By Senghun Woo, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO

Focus on Upper Echelon Changes
According to North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (KWP) opened in Pyongyang on February 19. The congress was convened about five years and one month after the 8th Congress and marks the third party congress held since Kim Jong-un came to power. This year’s congress appears to have focused more on changes within the leadership echelon than on economic development. In his opening speech, Kim Jong-Un stated that when the 8th Congress was convened in 2021, the country faced severe conditions due to “hostile forces, embargoes, and sanctions,” but that the situation has now fundamentally changed.
Kim Jong-un was also reappointed as General Secretary, the highest position in the Workers’ Party. North Korea justified his reappointment by claiming that the country’s war deterrence capability, centered on its nuclear forces, has been dramatically strengthened, suggesting that it will continue to pursue policies aimed at enhancing its nuclear and missile programs.

North Korea External Policy Changes
In his daily dispatch “Fault Lines,” HRNK author and George Mason University professor Dr. George Hutchinson pointed out that Kim closed the party congress with a nuclear expansion pledge, thus institutionalizing hostility toward Seoul while inviting conditional U.S. engagement.
Kim Jong-un stated that North Korea would “firmly maintain the toughest stance as its consistent policy toward the United States.” At the same time, he added that “if the United States respects the current status of our state as enshrined in the Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and withdraws its hostile policy toward North Korea, there is no reason for us not to maintain good relations with the United States.”
This remark is interpreted as signaling a positive stance regarding the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit, which has been raised in connection with U.S. President Donald Trump’s planned visit to China in April. On the other hand, the current “status as enshrined in the Constitution” is that of a nuclear state. In other words, it seems that, while North Korea has expressed openness to “unconditional talks with the United States,” it seems to have a condition of its own: acceptance as a nuclear power state. That, of course, is highly unlikely, as the United States has not abandoned its ultimate strategic goal of North Korea policy, the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID), or the full, final, verifiable denuclearization (FFVD) of North Korea.
With regard to South Korea, Kim Jong-un emphasized the concept of “two hostile states.” Kim Jong-un asserted that North Korea would never engage in dialogue with South Korea, which it regards as a most hostile country, and declared that the North would no longer consider the South as part of the same ethnicity or nation. According to KBS News, Kim also criticized the South Korean government’s conciliatory stance, calling it a “clumsy deception” and a “poorly executed act.” He warned that If South Korea’s actions were to undermine North Korea’s security, the possibility of South Korea’s complete collapse could not be ruled out.
In response, President Lee Jae-myung stated: “The values the South Korean government must pursue are peace and stability, and since hostile sentiments that risk war cannot be eliminated overnight, sustained efforts are necessary. I do not believe that threatening actions toward North Korea have served South Korea’s national interests. We will continue striving for dialogue between the leaders of the two Koreas.”
Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), assessed North Korea’s recent foreign policy stance as signaling an intention to sever inter-Korean relations while seeking to improve ties with the United States. He argued that without easing sanctions on North Korea, the country would be unable to avoid significant economic damage.

Major Personnel Reshuffle
According to KBS News, significant personnel changes were also evident at the 9th KWP Congress. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un, was promoted from deputy department director to director general and was reinstated as an alternate member of the KWP Politburo.
The Presidium of the Political Bureau, which is the party’s highest decision-making body, now includes Kim Jong-un, Pak Tae-song (Premier), Jo Yong-won (Director of the Organization and Guidance Department), Kim Jae-ryong (Director of the Discipline Investigation Department), and Ri Il-hwan (Party Secretary). In contrast, senior figures such as Choe Ryong-hae (Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly), Pak Jong-chon, and Ri Pyong-chol were excluded from the latest appointments, signaling a generational shift within North Korea’s leadership.
Notably, unlike in the past, none of the five members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau come from purely military backgrounds. Cho Han-bum, a KINU senior research fellow, assessed a stronger emphasis on policy execution and further consolidation of Kim Jong-un’s centralized leadership.
Meanwhile, key officials previously responsible for inter-Korean affairs were also ommitted from major appointments. Ri Son-gwon, director of the Party’s 10th Bureau, and Kim Yong-chol, a party advisor, both of whom had been elected to the Central Committee at the 8th Party Congress, were not included in any major positions this time. This omission suggests a significant reduction in the political standing of figures once regarded as specialists in South Korean affairs. In a regular briefing, Yoon Min-ho, spokesperson for South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, noted that the “South Korea line” appears to have been removed from the leadership structure.

Senghun Woo is a research intern at HRNK and a senior at Incheon National University in South Korea, where he is double majoring in International Relations and Logistics. He is currently an exchange student at American University in Washington, DC. After completing his military service in Somalia, he became increasingly interested in North Korean human rights issues. His primary areas of interest include political prison camps and the everyday lives of North Korean people, with a focus on how human rights conditions shape social and political outcomes. At HRNK, he supports the team’s monitoring and compilation of North Korea-related developments, including work on the Daily Press as well as logistical tasks essential to the organization’s social media.
 
Bibliography
Fault Lines Daily Summary – (02/26/2026, George Hutchnson)
ALJAZEERA, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un pledges to lift living standards at rare congress (02/20/2026, AL Jazeera staff)
BBC News Korea, 김정은, 9차 당대회서 만장일치로 총비서 재추대...애시당초 '반대표'는 불가능하다? (02/26/2026, 한상미)
BBC News Korea, 북한 9차 당대회 7일 만에 종료…주목할 점은? (02/26/2026, 구유나)
[한눈에 이슈] 북한 9차 당대회 결론은 ... '통미봉남' 노선 견지? (02/26/2026, KBS)
[현장영상] "북한이 우리를 불신한다고.." 북 언사에 대통령 입 열었다 (02/26/2026, JTBC)

By Senghun Woo, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO

1. Introduction
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a significant escalation in international armed conflict, with enduring implications for global security. As the war has continued, Russia has faced increasing challenges in sustaining its military operations. Against this international backdrop, in June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a surprise visit to North Korea, signaling a rapid deepening of relations between the two countries. On June 19, 2024, North Korea and Russia concluded the Treaty on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which includes a provision committing both parties to provide assistance if either is attacked. While formally framed as a diplomatic and security cooperation agreement, the treaty has been widely interpreted as institutionalizing enhanced military cooperation between the two states.
The course of the war subsequently entered another phase. On August 6, 2024, Ukraine launched a military operation targeting Russia’s Kursk region, initially achieving what was assessed as a degree of operational success. However, the situation changed markedly following reports that North Korean military personnel had joined Russian forces and were deployed in combat operations in the area. The involvement of North Korean troops altered the dynamics of the fighting in Kursk and underscored a significant shift in the conflict, marking the transition of the war from a bilateral armed confrontation to one involving the direct participation of military forces from a third country.
This article focuses on the case of North Korea’s deployment of troops to Ukraine and seeks to examine the human rights conditions of North Korean soldiers arising from this process.

2. Deployment Overview
In October 2024, South Korean intelligence authorities announced that North Korea had deployed approximately four brigades of troops, including special forces units, totaling around 12,000 personnel, to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. According to these authorities, roughly three-quarters of the deployed forces were drawn from the Eleventh Corps, commonly referred to as the “Storm Corps,” while the remaining quarter consisted of personnel from the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Ukrainian intelligence officials further stated that the contingent included approximately 500 officers and three generals based in Pyongyang.
According to media reports, the deployed forces were not sent directly to the front lines following their departure from North Korea. Instead, they were transferred to several military facilities in Russia’s Far East, including Vladivostok, Ussuriysk (Baranovsky), Ulan-Ude (Donguz), Yekaterinoslavsky, Knyazhe-Volkonskoye, and Sergeevka. While stationed at these locations, North Korean troops reportedly underwent approximately six weeks of acclimation training and were issued select modern weapons before being deployed to combat operations in the Kursk region around November 2024.
Subsequently, on February 27, 2025, South Korean intelligence authorities disclosed that North Korea had dispatched an additional contingent of more than 1,000 troops to Russia.
Reports have also indicated that North Korean troops deployed to the battlefield were issued Russian military uniforms and identification documents, effectively concealing their affiliation as members of the Russian armed forces. Although the Russian government initially denied the presence of North Korean troops, on April 26, 2025, Russia officially acknowledged that North Korean forces had participated in operations related to the recapture of the Kursk region.

3. Background
As the war in Ukraine has become increasingly protracted, it has been assessed that Russia has been been facing growing manpower shortages. Roman Botskala, a Ukrainian war correspondent, has noted that Russia sought to address gaps in front-line personnel by utilizing North Korean troops. This assessment suggests that Russia’s reliance on foreign military personnel became more pronounced as the demands of the war intensified.
The Russian government has also partially formalized its position regarding North Korean participation in combat operations. Moscow announced that North Korean troops were deployed in operations to retake the Kursk region and stated that their support contributed to the recapture of the area. This marked a departure from Russia’s earlier blanket denials and represented a limited acknowledgment of the role played by North Korean forces.
North Korea, for its part, is also assessed to have derived substantial benefits from military cooperation with Russia. According to the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, North Korea may have secured economic gains totaling approximately 27 billion U.S. dollars in exchange for providing munitions, troops, and technical support to Russia. Of this amount, an estimated 19.2 billion U.S. dollars reportedly stemmed from the supply of military equipment, while troop deployments are estimated to have generated approximately 280 million U.S. dollars in revenue.
These economic gains may have contributed not only to North Korea’s financial position but also to the political stability of the Kim Jong-un regime. In particular, strengthened relations with Russia appear to have expanded North Korea’s diplomatic space, as evidenced by its participation in China’s Victory Day commemorations and the visible reinforcement of trilateral cooperation among North Korea, Russia, and China. Additionally, a memorial ceremony held in North Korea in August 2025 for soldiers deployed abroad may have been used as a means of reinforcing internal cohesion.
In addition, exposure to modern warfare may have provided North Korea with opportunities to advance its military strategy and develop military technologies. Available assessments indicate that approximately 3,000 North Korean personnel returned to North Korea after deployment, with many of them reportedly reassigned as military instructors responsible for disseminating modern combat tactics, including drone operations and multiple rocket launcher systems, within the North Korean military.

4. The Human Rights Situation of North Korean Soldiers
In November 2024, Ukraine announced via Telegram and other social media platforms that its forces had captured wounded North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region. These cases are widely regarded as direct evidence confirming the deployment of North Korean troops to the war in Ukraine.
Subsequently, the South Korean investigative television program PD Notebook aired in-depth interviews with North Korean prisoners of war, offering a more detailed account of the human rights conditions experienced by North Korean soldiers during their participation in the conflict. According to the broadcast, the captured soldiers are currently held in prisoner-of-war facilities in Ukraine and have reported severe psychological distress stemming from the fact of their capture. Both prisoners stated that they regarded becoming a prisoner of war as a dishonor worse than death and expressed deep anguish over having survived.
One prisoner testified that he was unable to attempt suicide after losing consciousness due to injuries sustained in combat. During the interview, he expressed fear that repatriation to North Korea would result in severe punishment not only for himself but also for his family, and he voiced extreme anxiety over the possibility of being returned. Another prisoner stated that he attempted to commit suicide with a grenade immediately after capture but was prevented when Ukrainian soldiers initially posed as Russian forces. After realizing that they were Ukrainian soldiers, he attempted suicide again but failed. He stated, “A North Korean soldier cannot become a prisoner. Becoming a prisoner itself is a crime,” and expressed resentment over having survived.
In this context, a platoon leader from Ukraine’s 225th Regiment stated in a media interview that North Korean soldiers frequently choose suicide over capture. This behavior is widely understood to be closely linked to ideological indoctrination and military conditioning within North Korean society. According to testimony from North Korean escapees, soldiers are taught that being taken prisoner during wartime constitutes betrayal and are instructed to carry out self-destruction immediately prior to capture.
Another significant human rights issue revealed through prisoner interviews concerns the severe information blackout and complete severance of family contact during the deployment process. Some prisoners stated that they were not informed in advance that they were being sent to an overseas war and were unable to notify their families. One prisoner explained that he only realized he was being sent to Russia after boarding a ship and noticing Russian personnel on board. Another stated that he had not been able to contact his family even once since entering military service.
This severance of family contact appears to have generated widespread anxiety within North Korea. According to Daily NK, following reports of troop deployments, parents with children in the military experienced extreme distress due to uncertainty over whether their children had been deployed. Some parents reportedly attempted to visit their children’s units but were denied access. South Korean intelligence authorities have further assessed that North Korean authorities may have sought to relocate and isolate the families of deployed soldiers as a means of enforcing control and preventing the leakage of information.

5. The Repatriation of North Korean Prisoners of War
It has been reported that the two North Korean prisoners of war currently detained in Ukraine wish to relocate to South Korea. However, the future disposition of these prisoners extends beyond a purely humanitarian matter and is closely intertwined with the complex diplomatic and political dynamics surrounding the war in Ukraine, making resolution difficult. From Ukraine’s perspective, North Korean prisoners of war may be viewed as a potential bargaining instrument in negotiations with Russia.
At the same time, repatriating these prisoners to North Korea or Russia would likely expose them to severe punishment, raising the strong possibility of international humanitarian criticism. As documented in earlier prisoner interviews, North Korean soldiers internalize the fear that being taken prisoner is treated as “treason” or “defection,” potentially subjecting not only themselves but also their families to punishment. Under such circumstances, forced repatriation carries a substantial risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or violations of the right to life.
International humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions, clearly establishes the principle of non-refoulement in relation to the protection of prisoners of war and underscores the need to take individual intent into account. Under the Geneva Conventions, prisoners of war must not be forcibly returned to a country where they face a risk of persecution, and the wishes of the individual concerned should constitute a key consideration in decisions regarding repatriation or resettlement. These principles carry heightened significance in the present context, in which the North Korean prisoners of war have expressed a clear desire to relocate to South Korea.
According to a TV Chosun report published on February 7, 2025, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine reached an agreement through trilateral negotiations to exchange a total of 314 prisoners of war. However, it was confirmed that the two North Korean prisoners held in Ukraine would not be included in the exchange list. This development suggests that the issue of North Korean prisoners of war is being addressed separately from general prisoner exchange negotiations.
Meanwhile, the South Korean government has stated that it would accept all North Korean prisoners of war who formally request to travel to South Korea. Nevertheless, despite this stated principle, the government has thus far been assessed as maintaining a cautious stance with respect to concrete diplomatic and institutional measures. As a result, it remains unclear how the expressed wishes of the North Korean prisoners of war and the protection principles enshrined in international humanitarian law will be implemented in practice.
​
6. Concluding Remarks
This report has examined North Korea’s participation in the war in Ukraine and the human rights issues arising from that involvement, based on limited publicly available information and testimony from North Korean prisoners of war. While verified information remains constrained, prisoner interviews constitute a critical evidentiary basis for analyzing human rights violations associated with the deployment of North Korean troops and therefore carry particular significance.
North Korea’s overseas deployment of military personnel represents more than a case of bilateral military cooperation. Rather, it reflects the extension of the systems of control and repression that the North Korean regime has long maintained domestically into the context of an international armed conflict. Testimony from prisoners of war indicates that North Korean soldiers were mobilized without regard to their personal will and were deprived of meaningful access to information or choice regarding their participation in the war. Ideological training and indoctrination that frame capture as a dishonor worse than death underscore the extent to which North Korean soldiers’ right to life and human dignity have been severely compromised. In this context, North Korean soldiers should be understood not primarily as perpetrators of war, but as victims of systematic, state-imposed human rights violations.
The treatment and disposition of North Korean prisoners of war raise serious human rights responsibilities for the international community. Multiple testimonies and sources indicate that repatriation to North Korea or Russia would expose these individuals to a high risk of severe punishment and inhuman treatment. Under such circumstances, the obligation to protect the life and dignity of prisoners of war becomes especially clear. International humanitarian law and international human rights norms establish that prisoners of war are objects of protection rather than instruments of diplomatic negotiation and emphasize the prohibition against forced return to countries where individuals face a risk of persecution.
Accordingly, Ukraine, South Korea, and the broader international community share responsibility for identifying solutions that prioritize the expressed wishes and safety of North Korean prisoners of war, taking into account the specific human rights risk they face. The issue of North Korean prisoners of war is not merely an ancillary consequence of the conflict, but a test case for the fundamental principles of the international humanitarian law and human rights system, including the protection of human dignity and basic rights even in the context of armed conflict.

Senghun Woo is a research intern at HRNK and a senior at Incheon National University in South Korea, where he is double majoring in International Relations and Logistics. He is currently an exchange student at American University in Washington, DC. After completing his military service in Somalia, he became increasingly interested in North Korean human rights issues. His primary areas of interest include political prison camps and the everyday lives of North Korean people, with a focus on how human rights conditions shape social and political outcomes. At HRNK, he supports the team’s monitoring and compilation of North Korea-related developments, including work on the Daily Press as well as logistical tasks essential to the organization’s social media.

7. Sources
Media Reports
Hubina, Yevheniia. “Ukrainian Intelligence Details Russia’s Use of North Korean Troops in War Against Ukraine.” Ukrainska Pravda, February 4, 2026.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/02/04/8019390/.
Oliynyk, Tetyana. “First North Korean Troops Arrive in Russia’s Kursk Oblast—Ukrainian Intelligence.” Ukrainska Pravda, October 24, 2024.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/10/24/7481239/.
Romanenko, Valentyna. “North Korean Drone Operators Adjust Russian Attacks on Ukrainian Forces from Kursk Oblast—Video.” Ukrainska Pravda, October 16, 2025.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/10/16/8003005/.
Jeong, Cheol-hwan. “North Korean Troops Advance Without Aiding Wounded Comrades: Fighting Style Distinct from Russian Forces.” Chosun Ilbo, January 13, 2025.
https://www.chosun.com/international/international_general/2025/01/12/QLFO6OUMXFAG5MFJESNAVTJZSM/.
Kim, Dong-hyun. “Russia Officially Acknowledges First Deployment of North Korean Troops, Says They Helped Repel Ukraine.” Chosun Ilbo, April 28, 2025.
https://www.chosun.com/international/international_general/2025/04/28/7I3LD4QTOFCJNC4Y3Y43BKUQZY/.
Kim, Myeong-il. “North Korean Residents Shaken by Troop Deployments to Russia: Some Parents Rush to Military Units.” Chosun Ilbo, October 31, 2024.
https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2024/10/31/V6OKVBUMPBBSRMLNGTGNM65T2E/.
TV Chosun. “‘We Want to Go to South Korea’: Two North Korean POWs Excluded from Russia–Ukraine Prisoner Exchange.” February 7, 2026.
https://www.chosun.com/national/national_general/2026/02/06/7S75UOA7YFAMTMVPQNPYQB5H5Y/.
Ryu, Byeong-su. “South Korean Intelligence Says North Korea Has Sent Additional Troops to Russia; Scale Under Review.” TV Chosun, February 27, 2025.
https://news.tvchosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2025/02/27/2025022790091.html.
Kim, Hyeon-cheol. “North Korea Earned 27 billion U.S. Dollars by Supporting Russia’s War in Ukraine.”, April 17, 2025.
http://www.g-enews.com/ko
kr/news/article/news_all/2025041623173148029a1f309431_1/article.html
Research Institutes and Academic Publications
Lee, Chung-gu. The Russia–Ukraine War and the Deployment of North Korean Troops: Psychological Warfare Implications and Measures to Strengthen Mental Combat Power of the South Korean Military. Seoul: Defense Institute for Spiritual Combat Power, 2025.
Lee, Su-won. North Korea’s Perception of and Response to the Russia–Ukraine War. August 2025.
Broadcast Media
MBC. PD Notebook.
Part 1: “The Russia–Ukraine War and North Korean Troops—Part 1: The Shadow Army.”
Part 2: “The Russia–Ukraine War and North Korean Troops—Part 2: Endless War.”

By Samantha Clark, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO

In the heart of Maputo, Mozambique’s capital, a 31-foot bronze statue of President Samora Machel stands watch over Independence Square. The monument, cast and erected by the North Korean state construction firm Mansudae Overseas Projects, is one of Pyongyang’s most visible legacies in southern Africa [International-Relations-2022]. For decades, North Korea’s leaders saw African liberation movements as both ideological allies and potential diplomatic votes in their long rivalry with South Korea. Mozambique, a Cold War battleground turned emerging economy, was one of those targets.

Yet while Pyongyang’s imprint in Maputo is undeniable, its role was primarily cultural and symbolic rather than in heavy infrastructure. The country’s marquee national stadium — the 42,000-seat Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto — was financed by Beijing and constructed by China’s Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group, a prominent example of China’s modern “stadium diplomacy” [news reports on Zimpeto].

Revolutionary solidarity and early ties

Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975 under the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO party. Like other newly liberated African states, it attracted attention from Pyongyang. North Korea’s Africa policy in the 1970s and 80s was ambitious: Kim Il-sung aimed to promote Juche (self-reliance), offer training and weapons to liberation movements, and secure diplomatic recognition over Seoul [International-Relations-2022]. This “Third World solidarity” was also a Cold War tactic — the DPRK hoped to win votes in the Non-Aligned Movement and United Nations General Assembly, where South Korea was competing for legitimacy [International-Relations-2022].

After Mozambique’s independence, Pyongyang positioned itself quickly after independence as a friendly socialist partner. It exported ideology and gifts. Mansudae artists and engineers became cultural ambassadors: in Maputo they built the Samora Machel statue, echoing similar commissions across Africa such as Heroes’ Acre in Namibia and monuments in Zimbabwe [International-Relations-2022]. Against the background of such cultural and ideological exchanges, according to military proliferation expert Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. (Angelo State University), North Korea’s relationship with Mozambique has been centered on sanctions evasion, military exports and aid, and illegal fishing.

Mozambique’s unique political economy

To understand why North Korea’s role remained symbolic rather than structural, it helps to look at Mozambique’s internal development strategy. As Hye-lim Yoo notes, post-independence Mozambique faced extreme regional imbalance. The south, anchored by Maputo and closely tied to South Africa, dominated politics and industry; the mid and north, rich in land and resources, were poorly integrated [Yoo 2015]. When FRELIMO abandoned socialism after a devastating civil war with RENAMO and democratized in 1994, it still chose an urban, manufacturing-centered growth path rather than rural resource extraction [Yoo 2015]. This made the government eager for foreign partners in light manufacturing and prestige projects but less interested in North Korea’s now-limited capital and expertise.

Mozambique also pivoted diplomatically. Despite its Portuguese past, it joined the British Commonwealth in 1995, a remarkable shift showing openness to Western economic advice [Yoo 2015]. Western and Chinese investment soon outpaced Pyongyang’s small offers. North Korea lacked the capacity — or global financial access — to underwrite the kind of mega-projects Mozambique sought.

Stadiums and symbolism

As Mozambique looked for large-scale infrastructure, it turned to Beijing. The Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto — centerpiece of the 2011 All-Africa Games — was a Chinese state gift, worth about US$65 million, financed by China and built by Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group [news sources on Zimpeto]. This fits a pattern of “stadium diplomacy” China has practiced across Africa, using highly visible sports infrastructure as a soft-power tool.

North Korea’s built legacy in Mozambique is primarily the Samora Machel statue and other smaller civic or memorial works, not large stadiums [International-Relations-2022]. The distinction illustrates how, on the cultural exchange and architectural front, Pyongyang’s resources and reach have remained limited compared with China’s.

Adapting under sanctions: doctors and illicit revenue

Though big infrastructure faded, Pyongyang found other ways to keep ties alive and earn currency. One was the exportation of North Korean health workers. As late as the 2010s, Mozambique hosted dozens of DPRK doctors on government-to-government contracts [UN 2020 report cited in International-Relations-2022]. In 2019, six North Korean physicians were arrested in the northern city of Pemba for operating a private clinic with state equipment, illustrating how sanctions-era workers sometimes moved into gray-market activity [International-Relations-2022].

Another small but telling episode occurred in 2015, when Mozambican authorities stopped a North Korean diplomat with roughly $100,000 and 4.5 kilograms of rhino horn in a car tied to the DPRK embassy in Pretoria — a stark example of how Pyongyang’s Africa presence often turns to illicit trade when formal channels dry up [International-Relations-2022].

During the Kim Jong-un era, Mozambique pledged to suspend and terminate North Korean medical contracts to comply with UN Security Council resolutions banning DPRK labor abroad [UN Panel, International-Relations-2022]. Official exchanges dwindled.

Why the relationship still matters

Despite this apparent retreat, Mozambique remains part of the story of North Korea’s Africa strategy. Scholars of DPRK foreign policy note that Africa provided an early proving ground for Juche diplomacy and later a residual set of sympathetic states or quiet economic partners under sanctions [International-Relations-2022]. Mozambique’s “solidarity, cordiality and friendship,” language used in its 2020 UN sanctions report, shows a desire to maintain historic goodwill even as it implements compliance measures [UN report, International-Relations-2022].

For Mozambique, North Korea is a small, once-symbolic partner now overshadowed by China’s scale and Western finance. Yet the DPRK’s art diplomacy still shapes the urban landscape — the Machel statue remains a landmark and a tourist photo stop.

Concluding remarks
​
Mozambique illustrates both the reach and the limits of North Korea’s Africa policy. Pyongyang once courted FRELIMO with ideology and monuments but never commanded the resources to build infrastructure on par with China’s Zimpeto Stadium. As sanctions cut off formal revenue and Mozambique globalized, North Korea’s presence shifted from symbolic solidarity to marginal economic workarounds, such as medical labor and occasional illicit ventures.

Understanding this layered history helps clarify how different external powers have shaped Mozambique — and how Pyongyang’s African ambitions have shrunk from Kim Il-sung’s grand Cold War vision to Kim Jong-un’s sanctions-battered pragmatism.

​Samantha Clark is an undergraduate at William & Mary studying Government and History. Her areas of focus are North Korean relations with Africa and the human rights consequences of authoritarian alliances. Recently, she was a research intern at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).

References 
1) International Relations 2022. An Exploratory Analysis of North Korea’s Relationship with Africa. -STEPHEN McGLINCHEY
2) Hye-Lim Yoo. “Political Dynamics of Mozambican Economic Growth Strategy Without Natural Resources Development and Its Implications on Applying East Asian Developmental State Model to Africa.” Paper presented at Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Sheffield, UK, 2015.
3) UN Security Council. “Report on Implementation of UN Sanctions: Mozambique.” United Nations, 2020.
4) Xinhua News Agency. “China Hands Over Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto to Mozambique.” August 2011.
5) BBC Africa. “China Finances and Builds Mozambique’s New National Stadium.” August 2011.
6) Mansudae Overseas Projects. Company materials and reporting on North Korean monuments abroad.
7) UN Panel of Experts on DPRK. Reports on North Korean overseas labor and sanctions evasion, 2019–2021.

By Mohona Ganguly, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO of HRNK

Part I: Introduction
 
            The DPRK’s nuclear arsenal has long been considered to be not only its most salient means of attack against its rivals, but also a symbol of “national pride.” North Korea’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, regards the nuclear program to be of personal importance to him due to its potential to grant him space and prominence on the international stage and its supposed representation of economic prosperity and national security (Pak 2020, 228). As such, it is of paramount importance to the DPRK government that the nuclear program be properly funded. In order to secure this financial support, North Korea has actively developed and maintained a series of illicit networks to generate hard currency. Some prominent examples of these illicit activities are Cybercrime, with trained hackers and groups associated with the DPRK stealing millions of dollars in cryptocurrency from international agencies and companies  (Patel 2025, Presentation 5, Slide 17), smuggling of drugs and counterfeit luxury goods (Patel 2025, Presentation 11, Slide 7), the government’s active collaboration with international Organized Crime Groups (OCGs), such as the Japanese Yakuza, the Hong Kong-based Triad, the Russian Mafia, and the Irish Republican Army  (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 2), and its sales of arms and missiles (Patel 2025, Presentation 5, Slide 8). However, the DPRK’s illicit activity that has arguably the direst consequences and human toll is its participation in human trafficking. This memo seeks to analyze the active North Korean human trafficking network through a systems-based approach, with special emphasis on its origins and current activities, and to provide a series of recommendations for the United States to actively take measures to prevent these crimes.
 
Part II. Overview of North Korean Human Trafficking
 
            The DPRK exploits its citizens and others abroad through its extensive human trafficking network. The regime engages in vast human trafficking maneuvers within North Korea’s borders, particularly through forcible imprisonment in labor camps, with an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 people being held within these facilities (U.S. State Department 2024). However, the DPRK receives a portion of the hard currency it requires to fund its nuclear program through its human trafficking activities abroad. These illicit networks take two primary forms: sending North Korean citizens overseas to work (U.S. State Department 2024) or actively participating in trafficking rings headed by international OCGs or other entities (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 10).
 
            The DPRK often sends its citizens abroad to work through bilateral arrangements with foreign governments or businesses (U.S. State Department 2024). These North Koreans work in a variety of industries overseas, such as in restaurants, factories, seafood processing plants, apparel, footwear manufacturing, shipbuilding, and textiles (U.S. State Department 2024).
The workers often migrate to countries with diplomatic relationships with North Korea, such as Russia, China, the UAE, and Malaysia (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). This action is directly in violation of the sanctions placed against North Korean labor overseas in 2019, and furthermore, the workers face a hazardous journey to their destination countries, grueling work conditions, and constant surveillance at their workplaces (U.S. State Department 2024). The workers are also forced to give up their passports, effectively trapping them within their destination countries (U.S. State Department 2024).

             The laborers work 12 to 16 hours a day and face the fear of potential retaliation against them and their families back in North Korea should they complain (U.S. State Department 2024).  These factors have led international organizations and experts to characterize this “work expatriation” process as a form of human trafficking, with some even deeming it, “state-sponsored slavery.” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 3). The DPRK uses these workers as a means of procuring hard currency through seizing their wages. Their salaries are often distributed directly into accounts held by the North Korean government, which legitimizes its retention of the wages by claiming that they are, “voluntary contributions,” by the workers to promote the country’s common good (U.S. State Department 2024). Ultimately, the workers receive only a fraction of their salaries, with the DPRK withholding up to 90 percent of their earnings (U.S. State Department 2024). This in turn generates millions of dollars in hard currency for the regime (U.S. State Department 2024). The exact amount of revenue generated through North Korean labor trafficking alone is estimated to be between $200 and $500 million dollars, which could account for a significant portion of the costs needed to maintain the DPRK’s nuclear program, which itself, the South Korean government projects, costs $1 billion dollars (CBS News 2017). Therefore, the DPRK’s labor trafficking does not only exact an immense human cost but also provides a sizable amount of the illicit funding they need to manage their nuclear program.
 
            The DPRK does not restrict its participation in international human trafficking to its citizens, however. Its partnerships with OCGs have also enabled them to participate in criminal activities internationally, including illicit human trafficking operations (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 10). One of the most prominent of these illicit connections is North Korea’s involvement in the Asian casino and gaming sector. The DPRK has strong ties with the 14k Triad, a factionalized organized crime group with illicit networks all throughout Asia (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Some members of the 14k triad have been actively involved in the gaming and casino sector, particularly to gain and eventually launder illicit revenue, and the DPRK is highly suspected to be a part of these schemes as an additional means of sanctions evasion because of their demonstrated close collaborations with the group (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). In 202c it was discovered that Alvin Chau, the CEO of the Macau junket operator Suncity Group, was allegedly closely involved with Broken Tooth, an influential gangster and the leader of the 14k triad faction of Macau (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Chau reportedly has strong ties to oil smuggling operations associated with the DPRK and has received an estimated $15 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank hack (which federal investigators at the time linked in part to North Korean hackers), which was deposited in the Suncity junket account (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8).  Furthermore, Broken Tooth (whose real name is Wan Kuok-Kai), became an investor in Southeast Asian casinos in 2012 (after completing a 14-year prison sentence) and claimed in 2018 that he made hundreds of millions in cryptocurrency through his casino ventures (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 8). These revenues have been attained through online and “above ground” casinos, primarily through illicit means like gambling, cryptocurrency investments, and, most notably, through human trafficking (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). The above ground,  “brick-and-mortar” casinos have long served as hubs for transnational human trafficking, and the 14k triad as an organization have been notable perpetrators of trafficking through these means (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Therefore, North Korea’s intimate involvement with Chau, Broken Tooth, and the 14k triad as a whole, signals that they are involved in human trafficking operations taking place in these casinos as a means to earn hard currency through these transactions to fund their nuclear program.
 
Part III: Case Study 1 - Cambodia and Myanmar Human Trafficking
 
            One of the most prominent instances of human trafficking within a 14k triad casino enterprise with a potential illicit connection to North Korea is the exposure of the extensive trafficking rings operating in “special economic zones” throughout Southeast Asia. These SEZs are industrial parks with relaxed regulations that serve as one-stop tax offices to emulate foreign investment (Kennedy and Southern 2022). However, they also eventually become borderline lawless areas, controlled solely on the whims of private security firms, with the local authorities not having the capacity or the desire to attempt to maintain control over them (Kennedy and Southern 2022). After the Covid-19 pandemic saw a sharp decrease in casino revenue because of travel restrictions halting visits from foreign tourists, those casinos located in SEZs or border towns in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, among other Southeast Asian countries, became a hotbed for online scam proliferation, and with it, human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Many victims, who are mostly young women from Thailand, are lured to these SEZs through online connections promising them decent jobs at the casinos (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Rescuers and survivors of these compounds have described the victims trafficked into these zones as being beaten, starved, deprived of water, electrocuted, and outright sold to other companies if they fail to perform their duties to their customers (Kennedy and Southern 2022).  Enslaved workers are often bought and sold through transactions between companies on a human trafficking Telegram channel known as White Shark (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Videos of workers being handcuffed, tortured, and even tasered in their rooms by their captors are common (Kennedy and Southern 2022). There have also been numerous reported instances of workers having committed suicide due to their treatment (Kennedy and Southern 2022). The local governments have been indifferent to these crimes occurring on their borders and as such have not taken significant action to combat this crisis (Kennedy and Southern 2022). The “slaves-for-scams” crisis has become so dire in Cambodia that the United States made the decision to downgrade the nation to a Tier 3, or the lowest possible level, in its 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Myanmar has also seen a rise in city-like SEZs surrounding Chinese-owned casino enterprises, which were already linked to human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Ekapop Lueangprasert, a local Thai official who has helped to rescue over 140 victims, aided a victim in her escape from a Myaweddy casino by swimming across the Moei River to Thailand, and to safety (Kennedy and Southern 2022).
 
            There are numerous perpetrators involved in these illicit schemes, including Zhao Wei, the Chinese businessman who owns the Kings Roman company, and Huang Mingxuan, a Hong Kong resident (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Zhao has invested over a billion dollars into the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, a self-governed casino and adjacent enclave on the Medong River that has become a hotspot for human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Another very influential figure in the online scam and casino human trafficking ring is Broken Tooth, Wan Kuok-Koi, himself (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Wan has utilized his organization, the World Hongman Association, as a means of investing in these casinos and SEZs, and has framed these ventures as a means of promoting his patriotism, or Chinese national pride (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Wan’s connections with the DPRK and his status as a “founding” figure of these SEZs and human trafficking enterprises calls into question North Korea’s own involvement in these illicit activities. Their longstanding relationship with the 14k triad and their willingness to perform illicit activities and strengthen these networks to fund and bolster their nuclear arsenal increases the likelihood of their involvement in this scheme (Owen and Seshadri, 8). Therefore, specifically targeting human trafficking rings such as these can potentially stall, or halt altogether, any monetary benefits the DPRK may be receiving from these operations.
 
Part IV: Case Study 2 - North Korean Labor in Chinese Seafood Processing Plants
 
            A significant instance of the DPRK trafficking its own citizens abroad for the purpose of working to generate hard currency for their nuclear program is their longstanding partnership with China’s seafood processing industry. Approximately 3,000 North Korean workers were employed at seafood processing plants in the northeastern city of Hunchun in China before the Covid-19 pandemic (Sullivan, Mendoza, and Kim 2021). Working conditions for these laborers are grim, as the North Koreans are subjected to unpaid overtime, routine  health and safety standard violations, and cramped and squalid living quarters (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12).  North Korean workers also face discrimination and isolation from their Chinese counterparts (Scarlatoiu 2023, 5). They are reportedly forced to wear blue headbands to distinguish themselves from the Chinese workers, and are forced to finish their three-year contracts with no sick days or without filing any complaints (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). On the other hand, Chinese workers are granted job protections and are allowed to take time off (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). Furthermore, the North Koreans working in these plants are paid significantly less than their Chinese co-workers, with them receiving approximately $300, while the Chinese workers earned $540 (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). These conditions have led to international human rights organizations, and survivors themselves, characterizing the workers’ conditions in these plants as meeting the necessary criteria for human trafficking, as “they are paid a pittance, constantly surveilled, and are unable to leave” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 8).
 
             The North Korean workers are considered to be more “valuable” in the eyes of their Chinese employers, with Li Shasha, a manager at a Chinese processing plant called Yanbian Shenghai Industry and Trade Co., claiming that North Korean employees are “more stable and unlikely to leave” compared to their Chinese counterparts (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). This reliance on the North Korean workers has led to an increase in demand for them, which in turn has propelled the DPRK to increase the “supply” of workers to China (Scarlatoiu 2023, 7). However, in August of 2023, China repatriated North Korean workers en masse, leading to a stalling in the trafficking of workers (Scarlatoiu 2023, 14). However, there appears to be no plans on either country’s end to permanently halt this arrangement, as the DPRK has indicated that it intends to send entirely new teams to China to replace them (Scarlatoiu 2023, 14).
 
             The DPRK is eager to continue this program by such means because they receive significant revenues from the workers within these processing plants. Of the $300 they earn, the workers only receive $70, as the rest is taken by the North Korean government as a form of, “patriotic contributions” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). Additionally, no wages are handed directly to the employees; rather, they are marked directly in the company’s account books as a payment (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12). The Chinese companies then pay the DPRK authorities directly, in hard Chinese currency (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12). These wage contributions are highly suspected to be appropriated by the government as yet another means of funding their nuclear program. As such, the government is able to benefit from their citizens’ labor, while said workers are forced into squalid working conditions with no means of escape. These decisions also affect supply chains throughout the world, as American chains, restaurants, and grocery stores, such as ALDI, have been found to have been carrying seafood products that were processed by North Korean workers, which leads to even more profits for the DPRK (Scarlatoiu 2023, 7).
 
Part VI - Systems Analysis and DPRK Government Agencies Involved in Human Trafficking
 
            Using the systems model, the DPRK government’s use of human trafficking performs the function of generating funds for the nuclear program, and also moving “goods” (in this case, labor and victims themselves) to achieve this goal. By potentially aiding the 14k triad and other OCGs in their casino human trafficking ventures, they receive some of the revenue gained and are therefore able to bolster their nuclear arsenal. By trafficking their own citizens in the overseas labor market, they create a “supply” for labor and also movement to evade the sanctions. They are also able to generate funds through this labor trafficking, as they appropriate most of their citizens’ wages and also profit off of the overseas trade of the goods North Korean workers produce.
 
            Numerous government agencies are involved in both main aspects of North Korean human trafficking. The most prominent of these agencies is Office 39, which handles most of the financial aspects of North Korea’s illicit networks (Patel 2025, Presentation 4, Slide 13). Some of their activities include managing and facilitating the DPRK’s hard currency earnings, smuggling goods, and counterfeiting (Patel 2025, Presentation 4, Slide 13). As such, Office 39 would be actively involved in any of North Korea’s casino ventures with the Triad and other OCGs. Office 39 also handles a very distinct responsibility in regard to labor trafficking out of North Korea (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 9). Office 39 assigns North Korean workers to industries overseas, with some of their own departments, such as the External Construction General Bureau and the Bong-Hwa General Bureau, assigning each worker to a different industry (in this case, Construction and Logging and Garment work, respectively) (Scarlatoiu et. al  2022, 9).

            Other government agencies are also actively involved in recruiting and screening North Koreans to work abroad. These include, but are not limited to, the Central Party’s Overseas Dispatch Department and the Provincial Party’s 2nd Department (Overseas Dispatch Department) (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). The departments who have the ultimate decision in who goes abroad are officials from the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), particularly those from the Organization and Guidance Department (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). The Ministry of Social Security is additionally responsible for security screenings and clearances (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). For the actual journey, the Foreign Ministry issues passports, while other departments train workers for overseas jobs (such as the Hotel Management Department and the Mansudae Art Studio) (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 22). Overall, numerous government agencies are involved in the process of selecting, assigning, and dispatching workers, and also managing the revenues they generate overseas.

Part VII: Treatment of North Korean Scientists Assigned to the Nuclear Program

            The importance of the nuclear program, and thus the illicit activities that are utilized to finance it, is highlighted by the DPRK’s treatment of the nuclear scientists who spearhead these programs. In North Korea, training of these scientists is considered paramount to the success of not only the program, but the country itself.  For example, recruitment for these positions begins extremely early, with young students being selected based on their aptitude for the sciences starting in elementary school (Collins 2024, 17). These students are engaged in a rigorous training regimen and pursue further education and research opportunities at universities such as the Mathematics Research Institute of the National Academy of Sciences, Kim Il-sung University, KCUT, the University of Science, Kim Hyong-jik University of Education, the Railroad College, and the College of Machinery (Collins 2024, 18). Many of these students are sent abroad to continue their studies, with notable host institutions including the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) in Dubna, near Moscow, and the Harbin Institute of Technology, one of China’s premier engineering schools (Collins 2024, 19). After they finish their studies, the nuclear scientists are assigned to different locations and facilities throughout North Korea, with the vast majority being assigned to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex (Collins 2024, 22)
 
            Under the rule of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, these scientists were forced to live under squalid conditions, being forced to live a life of relative poverty (Collins 2024, 36). According to one source, 80% of these nuclear scientists had to find work outside of their research in order to support their families (Collins 2024, 36). However, under Kim Jong-un, these workers are afforded substantially more respect, and patience in regard to their scientific processes, marked by trial-and-error (Collin 2024, 36). This demonstrates not only the importance of the nuclear program to Kim but also illuminates the stark contrast between the two groups of laborers whose work supports the nuclear program. While the scientists construct and design the nuclear arsenal and are granted respect for their efforts, the workers whose wages provide financial support for the program continue to suffer abuses and be sent abroad, with no acknowledgement.

Part VIII: Recommendations and Overall Strategy
 
            Due to the multifaceted and complex nature of North Korea’s human trafficking operations, I would suggest that the U.S. Government adopt a “two-pronged” approach towards preventing further operations. This plan would involve addressing both main types of human trafficking (the DPRK working with foreign OCGs and participating in labor trafficking of its own citizens) separately. This will allow for each type to be adequately handled, while also helping to stop any further trafficking and also stemming the flow of cash towards North Korea’s nuclear program from these operations.
 
Addressing North Korea’s Operations with OCGs
 
            The U.S. State Department and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN should first take diplomatic action to prevent human trafficking occurring at casinos in SEZs. These agencies should encourage the countries being affected by these operations, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, to end their indifferent posture and take concrete legislative measures to curb these illicit activities, possibly in conjunction with each other should there be any issues with jurisdiction over the SEZs. Some of these measures could include establishing clear standards for payment types and transparency in casinos, requiring additional licensing for accepting cryptocurrency, getting rid of private security companies, vetting employees and guests, and making identification mandatory for checking in. The State Department could emphasize this as a major priority in its diplomatic dealings with the countries involved, and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN could also suggest a Security Council or Arria-Formula meeting to discuss the matter. Further, U.S. and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies could launch formal investigations into cryptocurrency usage at these casinos as well as attempting to track victims of other human trafficking schemes from those casinos which have already been discovered. Other international human trafficking prevention non-profits or NGOs, such as Polaris, may also be involved to help search, identify, and care for victims. By setting these measures in place and also launching these investigations, one can potentially rescue any victims within these casino rings and also prevent North Korea from receiving any cryptocurrency payments for these transactions to fund their nuclear programs.

Addressing Labor Trafficking Outside North Korea
 
            The U.S. State Department and Permanent Mission to the UN should take measures to apply diplomatic pressure on those countries that have aided or facilitated North Korean overseas labor trafficking. Firstly, they should formally request China, Russia, the UAE, and other countries involved in this trafficking to demonstrate that they have taken measures to prevent any further reliance on North Korean labor, and they should also be tasked with proving that they are no longer employing any North Korean workers.
 
            The Food and Drug administration (FDA), U.S. Department Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Department of Commerce should also take steps to determine whether imports have been processed or made with North Korean labor. One way to begin this process would be to identify companies from nations that have used North Korean labor in the past. For example, imports from Chinese companies that have used seafood processed by North Korean workers and which have imported products to the United States before, such as Hunchun Pagoda Industry Co. Ltd. and Yantai Dachen Hunchun Seafood Products (Scarlatoiu 2023, 5) should be thoroughly inspected. If they are determined to have used North Korean labor, they should be denied entry in accordance with the Tariff Act of 1930 (Scarlatoiu 2023, 15).
 
            The United States should also encourage the International Labor Organization (ILO) to conduct an investigation into processing plants and companies that have used North Korean labor. This is because many countries that have been proven to have utilized North Korean labor, such as China and Russia, have ratified several of the ILO’s Core Conventions (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 5). Using North Korean labor has violated numerous of these conventions, such as the Forced Labor Convention of 1930 and the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize Convention of 1948 (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 10). As these workers are surveilled, live in fear for their lives and their families’ safety if they do not comply, and have their passports confiscated, they are subjected to forced labor and have had the right to freely associate stripped from them. As such, these nations have violated the conventions, and the ILO should investigate.
 
            By taking these actions, the United States can prevent any profits from goods made with North Korean forced labor from reaching the DPRK and potentially funding its nuclear program. They can also move towards bringing the labor trafficking out of North Korea to a halt, saving these workers from dire working conditions and further curtailing the DPRK’s cash flow.
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks
 
            Along with its many other extensive illicit networks, North Korea has relied heavily on human trafficking as a means of funding its nuclear arsenal. By actively participating with OCGs in their human trafficking ventures, and encouraging labor trafficking of its own citizens abroad, North Korea has continued to receive the funds they need through the suffering of others. By adopting these measures, we will not only have come closer to achieving our objective of weakening North Korea’s illicit networks and their nuclear program through cutting off their valuable sources of hard currency, but we will have spared victims of their crimes from further pain and humiliation, and there is no price that can equate to that.
 
Mohona Ganguly is a former HRNK Research Intern. She is a graduate of Cornell University, having majored in Industrial and Labor Relations, and received her Master of Public Administration (MPA) from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. She currently serves as Policy Chair for the South Asian Legal Defense Fund. She is driven by her commitment towards advancing human rights and labor justice. Her academic and professional interests focus on labor rights and international law, especially how they interact with issues related to North Korea and Asia as a whole.

References
1) Collins, Robert. “Slaves to the Bomb - The Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists.” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024.
2) “How U.S. Seafood Fans May Help Fund North Korea.” CBS News, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-us-seafood-fans-may-unwittingly-help-fund-north-korea/.
3) Kennedy, Lindsey, and Nathan Paul Southern. “Inside Southeast Asia’s Casino Scam Archipelago.” – The Diplomat, August 2, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/inside-southeast-asias-casino-scam-archipelago/.
4) “North Korean Overseas Workers.” North Korea in the World, June 11, 2021. https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/economic/north-korean-overseas-workers.
5) Owen, Allison, and Chandana Seshadri. “North Korean Activity in the Casino and Gaming Sector.” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, September 2024. https://static.rusi.org/north-korean-activity-in-casino-gaming-industry_0.pdf.
6) Pak, Jung H. Becoming Kim Jong Un: A former CIA officer’s insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Leader. S.l.: Random House, 2020.
7) Patel, Kris, “4. DPRK Govt Basics” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, January 28, 2025)
8) Patel, Kris, “5. Basics of DPRK illicit activities” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, February 3rd , 2025)
9) Patel, Kris, “5.5 Basics of DPRK illicit activities” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, February 4th , 2025)
10) Patel, Kris, “11. Other Illicit Activities - Not Cybercrime” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, March 5th, 2025)
11) Sullivan,Tim, Martha Mendoza, and Hyung-Jin Kim, “NKorean Workers Prep Seafood Going to US Stores, Restaurants,” AP News, August 21, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/sports-middle-east-canada-europe-global-trade- 8b493b7df6e147e98d19f3abb5ca090a.
12) Scarlatoiu, Greg. “How Forced Labor in China Taints America’s Seafood Supply Chain.” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, October 24, 2023. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/evo-subsites/cecc.house.gov/files/documents/Greg%20Scarlatiou%20-%20CECC%20testimony%20-%20revised%20as%20of%2010.26.pdf.
13) Scarlatoiu, Greg, Raymond Ha, and Hyunseung Lee. “North Korean Workers Officially Dispatched to China & Russia.” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2022. https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf.
14)“2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea.” U.S. Department of State, 2024. https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/north-korea/.

By Hannah Whiting, Former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO of HRNK

          What started with the compassionate heart of the King has seen its way through challenge and triumphed once again.[i] The Korean language, in its differing forms and journeys, holds the heart of over eighty million people today.[ii] Language can form a person's identity. The ability to adequately express oneself builds human connection. Kind and true words foster unification. Can a simple understanding of language bridge the gap between two enemy countries? Are the languages of North and South Korea the same or different? How might this affect the future of Korea? The history and evolution of the Korean language lights understanding into the past and breeds questions about the nearing future. 

King Sejong and the compassionate creation of Hangul

          With difficulty communicating, the common Korean lived their life as they watched only the elite communicate with the written word of the Hanja script. Hanja Chinese characters could not accurately depict the full sounds of the spoken Korean.[iii] Many of the Koreans did not endeavor to learn it which created a divide.  

         Much to the benefit of the country, King Sejong portrayed understanding to the fact that the Classical Chinese characters felt hard to learn by the common person (which made up most of the population). Through scientific understanding and compassion, King Sejong and a group of scholars endeavored to create Hangul. This 28-letter language blessed the Korean people with the option to more easily learn to read, write, and accomplish King Sejong’s desire for greater ability to express their feelings (Milwaukee Independent, 2025).

Hangul banned and revived again

           In the Joseon Dynasty, fear took over. They did not approve or like the fact that all the commoners knew Hangul. They also felt that Hanja took more of a respectable stance in terms of language and writing. As a result, in 1504 they banned Hangul. It stayed banned for many years after.

          In the 16th and 17th centuries Hangul began to creep back in. Finally, in 1849, King GoJong requested it back for the writing of important documents. Such occurrences brought back the use of Hangul. Finally, in 1894 teachers began to teach it in schools (The Korea Herald, 2025).

The Japanese rule and banning of the language

          Just under twenty years later in 1910, the Japanese took over and declared Japanese as the official language. They did not, however, eliminate Hangul ... yet. During this time, Ju Si Gyeong helped to name and partially standardize some of the Korean language. In 1938, however, the Japanese removed all the Korean education in schools. They strove to eliminate the entire Korean culture.

          While it continued to stay in use, the language did not officially come back for almost ten whole years.[iv] When the United States finally defeated the Empire of Japan, at the end of World War II,[v] the Koreans renewed their pride in the language and Hangul received full standardization. The Koreans’ preservation, memory, and protection of the language and alphabet carried through. Their endurance paid off as they retrieved their beautiful culture again (Linguatute, 2025).

North and South Korea split, affecting the language

          Despite the joyful liberation from colonial rule, Koreans experienced conflict within their own country. Toward the end of World War II in the Pacific, the Soviet Union occupied much of the north side of Korea and the United States assumed control of the south. They helped to create the line between North and South Korea as they both supported different governments. The Soviet Union left the North overwhelmed by communism and the United States instituted in the South an incipient democratic government.[vi]

          This resulted in the infamous official split of North and South Korea in 1948.[vii] That next year, North Korea created Chosŏn’gŭl (조선글). This language took out Hanja and kept the Hangul (Linguatute, 2025). The South Koreans, on the other hand, kept both. Korean dictionaries use Hanja to explain words.[viii]

North and South Korean language in the modern day

          In the modern day, South Korea has continued to experience language influence from the outside world. When asking a North Korean escapee what she found most distinct about the current South Korean language she responded “loanwords.” Due to history, 60% of the language consists of Sino-Korean.[ix] Many wonder why we use two different number systems in Korea. Sino-Korean owns one number system. There are two because China influenced Korea many years back. This evolved into Sino-Korean.[x] Currently there are many loanwords that come from the United States.[xi] Completing a quick search will provide English-Korean words such as “pizza, computer, television, ice-cream, shopping, jogging” and more.

          North Koreans are known to use some Russian and Chinese loanwords.[xii] North Korea has also striven to eliminate language from South Korea. In 2023 the Pyongyang Cultural Language Act stated that they will put someone for at least ten years in a labor camp if they spread the “puppet language,” a term North Korean propaganda uses to describe the South Korean dialect.[xiii] This type of desire for negative talk about the South dates to the end of World War 2.[xiv] 

A present and potential future, marked but not defined by differences

          If the North and South came back together, they would need to consider and agree upon how to use the language. Would they choose to take Hanja out altogether throughout the whole country? Who would decide this? The current app “Univoca” helps to bridge the gap between North and South Korean words by providing continually evolving translation.[xv] North Koreans have found it useful. South Korean teachers hope it will help the escapees to integrate well.[xvi]

Concluding remarks

          In conclusion, the Korean language and Korean writing have evolved overtime. From Hanja to Hangul creation, to elimination, to the rise again, to the Japanese rule, and to the revival of Hangul. Hangul survived despite the leadership that desired its extinction. Currently North and South Korea benefit from the uses of its creation.

          With knowledge of South Korea accepting more new words, one may conclude that in the future the dialects of the North and the South will differ even more. To what degree might this produce problems? If the language difference continues to increase and the North and South reunite, the country may need more translators. The younger generation of Koreans may need to look to their older generations who better remember the traditional language. Expressions of patience and humility may need to take place as the people regain their understandings and form the future official Korean language.

Hannah Whiting is a former HRNK intern and an aspiring marriage and family therapist with a Bachelor's degree in Marriage and Family Studies and a certificate in Child and Family Advocacy. Her love for the people of Korea developed while living as a missionary for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Seoul, South Korea. While there, the Korean people and experience won her heart and changed her life forever. 

Endnotes
[i]. Milwaukee Independent, “The Creation of Hangul: A Linguistic Masterpiece Designed by King Sejong to Increase Korean Literacy,” Milwaukee Independent, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/articles/creation-hangul-linguistic-masterpiece-designed-king-sejong-increase-korean-literacy/.

[ii]. The Korea Herald, “Korean Has 81.7 Million Speakers, Driven by Global Pop Culture Superpower from Asia,” Korea Herald, accessed August 30, 2025, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3032661#:~:text=Korean%20has%2081.7%20million%20speakers,pop%20culture%20superpower%20from%20Asia.

[iii]. The Anthrotorian, “The Hangul Revolution: How the Creation of a New Written Language Changed South Korea Forever,” The Anthrotorian, accessed August 30, 2025, https://theanthrotorian.com/culture/the-hangul-revolution-how-the-creation-of-a-new-written-language-changed-south-korea-forever.
 
[iv]. Linguatute, “Symbols of Identity: The Role of the Hangul Writing System in Korean History,” Linguatute, accessed August 30, 2025, https://linguatute.com/symbols-of-identity-the-role-of-the-hangul-writing-system-in-korean-history/.

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