as refugee status. Banning the practice of forced repatriation is imperative to implementing the non-refoulement principle.

Sloane Thor is a first-year graduate student in the Masters of Asian Studies Program at the Elliott School of International Affairs. As a recipient of the GWIKS Academy of Korean Studies Fellowship, she is excited to pursue her interest in North Korean human rights and inter-peninsular politics. Sloane Thor graduated cum laude from Wittenberg University with a major in East Asian Studies and minors in Mandarin Chinese language and Literature, Political Science, and International Studies. Her passion for North Korean human rights began after studying abroad in South Korea for a semester at Yonsei University in Seoul. During her time there she took a class on North Korean human rights and the U.N. taught by HRNK CEO Greg Scarlatoiu, which prompted her to write a  thesis style paper on North Korean humanrights for her senior capstone project when she returned  to the United States. She currently speaks,reads, and writes Korean at an intermediate level and has advanced proficiency in Chinese and French. As a second-year intern at HRNK she is excited to pursue the topic of North Koreans in China further along with studying North Korean propaganda. She hopes to bring her language skills into use whether it is through translating or cultural literacy when it comes to resources. 

[1] King, Robert R. “Number of North Korean Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two Decades.” CSIS, January 27, 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades.
[2] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China. Washington, D.C.: U.S. (2009). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf.
[3] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China. Washington, D.C.: U.S. (2009). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf.
[4] “World Report 2020: Rights Trends in North Korea.” Human Rights Watch, January 22, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/north-korea.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Zaugg, Julie. “These North Korean Defectors Were Sold into China as Cybersex Slaves. Then They Escaped.” CNN, June 10, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/09/asia/north-korea-defectors-intl-hnk/index.html.
[7] Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.” Forbes, July 1, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/07/01/trafficking-of-north-korean-women-in-china/?sh=1777b7187af0.
[8] Yoon, Hee-soon. “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.” (2019). Korea Future Initiative. http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[9] Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.”
[10] Lisa Cameron, Dan-dan Zhang, and Xin Meng, “China’s One-Child Policy: Effects on the Sex Ratio and Crime.” Institute for Family Studies, December 19, 2018.
[11] Kathleen Davis, “Brides, Bruises and the Border: The Trafficking of North Korean Women into China.” SAIS Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): 131-141, 133.
[12] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.”
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.”
[15] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.”
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative. http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[21] “Cybersex Trafficking - International Justice Mission.” IJM, September 2016. https://www.ijm.org/sites/default/files/IJM_2016_Casework_FactSheets_CybersexTrafficking.pdf.
[22] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[23] Ji-an, Son Hyeon-yoo & Seo. “Attention for Digital Sex Crimes: A Push for Reform in South Korea.” 한양저널, June 1, 2020. https://www.hanyangian.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=992.
[24] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[25] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[26] Sang-hun, Choe. “After Fleeing North Korea, Women Get Trapped as Cybersex Slaves in China.” The New York Times, September 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/asia/north-korea-cybersex-china.html#:~:text=With%20nowhere%20to%20turn%20for,in%20a%20report%20in%20May.
[27] Zaugg, Julie. “These North Korean Defectors Were Sold into China as Cybersex Slaves. Then They Escaped.” CNN, June 10, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/09/asia/north-korea-defectors-intl-hnk/index.html.
[28] Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf
[29] Micallef, Etienne. “China, EU Work to Combat Human Trafficking.” International Organization for Migration, November 15, 2016. https://www.iom.int/news/china-eu-work-combat-human-trafficking.